1572:, the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism (predeterminism, theological determinism, etc.) As such, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism (or "Hard Theological Determinism" above) might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism (if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe), or even compatibilism (if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will), if not hard determinism itself. By the same principle, metaphysical libertarianism (a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism) might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism (if it was assumed such free will events were pre-ordained and therefore were destined to occur, but of which whose outcomes were not "predestined" or determined by God). If hard theological determinism is accepted (if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by God), then metaphysical libertarianism is not, however, possible, and would require reclassification (as hard incompatibilism for example, given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic – although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also).
842:
volition – a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm). Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom – intentional actions are rather self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control", rather they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person". Another question raised by such non-causal theory, is how an agent acts upon reason, if the said intentional actions are spontaneous.
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lobe and progressing to the primary motor cortex and then to parietal cortex has been observed. The sense of agency thus appears to normally emerge in conjunction with this orderly sequential network activation incorporating premotor association cortices together with primary motor cortex. In particular, the supplementary motor complex on the medial surface of the frontal lobe appears to activate prior to primary motor cortex presumably in associated with a preparatory pre-movement process. In a recent study using functional magnetic resonance imaging, alien movements were characterized by a relatively isolated activation of the primary motor cortex contralateral to the alien hand, while voluntary movements of the same body part included the natural activation of motor association cortex associated with the premotor process. The clinical definition requires "feeling that one limb is foreign or has a
1907:, have no second-order desire not to take the drug. The second group, "unwilling addicts", have a second-order desire not to take the drug, while the third group, "willing addicts", have a second-order desire to take it. According to Frankfurt, the members of the first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons. The members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug, but their will is overcome by the addiction. Finally, the members of the third group willingly take the drug they are addicted to. Frankfurt's theory can ramify to any number of levels. Critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher-order levels of desire and preference. Others argue that Frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together.
3226:"Do not say: "It was God's doing that I fell away," for what he hates he does not do. Do not say: "He himself has led me astray," for he has no need of the wicked. Abominable wickedness the Lord hates and he does not let it happen to those who fear him. God in the beginning created human beings and made them subject to their own free choice. If you choose, you can keep the commandments; loyalty is doing the will of God. Set before you are fire and water; to whatever you choose, stretch out your hand. Before everyone are life and death, whichever they choose will be given them. Immense is the wisdom of the Lord; mighty in power, he sees all things. The eyes of God behold his works, and he understands every human deed. He never commands anyone to sin, nor shows leniency toward deceivers." - Ben Sira 15:11-20 NABRE
2958:. This is the tendency for people to trust the reliability of their own introspections while distrusting the introspections of other people. The theory implies that people will more readily attribute free will to themselves rather than others. This prediction has been confirmed by three of Pronin and Kugler's experiments. When college students were asked about personal decisions in their own and their roommate's lives, they regarded their own choices as less predictable. Staff at a restaurant described their co-workers' lives as more determined (having fewer future possibilities) than their own lives. When weighing up the influence of different factors on behavior, students gave desires and intentions the strongest weight for their own behavior, but rated personality traits as most predictive of other people.
2412:. The will is "the primary mover of all the powers of the soul... and it is also the efficient cause of motion in the body." Choice falls into five stages: (i) intellectual consideration of whether an objective is desirable, (ii) intellectual consideration of means of attaining the objective, (iii) will arrives at an intent to pursue the objective, (iv) will and intellect jointly decide upon choice of means (v) will elects execution. Free will enters as follows: Free will is an "appetitive power", that is, not a cognitive power of intellect (the term "appetite" from Aquinas's definition "includes all forms of internal inclination"). He states that judgment "concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite ."
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people's responses to moral dilemmas under a deterministic model of reality). Edward Cokely has found that incompatibilism is intuitive – it was naturally adhered to, in that determinism does indeed negate belief in moral responsibility in general. Joshua Knobe and Shaun
Nichols have proposed that incompatibilism may or may not be intuitive, and that it is dependent to some large degree upon the circumstances; whether or not the crime incites an emotional response – for example if it involves harming another human being. They found that belief in free will is a cultural universal, and that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.
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796:
415:, in the traditional phrase. Being responsible for one's choices is the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if a person has free will, then they are the ultimate cause of their actions. If determinism is true, then all of a person's choices are caused by events and facts outside their control. So, if everything someone does is caused by events and facts outside their control, then they cannot be the ultimate cause of their actions. Therefore, they cannot have free will. This argument has also been challenged by various compatibilist philosophers.
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will due to its indeterminacy. This misconception applies both when considering oneself and others. Another contribution is choice. It has been demonstrated that people's belief in free will increases if presented with a simple level of choice. The specificity of the amount of choice is important, as too little or too great a degree of choice may negatively influence belief. It is also likely that the associative relationship between level of choice and perception of free will is influentially bidirectional. It is also possible that one's desire for control, or other basic motivational patterns, act as a third variable.
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874:. The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world.
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915:, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see
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the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
4158:...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.
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desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is identified with their effective first-order desire, that is, the one they act on, and this will is free if it was the desire the person wanted to act upon, that is, the person's second-order desire was effective. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts". All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it.
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test where they would be rewarded with cash. Provoking a rejection of free will has also been associated with increased aggression and less helpful behaviour. However, although these initial studies suggested that believing in free will is associated with more morally praiseworthy behavior, more recent studies (including direct, multi-site replications) with substantially larger sample sizes have reported contradictory findings (typically, no association between belief in free will and moral behavior), casting doubt over the original findings.
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of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.
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1785:
2280:' views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds", he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it. Ultimately he believed that the problem of free will was a metaphysical issue and, therefore, could not be settled by science. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work
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there can be physical restrictions to the body, psychological restrictions to the decision, and rational restrictions to the formation of reasons (desires plus beliefs) that should lead to what we would call a reasonable action. The last two are usually called "restrictions of free will". The restriction at the level of reasons is particularly important since it can be motivated by external reasons that are insufficiently conscious to the agent. One example was the collective suicide led by
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ways, all of them involve aspects of the way people make decisions and initiate actions, which have been studied extensively by neuroscientists. Some of the experimental observations are widely viewed as implying that free will does not exist or is an illusion (but many philosophers see this as a misunderstanding). Third, psychologists have studied the beliefs that the majority of ordinary people hold about free will and its role in assigning moral responsibility.
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observed behavior. However, Wegner has been able to manipulate people's thoughts and behaviors so as to conform to or violate the two requirements for causal inference. Through such work, Wegner has been able to show that people often experience conscious will over behaviors that they have not, in fact, caused – and conversely, that people can be led to experience a lack of will over behaviors they did cause. For instance,
2286:, he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories. He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief" – it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines
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natural occurrences of deterministic deliberation in the brain in terms of the first person perspective of the conscious agent performing the deliberation. Such an approach has been considered a form of identity dualism. A description of "how conscious experience might affect brains" has been provided in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing."
10153:...it is important to be clear about exactly what experience one wants one's subjects to introspect. Of course, explaining to subjects exactly what the experimenter wants them to experience can bring its own problems–...instructions to attend to a particular internally generated experience can easily alter both the timing and the content of that experience and even whether or not it is consciously experienced at all.
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1440:, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God. With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.
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2484:, the belief that all happiness and suffering arise from previous actions, is considered a wrong view according to Buddhist doctrines. Because Buddhists also reject agenthood, the traditional compatibilist strategies are closed to them as well. Instead, the Buddhist philosophical strategy is to examine the metaphysics of causality. Ancient India had many heated arguments about the nature of causality with
952:) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the
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of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature."
3622:...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
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977:. It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. Firstly, it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by
2662:", concerning the relative importance of genetics and biology as compared to culture and environment in human behavior. The view of many researchers is that many human behaviors can be explained in terms of humans' brains, genes, and evolutionary histories. This point of view raises the fear that such attribution makes it impossible to hold others responsible for their actions.
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2141:
2269:"Moral" in this case refers to action that is willed, while "imagination" refers to the mental capacity to envision conditions that do not already hold. Both of these functions are necessarily conditions for freedom. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united.
3191:(the belief that God and man cooperate in salvation), Methodism teaches that "Our Lord Jesus Christ did so die for all men as to make salvation attainable by every man that cometh into the world. If men are not saved that fault is entirely their own, lying solely in their own unwillingness to obtain the salvation offered to them. (John 1:9; I Thess. 5:9; Titus 2:11-12)."
1332:, or some other force), including human actions. Predeterminism is frequently taken to mean that human actions cannot interfere with (or have no bearing on) the outcomes of a pre-determined course of events, and that one's destiny was established externally (for example, exclusively by a creator deity). The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking
1345:. It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism – in the context of its capacity to determine future events. Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism. The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of
3074:. This is worrying because counterfactual thinking ("If I had done something different...") is an important part of learning from one's choices, including those that harmed others. Again, this cannot be taken to mean that belief in determinism is to blame; these are the results we would expect from increasing people's belief in fatalism.
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responsible for bodily action, although unconscious brain activity is often caused by external events (for example, the instantaneous reaction to being burned). Cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic – and in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of
6783:"Determinism" is, in essence, the position holding that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position holding that all behavior is caused by conditions predating behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such).
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not a proof of the non-existence of free will, as also unconscious agendas may be free and non-deterministic. According to their suggestion, man has relative freedom, i.e. freedom in degrees, that can be increased or decreased through deliberate choices that involve both conscious and unconscious (panencephalic) processes.
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randomness, mental processes as experienced have no influence on the probabilistic outcomes (such as volition). According to many interpretations, indeterminism enables free will to exist, while others assert the opposite (because the action was not controllable by the physical being who claims to possess the free will).
1875:, claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs."
1277: – that they have independently fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance. In such a case, even if an individual could have influence over their lower level physical system, their choices in regard to this cannot be their own, as is the case with libertarian free will. Omniscience features as an
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3063:. Having participants read articles that simply "disprove free will" is unlikely to increase their understanding of determinism, or the compatibilistic free will that it still permits. In other words, experimental manipulations purporting to "provoke disbelief in free will" may instead cause a belief in
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Circular causality departs so strongly from the classical tenets of necessity, invariance, and precise temporal order that the only reason to call it that is to satisfy the human habitual need for causes.... The very strong appeal of agency to explain events may come from the subjective experience of
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For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of
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claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness. As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one
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declared that "the free will of man, moved and excited by God, can by its consent co-operate with God, Who excites and invites its action; and that it can thereby dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification. The will can resist grace if it chooses. It is not like a lifeless thing,
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Regardless of the validity of belief in free will, it may be beneficial to understand where the idea comes from. One contribution is randomness. While it is established that randomness is not the only factor in the perception of the free will, it has been shown that randomness can be mistaken as free
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does not emerge in conjunction with the overt appearance of the purposeful act even though the sense of ownership in relationship to the body part is maintained. This phenomenon corresponds with an impairment in the premotor mechanism manifested temporally by the appearance of the readiness potential
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It has been shown that in several brain-related conditions, individuals cannot entirely control their own actions, though the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will. Neuroscientific studies are valuable tools in developing models of how humans experience free
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From an anthropological perspective, free will can be regarded as an explanation for human behavior that justifies a socially sanctioned system of rewards and punishments. Under this definition, free will may be described as a political ideology. In a society where people are taught to believe that
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A compatibilist interpretation of
Aquinas's view is defended thus: "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause
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Compatibilist models adhere to models of mind in which mental activity (such as deliberation) can be reduced to physical activity without any change in physical outcome. Although compatibilism is generally aligned to (or is at least compatible with) physicalism, some compatibilist models describe the
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The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by a conscious being). While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by
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stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it
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or determinateness is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. This creates a unique problem for free will given that propositions about the future already have a truth value in the present (that is it is already determined as either true
649:
makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by the behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where; "If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then
3067:, which may provide an alternative explanation for previous experimental findings. To test the effects of belief in determinism, it has been argued that future studies would need to provide articles that do not simply "attack free will", but instead focus on explaining determinism and compatibilism.
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subjects with information about an effect increases the probability that a person falsely believes is the cause. The implication for such work is that the perception of conscious will (which he says might be more accurately labelled as 'the emotion of authorship') is not tethered to the execution of
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is the patient's delusion of being controlled by an external force. People with schizophrenia will sometimes report that, although they are acting in the world, they do not recall initiating the particular actions they performed. This is sometimes likened to being a robot controlled by someone else.
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with specialized multivariate analyses to study the temporal dimension in the activation of the cortical network associated with voluntary movement in human subjects, an anterior-to-posterior sequential activation process beginning in the supplementary motor area on the medial surface of the frontal
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argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results. Kornhuber and Deecke underlined that absence of conscious will during the early
Bereitschaftspotential (termed BP1) is
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Science has contributed to the free will problem in at least three ways. First, physics has addressed the question of whether nature is deterministic, which is viewed as crucial by incompatibilists (compatibilists, however, view it as irrelevant). Second, although free will can be defined in various
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However, the preceding quote has often been misinterpreted as
Vivekananda implying that everything is predetermined. What Vivekananda actually meant by lack of free will was that the will was not "free" because it was heavily influenced by the law of cause and effect – "The will is not free, it
2479:
In
Buddhism it is taught that the idea of absolute freedom of choice (that is that any human being could be completely free to make any choice) is unwise, because it denies the reality of one's physical needs and circumstances. Equally incorrect is the idea that humans have no choice in life or that
2372:
Freeman introduces what he calls "circular causality" to "allow for the contribution of self-organizing dynamics", the "formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the patterns of activity of the contributing individuals", applicable to "interactions between neurons and neural masses...
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through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but liable to necessity; that notwithstanding all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning to the end of his life he must bear the same character that he himself condemns, and, as
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entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if indeterminism is true, incompatibilists have not provided, and cannot provide, an adequate account
1939:
According to
Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist. Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions
1883:
Compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason. Some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher-order brain processing – the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity. Likewise, some modern compatibilists
1529:
This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of
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is the capacity to know everything that there is to know (included in which are all future events), and is a property often attributed to a creator deity. Omniscience implies the existence of destiny. Some authors have claimed that free will cannot coexist with omniscience. One argument asserts that
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Various definitions of free will that have been proposed for
Metaphysical Libertarianism (agent/substance causal, centered accounts, and efforts of will theory), along with examples of other common free will positions (Compatibilism, Hard Determinism, and Hard Incompatibilism). Red circles represent
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that causes those negative effects. Kathleen Vohs has found that those whose belief in free will had been eroded were more likely to cheat. In a study conducted by Roy
Baumeister, after participants read an article arguing against free will, they were more likely to lie about their performance on a
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Whether people naturally adhere to an incompatibilist model of free will has been questioned in the research. Eddy
Nahmias has found that incompatibilism is not intuitive – it was not adhered to, in that determinism does not negate belief in moral responsibility (based on an empirical study of
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For example, if a person hears an explosion and sees a tree fall down that person is likely to infer that the explosion caused the tree to fall over. However, if the explosion occurs after the tree falls down (that is, the first requirement is not met), or rather than an explosion, the person hears
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supporting the view that human perception of conscious control is an illusion. Wegner summarizes some empirical evidence that may suggest that the perception of conscious control is open to modification (or even manipulation). Wegner observes that one event is inferred to have caused a second event
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Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will
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do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually)
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An alternative explanation builds on the idea that subjects tend to confuse determinism with fatalism... What happens then when agents' self-efficacy is undermined? It is not that their basic desires and drives are defeated. It is rather, I suggest, that they become skeptical that they can control
2800:
A study by Aaron
Schurger and colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), casting doubt on conclusions drawn from studies
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the conscious mental act to do so. Some believe the implication is that free will was not involved in the decision and is an illusion. The first of these experiments reported the brain registered activity related to the move about 0.2 s before movement onset. However, these authors also found that
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in 1965.). Although it was well known that the readiness potential reliably preceded the physical action, Libet asked whether it could be recorded before the conscious intention to move. To determine when subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second hand of a clock. After
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predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all, although evolution of the universal state vector is completely deterministic. Current physical theories cannot resolve the question of whether determinism is true of the world, being very
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in other things (things that cause or necessitate other things). According to Hume, 'causation' is on weak grounds: "Once we realise that 'A must bring about B' is tantamount merely to 'Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A,' then we are left with a
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developed a neocompatibilist theory based on the causal theory of action that is complementary to classical compatibilism. According to him, physical, psychological and rational restrictions can interfere at different levels of the causal chain that would naturally lead to action. Correspondingly,
1935:
and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown
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free will must assert influence on physical reality, and where mind is responsible for such influence (as opposed to ordinary system randomness), it must be distinct from body to accomplish this. Both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction, and those particular models thereof that
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of all events and outcomes by the divinity (that is, they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all. Theological determinism
1093:
agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem. He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible
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propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen. An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or
841:
Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or
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Buttrick, Nicholas R.; Aczel, Balazs; Aeschbach, Lena F.; Bakos, Bence E.; Brühlmann, Florian; Claypool, Heather M.; Hüffmeier, Joachim; Kovacs, Marton; Schuepfer, Kurt; Szecsi, Peter; Szuts, Attila; Szöke, Orsolya; Thomae, Manuela; Torka, Ann-Kathrin; Walker, Ryan J.; Wood, Michael J. (September
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in holding that necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary from the perspective of an omniscient. Some philosophers follow
2973:
Since at least 1959, free will belief in individuals has been analysed with respect to traits in social behaviour. In general, the concept of free will researched to date in this context has been that of the incompatibilist, or more specifically, the libertarian, that is freedom from determinism.
2793:
Others have argued that data such as the Bereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That
2754:
Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that
2577:
Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as free-will; the very words are a contradiction, because will is what we know, and everything that we know is within our universe, and everything within our universe is moulded by conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire
2424:
Historically, most of the philosophical effort invested in resolving the dilemma has taken the form of close examination of definitions and ambiguities in the concepts designated by "free", "freedom", "will", "choice" and so forth. Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases
1899:
The notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by Frankfurt. Frankfurt argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order
832:
require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and
422:
in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control
2645:
work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals. A more significant question is whether the indeterminism of quantum mechanics allows for the traditional idea of free will (based on a perception of free will). If a person's action is, however, only a result of complete quantum
2459:, often translated as "dependent origination", "dependent arising" or "conditioned genesis". It teaches that every volition is a conditioned action as a result of ignorance. In part, it states that free will is inherently conditioned and not "free" to begin with. It is also part of the theory of
2264:
Steiner then argues that inner freedom is achieved when we integrate our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, with our thoughts, which lend coherence to these impressions and thereby disclose to us an understandable world. Acknowledging the many influences on our
444:
the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this
439:
The difficulty of this argument for some compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained
408:
Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain". Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that someone must be the
8165:
Kant argued that, in order that human life is not just a "dream" (a random or projected by subjects juxtaposition of moments), the temporality of event A as before or after B must submit to a rule. An established order then implies the existence of some necessary conditions and causes, that is:
2938:
Wegner has applied this principle to the inferences people make about their own conscious will. People typically experience a thought that is consistent with a behavior, and then they observe themselves performing this behavior. As a result, people infer that their thoughts must have caused the
2640:
Assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, one may still object that such indeterminism is for all practical purposes confined to microscopic phenomena. This is not always the case: many macroscopic phenomena are based on quantum effects. For instance, some
2175:
underlying the phenomenal world, is in itself groundless: that is, not subject to time, space, and causality (the forms that governs the world of appearance). Thus, the will, in itself and outside of appearance, is free. Schopenhauer discussed the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in
153:
have done otherwise without physical impediment. Many contemporary compatibilists instead identify free will as a psychological capacity, such as to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason, and there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns,
2835:
response to an unwanted, premonitory urge. Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed. People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics for limited periods, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward. The control exerted (from
811:
Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under
1648:
holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance, the seat of consciousness and intelligence, and is not identical with physical states of the brain or body. It is suggested that although the two worlds do interact, each retains some measure of autonomy. Under cartesian dualism external mind is
11122:
Some studies have been conducted indicating that people react strongly to the way in which mental determinism is described, when reconciling it with moral responsibility. Eddy Nahmias has noted that when people's actions are framed with respect to their beliefs and desires (rather than their
2999:
The researchers also found that people consider acts more "free" when they involve a person opposing external forces, planning, or making random actions. Notably, the last behaviour, "random" actions, may not be possible; when participants attempt to perform tasks in a random manner (such as
2425:
like "ability to do otherwise" or "alternative possibilities". This emphasis upon words has led some philosophers to claim the problem is merely verbal and thus a pseudo-problem. In response, others point out the complexity of decision making and the importance of nuances in the terminology.
145:. Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" means and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatibilists considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if,
2989:
Studies also reveal a correlation between the likelihood of accepting a deterministic model of mind and personality type. For example, Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely found that people of an extrovert personality type are more likely to dissociate belief in determinism from belief in moral
88:
are seen as deserving credit or blame. Whether free will exists, what it is and the implications of whether it exists or not constitute some of the longest running debates of philosophy. Some conceive of free will as the ability to act beyond the limits of external influences or wishes.
1146:
in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing uncaused or
1560:: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely." For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events.
2075:
positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts. Also consistent with both autonomy and
906:
is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of
2794:
ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power... as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".
2364:
suggested at a minimum our decision processes with moral implications lie outside the reach of everyday causality, and lie outside the rules governing material objects. "There is a sharp difference between moral judgments and judgments of fact... Moral judgments... must be
729:. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.
2092:
holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are
1714:) are not ontologically reducible to physical states. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states. In one such construction,
2449:, "There is free action, there is retribution, but I see no agent that passes out from one set of momentary elements into another one, except the of those elements." Buddhists believe in neither absolute free will, nor determinism. It preaches a middle doctrine, named
3202:
For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren; and whom He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also
1151:. The most common form of causal determinism is nomological determinism (or scientific determinism), the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.
2869:. The standard neurological explanation is that the felt will reported by the speaking left hemisphere does not correspond with the actions performed by the non-speaking right hemisphere, thus suggesting that the two hemispheres may have independent senses of will.
2467:
in Hinduism. In Buddhism, the idea of karma is much less deterministic. The Buddhist notion of karma is primarily focused on the cause and effect of moral actions in this life, while in Hinduism the concept of karma is more often connected with determining one's
8182:
Schopenhauer, who by the way continued and simplified Kant's system, argued (among others basing on optical illusions and the "initial processing") that it is the intellect or even the brain what generates the image of the world out of something else, by
6671:
Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at
741:, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.
365:
Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are logically incompatible, and that the major question regarding whether or not people have free will is thus whether or not their actions are determined. "Hard determinists", such as
2759:; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation..." The bearing of timing experiments upon free will is still under discussion.
7185:
The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World
6724:
Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in
968:
Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world. Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both
1855:, asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [
1814:
positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; though they disagree among themselves about what, in turn,
401:": if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot, then people must not have free will. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as
10166:
2674:". Responsibility does not require that behavior be uncaused, as long as behavior responds to praise and blame. Moreover, it is not certain that environmental determination is any less threatening to free will than genetic determination.
781:, is perhaps more relevant. Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false – yet the intention of their position is sustained by hard incompatibilism.
828:. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with
3042:
those desires; and in the face of that skepticism, they fail to apply the effort that is needed even to try. If they were tempted to behave badly, then coming to believe in fatalism makes them less likely to resist that temptation.
11217:
Stillman, Tyler F.; Roy F. Baumeister; Kathleen D. Vohs; Nathaniel M. Lambert; Frank D. Fincham; Lauren E. Brewer (2010-01-01). "Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance".
3833:
Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been
386:, are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true. Another view is that of hard incompatibilists, which state that free will is incompatible with both
8504:
necessity from God strictly with regard to a concrete ("contingent") act. A typical choice was not separately ordained to be so-and-so by God; St. Thomas says the choice is not necessary, but in fact that apparently means it was
3896:
One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free
2620: – and some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient information would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy. Modern science, on the other hand, is a mixture of deterministic and
2583:
is a phenomenon bound by cause and effect, but there is something behind the will which is free." Vivekananda never said things were absolutely determined and placed emphasis on the power of conscious choice to alter one's past
2314:
approached free will via the notion of causality. It was his position that causality was a mental construct used to explain the repeated association of events, and that one must examine more closely the relation between things
1196:
Destiny or fate is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos.
193:
proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will, so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is". This requirement was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists.
1826:
that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction. Nonetheless, some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments. Some "modern compatibilists", such as
2373:
and between the behaving animal and its environment". In this view, mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example,
2080:, they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics. While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions.
1498:, does not affect the outcome. God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right). A rejection of theological determinism (or
622:
itself may occupy any of the nine positions, that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. However, the most common meaning attached to
8489:, Book III about Providence, c. 88–91 (260–267), where it is postulated that everything has its cause and it is again and again in detail referred also to all individual choices of man etc., even refuting opposite views.
3008:
A recent 2020 survey has shown that compatibilism is quite a popular stance among those who specialize in philosophy (59.2%). Belief in libertarianism amounted to 18.8%, while a lack of belief in free will equaled 11.2%.
1835:, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.
445:
argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider".
273:
from the freedom to enact it. Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition. Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the
3379:
is challenged by most theologians. Free will, according to Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life. Actions taken by people exercising free will are counted on the
2877:
Although the neural mechanisms of schizophrenia are not yet clear, one influential hypothesis is that there is a breakdown in brain systems that compare motor commands with the feedback received from the body (known as
4389:
Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of
264:
have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as humans are not externally constrained or coerced. Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of
695:
Determinism can be divided into causal, logical and theological determinism. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will. Hard determinism is the claim that
2706:
in the 1980s, in which he asked each subject to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he measured the associated activity in their brain; in particular, the build-up of electrical signal called the
427:
of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the
6913:
Many religions of the world have considered that the path of history is predetermined by God or Fate. On this basis, many believe that what will happen will happen, and they accept their destiny with fatalism.
893:. An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model.
1803:
is a non-metaphysical concept. Likewise, some compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his
880:
asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process. This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of
16477:
2118:"Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined."
10603:
Stillman, T.F., R.F. Baumeister, F.D. Fincham, T.E. Joiner, N.M. Lambert, A.R. Mele, and D.M. Tice. 2008. Guilty, free, and wise. Belief in free will promotes learning from negative emotions. Manuscript in
6836:
The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies
6638:
Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.
3104:
The notions of free will and predestination are heavily debated among Christians. Free will in the Christian sense is the ability to choose between good or evil. Among Catholics, there are those holding to
757:
its outcome in advance. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in
2132:
discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a
2031:
may experience a conscious desire to escape addiction, but be unable to do so. The "will" is disconnected from the freedom to act. This situation is related to an abnormal production and distribution of
981:(without an underlying basis for the free will decision). Secondly, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind – a common problem associated with
1795:
Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. They believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance,
238:) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect).
1822:
Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to
1659:
suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the
936:
C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.
182:(3rd century CE): "what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them".
