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about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of that school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behavior. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches and argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decisionmakers use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when a defending state's unanticipated behavior cannot be explained by case-specific variables.
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regime security are better served by defiance, or there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. That is partly a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent that such actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.
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seemingly resolved adversary. If all defending states have such incentives, potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In that regard, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Those are actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that bluff are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict.
1447:, said: Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. The United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. On the other hand, Russian deterrence is enjoying spectacular success. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts.
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and military co-operation into a crisis or militarized confrontation that threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars, however, is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and the military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.
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equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve.
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persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."
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and interpret intentions, the advantage of offense over defense, and weak actors and non-state actors can develop considerable cyber capabilities. Scholars have also debated the feasibility of launching highly damaging cyber attacks and engaging in destructive cyber warfare, with most scholars expressing skepticism that cyber capabilities have enhanced the ability of states to launch highly destructive attacks. The most prominent cyber attack to date is the
27:
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state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.
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orientation of potential attacking states generally is for the short term and is driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and strongly to a range of contingencies. Deterrence often fails if either a defending state or an attacking state underestimates or overestimates the other's ability to undertake a particular course of action.
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at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict. The argument is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests. Even less well-established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests and economic interests.
1330:(MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the
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Logan have challenged this assertion. A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict. A 2022 study by
Kyungwon Suh suggests that nuclear superiority may not reduce the likelihood that nuclear opponents will initiate nuclear crises.
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the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of noncompliance that it can impose on and the benefits of compliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.
1486:, said that Western fears about nuclear weapons and World War III have left it "fully deterred" and Putin "completely undeterred." The West have "ceded the initiative to the enemy." No attempt was made by NATO to deter Moscow with the threat of military force, wondered another expert. To the contrary, it was Russia’s deterrence that proved to be successful.
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costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, interests at stake.
1552:, states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible).
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reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, but it has been noted that there comes a point that further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond that point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to expand
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Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory. Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control,
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Scholars have debated how cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence, given that it may be harder to attribute responsibility for cyber attacks, the barriers to entry may be lower, the risks and costs may be lower for actors who conduct cyber attacks, it may be harder to signal
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give nations the potential to destroy their enemies but also the rest of humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence
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The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat by diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a
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Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic
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must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be
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Definition of deterrence from the
Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics by Michael Keane: "The prevention or inhibition of action brought about by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It assumes
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where proposed steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Kissinger has argued, "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way." Shultz said,
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in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to
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A 2022 study by Brian
Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg found that high-resolve, low-capability signals (such as tripwires) were not viewed as more reassuring to allies than low-resolve, high-capability alternatives (such as forces stationed offshore). Their study cast doubt on the reassuring value
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provides further detail in relation to those factors. Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that
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A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one
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Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about
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immoral in nature. In addition, he observes that deterrence theories serve to perpetuate a state of mutual assured destruction between nations over time. Holmes further argues that it is therefore both irrational and immoral to utilize a methodology for perpetuating international peace which relies
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According to
Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables."
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Furthermore, Huth argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavorable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility
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Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known. Attacking states may look beyond the short-term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are
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argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important: a defending state strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and minimizes international and domestic constraints and
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While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the
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columnist and one of
Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you
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A successful deterrence policy must be considered in military terms but also political terms: International relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic
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Scholars have debated whether having a superior nuclear arsenal provides a deterrent against other nuclear-armed states with smaller arsenals. Matthew
Kroenig has argued that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to win nuclear crises, whereas Todd Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann and David C.
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is a key concept in rational deterrence theory. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid
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There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behavior in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state
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Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial
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that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions in the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and
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As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories: preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence) or preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur if
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Intrawar deterrence is deterrence within a war context. It means that war has broken out but actors still seek to deter certain forms of behavior. In the words of
Caitlin Talmadge, "intra-war deterrence failures... can be thought of as causing wars to get worse in some way." Examples of intrawar
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becomes involved. The latter case has generated most interest in academic literature. Building on the two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a
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brought his background in game theory to the subject of studying international deterrence. Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now
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Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to
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Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory argue that newly nuclear-armed states may pose a short- or medium-term risk, but that "nuclear learning" occurs over time as states learn to live with new nuclear-armed states. Mark S. Bell and
Nicholas L. Miller have however argued that there is a weak
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International relations scholars Dan Reiter and Paul Poast have argued that so-called "tripwires" do not deter aggression. Tripwires entail that small forces are deployed abroad with the assumption that an attack on them will trigger a greater deployment of forces. Dan Altman has argued that
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outlines that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies in not offering too little, too late or for too much in return and not offering too much, too soon, or for too little return.
