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this sense, concepts' structure relies on their relationships to other concepts as mandated by a particular mental theory about the state of the world. How this is supposed to work is a little less clear than in the previous two theories, but is still a prominent and notable theory. This is supposed to explain some of the issues of ignorance and error that come up in prototype and classical theories as concepts that are structured around each other seem to account for errors such as whale as a fish (this misconception came from an incorrect theory about what a whale is like, combining with our theory of what a fish is). When we learn that a whale is not a fish, we are recognizing that whales don't in fact fit the theory we had about what makes something a fish. Theory-theory also postulates that people's theories about the world are what inform their conceptual knowledge of the world. Therefore, analysing people's theories can offer insights into their concepts. In this sense, "theory" means an individual's mental explanation rather than scientific fact. This theory criticizes classical and prototype theory as relying too much on similarities and using them as a sufficient constraint. It suggests that theories or mental understandings contribute more to what has membership to a group rather than weighted similarities, and a cohesive category is formed more by what makes sense to the perceiver. Weights assigned to features have shown to fluctuate and vary depending on context and experimental task demonstrated by
Tversky. For this reason, similarities between members may be collateral rather than causal.
731:. There are not necessarily any necessary conditions for membership; a dog can still be a dog with only three legs. This view is particularly supported by psychological experimental evidence for prototypicality effects. Participants willingly and consistently rate objects in categories like 'vegetable' or 'furniture' as more or less typical of that class. It seems that our categories are fuzzy psychologically, and so this structure has explanatory power. We can judge an item's membership of the referent class of a concept by comparing it to the typical member—the most central member of the concept. If it is similar enough in the relevant ways, it will be cognitively admitted as a member of the relevant class of entities. Rosch suggests that every category is represented by a central exemplar which embodies all or the maximum possible number of features of a given category. Lech, Gunturkun, and Suchan explain that categorization involves many areas of the brain. Some of these are: visual association areas, prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and temporal lobe.
551:, founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy, famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference. For him, the sense of an expression in language describes a certain state of affairs in the world, namely, the way that some object is presented. Since many commentators view the notion of sense as identical to the notion of concept, and Frege regards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world, it seems to follow that we may understand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world. Accordingly, concepts (as senses) have an ontological status.
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508:'s term) of an independently existing world of ideas, in that it denies the existence of any such realm. It also contrasts with the empiricist view that concepts are abstract generalizations of individual experiences, because the contingent and bodily experience is preserved in a concept, and not abstracted away. While the perspective is compatible with Jamesian pragmatism, the notion of the transformation of embodied concepts through structural mapping makes a distinct contribution to the problem of concept formation.
252:, a concept is a mental representation, which the brain uses to denote a class of things in the world. This is to say that it is literally, a symbol or group of symbols together made from the physical material of the brain. Concepts are mental representations that allow us to draw appropriate inferences about the type of entities we encounter in our everyday lives. Concepts do not encompass all mental representations, but are merely a subset of them. The use of concepts is necessary to cognitive processes such as
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Instead, Hampton found that some items were barely considered category members and others that were barely non-members. For example, participants considered sinks as barely members of kitchen utensil category, while sponges were considered barely non-members, with much disagreement among participants of the study. If concepts and categories were very well defined, such cases should be rare. Since then, many researches have discovered borderline members that are not clearly in or out of a category of concept.
231:(colloquially understood as the stances or perspectives we take towards ideas, be it "believing", "doubting", "wondering", "accepting", etc.). And these propositional attitudes, in turn, are the building blocks of our understanding of thoughts that populate everyday life, as well as folk psychology. In this way, we have an analysis that ties our common everyday understanding of thoughts down to the scientific and philosophical understanding of concepts.
46:. As such, concepts are studied within such disciplines as linguistics, psychology, and philosophy, and these disciplines are interested in the logical and psychological structure of concepts, and how they are put together to form thoughts and sentences. The study of concepts has served as an important flagship of an emerging interdisciplinary approach, cognitive science.
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critical to the function of language, and Labov's experiment found that the function that an artifact contributed to what people categorized it as. For example, a container holding mashed potatoes versus tea swayed people toward classifying them as a bowl and a cup, respectively. This experiment also illuminated the optimal dimensions of what the prototype for "cup" is.
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Classical Theory because something is either a member of a category or is not. This type of problem is paralleled in other areas of linguistics such as phonology, with an illogical question such as "is /i/ or /o/ a better vowel?" The
Classical approach and Aristotelian categories may be a better descriptor in some cases.
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comparing these objects, I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk, branches, leaves, and the like; further, however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves themselves, and abstract from their size, shape, and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a tree.