1742:
requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Secondarily,
3803:
Hence the notion of contingency appeared as the very opposition of necessity, so that wherever a thing is considered dependent or relies upon another thing, it is contingent and thus not necessary.
885:(random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by
2996:
and colleagues reviewed literature on the psychological effects of a belief (or disbelief) in free will and found that most people tend to believe in a sort of "naive compatibilistic free will".
10500:
Feltz, Adam; Edward T. Cokely (March 2009). "Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism".
8287:
cause and effect that develops early in human life, before the acquisition of language...the question I raise here is whether brains share this property with other material objects in the world.
7552:
Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.
3017:
79 percent of evolutionary biologists said that they believe in free will according to a survey conducted in 2007, only 14 percent chose no free will, and 7 percent did not answer the question.
2779:
Benjamin Libet's results are quoted in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In
2734:
These studies of the timing between actions and the conscious decision bear upon the role of the brain in understanding free will. A subject's declaration of intention to move a finger appears
4301:
Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)
3866:
The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.
4987:... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description.
3055:
Moreover, whether or not these experimental findings are a result of actual manipulations in belief in free will is a matter of debate. First of all, free will can at least refer to either
4970:
Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.
8187:, e.g. concrete physical objects. Intellect in his works is strictly connected with recognizing causes and effects and associating them, it is somewhat close to the contemporary view of
1220:
implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with
1353:
definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe.
8300:
2194:
of the will, is as such determined, and has entered the form of the phenomenon, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence we get the strange fact that everyone considers himself to be
666:. The relevance of such prospective indeterminate activity to free will is, however, contested, even when chaos theory is introduced to magnify the effects of such microscopic events.
8957:
Libet, Benjamin; Gleason, Curtis A.; Wright, Elwood W.; Pearl, Dennis K. (1983). "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)".
1094:
for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation
6427:
Groblacher, Simon; Paterek, Tomasz; Kaltenbaek, Rainer; Brukner, Caslav; Zukowski, Marek; Aspelmeyer, Markus; Zeilinger, Anton (2007). "An experimental test of non-local realism".
1747:
are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will (i.e. interactionalist dualism and non-reductive physicalism).
1671:, that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include
2265:
choices, he nevertheless points out that they do not preclude freedom unless we fail to recognise them. Steiner argues that outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with
6875:
However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped.
1110:, and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states
766:, the idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment,
219:
On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads them to believe that they have free will. On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken.
8192:
10673:
Gregory W. Graffin and William B. Provine, "Evolution, Religion, and Free Will," American Scientist 95 (July–August 2007), 294–97; results of Cornell Evolution Project survey,
1214:). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur.
911:
have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of
10677:
2480:
their lives are pre-determined. To deny freedom would be to deny the efforts of Buddhists to make moral progress (through our capacity to freely choose compassionate action).
1847:, claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise,
1116:. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as
13403:
11969:
9827:
8021:"Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden. Mit Einleitung von Dr. Rudolf Steiner, Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, o.J. (1894–96)"
2731:
brain activity of the readiness potential leading up to subjects' movements began approximately half a second before the subject was aware of a conscious intention to move.
2044:
405:
on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it remains possible and plausible that we are different from such objects in important ways.
1082:). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to
3031:
Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to cause various negative effects. The authors concluded, in their paper, that it is belief in
1086:
a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose".
2843:, the affected individual's limb will produce unintentional movements without the will of the person. The affected limb effectively demonstrates 'a will of its own.' The
14540:
4096:
Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences,
1557:
8191:
and formation of associations. The intellectuality of all perception implied then of course that causality is rooted in the world, precedes and enables experience. See
3223:
There are also mentions of moral freedom in what are now termed as 'Deuterocanonical' works which the Orthodox and Catholic Churches use. In Sirach 15 the text states:
8942:, 1965. Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkürbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflügers Arch 284: 1–17.
1947:, a fundamental question is: From the standpoint of statistical outcomes, to what extent do the choices of a conscious being have the ability to influence the future?
222:
It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the physical world can be explained entirely by
4814:
10613:
Bar-Hillel, M. 2007. Randomness is too important to trust to chance. Presented at the 2007 Summer Institute in Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth Medical School, NH
10070:
2986:
Studies indicate that peoples' belief in free will is inconsistent. Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler found that people believe they have more free will than others.
1940:
are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance. More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.
1888:
have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character. Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural
208:
The underlying questions are whether we have control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent. These questions predate the early Greek
10740:
Baumeister, R.F.; Masicampo, E.J.; DeWall, C.N. (2009). "Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness".
13343:
2961:
Caveats have, however, been identified in studying a subject's awareness of mental events, in that the process of introspection itself may alter the experience.
2554:
is truly free, and its freedom is also distinct from all feelings, thoughts, actions, or wills, and is thus not at all a freedom of will. The metaphysics of the
1482:
Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of
11488:, 1947 Harvard University Press; Religious Philosophy, 1961 Harvard University Press; and "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy" in Religious Philosophy
2935:
the ring of a telephone (that is, the second requirement is not met), then that person is not likely to infer that either noise caused the tree to fall down.
2241:. The controllable and uncontrollable aspects of decision making thereby are made logically separable, as pointed out in the introduction. This separation of
15815:
2393:
viewed humans as pre-programmed (by virtue of being human) to seek certain goals, but able to choose between routes to achieve these goals (our Aristotelian
997:
has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following:
708:(see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety. Relevant forms of determinism include:
16481:
9028:
7516:
The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.
2724:
making a movement, the volunteer reported the time on the clock when they first felt the conscious intention to move; this became known as Libet's W time.
1728:
of mental properties correlated with physical properties – implying causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as
1706:
is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. Alternatively,
960:, one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will.
15466:
11599:
2948:. Although many interpret this work as a blow against the argument for free will, both psychologists and philosophers have criticized Wegner's theories.
11022:"Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist"
3910:
348:
determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.
16324:
11509:
8073:
Steiner, R. (1964). Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1964, 1970, 1972, 1979, 230 pp., translated from the 12th German edition of 1962 by Michael Wilson.
3305:
Maimonides's reasoned that human beings must have free will (at least in the context of choosing to do good or evil), as without this, the demands of
1819:
matter. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.
1799:
make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly,
1530:
the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included:
100:
identified this issue, which remains a major focus of philosophical debate. The view that posits free will as incompatible with determinism is called
1494:(terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, while
11524:
10322:
Feltz, Adam; Edward T. Cokely; Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009-02-01). "Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board".
2137:), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.
1210:, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance
9915:
Aarts, H.; Custers, R.; Wegner, D. (2005). "On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information".
11823:
8500:. In order to avoid, at least in concept, the absolution of man of any guilt he then notes the contingency of all that takes place, i.e. lack of
10215:
Feldman, G.; Baumeister, R.F.; Wong, K.F. (2014). "July 30). Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will".
1762:
us to have experiences." According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents
1702:; that is, that there are no non-physical substances (for example physically independent minds). Physicalism can be reductive or non-reductive.
1427:'s omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."
174:(1st century CE): "it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them". According to
11903:
11414:
11125:
Nahmias, Eddy; D. Justin Coates; Trevor Kvaran (2007-09-01). "Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions".
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7355:
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Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. For example,
721:, future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the
777:
Suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism, where something near to, like that informally known as
11397:
8315:
7902:
Stump, Eleonore (1996). "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities". In Howard-Snyder, Daniel; Jordan, Jeff (eds.).
6572:
4285:
Joshua Greene; Jonathan Cohen (2011). "For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything". In Judy Illes; Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.).
1758:: "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane
1357:
asserts that a supremely powerful being has indeed fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance, and is a famous doctrine of the
650:
what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them."
3175:
which remains purely passive. Weakened and diminished by Adam's fall, free will is yet not destroyed in the race (Sess. VI, cap. i and v)."
14516:
5069:
305:, as well as models supporting more minimal criteria; such as the ability to consciously veto an action or competing desire. Yet even with
141:
choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs. determinism a
7917:
Honderich, T. (2001). "Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False and the Real Problem". In Kane, Robert (ed.).
4074:
3298:
1984:
in which the mind is simply part of nature, perhaps merely a feature of many very complex self-programming feedback systems (for example,
302:
8517:, where one can try to show that more and more developed products appearing in the evolution of a universe or, simpler, an automaton are
8166:
sufficient bases (a so-called sufficient reason is the coincidence of all the necessary conditions). Without established causality, both
6355:
Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind; An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; And an Essay on Quantity
956:. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality.
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4354:
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with a good creator deity (i.e. if a deity knew what they were going to choose, then they are responsible for letting them choose it).
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9077:
1968:
models of free will often consider deterministic relationships as discoverable in the physical world (including the brain). Cognitive
468:
for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities:
15762:
15441:
15431:
9589:
Assal, F.; Schwartz, S.; Vuilleumier, P. (2007). "Moving with or without will: Functional neural correlates of alien hand syndrome".
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A study that compared deliberate and arbitrary decisions, found that the early signs of decision are absent for the deliberate ones.
2542:, for instance, matter is without any freedom, and soul lacks any ability to control the unfolding of matter. The only real freedom (
1224:
free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny).
10674:
5126:
2500:, and Buddhists all taking slightly different lines. In many ways, the Buddhist position is closer to a theory of "conditionality" (
1502:) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will.
944:) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow
9780:
Frith, CD; Blakemore, S; Wolpert, DM (2000). "Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action".
717:
The idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen. In its most common form,
11988:
11580:
Gazzaniga, M. & Steven, M.S. (2004) Free Will in the 21st Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience and Law, in Garland, B. (ed.)
10694:
Vohs, K.D.; Schooler, J.W. (2008). "The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating".
9846:
2823:) despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or
1865:
writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains." Similarly,
14783:
14548:
11532:
8493:
6387:
2702:, and researchers can now watch the brain's decision-making process at work. A seminal experiment in this field was conducted by
2036:
in the brain. The neuroscience of free will places restrictions on both compatibilist and incompatibilist free will conceptions.
5521:
Free will is the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives.
1420:
dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."
15451:
12458:
10556:
Baumeister, R.; Crescioni, A.W.; Alquist, J. (2009). "Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture".
4726:
Sartre also provides a psychological version of the argument by claiming that if man's actions are not his own, he would be in
3398:
948:
free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious
11468:
Ockham, William. Predestination, God's Knowledge, and Future Contingents, early 14th century, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and
9484:
8513:
with regard to its direct previous cause in will and intellect. (The contingency, or fortuity, is even intuitive under modern
8085:
See Bricklin, Jonathan, "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will", in Libet (1999),
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together with observable involuntary motor activity" (emphasis in original). This syndrome is often a result of damage to the
2052:. The suicidal agents were not conscious that their free will have been manipulated by external, even if ungrounded, reasons.
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11836:
11810:, Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W. (2000). Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure.
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11756:
11739:
11391:
10357:
Nichols, Shaun; Joshua Knobe (2007-12-01). "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions".
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Physics is simply unable to resolve the question of free will, although, if anything, it probably leans towards determinism.
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to activity in the muscle underlying the movement; the entire process resulting in action involves more steps than just the
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generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate is related to
16271:
16069:
15747:
15436:
14833:
13473:
13393:
10783:
Monroe, Andrew E.; Brady, Garrett L.; Malle, Bertram F. (21 September 2016). "This Isn't the Free Will Worth Looking For".
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Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism
5306:: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state." For further discussion see
2178:
1171:
655:
4820:
2666:'s view is that fear of determinism in the context of "genetics" and "evolution" is a mistake, that it is "a confusion of
2562:
schools strongly suggest a belief in determinism, but do not seem to make explicit claims about determinism or free will.
2167:
and thus liable to necessity. Thus, he argues, humans do not possess free will as conventionally understood. However, the
1655:
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recordable on the scalp several hundred milliseconds before the overt appearance of a spontaneous willed movement. Using
2634:
2233:, which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom:
4227:
2198:
quite free, even in his individual actions, and imagines he can at any moment enter upon a different way of life... But
1736:, yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states (see epiphenomenalism).
154:
sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will.
16283:
16238:
15757:
15653:
15330:
8020:
6411:
8509:
with regard to God and the law of nature (as a specific case that could have not existed in other circumstances), and
3327:
122:
to be incompatible with free will and thus free will to be impossible whatever the case may be regarding determinism.
16108:
13664:
12150:
12024:
11948:
11933:
11860:
11784:
11770:
11589:
11565:
11519:
10920:
Nadelhoffer, Thomas; Shepard, Jason; Crone, Damien L.; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Levy, Neil (October 2020).
8920:
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8007:
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7738:
A thoughtful list of careful distinctions regarding the application of empirical science to these issues is found in
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7477:
6261:
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asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: that mental states (such as
68:, and other judgements which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of
10869:
Caspar, Emilie A.; Vuillaume, Laurène; Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, Pedro A.; Cleeremans, Axel (17 January 2017).
6924:
1766:
core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?" Others however argue that "
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16228:
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15849:
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He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the kind intention of His will.
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the brain has begun to implement the action, suggesting to some that unconsciously the brain has made the decision
2642:
1278:
137:
for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of
804:
One kind of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the
96:
suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will.
16532:
16522:
16372:
15855:
15842:
14933:
13323:
10277:
Nahmias, Eddy; Stephen G Morris; Thomas Nadelhoffer; Jason Turner (2006-07-01). "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?".
9681:
Scepkowski, L.A.; Cronin-Golomb, A. (2003). "The alien hand: cases, categorizations, and anatomical correlates".
2331:
of causal law (i.e. that it precedes all experience and is rooted in the construction of the perceivable world):
774:. Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, such as bio-environmental determinism, are even more common.
651:
285:, namely, that if the world is deterministic, then our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an
12122:
10394:
Sarkissian, HAGOP; Amita Chatterjee; Felipe de Brigard; Joshua Knobe; Shaun Nichols; Smita Sirker (2010-06-01).
9059:
5185:
3670:. In Raymond Y. Chiao; Marvin L. Cohen; Anthony J. Leggett; William D. Phillips; Charles L. Harper, Jr. (eds.).
3096:
2658:
have frequently addressed questions related to free will. One of the most heated debates in biology is that of "
1921:, Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book
16243:
15937:
15861:
15501:
14532:
10922:"Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will"
8419:
our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".
8170:
and in the external world, the passing of time would be impossible, because it is essentially directional. See
5393:
4493:
2299:
2164:
1851:. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of
1423:
The second form, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge – "because
7867:
Nida-Rümelin, Julian (1 January 2019). "The Reasons Account of Free Will A Libertarian-Compatibilist Hybrid".
4519:
4007:
3100:
Augustine's view of free will and predestination would go on to have a profound impact on Christian theology.
2207:
Schopenhauer elaborated on the topic in Book IV of the same work and in even greater depth in his later essay
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1376:. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future.
1244:
114:(the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible). Another incompatibilist position is
10623:
Wagenaar, W.A. (1972). "Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature".
6841:
Garris, M.D.; et al. (1992). "A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS)".
2612:
Early scientific thought often portrayed the universe as deterministic – for example in the thought of
1431:
There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that theological determinism requires
853:
is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities.
16502:
16354:
16172:
15888:
15305:
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neurological underpinnings), they are more likely to dissociate determinism from moral responsibility. See
3975:
3335:
3056:
1591:
1463:
Strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will, and is a form of
982:
790:
371:
298:
107:
2512:
1412:. Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism.
795:
16527:
16512:
15894:
15821:
15809:
14953:
14776:
14228:
13383:
12322:
8568:" in Freedom and Determinism. Campbell, Joseph Keim; O'Rourke, Michael; and Shier, David. 2004. MIT Press
8167:
3488:
3355:
the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's
2352:(which referenced the so-called intellectuality of representations, that is, in other words, objects and
1743:
1541:
Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by
1456:
994:
993:
Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether the world is deterministic or not.
290:
8992:
Libet, B. (1985). "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action".
8755:
5246:
3077:
Along similar lines, Tyler Stillman has found that belief in free will predicts better job performance.
1479:
free will. Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left).
1471:
has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to
16334:
16303:
15868:
15703:
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15563:
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14524:
13488:
12954:
12569:
12110:
12010:
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11288:
9383:"Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition"
7998:
7536:(Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 487
7500:(Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 487
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developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine
3360:
3165:
2310:
2209:
1871:
1672:
1506:
The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows:
1337:
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is false and free will is possible (at least some people have free will). This view is associated with
21:
8408:. The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
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6595:
2525:
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12183:
11074:"'Irresponsible and a Disservice': The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma"
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3238:
2687:
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1985:
1960:
1951:
and other philosophical problems pose questions about free will and predictable outcomes of choices.
1917:
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771:
383:
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9029:"Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential)"
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13433:
12347:
9870:
Wegner, D.M.; Wheatley, T. (1999). "Apparent mental causation: sources of the experience of will".
8106:
7598:
Gallagher, S. (2000). "Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science".
6925:
Anne Lockyer Jordan; Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate; Neil Lockyer; Edwin Tate (2004).
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seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.
1660:
179:
163:
97:
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Baumeister and colleagues also note that volunteers disbelieving in free will are less capable of
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accepts both freedom and determinism (or something similar to it), but despite its focus on human
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http://faculty.bennington.edu/~sherman/Evolution%20in%20America/evol%20religion%20free%20will.pdf
10022:"When consciousness matters: a critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will"
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In this work, he stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can
2068:
1969:
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1286:
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1211:
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718:
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325:
321:
235:
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Randolph Clarke (1996). "Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action".
3735:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
3229:
The exact meaning of these verses has been debated by Christian theologians throughout history.
1238:
Discussion regarding destiny does not necessitate the existence of supernatural powers. Logical
1200:
Although often used interchangeably, the words "fate" and "destiny" have distinct connotations.
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7530:"Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation"
7494:"Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation"
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is that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3).
337:
324:, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will. For example, logical and
203:
10594:. Unpublished manuscript, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia.
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8365:
8205:
8119:
8046:
7529:
7493:
5309:
4171:
4106:
4051:
3946:
3814:
3697:
3667:
3243:
1486: – and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as
16407:
16233:
16167:
15683:
15643:
15568:
15471:
15350:
14973:
14893:
14588:
14580:
14508:
14464:
13826:
13821:
13716:
13423:
13333:
13204:
12894:
12839:
12834:
12792:
12720:
12654:
12584:
12432:
12407:
12362:
12312:
12261:
12143:
11338:
11216:
10134:
9207:
9135:
8935:
8267:
8234:
7933:
7721:
7235:
7212:
7162:
7129:
6678:
6621:
5994:
5988:
5536:
Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy
5003:
4200:
4139:
3847:
3640:
3599:
3206:
3086:
2716:
2659:
2072:
2024:
2020:
1703:
1619:
1581:
949:
941:
927:
908:
663:
189:) was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE). It has traditionally meant (until
9542:"A comparison of Granger causality and coherency in fMRI-based analysis of the motor system"
9432:"Neural precursors of decisions that matter—an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice"
8735:"Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem"
8532:
8362:
A discussion of the roles of will, intellect and passions in Aquinas' teachings is found in
4937:
4875:
4372:
4307:
3879:
808:
be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.
449:
suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if
16191:
16003:
15998:
15956:
15835:
15673:
15613:
15506:
15310:
15190:
14843:
14705:
13845:
13835:
13816:
13794:
13756:
13694:
13606:
13569:
13531:
13468:
12929:
12904:
12829:
12527:
12508:
12488:
12372:
12317:
12307:
12251:
12178:
11258:
10454:
9335:
9116:
7806:
6850:
6795:
6707:
6662:
6499:
Christosis: Pauline Soteriology in Light of Deification in Irenaeus and Cyril of Alexandria
6446:
5480:
5303:
5009:
4883:
4322:
3184:
2940:
2898:
2751:
of brain activity. The bearing of these results upon notions of free will appears complex.
2630:
2061:
2016:
2012:
2008:
1993:
1948:
1691:
1487:
1175:
1117:
767:
341:
317:
260:
Compatibilists maintain that mental reality is not of itself causally effective. Classical
254:
231:
115:
57:
15241:
14369:
11628:– disembodied, strangers to blood, sweat, and tears – have no occasion for that." (p. 30.)
7337:
3393:
3183:, have free will through which they can choose God and to do good works, with the goal of
2011:). Cognitive naturalism stresses the role of neurological sciences. Overall brain health,
1003:
Determinism (D) is true, D does not imply we lack free will (F), but in fact we do lack F.
800:
mental states; blue circles represent physical states; arrows describe causal interaction.
8:
16455:
16013:
15608:
15521:
15170:
14998:
14818:
14675:
14636:
14612:
14479:
14399:
14379:
14354:
14324:
13736:
13616:
13313:
13149:
13114:
13094:
13049:
12864:
12854:
12824:
12498:
12493:
12392:
12367:
12282:
12038:
11845:
11727:
11613:
8760:
5083:
3759:
3455:
3414:
3170:
thus rejecting free will. In condemnation of Calvin and Luther views, the Roman Catholic
2944:
actual behaviors, but is inferred from various cues through an intricate mental process,
2910:'s contributions to the free will debate have come primarily through social psychologist
2840:
2769:
suggest that the cancelling or "veto" of an action may first arise subconsciously as well
2708:
2442:
2345:
2156:
2144:
1699:
1467:(equivalent to theological fatalism below). It claims that free will does not exist, and
1459:
free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation.
890:
805:
732:
646:
446:
441:
436:
remarks that C.D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s.
50:
13029:
11428:
Jackson, Timothy P. (1998). "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will".
10458:
9339:
8679:
8565:
7465:
7448:
6854:
6711:
6666:
6450:
5484:
5013:
4968:"The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature;
4326:
3729:
McKenna, Michael; Coates, D. Justin (2015). "Compatibilism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
3297:, in a two part treatment, where human free will is specified as part of the universe's
2578:
freedom we have to get beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be found here.
370:, are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, "
92:
Some conceive free will to be the capacity to make choices undetermined by past events.
16507:
16497:
16401:
16033:
15908:
15875:
15678:
15658:
15633:
15628:
15573:
15292:
14913:
14883:
14670:
14665:
14500:
14439:
14309:
13897:
13804:
13789:
13741:
13689:
13503:
13493:
13263:
13253:
12757:
12669:
12427:
12412:
11897:
11872:
Quantum theory and free will : how mental intentions translate into bodily actions
11744:
11712:
11658:
11633:
11408:
11235:
11194:
11169:
11150:
11100:
11073:
11054:
10991:
10949:
10897:
10870:
10846:
10819:
10800:
10765:
10719:
10573:
10533:
10477:
10442:
10423:
10393:
10300:
10259:
10197:
10044:
9975:
9940:
9805:
9742:
9717:
9658:
9633:
9614:
9566:
9541:
9522:
9458:
9431:
9407:
9382:
9358:
9324:"An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement"
9323:
9299:
9272:
9108:
9009:
7934:"Part III: On the origin and nature of the emotions; Postulates (Proposition II, Note)"
7884:
7623:
7427:
7349:
7312:
7051:
7032:
6904:
6866:
6746:
6652:
6478:
6436:
6250:
5763:
5569:
5512:
5470:
5281:
5277:
5051:
5035:
4851:
4847:
4346:
3571:
3384:
because they are their own; however, the free will happens with the permission of God.
3306:
3153:
3145:
2919:
2394:
1989:
1806:
1635:
1587:
1448:
1437:
1362:
1333:
1159:
1135:
726:
722:
712:
688:
582:
may occupy any of the nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to
367:
16473:
15104:
12036:'s assertion that God does not play dice with the universe has been misinterpreted)",
10868:
10109:
9793:
9273:"Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late?"
8716:
8490:
7832:
Lemos, John (2002). "Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–naturalism".
7611:
2445:, it rejects the western concept of a total agent from external sources. According to
2290: – the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.
216:), and some modern philosophers lament the lack of progress over all these centuries.
178:, the notion of incompatibilist free will is perhaps first identified in the works of
16329:
15593:
15553:
15538:
15266:
15195:
15175:
15059:
14943:
14725:
14710:
14700:
14680:
14429:
14260:
14163:
14153:
13882:
13840:
13543:
13273:
13189:
13144:
12730:
12699:
12422:
12382:
12297:
12266:
12173:
12020:
11978:
11958:
11944:
11929:
11915:
11885:
11875:
11856:
11832:
11780:
11766:
11752:
11735:
11663:
11585:
11570:
11561:
11515:
11387:
11199:
11142:
11138:
11105:
11090:
11058:
10995:
10953:
10941:
10902:
10851:
10804:
10757:
10711:
10707:
10577:
10525:
10517:
10482:
10415:
10411:
10380:
10339:
10335:
10304:
10276:
10189:
10142:
10113:
10076:
10000:
9979:
9932:
9897:
9836:
9809:
9797:
9747:
9698:
9663:
9606:
9571:
9514:
9463:
9412:
9363:
9304:
9253:
9243:
9219:
9170:
9141:
9100:
9051:
8974:
8916:
8891:
8866:
8841:
8801:
8658:
8634:
8610:
8585:
8540:
8380:
8275:
8246:
8213:
8127:
8054:
8003:
7965:
7941:
7888:
7849:
7772:
7698:
7678:
7615:
7571:
7541:
7505:
7473:
7304:
7271:
7241:
7174:
7141:
7097:
7004:
6968:
6932:
6552:
6503:
6470:
6462:
6359:
6325:
6291:
6257:
6196:
6189:
6160:
6126:
6065:
6023:
5998:
5960:
5926:
5892:
5858:
5824:
5790:
5767:
5728:
5678:
5644:
5610:
5576:
5540:
5516:
5504:
5496:
5492:
5421:
5350:
5321:
5215:
5152:
5118:
5025:
4943:
4916:
4887:
4855:
4760:
4700:
4675:
4650:
4593:
4561:
4467:
4378:
4338:
4290:
4206:
4179:
4147:
4118:
3954:
3916:
3885:
3855:
3822:
3763:
3709:
3675:
3646:
3605:
3575:
3478:
3446:
3409:
2894:
2812:
2625:
2584:
2566:
2460:
2168:
1997:
1800:
1289:, and is closely related to other such arguments, for example the incompatibility of
1152:
923:
433:
379:
270:
190:
85:
15013:
13034:
11154:
10937:
10769:
10537:
10427:
10201:
10048:
9944:
9618:
9112:
6870:
6770:
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society
5461:
Danko D. Georgiev (2021). "Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will".
5285:
4350:
1770:
plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."