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Finally, coercive credibility requires that in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of co-operation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that failure to co-operate has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as
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was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of
1420:) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining
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In 1966, Schelling is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of
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military force or action refrains from doing so. Scholars distinguish between "extended deterrence" (the protection of allies) and "direct deterrence" (protection of oneself). Rational deterrence theory holds that an attacker will be deterred if they believe
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An example shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can fail and even backfire if the assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.
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Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as
Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities similarly argued: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not.
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1416:". It explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of MAD, but the US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure by threats of immense retaliation (or even
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argued in 1994 that nuclear weapons were obsolete in the "new world disorder" after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and he advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.
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refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the
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have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and created the
Nuclear Security Project to advance that agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled
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and loss of control over others likely. Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for
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There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers, and complexities in state-hacker relationships. According to political scientists Joseph Brown and
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deterrence include deterring adversaries from resorting to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks or attacking civilian populations indiscriminately. Broadly, it involves any prevention of escalation.
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otherwise take an action refrains from doing so due to the consequences that the deterrer is perceived likely to take. "Immediate deterrence" is considered successful when an actor seriously contemplating
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687:, which has been seen in Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. There, defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state and to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs.
532:", his country needed an air force that could immediately retaliate: "If we are prepared it may never come. It is not immediately conceivable that any nation will dare to attack us if we are prepared".
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the findings reinforce a key theoretical tenet of the nuclear revolution: Once states have achieved a secure second-strike capability, nuclear superiority does not confer additional political benefits.
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Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonable to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero.
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Deterrence is most likely to be successful when a prospective attacker believes that the probability of success is low and the costs of attack are high. Central problems of deterrence include the
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would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer.
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nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the
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of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, deterrence failure is more likely since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.
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would be met with a nuclear response. Later Ukrainian attacks on the same fleet using a different communications system also caused deterrence, this time to the Russian Navy.
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566:, synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of
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The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. In
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Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly
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between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a
495:(Probability of deterrer carrying out deterrent threat Ă— Costs if threat carried out) > (Probability of the attacker accomplishing the action Ă— Benefits of the action)
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in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by
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36:, one of two submarines designed to provide a nuclear deterrence using cruise missiles with a 500-mile (800 km) range—placed on patrol by starting to carry the
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misperceptions. Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures, as exemplified in case of
1305:, asserted that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support, and that his ideas were misinterpreted as espoused by the general public.
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state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
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The two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker).
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tripwires do work to deter aggression, citing the Western deployment of forces to Berlin in 1948–1949 to deter Soviet aggression as a successful example.
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A successful nuclear deterrent requires a country to preserve its ability to retaliate by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or ensuring a
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Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward.
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1650:"If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable."
1346:'s arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979
6045:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes; Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, Richard Smoke, Willis Harman"
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1443:, many western hawks expressed the view that deterrence worked in that war but only in one way – in favor of Russia. Former US security advisor,
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often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.
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4292:"An explosive Elon Musk biography is just hitting shelves. But the book's acclaimed author is already walking back a major claim | CNN Business"
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1428:. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence.
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See, for example, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989)
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1610:, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.
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467:. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence. Deterrence also tends to be distinguished from
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Zagare, Frank C. (2004), "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory",
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Tavberidze, Vazha, (2022). "Former NATO Commander Says Western Fears Of Nuclear War Are Preventing A Proper Response To Putin,"
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One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see
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589:(1966), Schelling offers a broader definition of deterrence, as he defines it as "to prevent from action by fear of consequences."
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attack on Iran's nuclear program. By 2019, the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage was the
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NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice
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The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and
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throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the
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under the belief that the United States will refuse to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.
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exclusively upon the continuous development of new iterations of the very weapons which it is designed to prohibit.