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domains such as freedom, equality, science, happiness, etc., are also symbolized by concepts. A concept is merely a symbol, a representation of the abstraction. The word is not to be mistaken for the thing. For example, the word "moon" (a concept) is not the large, bright, shape-changing object up in the sky, but only
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was the starkest proponent of the realist thesis of universal concepts. By his view, concepts (and ideas in general) are innate ideas that were instantiations of a transcendental world of pure forms that lay behind the veil of the physical world. In this way, universals were explained as transcendent
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Concepts are classified into a hierarchy, higher levels of which are termed "superordinate" and lower levels termed "subordinate". Additionally, there is the "basic" or "middle" level at which people will most readily categorize a concept. For example, a basic-level concept would be "chair", with its
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Experiments and research showed that assumptions of well defined concepts and categories might not be correct. Researcher
Hampton asked participants to differentiate whether items were in different categories. Hampton did not conclude that items were either clear and absolute members or non-members.
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of concepts—what kind of things they are. The ontology of concepts determines the answer to other questions, such as how to integrate concepts into a wider theory of the mind, what functions are allowed or disallowed by a concept's ontology, etc. There are two main views of the ontology of concepts:
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Theory-theory is a reaction to the previous two theories and develops them further. This theory postulates that categorization by concepts is something like scientific theorizing. Concepts are not learned in isolation, but rather are learned as a part of our experiences with the world around us. In
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as if it had concrete or material existence, such as a person, a place, or a thing. It may represent a natural object that exists in the real world like a tree, an animal, a stone, etc. It may also name an artificial (man-made) object like a chair, computer, house, etc. Abstract ideas and knowledge
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from the day's hippocampal events and objects into cortical concepts is often considered to be the computation underlying (some stages of) sleep and dreaming. Many people (beginning with
Aristotle) report memories of dreams which appear to mix the day's events with analogous or related historical
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Prototypes also deal with the essence of things and to what extent they belong to a category. There have been a number of experiments dealing with questionnaires asking participants to rate something according to the extent to which it belongs to a category. This question is contradictory to the
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Given that most later theories of concepts were born out of the rejection of some or all of the classical theory, it seems appropriate to give an account of what might be wrong with this theory. In the 20th century, philosophers such as
Wittgenstein and Rosch argued against the classical theory.
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The classical theory persisted for so long unquestioned because it seemed intuitively correct and has great explanatory power. It can explain how concepts would be acquired, how we use them to categorize and how we use the structure of a concept to determine its referent class. In fact, for many
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in which quantities are on the verge of nascence or evanescence, that is, coming into or going out of existence. The abstract concepts are now considered to be totally autonomous, even though they originated from the process of abstracting or taking away qualities from perceptions until only the
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In order to make our mental images into concepts, one must thus be able to compare, reflect, and abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example, I see a fir, a willow, and a linden. In firstly
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The
Prototype perspective is proposed as an alternative view to the Classical approach. While the Classical theory requires an all-or-nothing membership in a group, prototypes allow for more fuzzy boundaries and are characterized by attributes. Lakoff stresses that experience and cognition are
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The classical theory of concepts, also referred to as the empiricist theory of concepts, is the oldest theory about the structure of concepts (it can be traced back to
Aristotle), and was prominently held until the 1970s. The classical theory of concepts says that concepts have a definitional
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for membership in the class of things covered by a particular concept. A feature is considered necessary if every member of the denoted class has that feature. A feature is considered sufficient if something has all the parts required by the definition. For example, the classic example
492:, abstract concepts are transformations of concrete concepts derived from embodied experience. The mechanism of transformation is structural mapping, in which properties of two or more source domains are selectively mapped onto a blended space (Fauconnier & Turner, 1995; see
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structure. Adequate definitions of the kind required by this theory usually take the form of a list of features. These features must have two important qualities to provide a comprehensive definition. Features entailed by the definition of a concept must be both
629:. An entity is a bachelor (by this definition) if and only if it is both unmarried and a man. To check whether something is a member of the class, you compare its qualities to the features in the definition. Another key part of this theory is that it obeys the
772:(or "sensing concepts"), activation of a concept may be the main mechanism responsible for the creation of phenomenal experiences. Therefore, understanding how the brain processes concepts may be central to solving the mystery of how conscious experiences (or
420:. He held that the account of the concept as an abstraction of experience is only partly correct. He called those concepts that result from abstraction "a posteriori concepts" (meaning concepts that arise out of experience). An empirical or an
406:, not of a particular thing. According to Kant, there are twelve categories that constitute the understanding of phenomenal objects. Each category is that one predicate which is common to multiple empirical concepts. In order to explain how an
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objects. Needless to say, this form of realism was tied deeply with Plato's ontological projects. This remark on Plato is not of merely historical interest. For example, the view that numbers are
Platonic objects was revived by
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Rosch, E. (1977). Classification of real-world objects: Origins and representations in cognition. In P. Johnson-Laird, & P. Wason, Thinking: Readings in
Cognitive Science (pp. 212–223). Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Some concepts have fuzzy membership. There are items for which it is vague whether or not they fall into (or out of) a particular referent class. This is not possible in the classical theory as everything has equal and full
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It seems as though there can be cases where our ignorance or error about a class means that we either don't know the definition of a concept, or have incorrect notions about what a definition of a particular concept might
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Nikolić, D. (2009) Is synaesthesia actually ideaesthesia? An inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon. Proceedings of the Third
International Congress on Synaesthesia, Science & Art, Granada, Spain, April 26–29,
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Prototype theory came out of problems with the classical view of conceptual structure. Prototype theory says that concepts specify properties that members of a class tend to possess, rather than must possess.