1608:
309:, arguments have been made against libertarianism in that it is difficult to assign
241:
The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the
16450:
16415:
16362:
16295:
16162:
16157:
16137:
16117:
16086:
15767:
15708:
15410:
15395:
15390:
15365:
15325:
15300:
15180:
15150:
15018:
14988:
14968:
14828:
14695:
14620:
14604:
14434:
14419:
14364:
14143:
13925:
13892:
13887:
13784:
13684:
13621:
13601:
13593:
13169:
13154:
13134:
12934:
12746:
12689:
12417:
12387:
12377:
12342:
12256:
12246:
12236:
12200:
12195:
12136:
11911:
11708:
11653:
11645:
11469:
11239:
11227:
11189:
11181:
11134:
11095:
11085:
11044:
11036:
10981:
10933:
10892:
10882:
10841:
10831:
10792:
10749:
10723:
10703:
10642:
10565:
10509:
10472:
10462:
10407:
10376:
10331:
10296:
10251:
10224:
10181:
10105:
10036:
9967:
9924:
9889:
9789:
9737:
9729:
9690:
9653:
9645:
9598:
9561:
9553:
9526:
9506:
9453:
9443:
9402:
9394:
9353:
9343:
9294:
9284:
9092:
9043:
9013:
9001:
8966:
8712:
7876:
7841:
7607:
7419:
7061:
6900:
6896:
6858:
6827:
6715:
6651:
Hooft, G. (2001). "How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale".
6544:
6482:
6454:
6101:
5755:
5718:
5488:
5273:
5110:
5039:
5017:
4843:
4622:
4330:
3755:
3567:
3498:
3483:
3465:
3381:
3194:
3180:
3171:
3137:
3133:
3115:
2775:
suggest models that explain the relationship between conscious intention and action
2693:
2535:
1729:
1715:
1676:
1472:
1233:
1079:
678:
286:
226:. The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either
111:
69:
11797:
Muhm, Myriam (2004). Abolito il libero arbitrio – Colloquio con Wolf Singer.
7627:
7169:(A lecture given in Mannheim, 8 May 1972 ed.). Psychology Press. pp. 23
4876:
3460:
2502:
1443:
110:(the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible) and
16445:
15772:
15583:
15533:
15261:
15205:
15165:
15125:
15003:
14908:
14750:
14484:
14223:
14178:
14138:
14086:
14031:
14021:
13945:
13920:
13902:
13855:
13746:
13679:
13674:
13562:
13283:
13214:
13199:
13119:
13099:
13074:
12884:
12694:
12629:
12402:
12397:
12337:
12292:
12241:
12059:
12033:
11818:
11556:
11284:
10681:
10513:
10185:
9928:
9398:
9237:
8497:
8188:
7565:
7368:
7089:
6996:
6960:
6926:
6768:
6497:
6415:
6353:
6319:
6285:
6224:
6154:
6120:
6059:
5954:
5920:
5886:
5852:
5818:
5783:
5672:
5638:
5604:
5534:
5415:
5209:
5144:
4644:
4587:
4557:
4461:
4235:
4172:"Chapter 9: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will"
4011:
3852:
Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power
3550:
To state it briefly, we define "free will" as a will unimpeded by any compulsion.
3402:
3262:
2858:
2844:
2781:
2683:
2187:
2094:
2028:
1944:
1923:
1889:
1828:
1811:
1739:
1650:
1569:
1221:
970:
945:
931:
701:
360:
282:
175:
102:
16425:
11794:. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. Collected essays by scientists and philosophers.
10040:
9718:"Subjective experience, involuntary movement, and posterior alien hand syndrome"
9211:
8939:
2720:
1158:
Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is likely to be
351:
Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings.
16435:
16420:
16387:
16147:
15782:
15732:
15360:
15271:
15200:
15185:
15155:
15130:
15084:
15069:
15064:
14963:
14903:
14888:
14868:
14858:
14853:
14823:
14720:
14474:
14374:
14359:
14334:
14329:
14213:
14103:
14041:
13960:
13950:
13940:
13850:
13731:
13726:
13711:
13651:
13636:
13611:
13413:
13194:
13184:
13039:
13024:
12969:
12740:
12599:
12503:
12437:
12215:
12210:
12055:
11551:
10970:"Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1"
10228:
9893:
7940:(Original work published 1677 ed.). Digireads.com Publishing. p. 54.
6548:
6105:
5723:
5706:
3881:
Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will
3543:
3376:
3258:
3125:
3110:
3048:
2993:
2878:
2786:
2703:
2446:
2390:
2226:
2119:
2110:
1893:
1832:
1631:
1546:
1432:
1398:
1354:
1313:
1308:
1302:
1274:
1266:
1167:
1090:
886:
402:
398:
227:
133:
compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is
81:
11356:
11040:
10569:
9971:
9163:"Chapter 6: Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will"
9096:
9047:
9005:
8970:
7527:
7491:
7130:"Chapter 5: Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalizing theory"
6719:
5759:
5114:
4169:
3944:
2546:) consists in realizing the ultimate separateness of matter and self. For the
2229:, who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work, wrote
1892:, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a
1667:. Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called
1626:(for example, consciousness, memory, and judgment) and body (for example, the
1006:
D is true, D does not imply we lack F, but in fact we don't know if we have F.
662:
in nature, fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in the
166:
literature. The notion of compatibilist free will has been attributed to both
16491:
16142:
16132:
15598:
15256:
15246:
15236:
15226:
15160:
15145:
15140:
15135:
15099:
15094:
15089:
15074:
15033:
14928:
14792:
14404:
14344:
14294:
14133:
14071:
14056:
13955:
13870:
13799:
13751:
13659:
13641:
13483:
13209:
13159:
13124:
13104:
13084:
12649:
12357:
12332:
12327:
12029:
11889:
11828:
11675:
11231:
11185:
11146:
10986:
10969:
10887:
10836:
10796:
10753:
10521:
10419:
10343:
10308:
9694:
9289:
9190:
8537:
The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates
8431:
8340:
7853:
7308:
6466:
5732:
5500:
3634:
3513:
3422:
3326:
At the same time, Maimonides – and other thinkers – recognizes the
3160:
3060:
3026:
2911:
2882:
2873:
2872:
In addition, one of the most important ("first rank") diagnostic symptoms of
2663:
2573:, offers a good example of the worry about free will in the Hindu tradition.
2473:
2361:
2335:
2277:
2089:
1981:
1965:
1844:
1796:
1788:
1779:
1767:
1719:
1565:
1516:
1476:
1417:
1316:
is the idea that all events are determined in advance. Predeterminism is the
1179:
1163:
937:
750:
704:, so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to
659:
635:
594:. The position (1) of hard determinism adds to the table the contention that
391:
306:
261:
142:
126:
119:
10467:
10100:
Pronin, Emily (2009). "The Introspection Illusion". In Mark P. Zanna (ed.).
9348:
8024:
7880:
7845:
6408:
4334:
2797:
Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.
2591:. But it is the strong man who stands up and says I will make my own fate."
2538:
do not agree with each other entirely on the question of free will. For the
2397:). His view has been associated with both compatibilism and libertarianism.
1416:
The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a
16440:
16113:
15752:
15698:
15023:
14898:
14848:
14685:
14628:
14459:
14454:
14449:
14424:
14394:
14128:
14001:
13935:
13930:
13865:
13721:
13706:
13463:
13229:
13164:
13054:
12964:
12814:
12684:
12594:
12574:
12302:
11667:
11649:
11595:
11481:
11203:
11109:
10945:
10906:
10855:
10761:
10715:
10529:
10486:
10193:
9936:
9901:
9801:
9751:
9702:
9610:
9575:
9518:
9467:
9416:
9367:
9308:
9132:
A brief discussion of possible interpretation of these results is found in
9104:
8518:
8514:
7993:
7619:
7410:
Frankfurt, H. (1971). "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person".
6766:
6474:
6156:
Oxford Hb Of Free Will:Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories
5746:
Mark Balaguer (1999). "Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View".
5508:
5122:
4424:
Libet, Benjamin (2003). "Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity?".
4342:
3566:. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 50. pp. 1–52.
3418:
2954:
has argued that the subjective experience of free will is supported by the
2951:
2902:
2816:
2617:
2604:
humans have free will, free will may be described as a political doctrine.
2497:
2218:
only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."
2186:
But the fact is overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as
2004:
1992:), and so must be studied by the methods of empirical science, such as the
1932:
1927:. The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful
1784:
1751:
1653:
free will. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called
1538:, although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism.
602:
is untrue, and the position (2) of libertarianism adds the contention that
223:
77:
9992:
9667:
9649:
9510:
9055:
8978:
8913:
It Ain't Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and other Illusions
8485:
Further discussion of this compatibilistic theory can be found in Thomas'
8452:
8206:"Chapter 7: The critique of morality: The three pillars of Kantian ethics"
7758:
3401:
is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and
1679:. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is
1451:
of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism
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15385:
15375:
15345:
15320:
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14958:
14948:
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13219:
13139:
13069:
13019:
12797:
12725:
12704:
12659:
12624:
12579:
12550:
11867:
9733:
5084:"On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain"
3493:
3331:
3176:
3149:
3129:
3032:
2756:
2699:
2559:
2151:
is not subordinate to the laws of necessity (causality) and is thus free.
1973:
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1627:
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1495:
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829:
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375:
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3179:, the father of the Methodist tradition, taught that humans, enabled by
2147:
claimed that phenomena do not have freedom of the will, but the will as
1519:
foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do)
1265:
an omniscient creator not only implies destiny but a form of high level
16339:
16093:
15777:
15578:
15543:
15370:
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seems to have held views on predestination similar to Calvinism in his
2621:
2613:
2327:
This empiricist view was often denied by trying to prove the so-called
2305:
2282:
2254:
2129:
1885:
1862:
1550:
1402:
1358:
1317:
1071:
957:
762:
Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as
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213:
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10395:
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9557:
6862:
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14660:
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13991:
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10255:
7423:
6815:
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4001:
The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will
2762:
More studies have since been conducted, including some that try to:
683:
16377:
16122:
16081:
15663:
15618:
15335:
14690:
14655:
14289:
14274:
14198:
14193:
14158:
14148:
14061:
13996:
13970:
13453:
13014:
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12609:
12483:
12188:
8566:
Buddhism and the Freedom of the Will: Pali and Mahayanist Responses
8148:
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4100:), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?
3747:
3367:
were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant
3121:
3064:
3000:
generating random numbers), their behaviour betrays many patterns.
2862:
2755:
basis "...free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150–350
2463:. The concept of karma in Buddhism is different from the notion of
2456:
2438:
2319:
one another (descriptions of regularity in nature) and things that
2250:
2172:
2148:
2033:
1866:
1542:
1373:
1139:
250:
209:
28:
12089:
12074:
12053:
11616:
is what distinguishes us from machines. For biological creatures,
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9257:
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The first event is consistent with having caused the second event.
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Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise)
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14314:
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14168:
14123:
14118:
14113:
14026:
14016:
13303:
13009:
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come from acting in the world and experiencing the consequences.
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2493:
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2203:
it were, must play to the end the part he has taken upon himself.
1321:
1217:
1191:
1018:
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1324:, past, present and future, have been decided or are known (by
409:"ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. They must be
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16183:
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would have been meaningless, there would be no need for the
1162:. Although the scientific method cannot be used to rule out
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749:
The idea that the future is already determined, either by a
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15638:
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3372:
2547:
2485:
2261:
causes from the internal disposition receiving this cause.
1623:
1329:
1203:
1170:, it can be used to identify indeterminism in natural law.
850:
821:
817:
397:
Traditional arguments for incompatibilism are based on an "
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12128:
10974:
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The first event immediately precedes the second event, and
2106:
1838:
1021:
D isn't true, we don't have F, but F is compatible with D.
900:
responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision.
15411:
Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)
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3375:
Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward
2820:
2400:
In facing choices, he argued that humans are governed by
2023:
clearly influence mental activity, and their impact upon
1857:
1424:
1397:
stating that all events that happen are pre-ordained, or
1325:
1282:
423:
over these matters, we also can have no control over the
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9588:
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5214:. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 21.
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4507:
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3593:
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which was formulated by the French Reformed theologian,
2384:
1182:, and are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.
1106:, one must have been responsible for the way one was at
1098:, one must have been responsible for the way one was at
658:, and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic
316:
Free will here is predominantly treated with respect to
257:
for actions if they are caused entirely by past events.
13344:
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2249:
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418:
A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by
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3421:, in holding that free will is a feature of a human's
3293:) is foundational. The most succinct statement is by
2587:: "It is the coward and the fool who says this is his
15816:
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10499:
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10214:
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4308:"The self as a responding and responsible artifact"
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669:Below these positions are examined in more detail.
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4304:referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by
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3197:discusses Predestination in some of his Epistles.
2819:make involuntary movements and utterances (called
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11575:Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science.
10072:Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will
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7293:"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical"
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7210:
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4370:
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2861:, either when it is severed to treat intractable
1622:, that is, consideration of the relation between
293:is the form of incompatibilism which posits that
149:one counterfactually wanted to do otherwise, one
16489:
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10782:
10730:
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5526:
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3976:"Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of
3638:
3561:
3012:
2772:explain the underlying brain structures involved
2419:
1931:, and other such possibilities, then because of
1910:
162:The problem of free will has been identified in
11957:, Wij Zijn Ons Brein, Publishing Centre, 2010.
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9715:
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7813:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
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7739:
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6958:
6918:
6186:
6091:
5816:
4900:
4873:
3665:
3020:
1408:, or that they are destined to occur given its
618:as meaning both concepts are of dubious value.
281:A different approach to the dilemma is that of
253:dilemma as well: the question of how to assign
56:Free will is closely linked to the concepts of
11941:How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?
11606:, Princeton University Press, 2023, 333 pp.),
10396:"Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?"
10167:"March 1). Mistaking randomness for free will"
9869:
9026:
7655:
7563:
7557:
7487:
7485:
7127:
7081:
6988:
6928:Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition
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5918:
5891:. Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 33–61.
5636:
5334:
5307:
5196:
4935:
4022:
4020:
3996:never count as self-evident proof of anything.
3940:
3938:
3936:
3934:
3932:
3908:
3877:
3748:"Did Epicurus discover the free-will problem?"
3695:
3562:Baumeister, Roy F.; Monroe, Andrew E. (2014).
3338:. (In fact the problem may be seen to overlap
3156:views on predestination put forth in his work
1861:]." In articulating this crucial proviso,
1372:Predeterminism has therefore been compared to
940:physical models (particularly those involving
845:Some non-causal explanations involve invoking
784:
84:. Traditionally, only actions that are freely
16199:
15964:
14777:
13570:
12535:
12144:
10132:
9683:Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews
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7719:
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7163:"Notes of a realist on the body-mind problem"
6622:"Some Varieties of Free Will and Determinism"
6489:
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6122:Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action
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5454:
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4942:(2nd ed.). Psychology Press. p. 8.
4049:
3845:
3728:
2381:) jointly decide upon the behaviour of both.
1810:, and the Stoic Chrysippus. In contrast, the
1064:, and any position that includes having F as
16468:This article incorporates material from the
14517:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
12087:
11604:Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will
11455:Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence",
11281:Discipline of the Immanuel Missionary Church
11220:Social Psychological and Personality Science
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10824:Social Psychological and Personality Science
10785:Social Psychological and Personality Science
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7521:
6952:
6887:Sherman, H. (1981). "Marx and determinism".
6840:
6813:
6153:Timothy O'Connor (2005). Robert Kane (ed.).
6118:
6051:
6017:
5739:
4585:
4466:. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. p. 39.
4137:
4104:
4072:
3812:
3282:
118:, which holds not only determinism but also
11719:Harnad, Stevan (2009) The Explanatory Gap #
11325:Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam
10164:
9674:
9218:. University Press of America, Lanham, MD,
8117:
8053:. Cambridge University Press. p. 529.
8038:
7763:. In Andrew R Marks; Ushma S Neill (eds.).
7708:
7482:
7383:
7381:
7373:Freedom and Determinism in Stoic Philosophy
7270:1991 ed.). Penguin Books. p. ix.
7122:
7120:
6886:
6760:
6697:
6351:
6146:
6112:
5986:
5952:
5878:
5844:
5810:
5664:
5596:
5566:
5413:
5409:
5407:
5372:Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam
5292:
4869:
4867:
4865:
4642:
4551:
4198:
4026:
4017:
3929:
3674:. Cambridge University Press. p. 603.
3601:Determinism and freedom in Stoic philosophy
2698:It has become possible to study the living
2273:Free will as a pragmatically useful concept
2101:
1102:. To be responsible for the way one was at
16:Ability to make choices without constraints
16206:
16192:
15971:
15957:
14784:
14770:
13577:
13563:
12542:
12528:
12469:Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness
12151:
12137:
11902:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
11631:
11413:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
11015:
11013:
11011:
11009:
11007:
11005:
10742:Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
9758:
9497:Zinner, S.H. (2000). "Tourette disorder".
9479:
9477:
9242:. Bradford Books. MIT Press. p. 131.
9154:
9126:
8630:
8628:
8626:
8584:. Cambridge University Press. p. 73.
8140:
7449:Chapter XXI.: "Of the liberty of subjects"
7400:
7354:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
7227:
7072:
6628:. philosophy.lander.edu. 10 September 2009
6530:
6528:
6526:
6247:
6216:
5912:
5774:
5560:
5001:
4417:
4315:Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
4305:
4255:
4253:
3668:"§28.2: Compatibilism and incompatibilism"
3642:Research In Psychology: Methods and Design
3336:Divine providence as understood in Judaism
2888:
1379:
301:constructions, including both traditional
15442:Electromagnetic theories of consciousness
11657:
11525:Sri Aurobindo about freedom and free will
11501:Hawking, Stephen, and Mlodinow, Leonard,
11193:
11099:
11089:
11048:
10985:
10896:
10886:
10845:
10835:
10817:
10636:
10590:Paulhus, D.L. and Margesson. A., (1994).
10476:
10466:
10370:
10290:
10217:Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
9957:
9883:
9764:
9741:
9657:
9565:
9457:
9447:
9406:
9357:
9347:
9298:
9288:
9069:
8825:(4th ed.). W.H. Freeman and Company.
8732:
8393:
7962:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
7916:
7597:
7409:
7254:
7217:Consciousness: §9.9 Non-physical theories
7198:
7136:. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 69
6736:
6656:
6650:
6440:
6399:
6397:
6241:
6085:
5722:
5474:
5151:. Taylor & Francis. pp. 891–92.
5104:
4929:
4759:. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4613:Fischer, J.M. (1983). "Incompatibilism".
4517:
4457:
4455:
4453:
4451:
4449:
4437:
3854:. Columbia University Press. p. 37.
3061:compatibilistic (deterministic) free will
2968:
1843:Most "classical compatibilists", such as
12054:Timothy O’Connor, Christopher Franklin.
11817:
11432:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11273:
11246:
11174:Personality and Social Psychology Review
10622:
10279:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
10126:
9709:
9235:
8910:
8560:
8558:
8556:
8259:
7925:
7869:Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
7660:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7378:
7117:
7094:The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
6345:
6318:George Berkeley; Jonathan Dancy (1998).
6180:
5980:
5946:
5630:
5533:Christoph Lumer; Sandro Nannini (2007).
5404:
5391:
5244:
5183:
4961:
4959:
4862:
4694:
4581:
4579:
4577:
4547:
4545:
4491:
4464:Four Views on Free Will (Libertarianism)
4377:. Columbia University Press. p. 5.
4364:
4225:
4219:
4192:
4178:. Oxford University Press. p. 193.
4113:. Oxford University Press. pp. 128
3999:Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs:
3973:
3821:. Oxford University Press. p. 112.
3788:
3532:
3242:
3152:. John Calvin was heavily influenced by
3095:
2914:'s work on conscious will. In his book,
2594:
2139:
2105:
1783:
1603:
1496:knowing their actions before they happen
1442:
1155:poses a serious challenge to this view.
856:
794:
682:
629:
440:standing, if she had so desired. But it
14549:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
12072:
11967:
11462:
11427:
11337:
11002:
10551:
10549:
10547:
10241:
10019:
9825:
9533:
9490:
9474:
8952:
8950:
8948:
8860:
8623:
8598:
8338:
8301:"Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian"
7811:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7752:
7669:
7667:
7570:. Oxford University Press. p. 96.
7438:
7394:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7387:
7154:
6543:. SAGE Publications. pp. 1035–36.
6534:
6523:
6388:An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
6061:Person And Object: A Metaphysical Study
6018:Kane, Robert (2007). "Libertarianism".
6011:
5398:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5340:
5251:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5190:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4997:
4995:
4798:van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. (1998).
4793:
4791:
4739:
4612:
4536:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4529:
4524:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4498:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4411:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4404:
4250:
4163:
4146:. Oxford University Press. p. 14.
4131:
3745:
3732:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
3688:
3597:
3057:libertarian (indeterministic) free will
1839:Free will as lack of physical restraint
1134:Causal determinism is the concept that
988:
719:nomological (or scientific) determinism
157:
16490:
15452:Higher-order theories of consciousness
11912:Free Will Under the Light of the Quran
11694:
11674:
11019:
10099:
10062:
9821:
9819:
9782:Brain Research. Brain Research Reviews
9773:
9625:
9582:
9496:
9374:
9189:
9020:
8885:
8835:
8702:
8677:
8604:
8539:. Oxford University Press. p. 5.
8524:
8356:
8298:
8226:
8097:
8095:
7687:
7640:
7451:(1968 edition). London: Penguin Books.
7191:
6394:
5263:
5179:
5177:
5175:
4965:
4719:
4638:
4636:
4446:
4278:
4043:
3839:
2977:
2918:Wegner summarizes what he believes is
2433:
2257:(279–206 BCE), who separated external
1227:
1012:D is true, we have F, and F implies D.
862:have been created, referenced here as
836:
816:, which claims that some non-physical
610:is untrue. Position (9) may be called
49:between different possible courses of
16187:
15952:
15467:Lamme's recurrent feedback hypothesis
14765:
13558:
13374:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
12523:
12474:Universal Declaration of Human Rights
12132:
12017:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
12007:Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue
11866:
11598:, "The Fate of Free Will" (review of
11376:
11071:
10592:Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale
9996:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
8991:
8879:
8854:
8795:
8577:
8564:Gier, Nicholas and Kjellberg, Paul. "
8553:
8197:
8111:
7901:
7831:
7804:
7454:
7336:
7290:
7262:Tor Nørretranders (1998). "Preface".
6967:. Taylor & Francis. p. 194.
6843:Science of Artificial Neural Networks
5082:Lewis, E.R.; MacGregor, R.J. (2006).
4956:
4833:
4779:
4574:
4542:
4423:
4176:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
4111:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
4066:
3967:
3951:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
3806:
3789:Schopenhauer, A. "What is freedom?".
3659:
3627:
3538:
3397:can do for it, is to be truly free."
3136:, and formulated by Dutch theologian
3124:which was put forth by Jesuit priest
3003:
2850:functional magnetic resonance imaging
2526:Free will in theology § Hinduism
2428:
2385:Free will according to Thomas Aquinas
1341:is categorised as a specific type of
1336:, implying that there is an unbroken
1243:or false), and is referred to as the
1123:
197:
16070:Correlation does not imply causation
15933:
13474:Interpretations of quantum mechanics
13394:The World as Will and Representation
12019:. Oxford University Press, New York
11533:"There's No Such Thing as Free Will"
11530:
11319:
11078:British Journal of Social Psychology
10544:
10068:
9027:Benjamin Libet; et al. (1983).
8945:
8904:
8789:
8372:Arguments of the philosophers series
7982:The World as Will and Representation
7798:
7664:
7645:. New York: Oxford University Press.
7030:
7001:Encyclopedia of science and religion
6405:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5369:
5363:
4992:
4788:
4669:
4232:Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy
4107:"Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural"
3752:Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
3239:Free will in theology § Judaism
3158:On the Predestination of the Saints.
2179:The World as Will and Representation
1954:
1575:
1172:Interpretations of quantum mechanics
656:interpretations of quantum mechanics
14565:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
12095:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
12080:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
12065:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
9816:
8865:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8684:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
8153:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
8092:
8018:
7205:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7201:"The hard problem of consciousness"
7077:. Touchstone:New York. p. 149.
6191:Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality
5447:Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach,
5211:Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion
5172:
5092:Journal of Integrative Neuroscience
5008:. Vol. 131. pp. 457–459.
4812:
4754:
4674:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4633:
4234:. London: Routledge. Archived from
3645:(6th ed.). Wiley. p. 11.
3399:Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense
3340:several others in Jewish Philosophy
3283:
3266:
2519:
2113:thought that there is no free will.
2027:is also important. For example, an
1724:on physical events, describing the
1455:There are various implications for
1185:
672:
654:is currently disputed by prominent
453:had actually obtained in the past.
13:
16239:Novikov self-consistency principle
15758:Subjective character of experience
15654:Neural correlates of consciousness
11928:New York: Oxford University Press
11765:New York: Oxford University Press
11713:10.1002/j.2326-1951.2001.tb03561.x
11544:
11459:, new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–12.
11430:Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard
11168:Epstude, K.; Roese, N. J. (2008).
10301:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x
10165:Ebert, J.P.; Wegner, D.M. (2011).
10139:Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
9716:Bundick, T.; Spinella, M. (2000).
9634:"The alien hand and related signs"
9271:Guggisberg, AG; Mottaz, A (2013).
9167:Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
8776:"Infidels. "Metaphysical Freedom""
8756:"The Quantum Physics of Free Will"
8531:Paul Russell; Oisin Deery (2013).
8272:Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
8089:(Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic).
7805:Ridge, Michael (3 February 2014).
7266:(Jonathan Sydenham translation of
7211:Robert Van Gulick (Jan 14, 2014).
5278:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00266.x
4848:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x
4699:. London: George Allen and Unwin.
4260:O'Connor, Timothy (Oct 29, 2010).
3760:10.1093/oso/9780199242269.003.0008
3572:10.1016/B978-0-12-800284-1.00001-1
2607:
1879:Free will as a psychological state
1475:, although it does not invalidate
354:
14:
16549:
15788:Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation
15437:Damasio's theory of consciousness
14791:
12090:"FMedieval Theories of Free Will"
12047:
8491:Here the online text of the Summa
8432:"Catholic Encyclopedia: Appetite"
8400:Timothy O'Connor (Oct 29, 2010).
8339:Hartung, Christopher (May 2013).
8147:CM Lorkowski (November 7, 2010).
7342:Aristotle on Moral Responsibility
7088:Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (1996).
5316:. Psychology Press. pp. 197
3334:, and further (ii) the nature of
3321:justice could not be administered
2766:support Libet's original findings
2643:hardware random number generators
2055:
1686:A contrasting approach is called
1296:
1052:Pereboom calls positions 3 and 4
16249:Quantum mechanics of time travel
16229:Chronology protection conjecture
16065:Proximate and ultimate causation
15932:
15923:
15922:
15850:Journal of Consciousness Studies
15738:Sociology of human consciousness
15574:Dual consciousness (split-brain)
15477:Orchestrated objective reduction
14746:
14745:
13537:
13527:
13526:
12116:
12104:
11680:"Consciousness: An Afterthought"
11475:
11449:
11436:
11421:
11403:from the original on 2013-05-28.