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This article is about Deterrent in peace and conflict studies and nuclear weapons. For legal theory of justice, see
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era, philosophical objections to the reliance upon deterrence theories in general have also been raised on purely
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Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings:
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Mueller, Karl (2021), Osinga, Frans; Sweijs, Tim (eds.), "The Continuing Relevance of Conventional Deterrence",
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during World War II, was thinking about how the next war would be fought. He said in a speech that month to the
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From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
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628:. Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces. For example, the doctrine of
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5406:"Utility-based predictions of military escalation: Why experts forecasted Russia would not invade Ukraine"
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The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of
5563:"The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons"
5226:"Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today"
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Huth, P. K. (1999), "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate",
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Rynning, Sten (2021). "Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia". In Osinga, Frans; Sweijs, Tim (eds.).
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Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to
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communication of threats and assurance. Deterrence does not necessarily require military superiority.
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6513:
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943:
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112:
105:
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1537:
Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that establish appropriate standards of behavior
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6276:
1757:
972:
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127:
3700:"The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia (essay)"
1331:
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policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which can produce proxy warfare.
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30:
20:
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Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect
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Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them
1239:
and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the
960:
948:
338:
4354:
1722:
presumption which prohibits the killing of innocent life. Consequently, such theories are
722:
are supportive, and opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.
545:
A distinction is sometimes made between nuclear deterrence and "conventional deterrence."
8:
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7359:
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7053:
6910:
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4976:"#SorryNotSorry: Why states neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations"
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during arms negotiations between the United States and Russia allows each state to make
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The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to
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have noted that the implementation of such theories is inconsistent with a fundamental
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2008:
1955:
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1737:
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1470:
argued Musk had been deterred by Russia after the country's ambassador warned him an
1404:
1363:
1318:
1249:
wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used.
1224:
1007:
992:
987:
982:
918:
887:
293:
257:
161:
93:
5716:
5115:
4822:
4574:
4513:
4133:
3786:"Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes"
3138:
2504:
2366:
2203:
2183:
2157:
2137:
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and Kenneth Osgood, "Munich and appeasement have become among the dirtiest words in
459:
an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo). Deterrence is unlike
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4703:
4665:
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4554:
4542:
4493:
4437:
4105:
4094:"The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?"
4066:
4035:
3983:
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1904:
1822:
1792:
1715:
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1479:
1298:
875:
782:
609:
military conflict or short-term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).
559:
551:
468:
5454:
5422:
5405:
5241:
5099:
4719:
4653:
4608:
4558:
4196:
Bell, Mark S.; Miller, Nicholas L. (2022), Narang, Vipin; Sagan, Scott D. (eds.),
3495:
3437:
2547:
2530:
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7643:
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6773:
6545:
6540:
6535:
6453:
5935:
5922:
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5367:
5275:
4669:
4204:, Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age, Cornell University Press, pp. 209–229,
4159:
3747:
3661:
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3537:
3336:
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2579:
2040:
1949:
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1459:
1417:
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928:
795:
790:
433:
345:
252:
236:
176:
37:
7548:
5438:
5225:
5083:
4055:"Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?"
3663:
The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon
3479:
3421:
3392:"The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression"
2835:
2755:
7623:
7613:
7603:
7538:
7528:
7518:
7503:
7299:
7279:
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7259:
7219:
7186:
7171:
7166:
7156:
6965:
6342:
6086:
6044:
6002:
5947:
5848:
5471:
The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War
1827:
1782:
1540:
Escalation: raising the probability that costs will be imposed on the adversary
1467:
1355:
1017:
965:
895:
660:
318:
16:
Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons
5519:
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4864:
4070:
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3809:
3627:
3503:
3445:
3268:
3202:
2950:
2884:
2629:
2556:
2531:"Strategies of Extended Deterrence: How States Provide the Security Umbrella"
2496:
2427:
2358:
2295:
2282:
Glaser, Bonnie S.; Weiss, Jessica Chen; Christensen, Thomas J. (2023-11-30).