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concepts and memories, and suggest that they were being sorted or organized into more abstract concepts. ("Sort" is itself another word for concept, and "sorting" thus means to organize into concepts.)
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There is a lot of discussion on the most effective theory in concepts. Another theory is semantic pointers, which use perceptual and motor representations and these representations are like symbols.
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Fodor, J. A., Garrett, M. F., Walker, E. C., & Parkes, C. H. (1999). against definitions. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 491–513). Massachusetts: MIT press.
325:. However, it is necessary at least to begin by understanding that the concept "dog" is philosophically distinct from the things in the world grouped by this concept—or the reference class or
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Murphy, G., & Medin, D. (1999). the role of theories in conceptual coherence. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 425–459). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1999). what some concepts might not be. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, Concepts (pp. 225–261). Massachusetts: MIT press.
647:. Concept analysis is the act of trying to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the membership in the referent class of a concept. For example, Shoemaker's classic "
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A representation of the concept of a tree. The four upper images of trees can be roughly quantified into an overall generalization of the idea of a tree, pictured in the lower image.
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Carey, S. (1999). knowledge acquisition: enrichment or conceptual change? In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 459–489). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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567:, concepts in calculus do not refer to perceptions. As long as the concepts are useful and mutually compatible, they are accepted on their own. For example, the concepts of the
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Wittgenstein, L. (1999). philosophical investigations: sections 65–78. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 171–175). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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GĂłmez Milán, E., Iborra, O., de CĂłrdoba, M.J., Juárez-Ramos V., RodrĂguez Artacho, M.A., Rubio, J.L. (2013) The Kiki-Bouba effect: A case of personification and ideaesthesia.
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where it was noted that a synesthetic experience requires first an activation of a concept of the inducer. Later research expanded these results into everyday perception.
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Rosch, E. (1999). Principles of Categorization. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings (pp. 189–206). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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Hume, D. (1739). book one part one: of the understanding of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction etc. In D. Hume, a treatise of human nature. England.
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Rey, G. (1999). Concepts and Stereotypes. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings (pp. 279–301). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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651:" explored whether the concept of the flow of time can include flows where no changes take place, though change is usually taken as a definition of time.
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concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individual perceptions, like empirical concepts, they originate in the mind itself. He called these concepts
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are not considered to refer to spatial or temporal perceptions of the external world of experience. Neither are they related in any way to mysterious
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Quine, W. (1999). two dogmas of empiricism. In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 153–171). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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Putnam, H. (1999). is semantics possible? In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core readings (pp. 177–189). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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found typicality effects which cannot be explained by the classical theory of concepts, these sparked the prototype theory. See below.
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are a few of the key proponents and creators of this theory. Wittgenstein describes the relationship between members of a class as
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objects. In this view, concepts are abstract objects of a category out of a human's mind rather than some mental representations.
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217:, the structural position of concepts can be understood as follows: Concepts serve as the building blocks of what are called
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that celestial object. Concepts are created (named) to describe, explain and capture reality as it is known and understood.
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456:, i.e., the going back over different mental images, how they can be comprehended in one consciousness; and finally
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Margolis, Eric; Laurence, Stephen (2007). "The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?".
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Fodor, Jerry; Lepore, Ernest (1996). "The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes".
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Murphy, G. (2004). Chapter 2. In G. Murphy, a big book of concepts (pp. 11 – 41). Massachusetts: MIT press.