11370:
11349:
11331:
11313:
11304:
11295:
11210:
11161:
11139:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x
11116:
11091:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02077.x
11065:
10960:
10913:
10862:
10811:
10776:
10708:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02045.x
10667:
10653:
10616:
10607:
10597:
10584:
10493:
10434:
10412:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x
10387:
10381:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
10350:
10336:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01351.x
10315:
10270:
10208:
10158:
10093:
10013:
9986:
9951:
9908:
9863:
9632:Doody, RS; Jankovic, J. (1992).
9423:
9315:
9264:
9201:
9183:
8985:
8929:
8890:. London: Penguin. p. 179.
8829:
8814:
8768:
8748:
8726:
8696:
8653:Boniolo, G.; Vidali, P. (1999).
8646:
8571:
8479:
8466:
8445:
8424:
8345:(Thesis). University of Delaware
8332:
8292:
8176:
8159:
8079:
8067:
8012:
7987:
7974:
7954:
7936:. In R.H.M. Elwes, trans (ed.).
7910:
7895:
7860:
7825:
7785:
7714:A key exponent of this view was
7695:The Oxford Handbook to Free Will
7649:
7634:
7591:
7362:
7330:
7284:
7066:
7043:
7024:
5606:Free Will: A Philosophical Study
5493:10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104474
5132:from the original on 2011-06-08.
4784:. Random House. pp. 87–104.
4426:Journal of Consciousness Studies
4360:from the original on 2009-11-09.
4058:. Longmans, Green. pp. 145
4033:Journal of Consciousness Studies
3984:Journal of Consciousness Studies
3439:
2827:, because they are not strictly
2678:Neuroscience and neurophilosophy
2324:very weak notion of necessity."
2294:Free will and views of causality
2222:Free will as "moral imagination"
1773:
1279:incompatible-properties argument
245:or sometimes referred to as the
16476:", which is licensed under the
16213:
15978:
15856:Online Consciousness Conference
15843:How the Self Controls Its Brain
13324:Meditations on First Philosophy
12549:
11968:Wegener, Daniel Merton (2002).
11634:"Responsibility and punishment"
11505:, New York, Bantam Books, 2010.
11495:
10938:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104342
10075:. US: Oxford University Press.
9826:Wegener, Daniel Merton (2002).
9769:. New York: Grune and Stratton.
9483:Tourette Syndrome Association.
8609:(5th ed.). Prentice Hall.
8521:with regard to its principles.)
8120:"Notes to pages 74–81, note 22"
8105:(1979 edition). Cambridge, MA:
7904:Faith, Freedom, and Rationality
7740:Stoljar, Daniel (Sep 9, 2009).
7534:Oxford Handbook of Human Action
7498:Oxford Handbook of Human Action
7297:Philosophy & Public Affairs
6931:. Nelson Thornes. p. 211.
6880:
6802:. Merriam-Webster, Incorporated
6788:
6730:
6643:
6614:
6565:
6379:
5671:Daniel Clement Dennett (1981).
5441:
5257:
5186:"Arguments for Incompatibilism"
5075:
4911:. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 44
4827:
4806:
4773:
4748:
4733:
4713:
4688:
4663:
4606:
4494:"Arguments for Incompatibilism"
3902:
3871:
3797:
3120:There are also some holding to
3091:
2923:when two requirements are met:
2916:The Illusion of Conscious Will,
2831:: they may be experienced as a
2389:Thirteenth century philosopher
1510:Assume divine foreknowledge or
964:Agent/substance-causal theories
849:, the theory that a quality of
833:agent/substance-caused events.
15502:Altered state of consciousness
14533:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
13903:Value monism – Value pluralism
12459:Liberty, equality, brotherhood
11971:The Illusion of Conscious Will
11763:The Significance of Free Will.
10135:"The neuroscience of movement"
9829:The Illusion of Conscious Will
9195:The Illusion of Conscious Will
9169:. MIT Press. pp. 119–21.
8778:. Infidels.org. 25 August 2000
8642:. ramakrishnavivekananda.info.
7720:Hylton, Peter (Apr 30, 2010).
6995:Wentzel Van Huyssteen (2003).
6965:Dictionary of World Philosophy
6901:10.1080/00213624.1981.11503814
6256:. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
6125:. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
6022:. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 9.
5603:Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2000).
5343:God, Foreknowledge and Freedom
5208:Raymond J. VanArragon (2010).
4800:Metaphysics: The Big Questions
4592:. Cambridge University Press.
4374:How Brains Make Up Their Minds
4287:Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics
4228:"Free will. In E. Craig (Ed.)"
3884:. Lexington Books. p. 8.
3782:
3739:
3722:
3417:, a philosopher known for his
3359:, or divine commanding power.
3080:
2300:Principle of sufficient reason
2165:principle of sufficient reason
2083:
1791:was a classical compatibilist.
1698:is no more extensive than its
1642:and non-physical expositions.
1436:can also be seen as a form of
1250:
1166:with respect to violations of
642:completely by laws of physics.
45:is the capacity or ability to
1:
16345:Parallel universes in fiction
15604:Hard problem of consciousness
15462:Integrated information theory
11127:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
10110:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00401-2
9960:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
9794:10.1016/S0165-0173(99)00052-1
8994:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
8717:10.1016/S0262-4079(06)61122-6
8410:Philosophers who distinguish
8124:The significance of free will
7612:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5
7392:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
7037:The Consolation of Philosophy
6284:Michael J. Zimmerman (1984).
6058:Roderick M. Chisholm (2004).
5956:The Significance of Free Will
5451:(London, 1797), Vol. 1, p. 92
5341:Fischer, John Martin (1989).
5266:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
5188:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
4672:The Significance of Free Will
4520:"Foreknowledge and Free Will"
3520:
3252:U.S. House of Representatives
3128:. Among Protestants there is
3013:Among evolutionary biologists
2801:such as Libet's and Fried's.
2633:, and open to many different
2420:Free will as a pseudo-problem
1911:Free will as unpredictability
1756:hard problem of consciousness
1694:holding that everything that
1245:problem of future contingents
1089:The contemporary philosopher
1015:D is unproven, but we have F.
933:Miracles: A preliminary study
16355:Philosophy of space and time
16173:Libertarianism (metaphysics)
15902:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
15889:The Science of Consciousness
15763:Subjectivity and objectivity
14597:On the Genealogy of Morality
14557:Critique of Practical Reason
13509:Philosophy of space and time
11775:Lawhead, William F. (2005).
11609:The New York Review of Books
11472:1982, Hackett, esp pp. 46–47
11380:Guide to Understanding Islam
10514:10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001
10244:American Sociological Review
10186:10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.012
9929:10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001
9399:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045
8404:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
8233:Herbert James Paton (1971).
7932:Benedict de Spinoza (2008).
7744:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
7724:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
7600:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
7215:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
7161:Karl Raimund Popper (1999).
7132:. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.).
7050:Aquinas, St. Thomas (1923).
6816:"Freedom and psycho-genesis"
6502:. Mohr Siebeck. p. 50.
6195:. Cornell University Press.
6038:and would be more likely to
5789:. Harvard University Press.
5575:. Cornell University Press.
5396:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
5249:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
5002:Niels Bohr (April 1, 1933).
4978:. Robert O. Doyle, publisher
4816:How to think about free will
4742:The Metaphysics of Free Will
4534:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4522:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4496:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4409:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4264:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4052:"The dilemma of determinism"
3915:. Beacon Press. p. 38.
3564:Recent Research on Free Will
3525:
3261:the concept of "Free will" (
3021:Effects of the belief itself
2159:, the actions of humans, as
1849:if the person had decided to
1636:Philosophical models of mind
1592:Dualism (philosophy of mind)
1492:soft theological determinism
1465:hard theological determinism
1009:D is true, and we do have F.
791:Libertarianism (metaphysics)
278:to make rational decisions.
7:
15895:Understanding Consciousness
15822:Consciousness and Cognition
15810:A Universe of Consciousness
13384:The Phenomenology of Spirit
12323:Freedom from discrimination
12158:
12005:Williams, Clifford (1980).
11924:Van Inwagen, Peter (1986).
11531:Cave, Stephen (June 2016).
11442:Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848)
11345:. Harvard University Press.
10502:Consciousness and Cognition
10174:Consciousness and Cognition
10041:10.1080/0951508021000042049
9917:Consciousness and Cognition
9487:. Retrieved 19 August 2006.
9197:. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9134:David A. Rosenbaum (2009).
8342:Thomas Aquinas on Free Will
8266:Freeman, Walter J. (2009).
8023:(in German). Archived from
7697:. Oxford University Press.
7234:E. Bruce Goldstein (2010).
7167:All Life is Problem Solving
7096:. Oxford University Press.
6324:. Oxford University Press.
5959:. Oxford University Press.
5643:. Oxford University Press.
5539:. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
5420:. Oxford University Press.
5149:Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
4289:. Oxford University Press.
4202:Understanding Consciousness
4073:John A Bargh (2007-11-16).
3604:. Oxford University Press.
3489:Problem of mental causation
3432:
3289:
3277:
2649:
1976:approach to studying human
1750:It has been noted that the
785:Metaphysical libertarianism
702:incompatible with free will
464:for "true" and "false" and
291:Metaphysical libertarianism
164:ancient Greek philosophical
108:metaphysical libertarianism
10:
16554:
16335:Many-worlds interpretation
16222:General terms and concepts
15869:The Astonishing Hypothesis
15564:Disorders of consciousness
14525:A Treatise of Human Nature
13584:
12184:Personification of Liberty
12032:, "Is the Cosmos Random? (
12011:Hackett Publishing Company
11855:, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
11851:On the Freedom of the Will
11684:Cognition and Brain Theory
11511:Laws, Mind, and Free Will.
11289:Immanuel Missionary Church
10229:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.012
9894:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480
9239:Consciousness Reconsidered
8002:, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
7999:On the Freedom of the Will
7921:. Oxford University Press.
7462:A Treatise of Human Nature
6889:Journal of Economic Issues
6800:Merriam-Webster Dictionary
6600:Collins English Dictionary
6549:10.4135/9781412963961.n191
6106:10.5840/philtopics19962427
5851:Peter Van Inwagen (1983).
5785:Philosophical Explanations
5724:10.5840/faithphil199512123
4757:Freedom and Responsibility
4371:Walter J. Freeman (2000).
4003:For full text on line see
3912:Freedom of choice affirmed
3848:"The problem of free will"
3791:On the Freedom of the Will
3704:. Routledge. pp. 142
3461:Angst#Existentialist angst
3425:, and thus that non-human
3236:
3232:
3166:On the Bondage of the Will
3084:
3024:
2892:
2885:and delusions of control.
2715:, which was discovered by
2691:
2681:
2523:
2311:A Treatise of Human Nature
2297:
2210:On the Freedom of the Will
2059:
1958:
1872:Dictionnaire philosophique
1777:
1673:psychophysical parallelism
1585:
1579:
1383:
1338:chain of prior occurrences
1306:
1300:
1254:
1231:
1189:
1127:
1078:, a similar stance on the
1076:theological noncognitivism
878:Deliberative indeterminism
864:deliberative indeterminism
788:
676:
358:
249:. This dilemma leads to a
201:
34:
22:Free will (disambiguation)
18:
16396:
16353:
16317:
16294:
16257:
16221:
16052:
15986:
15918:
15801:
15649:Minimally conscious state
15559:Consciousness after death
15489:
15419:
15291:
15284:
15219:
15113:
15047:
14806:
14799:
14741:
14648:
14493:
14259:
13984:
13913:
13775:
13650:
13592:
13522:
13446:
13245:
12985:
12713:
12557:
12464:All men are created equal
12451:
12275:
12229:
12166:
11943:Exeter: Imprint Academic
11632:Goodenough, O.R. (2004).
11560:. New York: Viking Press
11386:. Istanbul. p. 209.
11327:. London: Luzac & Co.
11041:10.1007/s12152-009-9046-8
10570:10.1007/s12152-010-9058-4
10141:. MIT Press. p. 19.
9972:10.1017/S0140525X04300154
9161:Gallagher, Shaun (2009).
9097:10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7
9006:10.1017/S0140525X00044903
8840:. New York: McGraw-Hill.
8299:Staley, Kevin M. (2005).
8274:. MIT Press. p. 88.
8235:"§2 Moral judgements are
7722:"Willard van Orman Quine"
7388:McKenna, Michael (2004).
7375:, Oxford 1998, Chapter 6.
6997:"theological determinism"
6720:10.1080/13604819608900044
6496:Ben C. Blackwell (2011).
5993:. HarperCollins. p.
5392:Randolph, Clarke (2008).
5374:. London: Luzac & Co.
5370:Watt, Montgomery (1948).
5347:Stanford University Press
5245:Eshleman, Andrew (2009).
5143:G.H.R. Parkinson (2012).
5115:10.1142/S0219635206001112
4530:McKenna, Michael (2009).
4518:Zagzebski, Linda (2011).
4405:McKenna, Michael (2009).
4226:Strawson, Galen (2011) .
4075:"Free will is un-natural"
3746:Bobzien, Susanne (2000).
3639:C. James Goodwin (2009).
3598:Bobzien, Susanne (1998).
3408:Some philosophers follow
3387:
2811:For example, people with
2688:Neuroscience of free will
2231:The Philosophy of Freedom
2067:Alternatives to strictly
1961:Neuroscience of free will
1708:non-reductive physicalism
1669:epistemological pluralism
1661:"three-world" formulation
954:neuroscience of free will
917:non-reductive physicalism
772:psychological determinism
542:
507:
502:
499:
496:
493:
490:
487:
484:
481:
478:
372:metaphysical libertarians
16244:Self-fulfilling prophecy
16077:Contingency (philosophy)
15512:Artificial consciousness
15029:William Kingdon Clifford
13876:Universal prescriptivism
13499:Philosophy of psychology
13434:Simulacra and Simulation
11626:Artificial intelligences
11584:, New York: Dana Press,
11232:10.1177/1948550609351600
11186:10.1177/1088868308316091
11020:Holton, Richard (2011).
10987:10.1177/2515245920917931
10888:10.3389/FPSYG.2017.00020
10837:10.1177/1948550618780732
10797:10.1177/1948550616667616
10754:10.1177/0146167208327217
10069:Mele, Alfred R. (2009).
10029:Philosophical Psychology
9767:Clinical Psychopathology
9695:10.1177/1534582303260119
9290:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385
8640:"Sayings and utterances"
8364:Stump, Eleonore (2003).
8308:The Saint Anselm Journal
8193:online text of his proof
8172:online text of his proof
8107:Harvard University Press
7466:Of liberty and necessity
7237:Sensation and Perception
7090:"chapter 6, section 2.1"
6959:A. Pabl Iannone (2001).
6287:An essay on human action
6187:William L. Rowe (1991).
6042:our freedom rather than
5817:Richard Sorabji (1980).
5184:Vihvelin, Kadri (2003).
4874:Strawson, Galen (2010).
4782:Freedom and Determinisim
4589:Living without Free Will
4552:van Invagen, P. (1983).
4492:Vihvelin, Kadri (2011).
3666:Robert C Bishop (2010).
3509:Voluntarism (philosophy)
3346:
3132:, held primarily by the
2881:), leading to attendant
2743:awareness of action was
2534:) schools of thought in
2102:Free will as an illusion
2060:Not to be confused with
1754:have yet to resolve the
1744:metaphysical libertarian
1656:interactionalist dualism
1534:Deny the truth value of
1457:metaphysical libertarian
1062:classical libertarianism
1036:Living without Free Will
983:interactionalist dualism
700:is true, and that it is
180:Alexander of Aphrodisias
98:Ancient Greek philosophy
35:Not to be confused with
16518:Concepts in metaphysics
15829:Consciousness Explained
15748:Stream of consciousness
15723:Secondary consciousness
15447:Global workspace theory
15432:Dynamic core hypothesis
15427:Attention schema theory
15401:Revisionary materialism
15316:Eliminative materialism
14839:Charles Augustus Strong
13665:Artificial intelligence
13364:Critique of Pure Reason
11695:Harnad, Stevan (2001).
11343:The Philosophy of Kalam
10875:Frontiers in Psychology
10468:10.1073/pnas.1012046108
9349:10.1073/pnas.1210467109
9236:Flanagan, O.J. (1992).
9048:10.1093/brain/106.3.623
8971:10.1093/brain/106.3.623
8915:. New York: NYREV Inc.
8655:Filosofia della Scienza
8314:(2): 74. Archived from
8149:"David Hume: Causation"
7881:10.25162/arsp-2019-0001
7846:10.1111/1467-9973.00240
7716:Willard van Orman Quine
7564:Saul Smilansky (2000).
7470:Oxford University Press
7128:Sandro Nannini (2004).
6223:Richard Taylor (1966).
5919:John R. Searle (2001).
5760:10.1023/a:1004218827363
5637:Alfred R. Mele (2006).
5308:John T Roberts (2006).
5253:(Winter 2009 ed.).
5192:(Winter 2003 ed.).
4936:Alex Rosenberg (2005).
4819:, p. 15, archived from
4697:On Selfhood and Godhood
4695:Campbell, C.A. (1957).
4538:(Winter 2009 ed.).
4500:(Spring 2011 ed.).
4335:10.1196/annals.1279.003
3992:Feelings or intuitions
3909:Corliss Lamont (1969).
3878:Gregg D Caruso (2012).
3696:Janet Richards (2001).
3328:paradox that will arise
3072:counterfactual thinking
2908:Experimental psychology
2889:Experimental psychology
2340:Critique of Pure Reason
1936:and unknowable future.
1558:Alternate Possibilities
1391:Theological determinism
1386:Theological determinism
1380:Theological determinism
1367:theological determinism
1287:argument from free will
1271:theological determinism
1212:theological determinism
1060:, position 6 a form of
1056:, position 1 a form of
812:physics. This includes
745:Theological determinism
706:nomological determinism
472:Galen Strawson's table
451:different circumstances
326:theological determinism
322:nomological determinism
320:in the strict sense of
236:nomological determinism
16533:Philosophy of religion
16523:Philosophical problems
16408:closed timelike curves
16259:Time travel in fiction
16153:Metaphysical necessity
15883:The Emperor's New Mind
15689:Problem of other minds
15624:Introspection illusion
15457:Holonomic brain theory
14814:Alfred North Whitehead
12955:Type–token distinction
12783:Hypostatic abstraction
12565:Abstract object theory
12121:Quotations related to
11926:An Essay on Free Will.
11650:10.1098/rstb.2004.1548
11508:Horst, Steven (2011),
10625:Psychological Bulletin
10133:Susan Pockett (2009).
10020:Nahmias, Eddy (2002).
9765:Schneider, K. (1959).
7980:Schopenhauer, Arthur.
7919:The Free Will Handbook
7807:"Moral Non-Naturalism"
7567:Free Will and Illusion
7396:(Summer 200 ed.).
6686:Cite journal requires
6626:Philosophy 302: Ethics
6579:. 2010. Archived from
5885:Ted Honderich (1973).
5781:Robert Nozick (1981).
5300:scientific determinism
5247:"Moral Responsibility"
4740:Fischer, R.M. (1994).
4050:William James (1896).
3846:John R Searle (2013).
3319:("commandments"), and
3254:
3101:
3044:
2969:Believing in free will
2956:introspection illusion
2713:Bereitschaftspotential
2580:
2356:perceived with senses)
2205:
2152:
2114:
1792:
1611:
1556:Deny the Principle of
1452:
1347:biological determinism
904:Efforts of will theory
872:efforts of will theory
814:interactionist dualism
801:
764:biological determinism
692:
643:
590:, and position (2) is
307:physical indeterminism
269:, that is, separating
247:dilemma of determinism
204:Free will in antiquity
185:The term "free will" (
170:(4th century BCE) and
16456:Traversable wormholes
16234:Closed timelike curve
16168:Uncertainty principle
15684:Primary consciousness
15569:Divided consciousness
15472:Multiple drafts model
14974:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
14589:The Methods of Ethics
13827:Divine command theory
13822:Ideal observer theory
13544:Philosophy portal
13424:Being and Nothingness
12840:Mental representation
11910:Tosun, Ender (2020).
11874:. Cham, Switzerland.
11812:Psychological Review.
11761:Kane, Robert (1998).
11377:Tosun, Ender (2012).
11357:"Man and His Destiny"
10696:Psychological Science
9872:American Psychologist
9650:10.1136/jnnp.55.9.806
9511:10.1542/pir.21-11-372
8911:Lewontin, R. (2000).
8800:. Prentice Hall Inc.
8678:Hoefer, Carl (2008).
8578:Flood, Gavin (2004).
8487:Summa contra gentiles
8434:. Newadvent.org. 1907
8204:R Kevin Hill (2003).
8045:Keimpe Algra (1999).
7412:Journal of Philosophy
6814:Ormond, A.T. (1894).
6119:Alan Donagan (1987).
5922:Rationality in Action
5854:An Essay on Free Will
5748:Philosophical Studies
5400:(Fall 2008 ed.).
5068:Full text on line at
4722:Being and Nothingness
4720:Sartre, J.P. (1943).
4615:Philosophical Studies
4586:Pereboom, D. (2003).
4554:An Essay on Free Will
4526:(Fall 2011 ed.).
4138:Paul Russell (2002).
4105:John A Bargh (2008).
3819:The View From Nowhere
3813:Thomas Nagel (1989).
3250:of Maimonides in the
3246:
3099:
3087:Free will in theology
3039:
2946:authorship processing
2727:Libet found that the
2660:nature versus nurture
2629:far from a potential
2595:Scientific approaches
2575:
2253:and the teachings of
2184:
2163:, are subject to the
2143:
2109:
2021:personality disorders
1943:In the philosophy of
1787:
1704:Reductive physicalism
1618:is one aspect of the
1607:
1564:In the definition of
1446:
1281:for the existence of
942:quantum indeterminacy
922:Although at the time
857:Event-causal theories
798:
686:
664:uncertainty principle
633:
106:and encompasses both
16267:Timelines in fiction
16109:Deterministic system
15836:Cosmic Consciousness
15674:Philosophical zombie
15614:Higher consciousness
15507:Animal consciousness
15311:Double-aspect theory
14844:Christopher Peacocke
14706:Political philosophy
13469:Feminist metaphysics
12509:Right-libertarianism
12489:Civil libertarianism
12443:Water and sanitation
12179:Moral responsibility
12113:at Wikimedia Commons
11939:Velmans, Max (2003)
11846:Schopenhauer, Arthur
11749:I Am A Strange Loop.
11259:The Gospel Coalition
11072:Miles, J.B. (2011).
9734:10.1136/jnnp.68.1.83
9499:Pediatrics in Review
8861:Dawkins, R. (1976).
8796:Pinel, P.J. (1990).
8680:"Causal Determinism"
8657:. Milan: Mondadori.
8366:"Intellect and will"
8118:Robert Kane (1998).
7291:Rawls, John (1985).
7052:"Ia, q. 14, art 13."
6820:Psychological Review
6583:on September 4, 2012
6352:Thomas Reid (2012).
6094:Philosophical Topics
6064:. Psychology Press.
5987:Lewis, C.S. (1947).
5953:Robert Kane (1996).
5711:Faith and Philosophy
5567:Hugh McCann (1998).
5414:Robert Kane (2005).
4802:. Oxford: Blackwell.
4744:. Oxford: Blackwell.
4643:Dennett, D. (1984).
4199:Max Velmans (2009).
4027:Max Velmans (2002).
3978:The Volitional Brain
3185:Christian perfection
3144:held by most in the
3140:; and there is also
3109:, adopted from what
2899:Cognitive psychology
2631:theory of everything
2513:Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
2317:regularly succeeding
2062:Religious naturalism
2013:substance dependence
2009:cognitive psychology
1692:philosophical theory
1500:divine foreknowledge
1488:theological fatalism
1174:at present are both
1118:hard incompatibilism
989:Hard incompatibilism
779:adequate determinism
768:cultural determinism
737:The notion that all
652:Physical determinism
612:hard incompatibilism
430:consequence argument
318:physical determinism
243:problem of free will
232:physical determinism
158:History of free will
129:hold that free will
116:hard incompatibilism
58:moral responsibility
20:For other uses, see
16503:Action (philosophy)
16304:Grandfather paradox
15609:Heterophenomenology
15522:Attentional control
15171:Lawrence Weiskrantz
14999:Patricia Churchland
14834:Brian O'Shaughnessy
14819:Arthur Schopenhauer
14676:Evolutionary ethics
14637:Reasons and Persons
14613:A Theory of Justice
13767:Uncertain sentience
13314:Daneshnameh-ye Alai
12825:Linguistic modality
12499:Left-libertarianism
12494:Drug liberalization
12039:Scientific American
11819:Sapolsky, Robert M.
11745:Hofstadter, Douglas
11577:Complexity, IV (5).
11444:Journals and Papers
11310:Rambam Teshuvah 5:5
11301:Rambam Teshuvah 5:4
10459:2010PNAS..10722469P
10400:Mind & Language
10324:Mind & Language
9591:Annals of Neurology
9546:Human Brain Mapping
9449:10.7554/elife.39787
9340:2012PNAS..109E2904S
9137:Human Motor Control
8886:Pinker, S. (2002).
8836:Morris, D. (1967).
8823:Behavioral Genetics
8761:Scientific American
8605:Koller, J. (2007).
7673:Dennett, D. (2003)
7641:Watson, D. (1982).
7073:C.S. Lewis (1980).
6855:1992SPIE.1710..714G
6712:1996City....1..181S
6667:2001hep.th....4219T
6577:Oxford Dictionaries
6459:10.1038/nature05677
6451:2007Natur.446..871G
6248:John Thorp (1980).
5857:. Clarendon Press.
5485:2021BiSys.20804474G
5014:1933Natur.131..457B
4327:2003NYASA1001...39D
4306:DC Dennett (2003).
3456:Agency in Mormonism
3415:Philo of Alexandria
2978:What people believe
2841:alien hand syndrome
2709:readiness potential
2434:Buddhist philosophy
2182:, Book 2, Sec. 23:
2157:Arthur Schopenhauer
2145:Arthur Schopenhauer
1700:physical properties
1690:. Physicalism is a
1320:that all events of
1228:Logical determinism
891:John Martin Fischer
837:Non-causal theories
824:overrides physical
733:Logical determinism
473:
16528:Philosophy of life
16513:Concepts in ethics
16480:but not under the
16402:general relativity
16325:Alternative future
16318:Parallel timelines
16296:Temporal paradoxes
16272:in science fiction
15909:Wider than the Sky
15876:The Conscious Mind
15679:Philosophy of mind
15659:Neurophenomenology
15634:Locked-in syndrome
15629:Knowledge argument
15293:Philosophy of mind
14914:George Henry Lewes
14884:Douglas Hofstadter
14671:Ethics in religion
14666:Descriptive ethics
14501:Nicomachean Ethics
13504:Philosophy of self
13494:Philosophy of mind
12758:Embodied cognition
12670:Scientific realism
12088:Colleen McClusky.