1787:
1719:
1639:
1549:
1455:
1343:
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1204:
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684:
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171:
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4054:
7638:
7633:
7488:
7063:
6605:
6525:
6478:
6187:
5862:
4790:
2488:
2325:"Active Denial: Redesigning Japan's Response to China's Military Challenge"
2111:
2083:
1772:
1495:
1208:
517:
365:
216:
73:
6245:
5886:"IS IT TIME TO JUNK OUR NUKES? THE NEW WORLD DISORDER MAKES THEM OBSOLETE"
5177:"The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations"
5140:
4039:
3927:
2703:
2239:
789:
In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics,
7755:
7558:
7553:
7533:
7329:
7314:
7123:
7093:
7028:
7018:
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6759:
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6570:
6550:
6463:
6448:
6363:
5759:
5729:
5313:
5193:
5176:
4497:
3988:
3971:
3749:
The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters
3422:"Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force"
2472:
2349:
2340:
1723:
1499:
1444:
1371:
1278:
1240:
1220:
739:
605:
555:
500:
380:
375:
328:
206:
186:
122:
88:
63:
54:
6727:
5323:
5057:
5033:
4991:
4125:
4093:
3883:
3851:
3817:
3785:
3166:, Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 3–14
3162:
George, A (1991), "The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy",
3008:
2992:
2093:
7384:
7038:
6575:
6113:
6071:
6029:
5987:
5594:
5562:
4022:
Lee, Kyung Suk; Kim, James D.; Jin, Hwalmin; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2023).
3635:
3603:
3374:
3276:
3244:
3210:
3178:
2958:
2926:
2892:
2860:
2435:
2403:
2324:
1767:
1658:
1594:
1375:
1367:
1294:
1290:
1216:
1212:
1184:
The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary
632:
threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.
4791:"Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?"
4023:
1322:
26:
7289:
7209:
7033:
6681:
6436:
6204:
5512:
Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War
4704:"Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace"
4409:
Bar, Shmuel, (2022). "Deterrence after Ukraine—a critical analysis,"
1832:
1451:
1379:
1281:
of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on
1277:
The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the
313:
226:
221:
211:
100:
6105:
6063:
6021:
5979:
5578:
4244:"The Nautilus Institute Nuclear Strategy Project: US FOIA Documents"
3619:
3480:"Trivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance"
3366:
3260:
3194:
2942:
2876:
2419:
1317:
from Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the
7724:
7224:
6488:
6426:
6405:
5369:
Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition
4754:"The role of effects, saliencies and norms in US Cyberwar doctrine"
3733:"The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age
1707:
1627:
1421:
1266:
1257:
theoretical and empirical basis for notions of "nuclear learning."
1200:
558:
failed, contributes to deterrence theory. In the words of scholars
452:
context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict.
429:
152:
117:
5966:
Ullman, Richard H. (Summer 1989). "The Covert French Connection".
5277:
Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II
2791:"How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence?"
1174:, there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence:
7445:
7435:
7113:
4161:
When Proliferation Causes Peace: The Psychology of Nuclear Crises
1711:
1517:
1383:
440:, according to which a full-scale nuclear attack on a power with
68:
5506:
Jervis, Robert (2021), Bartel, Fritz; Monteiro, Nuno P. (eds.),
3164:
Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War
2861:"Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe"
1682:, such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France. Pursuing
1334:
in the early 2010s. Since then, relations have been less clear.
481:"General deterrence" is considered successful when an actor who
6580:
6468:
1483:
664:
648:
1900:
Introduction: Cross-Domain Deterrence, from Practice to Theory
1321:, the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of
7214:
6555:
6312:
903:
799:
761:: interactions tend to be between dyads (or triads) of states
656:
652:
542:
was founded 1949 with a role including deterring aggression.
530:
No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped
5439:"A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War"
5034:"Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace"
6332:
2657:
The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
2042:
The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
1359:
1351:
1159:
719:
639:
capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a
539:
2748:
NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020
1482:, a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general and a former
6612:
3735:, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 264–304
3179:"Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies"
1996:
Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity
725:
The other important considerations outlined by Jentleson
181:
78:
40:(shown at Pier 86 in New York, its home as a museum ship)
5914:
Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "
3477:
6087:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality., Robert L. Holmes"
4198:"The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age"
1301:, who is taken to be the founder of this policy in his
715:
6003:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes"
2281:
1527:
There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence:
714:
achieved if other major international actors like the
4591:
Borghard, Erica D.; Lonergan, Shawn W. (2021-08-03).
3245:"Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference"
2927:"Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe"
2404:"What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980"
2045:. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 3–5.
667:, have only sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons.
643:, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the
6194:. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp.
3353:
Jervis, Robert (1982). "Deterrence and Perception".