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Georgij Yu. Somov (2010). Concepts and Senses in Visual Art: Through the example of analysis of some works by
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Carey, S. (1991). Knowledge Acquisition: Enrichment or Conceptual Change? In S. Carey and R. Gelman (Eds.),
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It seems that there simply are no definitions—especially those based in sensory primitive concepts.
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by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other
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Murphy, Gregory L.; Medin, Douglas L. (1985). "The role of theories in conceptual coherence".
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Concepts may be exact or inexact. When the mind makes a generalization such as the concept of
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The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are:
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A concept is a common feature or characteristic. Kant investigated the way that empirical
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as a result of certain puzzles that he took to arise from the phenomenological accounts.
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Psychological experiments show no evidence for our using concepts as strict definitions.
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Eysenck. M. W., (2012) Fundamentals of Cognition (2nd) Psychology Taylor & Francis.
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Eysenck. M. W., (2012) Fundamentals of Cognition (2nd) Psychology Taylor & Francis
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1301:. in Concepts: Core Readings: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. pp. 3–83.
500:. This theory contrasts with the rationalist view that concepts are perceptions (or
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329:. Concepts that can be equated to a single word are called "lexical concepts".
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In the simplest terms, a concept is a name or label that regards or treats an
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of the particular objects and events which they abstract, which are stored in
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The study of concepts and conceptual structure falls into the disciplines of
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or the segregation of everything else by which the mental images differ ...
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The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition.
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A central question in the study of concepts is the question of what they
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Blouw, Peter; Solodkin, Eugene; Thagard, Paul; Eliasmith, Chris (2016).
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concept can relate to individual phenomena, in a manner analogous to an
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Concept simultaneously translated in several languages and meanings
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superordinate, "furniture", and its subordinate, "easy chair".
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idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles,
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Concepts are studied as components of human cognition in the
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There is debate as to the relationship between concepts and
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views of the mind construe concepts as abstract objects.
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The semantic view of concepts suggests that concepts are
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Volume 22, number 2 (April–June 1998), pp. 133–187.
1460:
Mroczko-Wä…Sowicz, Aleksandra; Nikoliä‡, Danko (2014).
1010:"Cognitive Science | Brain and Cognitive Sciences"
997:
The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition
660:
There are six primary arguments summarized as follows:
183:. Philosophers construe this question as one about the
1768:
The History of Calculus and its Conceptual Development
1610:"Homework Help and Textbook Solutions | bartleby"
1510:
Stevan Harnad (1995). Why and How We Are Not Zombies.
1263:
1829:, John Stuart Mill, University Press of the Pacific,
1164:
1162:
1160:
1158:
1156:
402:. But these pure categories are predicates of things
384:
maintained the view that human minds possess pure or
202:
191:
795:
The term "concept" is traced back to 1554–60 (Latin
416:
concept, Kant employed the technical concept of the
42:. Concepts play an important role in all aspects of
780:. Research on ideasthesia emerged from research on
234:
1453:
1153:
1059:. Metaphysics Research Lab at Stanford University
1046:
1044:
1042:
1040:
1038:
1036:
1034:
1032:
1030:
3599:
2041:Conceptual Science and Mathematical Permutations
1107:
2052:v:Conceptualize: A Wikiversity Learning Project
1941:. Horizons in Neuroscience Research 4: 157–167.
1359:
1357:
299:
275:Concepts are thought to be stored in long term
2036:Concepts. A Critical Approach, by Andy Blunden
1859:, H. J. Paton, London: Allen & Unwin, 1936
1336:Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior
1027:
678:also holds as an argument against definitions.
2939:
2084:
947:Goguen, Joseph (2005). "What is a Concept?".
584:Notable theories on the structure of concepts
511:
76:rather than a mental object or a mental state
53:, three understandings of a concept prevail:
1354:
1222:
1220:
1218:
1216:
1214:
1212:
1210:
1149:Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
639:years it was one of the major activities in
66:peculiar to cognitive agents (mental states)
1937:Daltrozzo J, Vion-Dury J, Schön D. (2010).
1904:Hjørland, Birger (2009). "Concept theory".
1648:
1416:
1208:
1206:
1204:
1202:
1200:
1198:
1196:
1194:
1192:
1190:
16:Mental representation or an abstract object
2946:
2932:
2808:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
2098:
2091:
2077:
1868:Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, 1998.
1737:
1577:
1540:
1487:
1477:
1231:. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1121:
1903:
1368:. Academic Press Inc. pp. 159–166.
1297:Stephen Lawrence; Eric Margolis (1999).
1187:
83:
1748:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015578.003.0071
1333:
580:common, essential attributes remained.