11552:Dennett, Daniel C.
11291:. 1986. p. 7.
10680:2016-06-17 at the
9277:Front Hum Neurosci
8607:Asian Philosophies
8496:2017-11-23 at the
7468:" (1967 edition).
7444:Hobbes, T. (1651)
7338:Meyer, Susan Sauve
7134:Mind and Causality
7033:"Book V, Prose vi"
6739:Studia Leibnitiana
6414:2007-08-25 at the
6385:Locke, J. (1689).
6226:Action and purpose
5640:Free Will and Luck
5609:. Westview Press.
4878:Freedom and belief
4649:. Bradford Books.
4627:10.1007/BF01112527
4413:(Winter ed.).
4010:2013-05-05 at the
3694:See, for example,
3472:De libero arbitrio
3255:
3154:Augustine of Hippo
3146:Reformed tradition
3134:Methodist Churches
3102:
3004:Among philosophers
2920:empirical evidence
2530:The six orthodox (
2429:Eastern philosophy
2267:moral imagination.
2235:freedom of thought
2153:
2115:
1998:cognitive sciences
1807:Nicomachean Ethics
1793:
1612:
1588:Philosophy of mind
1536:future contingents
1453:
1438:causal determinism
1363:Christian theology
1334:causal determinism
1124:Causal determinism
802:
723:thought experiment
713:Causal determinism
693:
644:
614:if one interprets
586:. Position (1) is
471:
198:Western philosophy
16464:
16463:
16416:Alcubierre metric
16330:Alternate history
16181:
16180:
15946:
15945:
15644:Mind–body problem
15594:Flash suppression
15554:Cartesian theater
15539:Binocular rivalry
15485:
15484:
15351:Mind–body dualism
15280:
15279:
15267:Victor J. Stenger
15242:Erwin Schrödinger
15196:Stanislas Dehaene
15176:Michael Gazzaniga
15060:Donald D. Hoffman
14944:John Polkinghorne
14924:Gottfried Leibniz
14759:
14758:
14726:Social philosophy
14711:Population ethics
14701:Philosophy of law
14681:History of ethics
14164:Political freedom
13841:Euthyphro dilemma
13632:Suffering-focused
13552:
13551:
12731:Category of being
12700:Truthmaker theory
12517:
12516:
12174:Cognitive liberty
12109:Media related to
11984:978-0-262-23222-7
11963:978-90-254-3522-6
11920:978-605-63198-2-2
11881:978-3-319-58301-3
11838:978-0-5255-6097-5
11757:978-0-465-03078-1
11740:978-1-4516-8340-0
11697:"No Easy Way Out"
11644:(1451): 1805–09.
11600:Kevin J. Mitchell
11592:, pp. 51–70.
11393:978-605-63198-1-5
10148:978-0-262-51257-2
10119:978-0-12-374472-2
10082:978-0-19-538426-0
10006:978-0-19-518963-6
9842:978-0-262-23222-7
9603:10.1002/ana.21173
9558:10.1002/hbm.20771
9249:978-0-262-56077-1
9224:978-0-7618-5862-1
9176:978-0-262-51257-2
9147:978-0-12-374226-1
8635:Swami Vivekananda
8616:978-0-13-092385-1
8591:978-0-521-60401-7
8546:978-0-19-973339-2
8412:freedom of action
8386:978-0-415-02960-5
8281:978-0-262-51257-2
8252:978-0-8122-1023-1
8219:978-0-19-928552-5
8133:978-0-19-512656-3
8101:James, W. (1907)
8060:978-0-521-25028-3
8019:Steiner, Rudolf.
7960:Hume, D. (1765).
7947:978-1-4209-3114-3
7778:978-0-7637-5083-1
7577:978-0-19-825018-0
7547:978-0-19-530998-0
7511:978-0-19-530998-0
7460:Hume, D. (1740).
7277:978-0-14-023012-3
7247:978-0-495-60149-4
7180:978-0-415-17486-2
7147:978-1-58811-475-4
7126:See for example:
7103:978-0-19-510763-0
7075:Mere Christianity
7010:978-0-02-865705-9
6974:978-0-415-17995-9
6938:978-0-7487-8078-5
6863:10.1117/12.140132
6558:978-1-4129-4164-8
6509:978-3-16-151672-6
6365:978-1-4077-2950-3
6331:978-0-19-875160-1
6297:978-0-8204-0122-5
6202:978-0-8014-2557-8
6166:978-0-19-517854-8
6132:978-0-7102-1168-2
6071:978-0-415-29593-2
6029:978-1-4051-3486-6
6004:978-0-688-17369-2
5966:978-0-19-510550-6
5932:978-0-262-69282-3
5898:978-0-7100-7392-1
5864:978-0-19-824924-5
5830:978-0-7156-1549-2
5796:978-0-674-66479-1
5684:978-0-262-54037-7
5650:978-0-19-530504-3
5616:978-0-8133-9093-2
5582:978-0-8014-8583-1
5546:978-0-7546-6058-3
5427:978-0-19-514970-8
5327:978-0-415-93927-0
5221:978-1-4411-3867-5
5158:978-0-415-00323-0
5031:978-0-444-89972-9
4949:978-0-415-34317-6
4922:978-1-4051-3486-6
4893:978-0-19-924750-9
4670:Kane, R. (1996).
4656:978-0-262-54042-1
4599:978-0-521-79198-4
4473:978-1-4051-3486-6
4384:978-0-231-12008-1
4296:978-0-19-162091-1
4238:on 26 August 2012
4212:978-0-415-42515-5
4185:978-0-19-518963-6
4153:978-0-19-515290-6
4124:978-0-19-518963-6
3974:TW Clark (1999).
3960:978-0-19-518963-6
3891:978-0-7391-7136-3
3861:978-0-231-51055-4
3828:978-0-19-505644-0
3769:978-0-19-924226-9
3715:978-0-415-21243-4
3681:978-0-521-88239-2
3652:978-0-470-52278-3
3611:978-0-19-823794-5
3479:Free will theorem
3447:Philosophy portal
3410:William of Ockham
3394:Søren Kierkegaard
3278:bechirah chofshit
3275:
3113:put forth in the
2895:Cognitive science
2813:Tourette syndrome
2654:Like physicists,
2626:Quantum mechanics
2567:Swami Vivekananda
2565:A quotation from
2482:Pubbekatahetuvada
2461:karma in Buddhism
2452:pratītyasamutpāda
2239:freedom of action
2073:mind–body dualism
2071:physics, such as
1955:The physical mind
1949:Newcomb's paradox
1903:The first group,
1801:political liberty
1646:Cartesian dualism
1638:are divided into
1620:mind–body problem
1582:Mind–body problem
1576:Mind–body problem
1153:Quantum mechanics
924:quantum mechanics
636:domino's movement
577:
576:
434:Peter van Inwagen
380:Peter van Inwagen
271:freedom of choice
191:the Enlightenment
187:liberum arbitrium
16545:
16538:Religious ethics
16451:van Stockum dust
16363:Butterfly effect
16208:
16201:
16194:
16185:
16184:
16163:Superdeterminism
16158:Necessitarianism
16138:Hard determinism
16118:Non-essentialism
16087:Cause (medicine)
15973:
15966:
15959:
15950:
15949:
15936:
15935:
15926:
15925:
15768:Unconscious mind
15396:Reflexive monism
15391:Property dualism
15366:New mysterianism
15326:Epiphenomenalism
15306:Computationalism
15301:Anomalous monism
15289:
15288:
15181:Michael Graziano
15151:Francisco Varela
15055:Carl Gustav Jung
15019:Thomas Metzinger
14989:Martin Heidegger
14969:Kenneth M. Sayre
14829:Bertrand Russell
14804:
14803:
14786:
14779:
14772:
14763:
14762:
14749:
14748:
14696:Moral psychology
14641:
14633:
14625:
14621:Practical Ethics
14617:
14609:
14605:Principia Ethica
14601:
14593:
14585:
14577:
14569:
14561:
14553:
14545:
14537:
14529:
14521:
14513:
14509:Ethics (Spinoza)
14505:
14144:Moral imperative
13602:Consequentialism
13579:
13572:
13565:
13556:
13555:
13542:
13541:
13540:
13530:
13529:
13439:
13429:
13419:
13409:
13399:
13389:
13379:
13369:
13359:
13349:
13339:
13329:
13319:
13309:
13299:
13289:
13279:
13269:
13259:
12935:Substantial form
12747:Cogito, ergo sum
12690:Substance theory
12544:
12537:
12530:
12521:
12520:
12201:Positive liberty
12196:Negative liberty
12153:
12146:
12139:
12130:
12129:
12120:
12108:
12099:
12084:
12069:
12060:Zalta, Edward N.
12009:. Indianapolis:
12002:
12000:
11999:
11993:
11987:. Archived from
11976:
11907:
11901:
11893:
11842:
11716:
11691:
11671:
11661:
11540:
11503:The Grand Design
11489:
11479:
11473:
11470:Norman Kretzmann
11466:
11460:
11453:
11447:
11440:
11434:
11433:
11425:
11419:
11418:
11412:
11404:
11402:
11385:
11374:
11368:
11367:
11365:
11364:
11353:
11347:
11346:
11335:
11329:
11328:
11321:Watt, Montgomery
11317:
11311:
11308:
11302:
11299:
11293:
11292:
11277:
11271:
11270:
11268:
11266:
11250:
11244:
11243:
11214:
11208:
11207:
11197:
11165:
11159:
11158:
11120:
11114:
11113:
11103:
11093:
11069:
11063:
11062:
11052:
11026:
11017:
11000:
10999:
10989:
10964:
10958:
10957:
10917:
10911:
10910:
10900:
10890:
10866:
10860:
10859:
10849:
10839:
10815:
10809:
10808:
10780:
10774:
10773:
10737:
10728:
10727:
10691:
10685:
10671:
10665:
10664:
10663:. November 2021.
10657:
10651:
10650:
10647:10.1037/h0032060
10640:
10620:
10614:
10611:
10605:
10601:
10595:
10588:
10582:
10581:
10553:
10542:
10541:
10497:
10491:
10490:
10480:
10470:
10453:(52): 22469–74.
10438:
10432:
10431:
10391:
10385:
10384:
10374:
10354:
10348:
10347:
10319:
10313:
10312:
10294:
10274:
10268:
10267:
10239:
10233:
10232:
10212:
10206:
10205:
10171:
10162:
10156:
10155:
10130:
10124:
10123:
10097:
10091:
10090:
10085:. Archived from
10066:
10060:
10059:
10057:
10051:. Archived from
10026:
10017:
10011:
10010:
9990:
9984:
9983:
9955:
9949:
9948:
9912:
9906:
9905:
9887:
9867:
9861:
9860:
9858:
9857:
9851:
9845:. Archived from
9834:
9823:
9814:
9813:
9777:
9771:
9770:
9762:
9756:
9755:
9745:
9713:
9707:
9706:
9678:
9672:
9671:
9661:
9629:
9623:
9622:
9586:
9580:
9579:
9569:
9537:
9531:
9530:
9494:
9488:
9481:
9472:
9471:
9461:
9451:
9427:
9421:
9420:
9410:
9378:
9372:
9371:
9361:
9351:
9334:(42): 16776–77.
9319:
9313:
9312:
9302:
9292:
9268:
9262:
9261:
9233:
9227:
9205:
9199:
9198:
9187:
9181:
9180:
9158:
9152:
9151:
9130:
9124:
9123:
9121:
9115:. Archived from
9082:
9073:
9067:
9066:
9064:
9058:. Archived from
9033:
9024:
9018:
9017:
8989:
8983:
8982:
8954:
8943:
8933:
8927:
8926:
8908:
8902:
8901:
8883:
8877:
8876:
8863:The Selfish Gene
8858:
8852:
8851:
8833:
8827:
8826:
8818:
8812:
8811:
8793:
8787:
8786:
8784:
8783:
8772:
8766:
8765:
8752:
8746:
8745:
8743:
8742:
8730:
8724:
8723:
8700:
8694:
8693:
8691:
8690:
8675:
8669:
8668:
8650:
8644:
8643:
8632:
8621:
8620:
8602:
8596:
8595:
8575:
8569:
8562:
8551:
8550:
8528:
8522:
8483:
8477:
8474:Summa Theologiae
8472:Thomas Aquinas,
8470:
8464:
8463:
8461:
8460:
8449:
8443:
8442:
8440:
8439:
8428:
8422:
8421:
8397:
8391:
8390:
8360:
8354:
8353:
8351:
8350:
8336:
8330:
8329:
8327:
8326:
8320:
8305:
8296:
8290:
8289:
8263:
8257:
8256:
8230:
8224:
8223:
8201:
8195:
8180:
8174:
8163:
8157:
8156:
8144:
8138:
8137:
8115:
8109:
8099:
8090:
8083:
8077:
8071:
8065:
8064:
8042:
8036:
8035:
8033:
8032:
8016:
8010:
7991:
7985:
7978:
7972:
7958:
7952:
7951:
7929:
7923:
7922:
7914:
7908:
7907:
7899:
7893:
7892:
7864:
7858:
7857:
7829:
7823:
7822:
7820:
7818:
7802:
7796:
7795:CSP, 2014, Ch. 7
7789:
7783:
7782:
7756:
7750:
7749:
7736:
7730:
7729:
7712:
7706:
7691:
7685:
7677:. Viking Books.
7671:
7662:
7661:
7653:
7647:
7646:
7638:
7632:
7631:
7595:
7589:
7588:
7586:
7584:
7561:
7555:
7554:
7525:
7519:
7518:
7489:
7480:
7464:Section VIII.: "
7458:
7452:
7442:
7436:
7435:
7407:
7398:
7397:
7385:
7376:
7369:Bobzien, Susanne
7366:
7360:
7359:
7353:
7345:
7334:
7328:
7327:
7325:
7323:
7288:
7282:
7281:
7258:
7252:
7251:
7231:
7225:
7224:
7208:
7195:
7189:
7188:
7158:
7152:
7151:
7124:
7115:
7114:
7112:
7110:
7085:
7079:
7078:
7070:
7064:
7062:Summa Theologica
7059:
7056:Summa Theologica
7047:
7041:
7040:
7028:
7022:
7021:
7019:
7017:
6992:
6986:
6985:
6983:
6981:
6956:
6950:
6949:
6947:
6945:
6922:
6916:
6915:
6884:
6878:
6877:
6838:
6832:10.1037/h0065249
6812:See for example
6811:
6809:
6807:
6796:"Predeterminism"
6792:
6786:
6785:
6780:
6778:
6764:
6758:
6757:
6734:
6728:
6727:
6695:
6689:
6684:
6682:
6674:
6660:
6649:See for example
6647:
6641:
6640:
6635:
6633:
6618:
6612:
6611:
6609:
6607:
6596:"Predeterminism"
6592:
6590:
6588:
6573:"Predeterminism"
6569:
6563:
6562:
6532:
6521:
6520:
6518:
6516:
6493:
6487:
6486:
6444:
6435:(7138): 871–75.
6424:
6418:
6401:
6392:
6383:
6377:
6376:
6374:
6372:
6349:
6343:
6342:
6340:
6338:
6315:
6309:
6308:
6306:
6304:
6281:
6275:
6274:
6272:
6270:
6255:
6245:
6239:
6238:
6236:
6234:
6220:
6214:
6213:
6211:
6209:
6194:
6184:
6178:
6177:
6175:
6173:
6150:
6144:
6143:
6141:
6139:
6116:
6110:
6109:
6089:
6083:
6082:
6080:
6078:
6055:
6049:
6048:
6015:
6009:
6008:
5984:
5978:
5977:
5975:
5973:
5950:
5944:
5943:
5941:
5939:
5916:
5910:
5909:
5907:
5905:
5882:
5876:
5875:
5873:
5871:
5848:
5842:
5841:
5839:
5837:
5814:
5808:
5807:
5805:
5803:
5788:
5778:
5772:
5771:
5743:
5737:
5736:
5726:
5702:
5696:
5695:
5693:
5691:
5668:
5662:
5661:
5659:
5657:
5634:
5628:
5627:
5625:
5623:
5600:
5594:
5593:
5591:
5589:
5574:
5564:
5558:
5557:
5555:
5553:
5530:
5524:
5523:
5478:
5458:
5452:
5445:
5439:
5438:
5436:
5434:
5411:
5402:
5401:
5389:
5376:
5375:
5367:
5361:
5360:
5345:. Stanford, CA:
5338:
5332:
5331:
5296:
5290:
5289:
5261:
5255:
5254:
5242:
5233:
5232:
5230:
5228:
5205:
5194:
5193:
5181:
5170:
5169:
5167:
5165:
5140:
5134:
5133:
5131:
5108:
5088:
5079:
5073:
5067:
5061:
5057:
5055:
5047:
5022:10.1038/131457a0
4999:
4990:
4989:
4984:
4983:
4963:
4954:
4953:
4933:
4927:
4926:
4904:
4898:
4897:
4881:
4871:
4860:
4859:
4831:
4825:
4824:
4810:
4804:
4803:
4795:
4786:
4785:
4777:
4771:
4770:
4755:Bok, H. (1998).
4752:
4746:
4745:
4737:
4731:
4725:
4717:
4711:
4710:
4692:
4686:
4685:
4667:
4661:
4660:
4640:
4631:
4630:
4610:
4604:
4603:
4583:
4572:
4571:
4549:
4540:
4539:
4527:
4515:
4502:
4501:
4489:
4478:
4477:
4459:
4444:
4443:
4441:
4421:
4415:
4414:
4402:
4393:
4392:
4368:
4362:
4361:
4359:
4312:
4303:
4282:
4276:
4275:
4273:
4272:
4257:
4248:
4247:
4245:
4243:
4223:
4217:
4216:
4196:
4190:
4189:
4167:
4161:
4160:
4135:
4129:
4128:
4102:
4093:
4092:
4086:
4080:. Archived from
4079:
4070:
4064:
4063:
4047:
4041:
4040:
4024:
4015:
3998:
3971:
3965:
3964:
3942:
3927:
3926:
3906:
3900:
3899:
3875:
3869:
3868:
3843:
3837:
3836:
3810:
3804:
3801:
3795:
3794:
3786:
3780:
3779:
3777:
3776:
3743:
3737:
3736:
3726:
3720:
3719:
3692:
3686:
3685:
3663:
3657:
3656:
3631:
3625:
3624:
3619:
3618:
3595:
3586:
3585:
3559:
3553:
3552:
3536:
3499:Superdeterminism
3484:Locus of control
3449:
3444:
3443:
3442:
3429:lack free will.
3405:are consistent.
3392:The philosopher
3382:Day of Judgement
3292:
3286:
3285:
3280:
3270:
3268:
3195:Paul the Apostle
3181:prevenient grace
3172:Council of Trent
3138:Jacobus Arminius
3116:Summa Theologica
3051:
2990:responsibility.
2855:will of its own,
2694:Neurostimulation
2536:Hindu philosophy
2520:Hindu philosophy
1990:cognitive robots
1730:property dualism
1718:, mental events
1716:anomalous monism
1677:epiphenomenalism
1473:hard determinism
1401:to happen, by a
1234:B-theory of time
1186:Destiny and fate
1080:existence of God
1058:hard determinism
1054:soft determinism
897:Centred accounts
868:centred accounts
679:Hard determinism
673:Hard determinism
588:hard determinism
584:soft determinism
474:
470:
283:incompatibilists
112:hard determinism
32:
25:
16553:
16552:
16548:
16547:
16546:
16544:
16543:
16542:
16488:
16487:
16465:
16460:
16446:Tipler cylinder
16405:
16392:
16349:
16313:
16290:
16253:
16217:
16212:
16182:
16177:
16048:
15982:
15977:
15947:
15942:
15914:
15797:
15773:Unconsciousness
15584:Explanatory gap
15534:Binding problem
15481:
15415:
15276:
15262:Susan Blackmore
15215:
15206:Stuart Hameroff
15126:Antonio Damasio
15109:
15105:Wolfgang Köhler
15043:
15004:Paul Churchland
14909:George Berkeley
14879:Donald Davidson
14795:
14790:
14760:
14755:
14737:
14644:
14639:
14631:
14623:
14615:
14607:
14599:
14591:
14583:
14575:
14567:
14559:
14551:
14543:
14535:
14527:
14519:
14511:
14503:
14489:
14262:
14255:
14179:Self-discipline
14139:Moral hierarchy
14087:Problem of evil
14032:Double standard
14022:Culture of life
13980:
13909:
13856:Non-cognitivism
13771:
13646:
13588:
13583:
13553:
13548:
13538:
13536:
13518:
13442:
13437:
13427:
13417:
13407:
13397:
13387:
13377:
13367:
13357:
13347:
13337:
13327:
13317:
13307:
13297:
13287:
13284:De rerum natura
13277:
13267:
13257:
13241:
12981:
12885:Physical object
12721:Abstract object
12709:
12695:Theory of forms
12630:Meaning of life
12553:
12548:
12518:
12513:
12447:
12433:To be forgotten
12348:Internet access
12271:
12225:
12162:
12157:
12050:
12045:
11997:
11995:
11991:
11985:
11974:
11895:
11894:
11882:
11868:Stapp, Henry P.
11839:
11557:Freedom Evolves
11547:
11545:Further reading
11498:
11493:
11492:
11480:
11476:
11467:
11463:
11454:
11450:
11441:
11437:
11426:
11422:
11406:
11405:
11400:
11394:
11383:
11375:
11371:
11362:
11360:
11355:
11354:
11350:
11336:
11332:
11318:
11314:
11309:
11305:
11300:
11296:
11285:Shoals, Indiana
11279:
11278:
11274:
11264:
11262:
11252:
11251:
11247:
11215:
11211:
11166:
11162:
11121:
11117:
11070:
11066:
11024:
11018:
11003:
10965:
10961:
10918:
10914:
10867:
10863:
10816:
10812:
10781:
10777:
10738:
10731:
10692:
10688:
10682:Wayback Machine
10672:
10668:
10659:
10658:
10654:
10638:10.1.1.211.9085
10621:
10617:
10612:
10608:
10602:
10598:
10589:
10585:
10554:
10545:
10498:
10494:
10439:
10435:
10392:
10388:
10372:10.1.1.175.1091
10355:
10351:
10320:
10316:
10292:10.1.1.364.1083
10275:
10271:
10256:10.2307/2089386
10240:
10236:
10213:
10209:
10169:
10163:
10159:
10149:
10131:
10127:
10120:
10098:
10094:
10083:
10067:
10063:
10055:
10024:
10018:
10014:
10007:
9991:
9987:
9956:
9952:
9913:
9909:
9885:10.1.1.188.8271
9868:
9864:
9855:
9853:
9849:
9843:
9832:
9824:
9817:
9788:(2–3): 357–63.
9778:
9774:
9763:
9759:
9714:
9710:
9679:
9675:
9630:
9626:
9587:
9583:
9552:(11): 3475–94.
9538:
9534:
9495:
9491:
9482:
9475:
9428:
9424:
9379:
9375:
9320:
9316:
9269:
9265:
9250:
9234:
9230:
9206:
9202:
9188:
9184:
9177:
9159:
9155:
9148:
9131:
9127:
9119:
9080:
9074:
9070:
9062:
9031:
9025:
9021:
8990:
8986:
8955:
8946:
8934:
8930:
8923:
8909:
8905:
8898:
8884:
8880:
8873:
8859:
8855:
8848:
8834:
8830:
8819:
8815:
8808:
8794:
8790:
8781:
8779:
8774:
8773:
8769:
8754:
8753:
8749:
8740:
8738:
8731:
8727:
8711:(2578): 52–55.
8701:
8697:
8688:
8686:
8676:
8672:
8665:
8651:
8647:
8638:
8633:
8624:
8617:
8603:
8599:
8592:
8576:
8572:
8563:
8554:
8547:
8529:
8525:
8498:Wayback Machine
8484:
8480:
8471:
8467:
8458:
8456:
8455:. Newadvent.org
8451:
8450:
8446:
8437:
8435:
8430:
8429:
8425:
8416:freedom of will
8398:
8394:
8387:
8361:
8357:
8348:
8346:
8337:
8333:
8324:
8322:
8318:
8303:
8297:
8293:
8282:
8264:
8260:
8253:
8231:
8227:
8220:
8202:
8198:
8189:cerebral cortex
8181:
8177:
8164:
8160:
8145:
8141:
8134:
8116:
8112:
8100:
8093:
8084:
8080:
8072:
8068:
8061:
8043:
8039:
8030:
8028:
8017:
8013:
7992:
7988:
7979:
7975:
7959:
7955:
7948:
7930:
7926:
7915:
7911:
7900:
7896:
7865:
7861:
7830:
7826:
7816:
7814:
7803:
7799:
7791:Claudio Costa.
7790:
7786:
7779:
7757:
7753:
7737:
7733:
7713:
7709:
7692:
7688:
7675:Freedom Evolves
7672:
7665:
7654:
7650:
7639:
7635:
7596:
7592:
7582:
7580:
7578:
7562:
7558:
7548:
7526:
7522:
7512:
7490:
7483:
7459:
7455:
7443:
7439:
7424:10.2307/2024717
7408:
7401:
7390:"Compatibilism"
7386:
7379:
7367:
7363:
7347:
7346:
7335:
7331:
7321:
7319:
7289:
7285:
7278:
7259:
7255:
7248:
7232:
7228:
7213:"Consciousness"
7199:Josh Weisberg.
7196:
7192:
7181:
7159:
7155:
7148:
7125:
7118:
7108:
7106:
7104:
7086:
7082:
7071:
7067:
7048:
7044:
7029:
7025:
7015:
7013:
7011:
6993:
6989:
6979:
6977:
6975:
6957:
6953:
6943:
6941:
6939:
6923:
6919:
6885:
6881:
6805:
6803:
6794:
6793:
6789:
6776:
6774:
6765:
6761:
6735:
6731:
6706:(1–2): 181–83.