2993:"THE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement Complex"
1534:
Punishment: the imposition of costs on the adversary
1260:
773:: outcomes reflect actors' cost-benefit calculations
5926:
436:and is related to but distinct from the concept of
5965:
5628:"Don't Be So Confident in Nuclear Decision-Making"
5403:
2660:. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 3.
2322:
4024:"Nuclear Weapons and Low-Level Military Conflict"
4021:
3319:, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1–34
3309:
3307:
3305:
2750:. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. pp. 29–45.
1511:The deterrence of an adversary's cyber operations
815:
7803:
5514:, Cambridge University Press, pp. 115–131,
5404:Driedger, Jonas J.; Polianskii, Mikhail (2023).
5132:Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power
5081:
4590:
4540:
3478:Blankenship, Brian; Lin-Greenberg, Erik (2022).
3112:
1211:never engaged each other in warfare, but fought
6237:. Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), pp. 731–746.
5082:Borghard, Erica D.; Lonergan, Shawn W. (2017).
4912:
4846:
4789:Kostyuk, Nadiya; Zhukov, Yuri M. (2019-02-01).
4541:Borghard, Erica D.; Lonergan, Shawn W. (2017).
3972:"The Nuclear Balance Is What States Make of It"
3915:
3849:
2829:, Nl Arms, T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 47–63,
2323:Heginbotham, Eric; Samuels, Richard J. (2018).
1390:, while overt support led to a ruling from the
6318:Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
6217:Complex Deterrence: Strategy In the Global Age
5847:
4701:
4262:"How Russia Is Beating the West at Deterrence"
3577:The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror
3302:
3177:Achen, Christopher H.; Snidal, Duncan (1989).
2990:
2609:
1992:
1896:
1508:The use of cyber actions to deter other states
6743:
6261:
5730:"Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero"
4915:"Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity"
4913:Finnemore, Martha; Hollis, Duncan B. (2016).
4849:"Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity"
4847:Finnemore, Martha; Hollis, Duncan B. (2016).
4788:
4751:
2139:Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
1626:, have criticized nuclear deterrence theory.
1138:
767:: actors consider the choices of other actors
733:
507:Costs Ă— P(Costs) > Benefits Ă— P(Benefits)
405:
5790:"Documentary Advances Nuclear Free Movement"
4974:Brown, Joseph M.; Fazal, Tanisha M. (2021).
4436:, Oxford University Press, pp. 95–120,
4382:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
3916:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2017).
3850:Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2013).
3108:
3106:
3104:
3102:
3035:
3033:
3031:
3029:
3027:
2654:Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015).
2653:
2039:Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015).
2038:
1694:France has developed and maintained its own
1600:
869:
6275:
5817:
5678:
4752:Farrell, Henry; Glaser, Charles L. (2017).
3724:
3242:
3176:
3155:
2991:Logevall, Fredrik; Osgood, Kenneth (2010).
2924:
2401:
2284:"Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence"
2181:
1289:. The period was characterized by numerous
6750:
6736:
6268:
6254:
5959:
5722:
5174:
4980:European Journal of International Security
4973:
4353:Koster, Ben Hodges, Timo S. (2022-05-05).
4195:
3705:. The Henry Stimson Center. Archived from
3535:
2858:
2584:. Princeton University Press. p. 20.
1145:
1131:
902:
824:
412:
398:
6757:
6333:North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
6233:"Nuclear Myths and Political Realities".
5698:
5421:
5192:
5135:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4853:The American Journal of International Law
4765:
4654:"Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare"
4482:"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace"
4427:
4322:
3987:
3922:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3852:"Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail"
3314:
3099:
3053:
3024:
2834:
2773:
2691:
2546:
2348:
2227:
2081:
1342:A third shift occurred with US President
6157:Schultz, George P. and Goodby, James E.
5657:"The Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship"
5223:
4236:
4091:
3604:"Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter"
2984:
2188:. Cornell University Press. p. 23.
2142:(1 ed.). Cornell University Press.
742:). Rational deterrence theory entails:
25:
6338:Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
4702:Gartzke, Erik; Lindsay, Jon R. (2015).
4651:
3783:
3745:
3539:The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
3113:Jentleson, B.A.; Whytock, C.A. (2005),
2824:
2745:
2698:. Cornell University Press. p. 1.
2234:. Cornell University Press. p. 6.
1993:Gartzke, Eric; Lindsay, Jon R. (2019).
1897:Lindsay, Jon R.; Gartzke, Erik (2019).