554:
174:
3600:
2953:
1399:
1226:
946:
655:Arguments against the classical theory
537:
394:, in the sense of the word that means
3547:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
2927:
2072:
1694:
1548:The Journal of Consciousness Studies.
1363:
1168:
424:concept is a general representation (
1103:
1101:
1099:
363:
2031:Blending and Conceptual Integration
2023:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2009:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1995:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1984:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
1972:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1888:Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis
1323:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1057:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
699:
674:'s argument against analyticity in
588:
477:
13:
3648:Concepts in the philosophy of mind
1632:
1089:""The logic of inexact concepts",
203:The psychological view of concepts
192:Concepts as mental representations
14:
3674:
2065:on ideasthesia (sensing concepts)
1961:
1946:
1842:, Arthur Schopenhauer, Volume I,
1096:
1051:Eric Margolis; Stephen Lawrence.
1890:"Concepts and Cognitive Science"
1525:Journal of Consciousness Studies
1512:Journal of Consciousness Studies
1132:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00663.x
742:
496:). A common class of blends are
398:, attribute, characteristic, or
235:The physicalist view of concepts
1864:Conceptual Integration Networks
1857:Kant's Metaphysic of Experience
1602:
1553:
1530:
1517:
1504:
1466:Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
1410:
1327:
1315:
1254:
1245:
215:representational theory of mind
2748:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
2018:"Classical Theory of Concepts"
1705:10.7551/mitpress/3169.001.0001
1299:Concepts and Cognitive Science
1138:
1080:
1071:
1002:
989:
973:
940:
757:
1:
3404:Hard problem of consciousness
2629:Principle of compositionality
1789:The Writings of William James
1348:10.1016/S0022-5371(79)90246-9
933:
778:hard problem of consciousness
563:, in the introduction to his
2778:Philosophical Investigations
1663:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00694-X
917:Process of concept formation
790:
300:Concepts as abstract objects
221:(colloquially understood as
213:Within the framework of the
7:
2619:Modality (natural language)
2004:"Theory–Theory of Concepts"
1793:University of Chicago Press
1366:A New Paradigm of Reference
1173:. Oxford University Press.
804:
768:According to the theory of
198:Direct and indirect realism
10:
3679:
2758:Language, Truth, and Logic
2498:Theological noncognitivism
2383:Contrast theory of meaning
2378:Causal theory of reference
2109:Index of language articles
1431:10.1037/0033-295x.92.3.289
801:– "something conceived").
761:
746:
703:
632:law of the excluded middle
592:
541:
515:
512:Realist universal concepts
481:
370:
303:
238:
206:
195:
18:
3567:
3534:
3361:
3231:
3126:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
3116:David Lewis (philosopher)
2961:
2898:
2843:Philosophy of information
2830:
2679:
2531:
2443:Mediated reference theory
2368:
2115:
2106:
1093:19 (3/4): 325–373 (1969).
619:is said to be defined by
373:A priori and a posteriori
2768:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
1840:Parerga and Paralipomena
1695:Prinz, Jesse J. (2002).
1479:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00509
1400:TAYLOR, John R. (1989).
1229:The Big Book of Concepts
1227:Murphy, Gregory (2002).
676:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
21:Concept (disambiguation)
3618:Concepts in metaphysics
3254:Eliminative materialism
2569:Use–mention distinction
2413:Direct reference theory
1894:Concepts: Core Readings
1878:, Penguin Books, 1982,
1844:Oxford University Press
1740:The Language of Thought
1321:'Godel's Rationalism',
882:General Concept Lattice
872:Formal concept analysis
279:memory, in contrast to
228:propositional attitudes
145:artificial intelligence
51:contemporary philosophy
3643:Philosophy of language
3506:Propositional attitude
3501:Problem of other minds
3409:Hypostatic abstraction
2503:Theory of descriptions
2438:Linguistic determinism
2100:Philosophy of language
1876:The Portable Nietzsche
1814:, Dover Publications,
1171:The Origin of Concepts
887:Hypostatic abstraction
475:
439:concepts are created.
310:Abstract object theory
219:mental representations
102:instantiated (reified)
89:
58:mental representations
3577:Philosophers category
3481:Mental representation
3244:Biological naturalism
3131:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
3106:Frank Cameron Jackson
2614:Mental representation
2549:Linguistic relativity
2433:Inquisitive semantics
1364:Brown, Roger (1978).
1169:Carey, Susan (2009).
490:cognitive linguistics
441:
432:, I, 1., §1, Note 1)
306:Abstract and concrete
209:Mental representation
167:often just means any
98:higher-level thinking
87:
3259:Emergent materialism
2798:Naming and Necessity
2708:De Arte Combinatoria
2507:Definite description
2468:Semantic externalism
1900:pp. 3–81, 1999.