6687:
6685:
6676:
6675:
6648:
6644:
6631:
6629:
6620:
6619:
6615:
6605:
6603:
6594:
6586:
6584:
6571:
6570:
6566:
6559:
6533:
6524:
6514:
6512:
6510:
6494:
6490:
6425:
6421:
6416:Wayback Machine
6402:
6395:
6384:
6380:
6370:
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6312:
6302:
6300:
6298:
6282:
6278:
6268:
6266:
6264:
6246:
6242:
6232:
6230:
6229:. Prentice-Hall
6221:
6217:
6207:
6205:
6203:
6185:
6181:
6171:
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6167:
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6147:
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6117:
6113:
6090:
6086:
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6074:
6072:
6056:
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6016:
6012:
6005:
5985:
5981:
5971:
5969:
5967:
5951:
5947:
5937:
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5917:
5913:
5903:
5901:
5899:
5883:
5879:
5869:
5867:
5865:
5849:
5845:
5835:
5833:
5831:
5815:
5811:
5801:
5799:
5797:
5779:
5775:
5744:
5740:
5703:
5699:
5689:
5687:
5685:
5669:
5665:
5655:
5653:
5651:
5635:
5631:
5621:
5619:
5617:
5601:
5597:
5587:
5585:
5583:
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5561:
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5549:
5547:
5531:
5527:
5459:
5455:
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5432:
5430:
5428:
5412:
5405:
5390:
5379:
5368:
5364:
5357:
5339:
5335:
5328:
5297:
5293:
5262:
5258:
5243:
5236:
5226:
5224:
5222:
5206:
5197:
5182:
5173:
5163:
5161:
5159:
5141:
5137:
5129:
5106:10.1.1.361.7065
5086:
5080:
5076:
5059:
5058:
5049:
5048:
5032:
5000:
4993:
4981:
4979:
4964:
4957:
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4934:
4930:
4923:
4905:
4901:
4894:
4872:
4863:
4832:
4828:
4811:
4807:
4796:
4789:
4778:
4774:
4767:
4753:
4749:
4738:
4734:
4718:
4714:
4707:
4693:
4689:
4682:
4668:
4664:
4657:
4641:
4634:
4611:
4607:
4600:
4584:
4575:
4568:
4558:Clarendon Press
4550:
4543:
4532:"Compatibilism"
4516:
4505:
4490:
4481:
4474:
4460:
4447:
4422:
4418:
4407:"Compatibilism"
4403:
4396:
4385:
4369:
4365:
4357:
4310:
4297:
4283:
4279:
4270:
4268:
4258:
4251:
4241:
4239:
4224:
4220:
4213:
4197:
4193:
4186:
4168:
4164:
4154:
4136:
4132:
4125:
4090:
4088:
4084:
4077:
4071:
4067:
4048:
4044:
4025:
4018:
4012:Wayback Machine
3990:(8–9): 279–93.
3972:
3968:
3961:
3943:
3930:
3923:
3907:
3903:
3892:
3876:
3872:
3862:
3844:
3840:
3829:
3811:
3807:
3802:
3798:
3787:
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3770:
3744:
3740:
3727:
3723:
3716:
3693:
3689:
3682:
3664:
3660:
3653:
3633:An argument by
3632:
3628:
3616:
3614:
3612:
3596:
3589:
3582:
3560:
3556:
3537:
3533:
3528:
3523:
3518:
3445:
3440:
3438:
3435:
3390:
3349:
3241:
3235:
3094:
3089:
3083:
3053:
3046:
3029:
3023:
3015:
3006:
2980:
2971:
2905:
2891:
2859:corpus callosum
2845:sense of agency
2782:Freedom Evolves
2696:
2690:
2684:Neurophilosophy
2682:Main articles:
2680:
2652:
2635:interpretations
2610:
2608:Quantum physics
2597:
2528:
2522:
2436:
2431:
2422:
2387:
2302:
2296:
2275:
2224:
2188:thing-in-itself
2104:
2086:
2065:
2058:
1986:neural networks
1963:
1957:
1945:decision theory
1924:Freedom Evolves
1913:
1890:sense of agency
1881:
1841:
1829:Harry Frankfurt
1812:incompatibilist
1782:
1776:
1752:laws of physics
1740:Incompatibilism
1651:incompatibilist
1602:
1584:
1578:
1570:incompatibilism
1388:
1382:
1311:
1305:
1299:
1285:, known as the
1259:
1253:
1236:
1230:
1222:incompatibilist
1194:
1188:
1180:indeterministic
1138:within a given
1132:
1126:
1034:Derk Pereboom,
991:
971:George Berkeley
966:
946:incompatibilist
938:Indeterministic
859:
839:
793:
787:
727:Laplace's demon
681:
675:
580:Incompatibilism
363:
361:Incompatibilism
357:
355:Incompatibilism
299:non-materialist
206:
200:
176:Susanne Bobzien
160:
103:incompatibilism
40:
33:
26:
19:
17:
12:
11:
5:
16551:
16541:
16540:
16535:
16530:
16525:
16520:
16515:
16510:
16505:
16500:
16462:
16461:
16459:
16458:
16453:
16448:
16443:
16438:
16436:Krasnikov tube
16433:
16428:
16423:
16421:BTZ black hole
16418:
16412:
16410:
16394:
16393:
16391:
16390:
16388:Predestination
16385:
16380:
16375:
16370:
16365:
16359:
16357:
16351:
16350:
16348:
16347:
16342:
16337:
16332:
16327:
16321:
16319:
16315:
16314:
16312:
16311:
16306:
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16287:
16286:
16276:
16275:
16274:
16263:
16261:
16255:
16254:
16252:
16251:
16246:
16241:
16236:
16231:
16225:
16223:
16219:
16218:
16211:
16210:
16203:
16196:
16188:
16179:
16178:
16176:
16175:
16170:
16165:
16160:
16155:
16150:
16148:Predeterminism
16145:
16140:
16135:
16130:
16125:
16120:
16111:
16106:
16101:
16096:
16091:
16090:
16089:
16079:
16074:
16073:
16072:
16067:
16056:
16054:
16053:Related topics
16050:
16049:
16047:
16046:
16041:
16036:
16031:
16026:
16021:
16016:
16011:
16006:
16001:
15996:
15990:
15988:
15984:
15983:
15976:
15975:
15968:
15961:
15953:
15944:
15943:
15941:
15940:
15930:
15919:
15916:
15915:
15913:
15912:
15905:
15898:
15891:
15886:
15879:
15872:
15865:
15858:
15853:
15846:
15839:
15832:
15825:
15818:
15813:
15805:
15803:
15799:
15798:
15796:
15795:
15790:
15785:
15783:Visual masking
15780:
15775:
15770:
15765:
15760:
15755:
15750:
15745:
15740:
15735:
15733:Sentiocentrism
15730:
15725:
15720:
15719:
15718:
15706:
15701:
15696:
15691:
15686:
15681:
15676:
15671:
15666:
15661:
15656:
15651:
15646:
15641:
15636:
15631:
15626:
15621:
15616:
15611:
15606:
15601:
15596:
15591:
15586:
15581:
15576:
15571:
15566:
15561:
15556:
15551:
15546:
15541:
15536:
15531:
15526:
15525:
15524:
15514:
15509:
15504:
15499:
15493:
15491:
15487:
15486:
15483:
15482:
15480:
15479:
15474:
15469:
15464:
15459:
15454:
15449:
15444:
15439:
15434:
15429:
15423:
15421:
15417:
15416:
15414:
15413:
15408:
15403:
15398:
15393:
15388:
15383:
15378:
15373:
15368:
15363:
15361:Neutral monism
15358:
15353:
15348:
15343:
15341:Interactionism
15338:
15333:
15328:
15323:
15318:
15313:
15308:
15303:
15297:
15295:
15286:
15282:
15281:
15278:
15277:
15275:
15274:
15272:Wolfgang Pauli
15269:
15264:
15259:
15254:
15249:
15244:
15239:
15234:
15229:
15223:
15221:
15217:
15216:
15214:
15213:
15208:
15203:
15201:Steven Laureys
15198:
15193:
15188:
15186:Patrick Wilken
15183:
15178:
15173:
15168:
15163:
15158:
15156:Gerald Edelman
15153:
15148:
15143:
15138:
15133:
15131:Benjamin Libet
15128:
15123:
15117:
15115:
15111:
15110:
15108:
15107:
15102:
15097:
15092:
15087:
15085:Max Wertheimer
15082:
15077:
15072:
15070:Gustav Fechner
15067:
15065:Franz Brentano
15062:
15057:
15051:
15049:
15045:
15044:
15042:
15041:
15039:William Seager
15036:
15031:
15026:
15021:
15016:
15014:René Descartes
15011:
15006:
15001:
14996:
14991:
14986:
14981:
14976:
14971:
14966:
14964:Keith Frankish
14961:
14956:
14951:
14946:
14941:
14936:
14931:
14926:
14921:
14916:
14911:
14906:
14904:Galen Strawson
14901:
14896:
14891:
14889:Edmund Husserl
14886:
14881:
14876:
14871:
14869:David Papineau
14866:
14861:
14859:David Chalmers
14856:
14854:Daniel Dennett
14851:
14846:
14841:
14836:
14831:
14826:
14824:Baruch Spinoza
14821:
14816:
14810:
14808:
14801:
14797:
14796:
14789:
14788:
14781:
14774:
14766:
14757:
14756:
14754:
14753:
14742:
14739:
14738:
14736:
14735:
14728:
14723:
14721:Secular ethics
14718:
14716:Rehabilitation
14713:
14708:
14703:
14698:
14693:
14688:
14683:
14678:
14673:
14668:
14663:
14658:
14652:
14650:
14646:
14645:
14643:
14642:
14634:
14626:
14618:
14610:
14602:
14594:
14586:
14581:Utilitarianism
14578:
14570:
14562:
14554:
14546:
14538:
14530:
14522:
14514:
14506:
14497:
14495:
14491:
14490:
14488:
14487:
14482:
14477:
14472:
14467:
14462:
14457:
14452:
14447:
14442:
14437:
14432:
14427:
14422:
14417:
14412:
14407:
14402:
14397:
14392:
14387:
14382:
14377:
14372:
14367:
14362:
14357:
14352:
14347:
14342:
14337:
14332:
14327:
14322:
14317:
14312:
14307:
14302:
14297:
14292:
14287:
14282:
14277:
14272:
14266:
14264:
14257:
14256:
14254:
14253:
14248:
14243:
14238:
14233:
14232:
14231:
14226:
14221:
14211:
14206:
14201:
14196:
14191:
14186:
14181:
14176:
14171:
14166:
14161:
14156:
14151:
14146:
14141:
14136:
14131:
14126:
14121:
14116:
14111:
14106:
14101:
14096:
14091:
14090:
14089:
14084:
14079:
14069:
14064:
14059:
14054:
14049:
14044:
14039:
14034:
14029:
14024:
14019:
14014:
14009:
14004:
13999:
13994:
13988:
13986:
13982:
13981:
13979:
13978:
13973:
13968:
13963:
13958:
13953:
13948:
13943:
13941:Existentialist
13938:
13933:
13928:
13923:
13917:
13915:
13911:
13910:
13908:
13907:
13906:
13905:
13895:
13890:
13885:
13880:
13879:
13878:
13873:
13868:
13863:
13853:
13848:
13843:
13838:
13836:Constructivism
13833:
13832:
13831:
13830:
13829:
13824:
13814:
13813:
13812:
13810:Non-naturalism
13807:
13792:
13787:
13781:
13779:
13773:
13772:
13770:
13769:
13764:
13759:
13754:
13749:
13744:
13739:
13734:
13729:
13724:
13719:
13714:
13709:
13704:
13703:
13702:
13692:
13687:
13682:
13677:
13672:
13667:
13662:
13656:
13654:
13648:
13647:
13645:
13644:
13639:
13637:Utilitarianism
13634:
13629:
13624:
13619:
13614:
13609:
13604:
13598:
13596:
13590:
13589:
13582:
13581:
13574:
13567:
13559:
13550:
13549:
13547:
13546:
13534:
13523:
13520:
13519:
13517:
13516:
13511:
13506:
13501:
13496:
13491:
13486:
13481:
13476:
13471:
13466:
13461:
13456:
13450:
13448:
13447:Related topics
13444:
13443:
13441:
13440:
13430:
13420:
13414:Being and Time
13410:
13400:
13390:
13380:
13370:
13360:
13350:
13340:
13330:
13320:
13310:
13300:
13290:
13280:
13270:
13260:
13249:
13247:
13243:
13242:
13240:
13239:
13232:
13227:
13222:
13217:
13212:
13207:
13202:
13197:
13192:
13187:
13182:
13177:
13172:
13167:
13162:
13157:
13152:
13147:
13142:
13137:
13132:
13127:
13122:
13117:
13112:
13107:
13102:
13097:
13092:
13087:
13082:
13077:
13072:
13067:
13062:
13057:
13052:
13047:
13042:
13037:
13032:
13027:
13022:
13017:
13012:
13007:
13002:
12997:
12991:
12989:
12987:Metaphysicians
12983:
12982:
12980:
12979:
12972:
12967:
12962:
12957:
12952:
12947:
12942:
12937:
12932:
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12922:
12917:
12912:
12907:
12902:
12897:
12892:
12887:
12882:
12877:
12872:
12867:
12862:
12857:
12852:
12847:
12842:
12837:
12832:
12827:
12822:
12817:
12812:
12807:
12806:
12805:
12795:
12790:
12785:
12780:
12775:
12770:
12765:
12760:
12755:
12750:
12743:
12741:Causal closure
12738:
12733:
12728:
12723:
12717:
12715:
12711:
12710:
12708:
12707:
12702:
12697:
12692:
12687:
12682:
12677:
12672:
12667:
12662:
12657:
12652:
12647:
12642:
12637:
12632:
12627:
12622:
12617:
12615:Libertarianism
12612:
12607:
12602:
12600:Existentialism
12597:
12592:
12587:
12582:
12577:
12572:
12567:
12561:
12559:
12555:
12554:
12547:
12546:
12539:
12532:
12524:
12515:
12514:
12512:
12511:
12506:
12504:Libertarianism
12501:
12496:
12491:
12486:
12481:
12476:
12471:
12466:
12461:
12455:
12453:
12449:
12448:
12446:
12445:
12440:
12435:
12430:
12425:
12420:
12415:
12410:
12405:
12400:
12395:
12390:
12385:
12380:
12375:
12370:
12365:
12360:
12355:
12350:
12345:
12340:
12335:
12330:
12325:
12320:
12315:
12310:
12305:
12300:
12295:
12290:
12285:
12279:
12277:
12273:
12272:
12270:
12269:
12264:
12259:
12254:
12249:
12244:
12239:
12233:
12231:
12227:
12226:
12224:
12223:
12218:
12216:Social liberty
12213:
12211:Self-ownership
12208:
12203:
12198:
12193:
12192:
12191:
12181:
12176:
12170:
12168:
12164:
12163:
12156:
12155:
12148:
12141:
12133:
12127:
12126:
12114:
12101:
12100:
12085:
12070:
12049:
12048:External links
12046:
12044:
12043:
12027:
12013:
12003:
11983:
11965:
11952:
11937:
11922:
11908:
11880:
11864:
11843:
11837:
11815:
11805:
11795:
11788:
11773:
11759:
11742:
11734:. Free Press.
11725:
11717:
11692:
11676:Harnad, Stevan
11672:
11629:
11593:
11578:
11568:
11548:
11546:
11543:
11542:
11541:
11528:
11522:
11506:
11497:
11494:
11491:
11490:
11474:
11461:
11448:
11435:
11420:
11392:
11369:
11359:. Al-islam.org
11348:
11339:Wolfson, Harry
11330:
11312:
11303:
11294:
11272:
11245:
11209:
11180:(2): 168–192.
11160:
11115:
11064:
11001:
10980:(3): 429–438.
10959:
10912:
10861:
10830:(5): 612–619.
10810:
10791:(2): 191–199.
10775:
10729:
10686:
10666:
10652:
10615:
10606:
10596:
10583:
10543:
10492:
10433:
10386:
10349:
10314:
10269:
10250:(3): 375–384.
10234:
10207:
10157:
10147:
10125:
10118:
10092:
10089:on 2011-11-13.
10081:
10061:
10058:on 2011-08-13.
10012:
10005:
9985:
9950:
9907:
9862:
9841:
9815:
9772:
9757:
9708:
9673:
9624:
9581:
9532:
9505:(11): 372–83.
9489:
9473:
9422:
9373:
9314:
9263:
9248:
9228:
9200:
9182:
9175:
9153:
9146:
9125:
9122:on 2014-12-17.
9068:
9065:on 2013-05-26.
9019:
8984:
8944:
8928:
8921:
8903:
8896:
8878:
8871:
8853:
8846:
8828:
8813:
8806:
8788:
8767:
8747:
8733:Honderich, E.
8725:
8695:
8670:
8663:
8645:
8622:
8615:
8597:
8590:
8570:
8552:
8545:
8523:
8478:
8465:
8444:
8423:
8392:
8385:
8355:
8331:
8291:
8280:
8258:
8251:
8225:
8218:
8196:
8175:
8158:
8139:
8132:
8110:
8091:
8078:
8066:
8059:
8037:
8011:
7986:
7973:
7953:
7946:
7924:
7909:
7894:
7859:
7840:(4): 468–482.
7834:Metaphilosophy
7824:
7797:
7784:
7777:
7751:
7731:
7707:
7686:
7663:
7648:
7633:
7590:
7576:
7556:
7546:
7520:
7510:
7481:
7453:
7437:
7399:
7377:
7361:
7329:
7303:(3): 223–251.
7283:
7276:
7253:
7246:
7226:
7190:
7179:
7153:
7146:
7116:
7102:
7080:
7065:
7042:
7023:
7009:
6987:
6973:
6951:
6937:
6917:
6879:
6787:
6759:
6729:
6688:|journal=
6658:hep-th/0104219
6642:
6613:
6564:
6557:
6537:Predeterminism
6522:
6508:
6488:
6419:
6393:
6378:
6364:
6344:
6330:
6310:
6296:
6276:
6262:
6240:
6215:
6201:
6179:
6165:
6145:
6131:
6111:
6084:
6070:
6050:
6028:
6010:
6003:
5979:
5965:
5945:
5931:
5911:
5897:
5877:
5863:
5843:
5829:
5809:
5795:
5773:
5754:(2): 189–211.
5738:
5697:
5683:
5663:
5649:
5629:
5615:
5595:
5581:
5559:
5545:
5525:
5453:
5440:
5426:
5403:
5377:
5362:
5355:
5333:
5326:
5291:
5256:
5234:
5220:
5195:
5171:
5157:
5135:
5074:
5070:us.archive.org
5060:|journal=
5030:
5005:Light and Life
4991:
4955:
4948:
4928:
4921:
4899:
4892:
4861:
4826:
4805:
4787:
4772:
4765:
4747:
4732:
4712:
4705:
4687:
4680:
4662:
4655:
4632:
4605:
4598:
4573:
4566:
4541:
4503:
4479:
4472:
4445:
4416:
4394:
4383:
4363:
4295:
4277:
4249:
4218:
4211:
4191:
4184:
4162:
4152:
4130:
4123:
4103:Also found in
4065:
4042:
4016:
3966:
3959:
3928:
3921:
3901:
3890:
3870:
3860:
3838:
3827:
3805:
3796:
3781:
3768:
3738:
3721:
3714:
3687:
3680:
3658:
3651:
3637:described by:
3626:
3610:
3587:
3580:
3554:
3530:
3529:
3527:
3524:
3522:
3519:
3517:
3516:
3511:
3506:
3501:
3496:
3491:
3486:
3481:
3476:
3468:
3463:
3458:
3452:
3451:
3450:
3434:
3431:
3389:
3386:
3377:predestination
3348:
3345:
3344:
3343:
3324:
3259:Jewish thought
3237:Main article:
3234:
3231:
3126:Luis de Molina
3111:Thomas Aquinas
3093:
3090:
3085:Main article:
3082:
3079:
3049:Richard Holton
3038:
3022:
3019:
3014:
3011:
3005:
3002:
2994:Roy Baumeister
2979:
2976:
2970:
2967:
2932:
2931:
2928:
2890:
2887:
2883:hallucinations
2879:proprioception
2787:Daniel Dennett
2777:
2776:
2773:
2770:
2767:
2711:(after German
2704:Benjamin Libet
2679:
2676:
2651:
2648:
2609:
2606:
2596:
2593:
2521:
2518:
2435:
2432:
2430:
2427:
2421:
2418:
2391:Thomas Aquinas
2386:
2383:
2358:
2357:
2348:'s proof from
2343:
2295:
2292:
2274:
2271:
2227:Rudolf Steiner
2223:
2220:
2127:
2126:
2120:Baruch Spinoza
2111:Baruch Spinoza
2103:
2100:
2085:
2082:
2057:
2056:Non-naturalism
2054:
2019:, and various
1956:
1953:
1912:
1909:
1905:wanton addicts
1894:theory of mind
1880:
1877:
1840:
1837:
1833:Daniel Dennett
1778:Main article:
1775:
1772:
1632:nervous system
1609:René Descartes
1580:Main article:
1577:
1574:
1562:
1561:
1554:
1547:Thomas Aquinas
1539:
1527:
1526:
1523:
1520:
1514:
1504:
1503:
1480:
1433:predestination
1429:
1428:
1421:
1384:Main article:
1381:
1378:
1355:Predestination
1314:Predeterminism
1309:Predestination
1303:Predeterminism
1301:Main article:
1298:
1297:Predeterminism
1295:
1275:predestination
1267:predeterminism
1255:Main article:
1252:
1249:
1229:
1226:
1190:Main article:
1187:
1184:
1168:causal closure
1128:Main article:
1125:
1122:
1091:Galen Strawson
1050:
1049:
1048:
1047:
1046:
1045:
1044:
1043:
1042:
1041:
1040:
1039:
1023:
1022:
1019:
1016:
1013:
1010:
1007:
1004:
990:
987:
965:
962:
926:(and physical
887:Daniel Dennett
858:
855:
838:
835:
789:Main article:
786:
783:
760:
759:
747:
742:
735:
730:
715:
677:Main article:
674:
671:
647:Alex Rosenberg
592:libertarianism
575:
574:
571:
568:
565:
562:
559:
556:
553:
550:
547:
540:
539:
536:
533:
530:
527:
524:
521:
518:
515:
512:
505:
504:
501:
498:
495:
492:
489:
486:
483:
480:
477:
403:Daniel Dennett
399:intuition pump
359:Main article:
356:
353:
262:compatibilists
255:responsibility
228:causal closure
212:(for example,
199:
196:
159:
156:
127:compatibilists
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
16550:
16539:
16536:
16534:
16531:
16529:
16526:
16524:
16521:
16519:
16516:
16514:
16511:
16509:
16506:
16504:
16501:
16499:
16496:
16495:
16493:
16486:
16485:
16483:
16479:
16475:
16471:
16457:
16454:
16452:
16449:
16447:
16444:
16442:
16439:
16437:
16434:
16432:
16429:
16427:
16424:
16422:
16419:
16417:
16414:
16413:
16411:
16409:
16403:
16399:
16395:
16389:
16386:
16384:
16381:
16379:
16376:
16374:
16371:
16369:
16366:
16364:
16361:
16360:
16358:
16356:
16352:
16346:
16343:
16341:
16338:
16336:
16333:
16331:
16328:
16326:
16323:
16322:
16320:
16316:
16310:
16307:
16305:
16302:
16301:
16299:
16297:
16293:
16285:
16282:
16281:
16280:
16277:
16273:
16270:
16269:
16268:
16265:
16264:
16262:
16260:
16256:
16250:
16247:
16245:
16242:
16240:
16237:
16235:
16232:
16230:
16227:
16226:
16224:
16220:
16216:
16209:
16204:
16202:
16197:
16195:
16190:
16189:
16186:
16174:
16171:
16169:
16166:
16164:
16161:
16159:
16156:
16154:
16151:
16149:
16146:
16144:
16143:Indeterminism
16141:
16139:
16136:
16134:
16133:Compatibilism
16131:
16129:
16126:
16124:
16121:
16119:
16115:
16112:
16110:
16107:
16105:
16102:
16100:
16097:
16095:
16092:
16088:
16085:
16084:
16083:
16080:
16078:
16075:
16071:
16068:
16066:
16063:
16062:
16061:
16058:
16057:
16055:
16051:
16045:
16042:
16040:
16039:Technological
16037:
16035:
16032:
16030:
16029:Psychological
16027:
16025:
16022:
16020:
16017:
16015:
16012:
16010:
16009:Environmental
16007:
16005:
16002:
16000:
15997:
15995:
15992:
15991:
15989:
15985:
15981:
15974:
15969:
15967:
15962:
15960:
15955:
15954:
15951:
15939:
15931:
15929:
15921:
15920:
15917:
15911:
15910:
15906:
15903:
15899:
15897:
15896:
15892:
15890:
15887:
15885:
15884:
15880:
15878:
15877:
15873:
15871:
15870:
15866:
15864:
15863:
15859:
15857:
15854:
15852:
15851:
15847:
15845:
15844:
15840:
15838:
15837:
15833:
15831:
15830:
15826:
15824:
15823:
15819:
15817:
15814:
15812:
15811:
15807:
15806:
15804:
15800:
15794:
15791:
15789:
15786:
15784:
15781:
15779:
15776:
15774:
15771:
15769:
15766:
15764:
15761:
15759:
15756:
15754:
15751:
15749:
15746:
15744:
15741:
15739:
15736:
15734:
15731:
15729:
15726:
15724:
15721:
15717:
15716:
15712:
15711:
15710:
15707:
15705:
15702:
15700:
15697:
15695:
15692:
15690:
15687:
15685:
15682:
15680:
15677:
15675:
15672:
15670:
15669:Phenomenology
15667:
15665:
15662:
15660:
15657:
15655:
15652:
15650:
15647:
15645:
15642:
15640:
15637:
15635:
15632:
15630:
15627:
15625:
15622:
15620:
15617:
15615:
15612:
15610:
15607:
15605:
15602:
15600:
15599:Hallucination
15597:
15595:
15592:
15590:
15587:
15585:
15582:
15580:
15577:
15575:
15572:
15570:
15567:
15565:
15562:
15560:
15557:
15555:
15552:
15550:
15547:
15545:
15542:
15540:
15537:
15535:
15532:
15530:
15527:
15523:
15520:
15519:
15518:
15515:
15513:
15510:
15508:
15505:
15503:
15500:
15498:
15495:
15494:
15492:
15488:
15478:
15475:
15473:
15470:
15468:
15465:
15463:
15460:
15458:
15455:
15453:
15450:
15448:
15445:
15443:
15440:
15438:
15435:
15433:
15430:
15428:
15425:
15424:
15422:
15418:
15412:
15409:
15407:
15404:
15402:
15399:
15397:
15394:
15392:
15389:
15387:
15384:
15382:
15379:
15377:
15374:
15372:
15369:
15367:
15364:
15362:
15359:
15357:
15354:
15352:
15349:
15347:
15344:
15342:
15339:
15337:
15334:
15332:
15331:Functionalism
15329:
15327:
15324:
15322:
15319:
15317:
15314:
15312:
15309:
15307:
15304:
15302:
15299:
15298:
15296:
15294:
15290:
15287:
15283:
15273:
15270:
15268:
15265:
15263:
15260:
15258:
15257:Roger Penrose
15255:
15253:
15250:
15248:
15247:Marvin Minsky
15245:
15243:
15240:
15238:
15237:Eugene Wigner
15235:
15233:
15230:
15228:
15227:Annaka Harris
15225:
15224:
15222:
15218:
15212:
15209:
15207:
15204:
15202:
15199:
15197:
15194:
15192:
15189:
15187:
15184:
15182:
15179:
15177:
15174:
15172:
15169:
15167:
15164:
15162:
15161:Giulio Tononi
15159:
15157:
15154:
15152:
15149:
15147:
15146:Francis Crick
15144:
15142:
15141:Christof Koch
15139:
15137:
15136:Bernard Baars
15134:
15132:
15129:
15127:
15124:
15122:
15119:
15118:
15116:
15112:
15106:
15103:
15101:
15100:William James
15098:
15096:
15095:Wilhelm Wundt
15093:
15091:
15090:Sigmund Freud
15088:
15086:
15083:
15081:
15078:
15076:
15075:Julian Jaynes
15073:
15071:
15068:
15066:
15063:
15061:
15058:
15056:
15053:
15052:
15050:
15046:
15040:
15037:
15035:
15034:William Lycan
15032:
15030:
15027:
15025:
15022:
15020:
15017:
15015:
15012:
15010:
15007:
15005:
15002:
15000:
14997:
14995:
14992:
14990:
14987:
14985:
14982:
14980:
14977:
14975:
14972:
14970:
14967:
14965:
14962:
14960:
14957:
14955:
14954:Joseph Levine
14952:
14950:
14947:
14945:
14942:
14940:
14937:
14935:
14932:
14930:
14929:Immanuel Kant
14927:
14925:
14922:
14920:
14917:
14915:
14912:
14910:
14907:
14905:
14902:
14900:
14897:
14895:
14894:Frank Jackson
14892:
14890:
14887:
14885:
14882:
14880:
14877:
14875:
14872:
14870:
14867:
14865:
14862:
14860:
14857:
14855:
14852:
14850:
14847:
14845:
14842:
14840:
14837:
14835:
14832:
14830:
14827:
14825:
14822:
14820:
14817:
14815:
14812:
14811:
14809:
14805:
14802:
14798:
14794:
14793:Consciousness
14787:
14782:
14780:
14775:
14773:
14768:
14767:
14764:
14752:
14744:
14743:
14740:
14734:
14733:
14729:
14727:
14724:
14722:
14719:
14717:
14714:
14712:
14709:
14707:
14704:
14702:
14699:
14697:
14694:
14692:
14689:
14687:
14684:
14682:
14679:
14677:
14674:
14672:
14669:
14667:
14664:
14662:
14659:
14657:
14654:
14653:
14651:
14647:
14638:
14635:
14630:
14627:
14622:
14619:
14614:
14611:
14606:
14603:
14598:
14595:
14590:
14587:
14582:
14579:
14574:
14571:
14566:
14563:
14558:
14555:
14550:
14547:
14542:
14539:
14534:
14531:
14526:
14523:
14518:
14515:
14510:
14507:
14502:
14499:
14498:
14496:
14492:
14486:
14483:
14481:
14478:
14476:
14473:
14471:
14468:
14466:
14463:
14461:
14458:
14456:
14453:
14451:
14448:
14446:
14443:
14441:
14438:
14436:
14433:
14431:
14428:
14426:
14423:
14421:
14418:
14416:
14413:
14411:
14408:
14406:
14403:
14401:
14398:
14396:
14393:
14391:
14388:
14386:
14383:
14381:
14378:
14376:
14373:
14371:
14368:
14366:
14363:
14361:
14358:
14356:
14353:
14351:
14348:
14346:
14343:
14341:
14338:
14336:
14333:
14331:
14328:
14326:
14323:
14321:
14318:
14316:
14313:
14311:
14308:
14306:
14303:
14301:
14298:
14296:
14293:
14291:
14288:
14286:
14283:
14281:
14278:
14276:
14273:
14271:
14268:
14267:
14265:
14263:
14258:
14252:
14249:
14247:
14244:
14242:
14239:
14237:
14234:
14230:
14227:
14225:
14222:
14220:
14217:
14216:
14215:
14212:
14210:
14207:
14205:
14202:
14200:
14197:
14195:
14192:
14190:
14187:
14185:
14182:
14180:
14177:
14175:
14172:
14170:
14167:
14165:
14162:
14160:
14157:
14155:
14152:
14150:
14147:
14145:
14142:
14140:
14137:
14135:
14134:Moral courage
14132:
14130:
14127:
14125:
14122:
14120:
14117:
14115:
14112:
14110:
14107:
14105:
14102:
14100:
14097:
14095:
14092:
14088:
14085:
14083:
14080:
14078:
14075:
14074:
14073:
14072:Good and evil
14070:
14068:
14065:
14063:
14060:
14058:
14057:Family values
14055:
14053:
14050:
14048:
14045:
14043:
14040:
14038:
14035:
14033:
14030:
14028:
14025:
14023:
14020:
14018:
14015:
14013:
14010:
14008:
14005:
14003:
14000:
13998:
13995:
13993:
13990:
13989:
13987:
13983:
13977:
13974:
13972:
13969:
13967:
13964:
13962:
13959:
13957:
13954:
13952:
13949:
13947:
13944:
13942:
13939:
13937:
13934:
13932:
13929:
13927:
13924:
13922:
13919:
13918:
13916:
13912:
13904:
13901:
13900:
13899:
13896:
13894:
13891:
13889:
13886:
13884:
13881:
13877:
13874:
13872:
13871:Quasi-realism
13869:
13867:
13864:
13862:
13859:
13858:
13857:
13854:
13852:
13849:
13847:
13844:
13842:
13839:
13837:
13834:
13828:
13825:
13823:
13820:
13819:
13818:
13815:
13811:
13808:
13806:
13803:
13802:
13801:
13798:
13797:
13796:
13793:
13791:
13788:
13786:
13783:
13782:
13780:
13778:
13774:
13768:
13765:
13763:
13760:
13758:
13755:
13753:
13750:
13748:
13745:
13743:
13740:
13738:
13735:
13733:
13730:
13728:
13725:
13723:
13720:
13718:
13715:
13713:
13710:
13708:
13705:
13701:
13698:
13697:
13696:
13695:Environmental
13693:
13691:
13688:
13686:
13683:
13681:
13678:
13676:
13673:
13671:
13668:
13666:
13663:
13661:
13658:
13657:
13655:
13653:
13649:
13643:
13640:
13638:
13635:
13633:
13630:
13628:
13625:
13623:
13620:
13618:
13617:Particularism
13615:
13613:
13610:
13608:
13605:
13603:
13600:
13599:
13597:
13595:
13591:
13587:
13580:
13575:
13573:
13568:
13566:
13561:
13560:
13557:
13545:
13535:
13533:
13525:
13524:
13521:
13515:
13512:
13510:
13507:
13505:
13502:
13500:
13497:
13495:
13492:
13490:
13489:Phenomenology
13487:
13485:
13482:
13480:
13477:
13475:
13472:
13470:
13467:
13465:
13462:
13460:
13457:
13455:
13452:
13451:
13449:
13445:
13436:
13435:
13431:
13426:
13425:
13421:
13416:
13415:
13411:
13406:
13405:
13401:
13396:
13395:
13391:
13386:
13385:
13381:
13376:
13375:
13371:
13366:
13365:
13361:
13356:
13355:
13351:
13346:
13345:
13341:
13336:
13335:
13331:
13326:
13325:
13321:
13316:
13315:
13311:
13306:
13305:
13301:
13296:
13295:
13291:
13286:
13285:
13281:
13276:
13275:
13271:
13266:
13265:
13261:
13256:
13255:
13251:
13250:
13248:
13246:Notable works
13244:
13238:
13237:
13233:
13231:
13228:
13226:
13223:
13221:
13218:
13216:
13213:
13211:
13208:
13206:
13203:
13201:
13198:
13196:
13193:
13191:
13188:
13186:
13183:
13181:
13178:
13176:
13173:
13171:
13168:
13166:
13163:
13161:
13158:
13156:
13153:
13151:
13148:
13146:
13143:
13141:
13138:
13136:
13133:
13131:
13128:
13126:
13123:
13121:
13118:
13116:
13113:
13111:
13108:
13106:
13103:
13101:
13098:
13096:
13093:
13091:
13088:
13086:
13083:
13081:
13078:
13076:
13073:
13071:
13068:
13066:
13063:
13061:
13058:
13056:
13053:
13051:
13048:
13046:
13043:
13041:
13038:
13036:
13033:
13031:
13028:
13026:
13023:
13021:
13018:
13016:
13013:
13011:
13008:
13006:
13003:
13001:
12998:
12996:
12993:
12992:
12990:
12988:
12984:
12978:
12977:
12973:
12971:
12968:
12966:
12963:
12961:
12958:
12956:
12953:
12951:
12948:
12946:
12943:
12941:
12938:
12936:
12933:
12931:
12928:
12926:
12923:
12921:
12918:
12916:
12913:
12911:
12908:
12906:
12903:
12901:
12898:
12896:
12893:
12891:
12888:
12886:
12883:
12881:
12878:
12876:
12873:
12871:
12868:
12866:
12863:
12861:
12858:
12856:
12853:
12851:
12848:
12846:
12843:
12841:
12838:
12836:
12833:
12831:
12828:
12826:
12823:
12821:
12818:
12816:
12813:
12811:
12808:
12804:
12801:
12800:
12799:
12796:
12794:
12791:
12789:
12786:
12784:
12781:
12779:
12776:
12774:
12771:
12769:
12766:
12764:
12761:
12759:
12756:
12754:
12751:
12749:
12748:
12744:
12742:
12739:
12737:
12734:
12732:
12729:
12727:
12724:
12722:
12719:
12718:
12716:
12712:
12706:
12703:
12701:
12698:
12696:
12693:
12691:
12688:
12686:
12683:
12681:
12678:
12676:
12673:
12671:
12668:
12666:
12663:
12661:
12658:
12656:
12653:
12651:
12650:Phenomenalism
12648:
12646:
12643:
12641:
12638:
12636:
12633:
12631:
12628:
12626:
12623:
12621:
12618:
12616:
12613:
12611:
12608:
12606:
12603:
12601:
12598:
12596:
12593:
12591:
12588:
12586:
12583:
12581:
12578:
12576:
12573:
12571:
12570:Action theory
12568:
12566:
12563:
12562:
12560:
12556:
12552:
12545:
12540:
12538:
12533:
12531:
12526:
12525:
12522:
12510:
12507:
12505:
12502:
12500:
12497:
12495:
12492:
12490:
12487:
12485:
12482:
12480:
12477:
12475:
12472:
12470:
12467:
12465:
12462:
12460:
12457:
12456:
12454:
12450:
12444:
12441:
12439:
12436:
12434:
12431:
12429:
12426:
12424:
12421:
12419:
12416:
12414:
12411:
12409:
12406:
12404:
12401:
12399:
12396:
12394:
12391:
12389:
12386:
12384:
12381:
12379:
12376:
12374:
12371:
12369:
12366:
12364:
12363:Morphological
12361:
12359:
12356:
12354:
12351:
12349:
12346:
12344:
12341:
12339:
12336:
12334:
12331:
12329:
12326:
12324:
12321:
12319:
12316:
12314:
12311:
12309:
12306:
12304:
12301:
12299:
12296:
12294:
12291:
12289:
12286:
12284:
12281:
12280:
12278:
12274:
12268:
12265:
12263:
12262:Morphological
12260:
12258:
12255:
12253:
12250:
12248:
12245:
12243:
12240:
12238:
12235:
12234:
12232:
12228:
12222:
12219:
12217:
12214:
12212:
12209:
12207:
12204:
12202:
12199:
12197:
12194:
12190:
12187:
12186:
12185:
12182:
12180:
12177:
12175:
12172:
12171:
12169:
12165:
12161:
12154:
12149:
12147:
12142:
12140:
12135:
12134:
12131:
12124:
12119:
12115:
12112:
12107:
12103:
12102:
12097:
12096:
12091:
12086:
12082:
12081:
12076:
12073:Kevin Timpe.
12071:
12067:
12066:
12061:
12057:
12052:
12051:
12041:
12040:
12035:
12031:
12030:George Musser
12028:
12026:
12025:0-19-518963-9
12022:
12018:
12014:
12012:
12008:
12004:
11994:on 2018-12-12
11990:
11986:
11980:
11977:. MIT Press.
11973:
11972:
11966:
11964:
11960:
11956:
11953:
11950:
11949:0-907845-39-8
11946:
11942:
11938:
11935:
11934:0-19-824924-1
11931:
11927:
11923:
11921:
11917:
11913:
11909:
11905:
11899:
11891:
11887:
11883:
11877:
11873:
11869:
11865:
11862:
11861:0-631-14552-4
11858:
11854:
11852:
11847:
11844:
11840:
11834:
11830:
11829:Penguin Press
11826:
11825:
11820:
11816:
11813:
11809:
11806:
11804:
11803:larchivio.org
11800:
11796:
11793:
11789:
11786:
11785:0-07-296355-7
11782:
11778:
11774:
11772:
11771:0-19-512656-4
11768:
11764:
11760:
11758:
11754:
11751:Basic Books.
11750:
11746:
11743:
11741:
11737:
11733:
11729:
11726:
11724:
11723:
11718:
11714:
11710:
11706:
11702:
11698:
11693:
11689:
11685:
11681:
11677:
11673:
11669:
11665:
11660:
11655:
11651:
11647:
11643:
11639:
11635:
11630:
11627:
11623:
11619:
11615:
11611:
11610:
11605:
11601:
11597:
11596:Gleick, James
11594:
11591:
11590:1-932594-04-3
11587:
11583:
11579:
11576:
11572:
11569:
11567:
11566:0-670-03186-0
11563:
11559:
11558:
11553:
11550:
11549:
11538:
11534:
11529:
11526:
11523:
11521:
11520:0-262-01525-0
11517:
11513:
11512:
11507:
11504:
11500:
11499:
11487:
11483:
11478:
11471:
11465:
11458:
11452:
11445:
11439:
11431:
11424:
11416:
11410:
11399:
11395:
11389:
11382:
11381:
11373:
11358:
11352:
11344:
11340:
11334:
11326:
11322:
11316:
11307:
11298:
11290:
11286:
11282:
11276:
11261:
11260:
11255:
11249:
11241:
11237:
11233:
11229:
11225:
11221:
11213:
11205:
11201:
11196:
11191:
11187:
11183:
11179:
11175:
11171:
11164:
11156:
11152:
11148:
11144:
11140:
11136:
11133:(1): 214–42.
11132:
11128:
11119:
11111:
11107:
11102:
11097:
11092:
11087:
11084:(2): 205–18.
11083:
11079:
11075:
11068:
11060:
11056:
11051:
11046:
11042:
11038:
11034:
11030:
11023:
11016:
11014:
11012:
11010:
11008:
11006:
10997:
10993:
10988:
10983:
10979:
10975:
10971:
10963:
10955:
10951:
10947:
10943:
10939:
10935:
10931:
10927:
10923:
10916:
10908:
10904:
10899:
10894:
10889:
10884:
10880:
10876:
10872:
10865:
10857:
10853:
10848:
10843:
10838:
10833:
10829:
10825:
10821:
10814:
10806:
10802:
10798:
10794:
10790:
10786:
10779:
10771:
10767:
10763:
10759:
10755:
10751:
10748:(2): 260–68.
10747:
10743:
10736:
10734:
10725:
10721:
10717:
10713:
10709:
10705:
10701:
10697:
10690:
10683:
10679:
10676:
10670:
10662:
10656:
10648:
10644:
10639:
10634:
10630:
10626:
10619:
10610:
10600:
10593:
10587:
10579:
10575:
10571:
10567:
10563:
10559:
10552:
10550:
10548:
10539:
10535:
10531:
10527:
10523:
10519:
10515:
10511:
10508:(1): 342–50.
10507:
10503:
10496:
10488:
10484:
10479:
10474:
10469:
10464:
10460:
10456:
10452:
10448:
10444:
10437:
10429:
10425:
10421:
10417:
10413:
10409:
10406:(3): 346–58.
10405:
10401:
10397:
10390:
10382:
10378:
10373:
10368:
10365:(4): 663–85.
10364:
10360:
10353:
10345:
10341:
10337:
10333:
10329:
10325:
10318:
10310:
10306:
10302:
10298:
10293:
10288:
10284:
10280:
10273:
10265:
10261:
10257:
10253:
10249:
10245:
10238:
10230:
10226:
10222:
10218:
10211:
10203:
10199:
10195:
10191:
10187:
10183:
10180:(3): 965–71.
10179:
10175:
10168:
10161:
10154:
10150:
10144:
10140:
10136:
10129:
10121:
10115:
10111:
10107:
10103:
10096:
10088:
10084:
10078:
10074:
10073:
10065:
10054:
10050:
10046:
10042:
10038:
10035:(4): 527–41.
10034:
10030:
10023:
10016:
10008:
10002:
9998:
9997:
9989:
9981:
9977:
9973:
9969:
9966:(5): 666–67.
9965:
9961:
9954:
9946:
9942:
9938:
9934:
9930:
9926:
9923:(3): 439–58.
9922:
9918:
9911:
9903:
9899:
9895:
9891:
9886:
9881:
9878:(7): 480–91.
9877:
9873:
9866:
9852:on 2018-12-12
9848:
9844:
9838:
9835:. MIT Press.
9831:
9830:
9822:
9820:
9811:
9807:
9803:
9799:
9795:
9791:
9787:
9783:
9776:
9768:
9761:
9753:
9749:
9744:
9739:
9735:
9731:
9727:
9723:
9719:
9712:
9704:
9700:
9696:
9692:
9689:(4): 261–77.
9688:
9684:
9677:
9669:
9665:
9660:
9655:
9651:
9647:
9644:(9): 806–10.
9643:
9639:
9635:
9628:
9620:
9616:
9612:
9608:
9604:
9600:
9597:(3): 301–06.
9596:
9592:
9585:
9577:
9573:
9568:
9563:
9559:
9555:
9551:
9547:
9543:
9536:
9528:
9524:
9520:
9516:
9512:
9508:
9504:
9500:
9493:
9486:
9480:
9478:
9469:
9465:
9460:
9455:
9450:
9445:
9441:
9437:
9433:
9426:
9418:
9414:
9409:
9404:
9400:
9396:
9393:(3): 548–62.
9392:
9388:
9384:
9377:
9369:
9365:
9360:
9355:
9350:
9345:
9341:
9337:
9333:
9329:
9325:
9318:
9310:
9306:
9301:
9296:
9291:
9286:
9282:
9278:
9274:
9267:
9259:
9255:
9251:
9245:
9241:
9240:
9232:
9225:
9221:
9217:
9213:
9209:
9204:
9196:
9192:
9186:
9178:
9172:
9168:
9164:
9157:
9149:
9143:
9139:
9138:
9129:
9118:
9114:
9110:
9106:
9102:
9098:
9094:
9091:(4): 535–39.
9090:
9086:
9085:Exp Brain Res
9079:
9072:
9061:
9057:
9053:
9049:
9045:
9042:(3): 623–42.
9041:
9037:
9030:
9023:
9015:
9011:
9007:
9003:
9000:(4): 529–66.
8999:
8995:
8988:
8980:
8976:
8972:
8968:
8965:(3): 623–42.
8964:
8960:
8953:
8951:
8949:
8941:
8937:
8932:
8924:
8922:88-420-6418-1
8918:
8914:
8907:
8899:
8897:0-14-200334-4
8893:
8889:
8882:
8874:
8872:88-04-39318-1
8868:
8864:
8857:
8849:
8847:0-385-33430-3
8843:
8839:
8838:The Naked Ape
8832:
8824:
8817:
8809:
8807:88-15-07174-1
8803:
8799:
8798:Biopsychology
8792:
8777:
8771:
8763:
8762:
8757:
8751:
8736:
8729:
8722:
8718:
8714:
8710:
8706:
8705:New Scientist
8699:
8685:
8681:
8674:
8666:
8664:88-424-9359-7
8660:
8656:
8649:
8641:
8636:
8631:
8629:
8627:
8618:
8612:
8608:
8601:
8593:
8587:
8583:
8582:
8574:
8567:
8561:
8559:
8557:
8548:
8542:
8538:
8534:
8527:
8520:
8516:
8512:
8508:
8503:
8499:
8495:
8492:
8488:
8482:
8475:
8469:
8454:
8448:
8433:
8427:
8420:
8417:
8413:
8407:
8403:
8396:
8388:
8382:
8378:
8374:
8371:
8367:
8359:
8344:
8343:
8335:
8321:on 2015-12-21
8317:
8313:
8309:
8302:
8295:
8288:
8283:
8277:
8273:
8269:
8262:
8254:
8248:
8244:
8240:
8238:
8229:
8221:
8215:
8211:
8207:
8200:
8194:
8190:
8186:
8179:
8173:
8169:
8162:
8154:
8150:
8143:
8135:
8129:
8125:
8121:
8114:
8108:
8104:
8098:
8096:
8088:
8082:
8076:
8070:
8062:
8056:
8052:
8048:
8041:
8027:on 2018-10-06
8026:
8022:
8015:
8009:
8008:0-631-14552-4
8005:
8001:
8000:
7995:
7990:
7983:
7977:
7971:
7970:0-87220-230-5
7967:
7963:
7957:
7949:
7943:
7939:
7935:
7928:
7920:
7913:
7905:
7898:
7890:
7886:
7882:
7878:
7874:
7870:
7863:
7855:
7851:
7847:
7843:
7839:
7835:
7828:
7812:
7808:
7801:
7794:
7788:
7780:
7774:
7770:
7766:
7762:
7755:
7747:
7743:
7735:
7727:
7723:
7717:
7711:
7704:
7703:0-19-513336-6
7700:
7696:
7690:
7684:
7683:0-670-03186-0
7680:
7676:
7670:
7668:
7659:
7652:
7644:
7637:
7629:
7625:
7621:
7617:
7613:
7609:
7605:
7601:
7594:
7579:
7573:
7569:
7568:
7560:
7553:
7549:
7543:
7539:
7535:
7531:
7524:
7517:
7513:
7507:
7503:
7499:
7495:
7488:
7486:
7479:
7478:0-87220-230-5
7475:
7471:
7467:
7463:
7457:
7450:
7447:
7441:
7433:
7429:
7425:
7421:
7417:
7413:
7406:
7404:
7395:
7391:
7384:
7382:
7374:
7370:
7365:
7357:
7351:
7343:
7339:
7333:
7318:
7314:
7310:
7306:
7302:
7298:
7294:
7287:
7279:
7273:
7269:
7265:
7257:
7249:
7243:
7239:
7238:
7230:
7222:
7218:
7214:
7206:
7202:
7194:
7187:
7182:
7176:
7172:
7168:
7164:
7157:
7149:
7143:
7139:
7135:
7131:
7123:
7121:
7105:
7099:
7095:
7091:
7084:
7076:
7069:
7063:
7057:
7053:
7046:
7038:
7034:
7027:
7012:
7006:
7002:
6998:
6991:
6976:
6970:
6966:
6962:
6961:"determinism"
6955:
6940:
6934:
6930:
6929:
6921:
6914:
6910:
6906:
6902:
6898:
6894:
6890:
6883:
6876:
6872:
6868:
6864:
6860:
6856:
6852:
6848:
6844:
6837:
6833:
6829:
6826:(3): 217–29.
6825:
6821:
6817:
6801:
6797:
6791:
6784:
6772:
6771:
6763:
6756:
6752:
6748:
6744:
6740:
6733:
6726:
6721:
6717:
6713:
6709:
6705:
6701:
6693:
6680:
6673:
6668:
6664:
6659:
6654:
6646:
6639:
6627:
6623:
6617:
6601:
6597:
6582:
6578:
6574:
6568:
6560:
6554:
6550:
6546:
6542:
6538:
6531:
6529:
6527:
6511:
6505:
6501:
6500:
6492:
6484:
6480:
6476:
6472:
6468:
6464:
6460:
6456:
6452:
6448:
6443:
6438:
6434:
6430:
6423:
6417:
6413:
6410:
6406:
6400:
6398:
6390:
6389:
6382:
6367:
6361:
6358:. HardPress.
6357:
6356:
6348:
6333:
6327:
6323:
6322:
6314:
6299:
6293:
6289:
6288:
6280:
6265:
6263:9780710005656
6259:
6254:
6253:
6244:
6228:
6227:
6219:
6204:
6198:
6193:
6192:
6183:
6168:
6162:
6158:
6157:
6149:
6134:
6128:
6124:
6123:
6115:
6107:
6103:
6099:
6095:
6088:
6073:
6067:
6063:
6062:
6054:
6047:
6045:
6041:
6037:
6036:spontaneously
6031:
6025:
6021:
6014:
6006:
6000:
5996:
5992:
5991:
5983:
5968:
5962:
5958:
5957:
5949:
5934:
5928:
5925:. MIT Press.
5924:
5923:
5915:
5900:
5894:
5890:
5889:
5881:
5866:
5860:
5856:
5855:
5847:
5832:
5826:
5823:. Duckworth.
5822:
5821:
5813:
5798:
5792:
5787:
5786:
5777:
5769:
5765:
5761:
5757:
5753:
5749:
5742:
5734:
5730:
5725:
5720:
5716:
5712:
5708:
5701:
5686:
5680:
5677:. MIT Press.
5676:
5675:
5667:
5652:
5646:
5642:
5641:
5633:
5618:
5612:
5608:
5607:
5599:
5584:
5578:
5573:
5572:
5563:
5548:
5542:
5538:
5537:
5529:
5522:
5518:
5514:
5510:
5506:
5502:
5498:
5494:
5490:
5486:
5482:
5477:
5472:
5468:
5464:
5457:
5450:
5444:
5429:
5423:
5419:
5418:
5410:
5408:
5399:
5395:
5388:
5386:
5384:
5382:
5373:
5366:
5358:
5356:1-55786-857-3
5352:
5348:
5344:
5337:
5329:
5323:
5319:
5315:
5311:
5310:"Determinism"
5305:
5302:goes back to
5301:
5295:
5287:
5283:
5279:
5275:
5271:
5267:
5260:
5252:
5248:
5241:
5239:
5223:
5217:
5213:
5212:
5204:
5202:
5200:
5191:
5187:
5180:
5178:
5176:
5160:
5154:
5150:
5146:
5145:"determinism"
5139:
5128:
5124:
5120:
5116:
5112:
5107:
5102:
5099:(2): 223–47.