1742:. pp. 159–182.
1550:20(1–2): pp. 84–102.
1419:Psychological Review
927:Intuitive statistics
847:Conceptual framework
555:Concepts in calculus
175:Ontology of concepts
19:For other uses, see
3628:Main topic articles
3456:Language of thought
3206:Ludwig Wittgenstein
3036:Patricia Churchland
2848:Philosophical logic
2838:Analytic philosophy
2644:Sense and reference
2523:Verification theory
2478:Situation semantics
1934:182 (1/4), 475–506.
1772:Carl Benjamin Boyer
1697:Furnishing the Mind
912:Object (philosophy)
907:Notion (philosophy)
862:Conversation theory
842:Conceptual blending
729:family resemblances
649:Time Without Change
561:Carl Benjamin Boyer
544:Sense and reference
538:Sense and reference
494:conceptual blending
3284:Neurophenomenology
2955:Philosophy of mind
2698:Port-Royal Grammar
2594:Family resemblance
2513:Theory of language
2488:Supposition theory
1939:Music and Concepts
1870:Cognitive Science.
1776:Dover Publications
1579:10.1111/cogs.12265
957:10.1007/11524564_4
852:Conceptual history
832:Concept and object
822:Class (philosophy)
484:Embodied cognition
90:
3613:Cognitive science
3595:
3594:
3491:Mind–body problem
3389:Cognitive closure
3353:Substance dualism
2971:G. E. M. Anscombe
2921:
2920:
2423:Dynamic semantics
1926:Bruegel the Elder
1918:10.1002/asi.21082
1826:A System of Logic
1566:Cognitive Science
1375:978-0-12-497750-1
1308:978-0-262-13353-1
1238:978-0-262-13409-5
1180:978-0-19-536763-8
966:978-3-540-27783-5
346:cognitive science
223:ideas in the mind
113:cognitive science
3670:
3343:Representational
3338:Property dualism
3331:Type physicalism
3296:New mysterianism
3264:Epiphenomenalism
3086:Martin Heidegger
2948:
2941:
2934:
2925:
2924:
2883:Formal semantics
2831:Related articles
2823:
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2793:
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2723:
2713:
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2693:
2463:Relevance theory
2458:Phallogocentrism
2093:
2086:
2079:
2070:
2069:
2027:
2013:
1999:
1976:
1963:Zalta, Edward N.
1921:
1912:(8): 1519–1536.
1761:
1718:
1682:
1626:
1624:
1622:
1621:
1612:. Archived from
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1600:
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1572:(5): 1128–1162.
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1012:. Archived from
1006:
1000:
993:
987:
977:
971:
970:
944:
857:Conceptual model
706:Prototype theory
700:Prototype theory
645:concept analysis
589:Classical theory
518:Platonic realism
478:Embodied content
473:
323:natural language
137:computer science
74:abstract objects
3678:
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3672:
3671:
3669:
3668:
3667:
3598:
3597:
3596:
3591:
3563:
3530:
3476:Mental property
3369:Abstract object
3357:
3227:
3181:Wilfrid Sellars
3056:Donald Davidson
3041:Paul Churchland
3001:George Berkeley
2957:
2952:
2922:
2917:
2894:
2873:School of Names
2826:
2821:
2811:
2801:
2791:
2788:Of Grammatology
2781:
2771:
2761:
2751:
2741:
2731:
2721:
2711:
2701:
2691:
2675:
2527:
2473:Semantic holism
2453:Non-cognitivism
2393:Conventionalism
2364:
2111:
2102:
2097:
2048:Latest concepts
2046:Concept Mobiles
2016:
2002:
1988:
1949:
1944:
1758:
1715:
1635:
1633:Further reading
1630:
1629:
1619:
1617:
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1607:
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1535:
1531:
1527:2 (3): 200–219.