5098:
5094:
5093:
5085:
5078:
5071:
5065:
5053:
5046:
5041:
5037:
5033:
5027:
5023:
5019:
5015:
5011:
5007:
5006:
4998:
4996:
4988:
4977:
4973:
4971:
4962:
4960:
4951:
4945:
4941:
4940:
4932:
4924:
4918:
4914:
4910:
4903:
4895:
4889:
4885:
4880:
4879:
4870:
4868:
4866:
4857:
4853:
4849:
4845:
4842:(3): 113–21.
4841:
4837:
4830:
4823:on 2008-09-11
4822:
4818:
4817:
4813:Inwagen, P.,
4809:
4801:
4794:
4792:
4783:
4776:
4768:
4766:0-691-01566-X
4762:
4758:
4751:
4743:
4736:
4729:
4723:
4716:
4708:
4706:0-415-29624-2
4702:
4698:
4691:
4683:
4681:0-19-512656-4
4677:
4673:
4666:
4658:
4652:
4648:
4647:
4639:
4637:
4628:
4624:
4620:
4616:
4609:
4601:
4595:
4591:
4590:
4582:
4580:
4578:
4569:
4567:0-19-824924-1
4563:
4559:
4555:
4548:
4546:
4537:
4533:
4525:
4521:
4514:
4512:
4510:
4508:
4499:
4495:
4488:
4486:
4484:
4475:
4469:
4465:
4458:
4456:
4454:
4452:
4450:
4440:
4439:10.1.1.5.2852
4435:
4432:(12): 24–28.
4431:
4427:
4420:
4412:
4408:
4401:
4399:
4391:
4386:
4380:
4376:
4375:
4367:
4356:
4352:
4348:
4344:
4340:
4336:
4332:
4328:
4324:
4320:
4316:
4309:
4302:
4298:
4292:
4288:
4281:
4267:
4263:
4256:
4254:
4237:
4233:
4229:
4222:
4214:
4208:
4204:
4203:
4195:
4187:
4181:
4177:
4173:
4166:
4159:
4155:
4149:
4145:
4141:
4134:
4126:
4120:
4116:
4112:
4108:
4101:
4099:
4087:on 2012-09-03
4083:
4076:
4069:
4061:
4057:
4053:
4046:
4038:
4034:
4030:
4023:
4021:
4013:
4009:
4006:
4002:
3997:
3995:
3989:
3985:
3981:
3979:
3970:
3962:
3956:
3952:
3948:
3941:
3939:
3937:
3935:
3933:
3924:
3922:9780826404763
3918:
3914:
3913:
3905:
3898:
3893:
3887:
3883:
3882:
3874:
3867:
3863:
3857:
3853:
3849:
3842:
3835:
3830:
3824:
3820:
3816:
3809:
3800:
3792:
3785:
3771:
3765:
3761:
3757:
3753:
3749:
3742:
3734:
3733:
3725:
3717:
3711:
3707:
3703:
3699:
3691:
3683:
3677:
3673:
3669:
3662:
3654:
3648:
3644:
3643:
3636:
3635:Rudolf Carnap
3630:
3623:
3613:
3607:
3603:
3602:
3594:
3592:
3583:
3581:9780128002841
3577:
3573:
3569:
3565:
3558:
3551:
3547:
3546:
3541:
3535:
3531:
3515:
3514:Will to power
3512:
3510:
3507:
3505:
3502:
3500:
3497:
3495:
3492:
3490:
3487:
3485:
3482:
3480:
3477:
3474:
3473:
3469:
3467:
3466:Buridan's ass
3464:
3462:
3459:
3457:
3454:
3453:
3448:
3437:
3430:
3428:
3424:
3420:
3416:
3411:
3406:
3404:
3400:
3395:
3385:
3383:
3378:
3374:
3371:position. In
3370:
3366:
3362:
3358:
3354:
3341:
3337:
3333:
3329:
3325:
3322:
3318:
3317:
3312:
3308:
3304:
3303:
3302:
3300:
3296:
3291:
3279:
3273:
3264:
3260:
3253:
3249:
3245:
3240:
3230:
3227:
3224:
3221:
3219:
3215:
3210:
3208:
3204:
3198:
3196:
3192:
3190:
3186:
3182:
3178:
3173:
3169:
3167:
3162:
3161:Martin Luther
3159:
3155:
3151:
3147:
3143:
3139:
3135:
3131:
3127:
3123:
3119:
3117:
3112:
3108:
3098:
3088:
3078:
3075:
3073:
3068:
3066:
3062:
3058:
3052:
3050:
3043:
3037:
3034:
3028:
3027:Self-efficacy
3018:
3010:
3001:
2997:
2995:
2991:
2987:
2984:
2975:
2966:
2962:
2959:
2957:
2953:
2949:
2947:
2942:
2936:
2929:
2926:
2925:
2924:
2921:
2917:
2913:
2912:Daniel Wegner
2909:
2904:
2900:
2896:
2886:
2884:
2880:
2875:
2874:schizophrenia
2870:
2868:
2864:
2860:
2856:
2851:
2846:
2842:
2837:
2834:
2830:
2826:
2822:
2818:
2817:tic disorders
2814:
2809:
2805:
2802:
2798:
2795:
2791:
2788:
2784:
2783:
2774:
2771:
2768:
2765:
2764:
2763:
2760:
2758:
2752:
2750:
2746:
2741:
2737:
2732:
2730:
2725:
2722:
2718:
2714:
2710:
2705:
2701:
2695:
2689:
2685:
2675:
2673:
2669:
2665:
2664:Steven Pinker
2661:
2657:
2647:
2644:
2638:
2636:
2632:
2627:
2623:
2619:
2615:
2605:
2601:
2592:
2590:
2586:
2579:
2574:
2572:
2568:
2563:
2561:
2557:
2553:
2550:school, only
2549:
2545:
2541:
2537:
2533:
2527:
2517:
2515:
2514:
2509:
2505:
2504:
2503:idappaccayatā
2499:
2495:
2491:
2487:
2483:
2477:
2475:
2471:
2466:
2462:
2458:
2454:
2453:
2448:
2444:
2440:
2426:
2417:
2413:
2411:
2407:
2403:
2398:
2396:
2392:
2382:
2380:
2376:
2370:
2368:
2363:
2362:Immanuel Kant
2360:In the 1780s
2355:
2351:
2347:
2344:
2341:
2337:
2334:
2333:
2332:
2330:
2325:
2322:
2318:
2313:
2312:
2307:
2301:
2291:
2289:
2285:
2284:
2279:
2278:William James
2270:
2268:
2262:
2260:
2256:
2252:
2248:
2244:
2240:
2236:
2232:
2228:
2219:
2217:
2213:
2211:
2204:
2201:
2197:
2193:
2189:
2183:
2181:
2180:
2174:
2170:
2166:
2162:
2158:
2155:According to
2150:
2146:
2142:
2138:
2136:
2131:
2125:
2121:
2117:
2116:
2112:
2108:
2099:
2096:
2091:
2090:Ted Honderich
2081:
2079:
2074:
2070:
2063:
2053:
2051:
2046:
2045:Claudio Costa
2041:
2037:
2035:
2030:
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14629:After Virtue
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11485:
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134:
130:
124:
101:
91:
78:deliberation
55:
42:
41:
16470:Citizendium
16431:Kerr metric
16368:Determinism
16309:Causal loop
16215:Time travel
16099:Illusionism
16044:Theological
15980:Determinism
15386:Physicalism
15381:Parallelism
15376:Panpsychism
15346:Materialism
15321:Emergentism
15211:Wolf Singer
15080:Kurt Koffka
15009:Philip Goff
14984:Michael Tye
14979:Max Velmans
14959:Karl Popper
14949:John Searle
14934:John Eccles
14919:Georges Rey
14504:(c. 322 BC)
14370:Kierkegaard
14189:Stewardship
13966:Rousseauian
13883:Rationalism
13795:Cognitivism
13742:Programming
13717:Meat eating
13690:Engineering
13294:Metaphysics
13278:(c. 200 BC)
13268:(c. 350 BC)
13258:(c. 350 BC)
13145:Collingwood
13050:Malebranche
12798:Information
12726:Anima mundi
12705:Type theory
12660:Physicalism
12625:Materialism
12580:Determinism
12551:Metaphysics
12353:Information
12318:Family life
12288:Association
12075:"Free Will"
12056:"Free Will"
11801:19.08.2004
11728:Harris, Sam
11029:Neuroethics
10558:Neuroethics
10330:(1): 1–23.
8737:. Ucl.ac.uk
8402:"Free Will"
7875:(1): 3–10.
7418:(1): 5–20.
7260:Quote from
7109:22 December
7016:22 December
6980:22 December
6944:22 December
6806:20 December
6777:20 December
6632:19 December
6606:20 December
6593:. See also
6587:20 December
6371:27 December
6337:27 December
6303:27 December
6290:. P. Lang.
6269:27 December
6233:27 December
6208:27 December
6172:27 December
6138:27 December
6077:27 December
5972:27 December
5938:27 December
5904:27 December
5870:27 December
5836:27 December
5802:27 December
5690:27 December
5656:27 December
5622:27 December
5588:27 December
5552:27 December
5433:27 December
5227:22 December
5164:26 December
4262:"Free Will"
4242:12 December
4039:(11): 2–29.
3754:: 287–338.
3540:Carus, Paul
3494:Prospection
3332:omniscience
3267:בחירה חפשית
3177:John Wesley
3150:John Calvin
3130:Arminianism
3081:In theology
3033:determinism
2829:involuntary
2825:unvoluntary
2729:unconscious
2672:exculpation
2668:explanation
2560:Vaisheshika
2084:Other views
1974:physicalist
1688:physicalism
1628:human brain
1600:Physicalism
1512:omniscience
1484:omniscience
1410:omniscience
1399:predestined
1395:determinism
1343:determinism
1291:omnipotence
1262:Omniscience
1257:Omniscience
1251:Omniscience
1240:determinism
1208:determinism
1149:self-caused
1130:Determinism
975:Thomas Reid
913:Robert Kane
847:panpsychism
830:physicalism
820:, will, or
698:determinism
447:David Lewis
388:determinism
384:Robert Kane
376:Thomas Reid
374:", such as
311:Origination
295:determinism
94:Determinism
82:prohibition
66:culpability
37:Self-agency
16492:Categories
16398:Spacetimes
16373:Eternalism
16340:Multiverse
16094:Falliblism
16024:Linguistic
16019:Historical
15994:Biological
15778:Upanishads
15579:Experience
15544:Blindsight
15371:Nondualism
15252:Max Planck
15232:David Bohm
15048:Psychology
14939:John Locke
14864:David Hume
14807:Philosophy
14400:Bonhoeffer
14109:Immorality
14052:Eudaimonia
14012:Conscience
14007:Compassion
13893:Skepticism
13888:Relativism
13805:Naturalism
13785:Absolutism
13757:Technology
13607:Deontology
13354:Monadology
13288:(c. 80 BC)
12995:Parmenides
12880:Perception
12778:Experience
12665:Relativism
12640:Naturalism
12590:Enactivism
12313:Fair trial
11998:2018-12-12
11955:Dick Swaab
11799:L'Espresso
11722:PhilPapers
11363:2010-11-21
10932:: 104342.
10223:: 239–45.
9856:2018-12-12
9258:lc92010057
9191:Wegner, D.
8782:2010-11-21
8741:2010-11-21
8689:2008-11-01
8507:contingent
8459:2012-08-13
8438:2012-08-13
8349:2015-12-09
8325:2015-12-09
8168:in subject
8103:Pragmatism
8075:((online))
8031:2007-08-02
7996:, Arthur,
7938:The Ethics
7583:6 February
7472:, Oxford.
7322:4 December
7031:Boethius.
6849:: 714–24.
6515:8 December
6409:((online))
5717:: 119–25.
5476:2107.06572
5469:: 104474.
5463:Biosystems
5272:: 242–57.
4982:2012-09-14
4621:: 121–37.
4556:. Oxford:
4271:2013-01-15
4091:2012-08-21
3775:2015-12-09
3617:2015-12-09
3545:The Monist
3521:References
3361:al-Ash'ari
3295:Maimonides
3248:Bas relief
3203:glorified.
3025:See also:
2893:See also:
2692:See also:
2656:biologists
2624:theories.
2622:stochastic
2614:Democritus
2524:See also:
2494:Samkhyists
2447:the Buddha
2377:and their
2306:David Hume
2298:See also:
2283:Pragmatism
2259:antecedent
2255:Chrysippus
2192:phenomenon
2130:David Hume
2069:naturalist
2043:Recently,
2017:depression
1994:behavioral
1970:naturalism
1959:See also:
1918:Elbow Room
1886:psychology
1863:David Hume
1586:See also:
1551:C.S. Lewis
1517:Infallible
1359:Calvinists
1318:philosophy
1307:See also:
1232:See also:
1072:John Locke
958:Niels Bohr
640:determined
543:Free will
420:Carl Ginet
338:biological
214:Chrysippus
202:See also:
74:persuasion
16508:Causality
16498:Free will
16474:Free will
16472:article "
16383:Free will
16279:Time loop
16128:Free will
16060:Causality
15793:Yogachara
15728:Sentience
15589:Free will
15529:Awareness
15517:Attention
15406:Solipsism
15121:Anil Seth
14994:Ned Block
14661:Casuistry
14573:Either/Or
14480:Korsgaard
14475:Azurmendi
14440:MacIntyre
14380:Nietzsche
14310:Augustine
14305:Confucius
14285:Aristotle
14261:Ethicists
14219:Intrinsic
14184:Suffering
14094:Happiness
14067:Free will
14047:Etiquette
13992:Authority
13936:Epicurean
13931:Confucian
13926:Christian
13861:Emotivism
13685:Discourse
13622:Pragmatic
13594:Normative
13514:Teleology
13479:Mereology
13459:Cosmology
13318:(c. 1000)
13215:Plantinga
13205:Armstrong
13155:Heidegger
13130:Whitehead
13115:Nietzsche
13035:Descartes
13005:Aristotle
12960:Universal
12890:Principle
12860:Necessity
12820:Intention
12773:Existence
12736:Causality
12675:Solipsism
12605:Free will
12479:Anarchism
12413:Sexuality
12308:Education
12267:Political
12221:Free will
12123:Free will
12111:Free will
11898:cite book
11890:991595874
11747:. (2007)
11732:Free Will
11409:cite book
11147:1475-4975
11059:143687015
11035:: 13–16.
10996:227095775
10954:220057834
10926:Cognition
10805:152011660
10633:CiteSeerX
10631:: 65–72.
10578:143223154
10522:1053-8100
10420:1468-0017
10367:CiteSeerX
10344:1468-0017
10309:1933-1592
10287:CiteSeerX
9980:144699878
9880:CiteSeerX
9810:206021496
9208:Kornhuber
8936:Kornhuber
8511:necessary
8476:, Q83 A1.
8370:Aquinas,
7889:155641763
7854:1467-9973
7693:Kane, R.
7643:Free Will
7446:Leviathan
7350:cite book
7344:. Oxford.
7309:0048-3915
6602:. Collins
6467:0028-0836
6442:0704.2529
6040:undermine
5768:169483672
5733:0739-7046
5517:235785726
5501:0303-2647
5417:Free Will
5101:CiteSeerX
5062:ignored (
5052:cite book
4856:170811962
4728:bad faith
4528:See also
4434:CiteSeerX
3897:flowing..
3834:proposed.
3815:"Freedom"
3526:Citations
3504:True Will
3272:romanized
3218:Ephesians
3189:synergism
3142:Calvinism
2833:voluntary
2717:Kornhuber
2618:Cārvākans
2571:Vedantist
2508:Nagarjuna
2498:Cārvākans
2402:intellect
2329:apriority
2304:In 1739,
2288:meliorism
2190:, but is
2171:, as the
2161:phenomena
2078:Darwinism
2050:Jim Jones
1978:cognition
1869:, in his
1824:implement
1726:emergence
1721:supervene
1616:free will
1490:), or as
1144:causality
1113:ex nihilo
1038:, p. xvi.
826:causality
412:causa sui
368:d'Holbach
172:Epictetus
168:Aristotle
135:necessary
43:Free will
16378:Fatalism
16123:Fatalism
16082:Etiology
16004:Economic
15999:Cultural
15928:Category
15664:Ontology
15619:Illusion
15336:Idealism
15285:Theories
14751:Category
14691:Ideology
14656:Axiology
14485:Nussbaum
14435:Frankena
14430:Anscombe
14420:Williams
14375:Sidgwick
14295:Valluvar
14290:Diogenes
14275:Socrates
14199:Theodicy
14194:Sympathy
14159:Pacifism
14149:Morality
14062:Fidelity
14042:Equality
13997:Autonomy
13985:Concepts
13946:Feminist
13921:Buddhist
13851:Nihilism
13790:Axiology
13747:Research
13680:Computer
13675:Business
13532:Category
13454:Axiology
13308:(c. 270)
13236:more ...
13190:Anscombe
13185:Strawson
13180:Davidson
13075:Berkeley
13015:Plotinus
12976:more ...
12915:Relation
12895:Property
12870:Ontology
12793:Identity
12714:Concepts
12645:Nihilism
12610:Idealism
12558:Theories
12484:Autonomy
12452:See also
12393:Religion
12383:Property
12368:Movement
12283:Assembly
12276:By right
12257:Internet
12247:Economic
12237:Academic
12189:Libertas
12167:Concepts
12034:Einstein
11870:(2017).
11848:(1839).
11821:(2023).
11808:Nowak A.
11730:. 2012.
11690:: 29–47.
11678:(1982).
11668:15590621
11573:(1999).
11554:(2003).
11398:Archived
11341:(1976).
11323:(1948).
11265:6 August
11204:18453477
11155:15648622
11110:22074173
10946:32593841
10907:28144228
10856:31249653
10770:16010829
10762:19141628
10716:18181791
10678:Archived
10564:: 1–11.
10538:16953908
10530:18805023
10487:21149703
10428:18837686
10202:19502601
10194:21367624
10049:16949962
9945:13991023
9937:16091264
9902:10424155
9802:10719163
9752:10601408
9703:15006289
9619:14180577
9611:17638304
9576:19387980
9519:11077021
9468:31642807
9417:21315264
9368:22869750
9309:23966921
9214:, 2012.
9193:(2002).
9113:43567513
9105:19641911
8494:Archived
8237:a priori
7620:10637618
7340:(2012).
6871:62639035
6751:40694201
6475:17443179
6412:Archived
5990:Miracles
5509:34242745
5286:14586058
5127:Archived
5123:16783870
4355:Archived
4351:46156580
4343:14625354
4008:Archived
3433:See also
3290:bechirah
3209:8:29–30
3122:Molinism
3065:fatalism
2863:epilepsy
2650:Genetics
2544:kaivalya
2490:Nyayists
2457:Sanskrit
2439:Buddhism
2410:passions
2379:synapses
2367:a priori
2251:Stoicism
2196:a priori
2173:noumenon
2149:noumenon
2135:velleity
2095:abstract
2034:dopamine
2025:volition
1867:Voltaire
1640:physical
1543:Boethius
1449:taxonomy
1374:fatalism
1140:paradigm
1084:postpone
950:volition
909:volition
689:taxonomy
606:implies
598:implies
342:cultural
287:illusion
29:FreeWill
16284:in film
16104:Destiny
16014:Genetic
15938:Commons
15715:Purusha
15704:Reentry
15497:Agnosia
15420:Science
14800:Figures
14649:Related
14395:Tillich
14360:Bentham
14335:Spinoza
14330:Aquinas
14315:Mencius
14229:Western
14204:Torture
14169:Precept
14124:Loyalty
14119:Liberty
14114:Justice
14027:Dignity
14017:Consent
13961:Kantian
13951:Islamic
13914:Schools
13800:Realism
13732:Nursing
13727:Medical
13712:Machine
13652:Applied
13304:Enneads
13298:(c. 50)
13264:Timaeus
13254:Sophist
13200:Dummett
13195:Deleuze
13135:Russell
13125:Bergson
13120:Meinong
13100:Bolzano
13060:Leibniz
13040:Spinoza
13025:Aquinas
13010:Proclus
12940:Thought
12930:Subject
12910:Reality
12905:Quality
12875:Pattern
12835:Meaning
12810:Insight
12768:Essence
12753:Concept
12655:Realism
12620:Liberty
12585:Dualism
12428:Thought
12418:Silence
12388:Protest
12378:Privacy
12343:Housing
12230:By type
12160:Liberty
12062:(ed.).
11659:1693460
11622:purpose
11240:3023336
11195:2408534
11101:3757306
10968:2020).
10898:5239816
10847:6542011
10724:2643260
10478:3012523
10455:Bibcode
10264:2089386
9743:1760620
9668:1402972
9659:1015106
9567:2767459
9527:7774922
9459:6809608
9408:3052770
9359:3479453
9336:Bibcode
9300:3746176
9283:: 385.
9056:6640273
9014:6965339
8979:6640273
8637:(1907)
8519:chaotic
7432:2024717
7317:2265349
6909:4224996
6851:Bibcode
6725:nature.
6708:Bibcode
6663:Bibcode
6483:4412358
6447:Bibcode
6044:enhance
5481:Bibcode
5304:Laplace
5040:4080545
5010:Bibcode
4836:Theoria
4390:brains.
4323:Bibcode
3427:animals
3369:Ash'ari
3316:Mitzvot
3274::
3233:Judaism
3107:Thomism
2941:priming
2616:or the
2552:Ishvara
2540:Samkhya
2510:in the
2470:destiny
2375:neurons
2308:in his
1322:history
1218:Destiny
1192:Destiny
755:knowing
330:destiny
303:dualism
276:ability
16034:Social
15862:Psyche
15709:Sakshi
15694:Qualia
15490:Topics
15356:Monism
15220:Others
14640:(1984)
14632:(1981)
14624:(1979)
14616:(1971)
14608:(1903)
14600:(1887)
14592:(1874)
14584:(1861)
14576:(1843)
14568:(1820)
14560:(1788)
14552:(1785)
14544:(1780)
14536:(1759)
14528:(1740)
14520:(1726)
14512:(1677)
14470:Taylor
14455:Parfit
14450:Singer
14425:Mackie
14300:Cicero
14241:Virtue
14174:Rights
14099:Honour
13956:Jewish
13752:Sexual
13660:Animal
13642:Virtue
13586:Ethics
13438:(1981)
13428:(1943)
13418:(1927)
13408:(1846)
13398:(1818)
13388:(1807)
13378:(1783)
13368:(1781)
13358:(1714)
13348:(1710)
13338:(1677)
13334:Ethics
13328:(1641)
13230:Parfit
13220:Kripke
13210:Putnam
13170:Sartre
13160:Carnap
13110:Peirce
13055:Newton
13030:Suárez
13020:Scotus
12900:Qualia
12865:Object
12855:Nature
12850:Motion
12830:Matter
12763:Entity
12635:Monism
12423:Speech
12403:Resist
12398:Repair
12338:Health
12298:Choice
12293:Asylum
12206:Rights
12023:
11981:
11961:
11947:
11932:
11918:
11888:
11878:
11859:
11835:
11783:
11769:
11755:
11738:
11666:
11656:
11618:reason
11614:Agency
11588:
11564:
11518:
11390:
11238:
11202:
11192:
11153:
11145:
11108:
11098:
11057:
10994:
10952:
10944:
10905:
10895:
10881:: 20.
10854:
10844:
10803:
10768:
10760:
10722:
10714:
10635:
10576:
10536:
10528:
10520:
10485:
10475:
10426:
10418:
10369:
10342:
10307:
10289:
10262:
10200:
10192:
10145:
10116:
10079:
10047:
10003:
9978:
9943:
9935:
9900:
9882:
9839:
9808:
9800:
9750:
9740:
9701:
9666:
9656:
9617:
9609:
9574:
9564:
9525:
9517:
9466:
9456:
9415:
9405:
9387:Neuron
9366:
9356:
9307:
9297:
9256:
9246:
9222:
9212:Deecke
9210:&
9173:
9144:
9111:
9103:
9054:
9012:
8977:
8940:Deecke
8938:&
8919:
8894:
8869:
8844:
8804:
8661:
8613:
8588:
8543:
8502:direct
8383:
8278:
8249:
8216:
8130:
8057:
8006:
7968:
7944:
7887:
7852:
7817:3 June
7775:
7718:. See
7701:
7681:
7628:451912
7626:
7618:
7574:
7544:
7508:
7476:
7430:
7315:
7307:
7274:
7244:
7177:
7144:
7100:
7007:
6971:
6935:
6907:
6869:
6839:, and
6749:
6696:, and
6555:
6506:
6481:
6473:
6465:
6429:Nature
6362:
6328:
6294:
6260:
6199:
6163:
6129:
6068:
6026:
6001:
5963:
5929:
5895:
5861:
5827:
5793:
5766:
5731:
5681:
5647:
5613:
5579:
5543:
5515:
5507:
5499:
5424:
5353:
5324:
5284:
5218:
5155:
5121:
5103:
5038:
5028:
4946:
4919:
4890:
4854:
4763:
4703:
4678:
4653:
4596:
4564:
4470:
4436:
4381:
4349:
4341:
4293:
4209:
4182:
4150:
4121:
3994:per se
3957:
3919:
3888:
3858:
3825:
3766:
3712:
3678:
3649:
3608:
3578:
3388:Others
3263:Hebrew
3207:Romans
2901:, and
2867:stroke
2808:will.
2740:before
2721:Deecke
2719:&
2532:astika
2443:agency
2408:, and
2354:qualia
2321:result
2247:action
2124:Ethics
2029:addict
1734:monism
1712:qualia
1696:exists
1665:Popper
1598:, and
1596:Monism
1549:, and
1136:events
870:, and
456:Using
382:, and
336:, and
267:action
210:stoics
86:willed
80:, and
70:advice
62:praise
51:action
47:choose
15987:Types
15802:Works
15549:Brain
14732:Index
14494:Works
14465:Adams
14460:Nagel
14415:Dewey
14410:Rawls
14390:Barth
14385:Moore
14350:Hegel
14325:Xunzi
14280:Plato
14270:Laozi
14251:Wrong
14224:Japan
14214:Value
14209:Trust
14104:Ideal
13971:Stoic
13722:Media
13707:Legal
13484:Meta-
13225:Lewis
13175:Quine
13140:Moore
13105:Lotze
13090:Hegel
13065:Wolff
13045:Locke
13000:Plato
12970:Value
12950:Truth
12438:Truth
12373:Press
12303:Death
12242:Civil
12058:. In
11992:(PDF)
11975:(PDF)
11527:(PDF)
11486:Philo
11401:(PDF)
11384:(PDF)
11236:S2CID
11151:S2CID
11055:S2CID
11025:(PDF)
10992:S2CID
10950:S2CID
10801:S2CID
10766:S2CID
10720:S2CID
10574:S2CID
10534:S2CID
10424:S2CID
10260:JSTOR
10198:S2CID
10170:(PDF)
10056:(PDF)
10045:S2CID
10025:(PDF)
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