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1123:10.1.1.188.9995
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377:Category (Kant)
371:Main articles:
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312:
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281:episodic memory
262:decision making
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115:disciplines of
100:. A concept is
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
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3633:Mental content
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3441:Intentionality
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3340:
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3333:
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3313:
3308:
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3291:Neutral monism
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3274:Interactionism
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3096:Edmund Husserl
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3066:René Descartes
3063:
3061:Daniel Dennett
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3031:David Chalmers
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3016:Franz Brentano
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3399:Consciousness
3397:
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3329:
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3324:
3322:
3321:Phenomenology
3319:
3317:
3316:Phenomenalism
3314:
3312:
3309:
3307:
3306:Occasionalism
3304:
3302:
3299:
3297:
3294:
3292:
3289:
3285:
3282:
3281:
3280:
3279:NaĂŻve realism
3277:
3275:
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3269:Functionalism
3267:
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3262:
3260:
3257:
3255:
3252:
3250:
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3240:
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3166:Richard Rorty
3164:
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3161:Hilary Putnam
3159:
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3154:
3152:
3149:
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3144:
3142:
3139:
3137:
3136:Marvin Minsky
3134:
3132:
3129:
3127:
3124:
3122:
3119:
3117:
3114:
3112:
3111:Immanuel Kant
3109:
3107:
3104:
3102:
3101:William James
3099:
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3009:
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3006:Henri Bergson
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2869:
2868:Scholasticism
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2483:Structuralism
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2408:Descriptivism
2406:
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2388:Contrastivism
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2019:
2015:
2011:
2010:
2005:
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1997:
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1991:
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1911:
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1899:
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1884:0-14-015062-5
1881:
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1853:
1852:0-19-824508-4
1849:
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1841:
1838:
1836:
1835:1-4102-0252-6
1832:
1828:
1827:
1823:
1821:
1820:0-486-25650-2
1817:
1813:
1812:Immanuel Kant
1809:
1808:
1804:
1802:
1801:0-226-39188-4
1798:
1794:
1790:
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1784:0-486-60509-4
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1773:
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1641:
1638:
1637:
1616:on 2008-07-06
1615:
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1111:
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1102:
1100:
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1087:Joseph Goguen
1083:
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1033:
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1016:on 2021-06-18
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950:
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925:
923:
922:Schema (Kant)
920:
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910:
908:
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903:
900:
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895:
893:
890:
888:
885:
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880:
878:
877:Fuzzy concept
875:
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870:
868:
867:Definitionism
865:
863:
860:
858:
855:
853:
850:
848:
845:
843:
840:
838:
835:
833:
830:
828:
827:Conceptualism
825:
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820:
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810:
809:
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799:
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749:Theory-theory
743:Theory-theory
740:
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730:
726:
722:
718:
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596:
595:Definitionism
581:
578:
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570:
566:
562:
559:According to
552:
550:
549:Gottlob Frege
545:
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528:
524:
519:
509:
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502:recollections
499:
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491:
485:
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3557: /
3553: /
3549: /
3466:Mental image
3461:Mental event
3424:Intelligence
3393:
3374:Chinese room
3220:
3171:Gilbert Ryle
3151:Derek Parfit
3141:Thomas Nagel
3071:Fred Dretske
2991:J. L. Austin
2963:Philosophers
2816:
2806:
2796:
2786:
2776:
2766:
2756:
2746:
2726:
2716:
2706:
2696:
2686:
2668:
2609:Metalanguage
2604:Logical form
2573:
2559:Truth-bearer
2518:Unilalianism
2428:Expressivism
2255:Wittgenstein
2200:von Humboldt
2117:Philosophers
2021:
2007:
1993:
1970:
1929:
1909:
1905:
1893:
1875:
1869:
1862:
1856:
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1618:. Retrieved
1614:the original
1604:
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1056:
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1014:the original
1004:
996:
991:
975:
948:
942:
796:
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786:
767:
752:
737:
733:
728:
721:Brent Berlin
713:Wittgenstein
709:
658:
637:
630:
624:
620:
614:
607:
601:
598:
564:
558:
547:
521:
501:
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465:
459:
453:
447:
442:
437:a posteriori
436:
434:
425:
422:a posteriori
421:
413:a posteriori
411:
407:
403:
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380:
364:
357:
350:
331:
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222:
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180:
178:
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110:
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91:
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27:
25:
3608:Abstraction
3551:information
3542:Metaphysics
3516:Tabula rasa
3326:Physicalism
3311:Parallelism
3239:Behaviorism
3196:Michael Tye
3191:Alan Turing
3176:John Searle
3051:Dharmakirti
3026:Tyler Burge
3021:C. D. Broad
2853:Linguistics
2818:Limited Inc
2738:On Denoting
2564:Proposition
2215:de Saussure
2180:Ibn Khaldun
1514:1: 164–167.
1145:Jerry Fodor
897:Ideasthesia
837:Concept map
812:Abstraction
782:synesthesia
770:ideasthesia
764:Ideasthesia
758:Ideasthesia
682:membership.
460:abstraction
426:Vorstellung
353:abstraction
334:linguistics
293:abstraction
285:hippocampus
247:physicalist
241:Physicalism
133:mathematics
117:linguistics
3602:Categories
3587:Task Force
3555:perception
3429:Artificial
3379:Creativity
3301:Nondualism
3201:Vasubandhu
3121:John Locke
3091:David Hume
3046:Andy Clark
2913:Discussion
2908:Task Force
2858:Pragmatics
2649:Speech act
2579:Categories
2493:Symbiosism
2448:Nominalism
2360:Watzlawick
2240:Bloomfield
2160:Chrysippus
1967:"Concepts"
1957:PhilPapers
1620:2011-11-25
1063:6 November
1053:"Concepts"
1020:2019-07-08
934:References
719:, Mervis,
641:philosophy
609:sufficient
569:derivative
532:Kurt Gödel
454:reflection
448:comparison
404:in general
392:categories
358:represents
342:psychology
338:philosophy
304:See also:
289:patient HM
239:See also:
196:See also:
157:categories
129:formalized
125:philosophy
121:psychology
3653:Semantics
3451:Intuition
3384:Cognition
3348:Solipsism
3011:Ned Block
2981:Armstrong
2976:Aristotle
2890:Semiotics
2878:Semantics
2728:Alciphron
2664:Statement
2599:Intension
2539:Ambiguity
2418:Dramatism
2398:Cratylism
2150:Eubulides
2145:Aristotle
2125:Confucius
1990:"Concept"
1931:Semiotica
1898:MIT Press
1651:Cognition
1439:0033-295X
1118:CiteSeerX
798:conceptum
791:Etymology
621:unmarried
603:necessary
523:Platonist
498:metaphors
472:Logic, §6
396:predicate
327:extension
270:inference
141:databases
64:abilities
44:cognition
3638:Ontology
3623:Concepts
3572:Category
3419:Identity
3362:Concepts
3232:Theories
3216:Zhuangzi
3146:Alva Noë
2903:Category
2863:Rhetoric
2688:Cratylus
2659:Sentence
2634:Property
2554:Language
2532:Concepts
2370:Theories
2335:Strawson
2320:Davidson
2310:Hintikka
2305:Anscombe
2250:Vygotsky
2205:Mauthner
2175:Averroes
2165:Zhuangzi
2155:Diodorus
2135:Cratylus
1679:15356470
1596:16809232
1588:26235459
1498:25191239
1091:Synthese
805:See also
616:bachelor
573:integral
571:and the
470:—
408:a priori
387:a priori
367:concepts
365:A priori
316:abstract
277:cortical
266:learning
185:ontology
161:informal
36:thoughts
32:abstract
3663:Objects
3658:Thought
3582:Project
3535:Related
3394:Concept
3249:Dualism
3222:more...
3081:Goldman
2670:more...
2574:Concept
2315:Dummett
2290:Gadamer
2285:Chomsky
2270:Derrida
2260:Russell
2245:Bergson
2230:Tillich
2190:Leibniz
2130:Gorgias
2061:TED-Ed
1982:at the
1980:Concept
1965:(ed.).
1953:Concept
1671:8820389
1489:4137691
1472:: 509.
1447:4023146
668:entail.
400:quality
165:concept
149:classes
40:beliefs
28:concept
3526:Zombie
3511:Qualia
2822:(1988)
2812:(1982)
2802:(1980)
2792:(1967)
2782:(1953)
2772:(1951)
2762:(1936)
2752:(1921)
2742:(1905)
2732:(1732)
2722:(1668)
2712:(1666)
2702:(1660)
2692:(n.d.)
2654:Symbol
2355:Searle
2345:Putnam
2295:Kripke
2280:Austin
2265:Carnap
2210:Ricœur
2195:Herder
2185:Hobbes
2063:Lesson
1882:
1850:
1833:
1818:
1799:
1782:
1754:
1731:Press.
1711:
1677:
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1486:
1445:
1437:
1372:
1305:
1235:
1177:
1120:
983:
963:
902:Noesis
774:qualia
725:Posner
577:limits
418:schema
344:, and
291:. The
268:, and
258:memory
153:schema
123:, and
38:, and
30:is an
3434:Human
3156:Plato
3076:Fodor
2680:Works
2589:Class
2350:Lewis
2340:Quine
2325:Grice
2275:Whorf
2235:Sapir
2220:Frege
2170:Xunzi
2140:Plato
1892:. In
1807:Logic
1675:S2CID
1592:S2CID
1537:2009.
717:Rosch
690:Rosch
672:Quine
527:Plato
506:Plato
504:, in
430:Logic
245:In a
159:. In
106:ideas
3559:self
3496:Pain
3486:Mind
3414:Idea
2639:Sign
2544:Cant
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