1876:(first ed.). Osprey. p. 108.
1852:and requires rational decision makers."
1431:
1265:The US policy of deterrence during the
703:
499:This model is frequently simplified in
7804:
6126:
6000:
5684:
5505:
5365:
5311:
5128:
4969:
4967:
4747:
4745:
4697:
4695:
4647:
4645:
4430:"Deterrence in and through Cyberspace"
4352:
4325:"What Russia Got by Scaring Elon Musk"
4318:
4316:
3919:Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
3730:
3659:
3601:
3573:
3419:
3352:
3161:
3067:
2615:
2577:
2470:
1947:
1903:. Oxford University Press. p. 2.
1573:
1559:
1414:Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence
324:Forum (alternative dispute resolution)
7822:Deterrence theory during the Cold War
6731:
6249:
6235:The American Political Science Review
6052:The American Political Science Review
5938:. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010.
5770:from the original on December 3, 2011
5740:from the original on December 3, 2011
5560:
5467:
5270:
5084:"The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace"
4919:American Journal of International Law
4586:
4584:
4543:"The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace"
4536:
4534:
4475:
4473:
4471:
4423:
4421:
4419:
4289:
4157:
3969:
3536:Sagan, Scott; Waltz, Kenneth (1995).
3386:
3384:
2788:
2466:
2464:
2397:
2395:
2393:
2391:
2389:
2387:
2318:
2316:
2077:
2075:
2073:
1954:. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30.
1871:
1701:
1665:
1653:
843:
831:Credibility (international relations)
471:or the use of full force in wartime.
6219:(University of Chicago Press, 2009)
6042:
5436:
4593:"Deterrence by denial in cyberspace"
3039:
2135:
1988:
1986:
1984:
1982:
1943:
1941:
1939:
6084:
5956:32, no. 3 (September 1988): p. 424.
5468:Green, Brendan Rittenhouse (2020).
5031:
4964:
4742:
4692:
4642:
4479:
4313:
4283:
4052:
3243:Huth, Paul; Russett, Bruce (1990).
2528:
2402:Huth, Paul; Russett, Bruce (1984).
1674:form of deterrence, the concept of
1489:
806:
13:
6799:First-player and second-player win
6411:International relations since 1989
6401:Diplomatic history of World War II
6323:International Criminal Court (ICC)
6151:
6127:Holmes, Robert L. (14 July 2014).
4581:
4531:
4468:
4442:10.1093/oso/9780190908645.003.0005
4416:
4098:The Journal of Conflict Resolution
3697:
3381:
3042:Annual Review of Political Science
2695:Israel and Conventional Deterrence
2581:Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy
2473:"Selection Effects and Deterrence"
2461:
2384:
2313:
2231:Israel and Conventional Deterrence
2129:
2070:
2005:10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001
1909:10.1093/oso/9780190908645.003.0001
1613:
1269:underwent significant variations.
1162:submarines, Schelling argues that
755:: actors are understood as unitary
670:
582:research for at least 2000 years.
14:
7878:
6707:International political sociology
6241:
6159:The War that Must Never be Fought
5928:Federation of American Scientists
5896:from the original on July 2, 2019
5883:
5858:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
3330:"A Nobel Laureate Who's Got Game"
1979:
1951:Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis
1936:
1464:Starlink communications in Crimea
1261:Stages of US policy of deterrence
6906:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
6120:
6078:
5950:. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence."
4428:Schneider, Jacquelyn G. (2019),
1454:prevented Ukraine from carrying
1441:2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
1408:achieve military superiority.".
6702:International political economy
6036:
5994:
5941:
5908:
5877:
5841:
5830:from the original on 2014-02-13
5811:
5800:from the original on 2023-04-05
5782:
5752:
5687:Journal of Theoretical Politics
5667:from the original on 2023-03-04
5649:
5638:from the original on 2023-07-07
5620:
5609:from the original on 2022-02-14
5554:
5544:from the original on 2024-02-24
5499:
5488:from the original on 2024-02-24
5461:
5430:
5397:
5386:from the original on 2024-02-24
5359:
5348:from the original on 2024-02-24
5305:
5294:from the original on 2023-04-05
5264:
5217:
5168:
5157:from the original on 2021-11-07
5122:
5075:
5064:from the original on 2021-11-06
5025:
5014:from the original on 2021-11-06
4953:from the original on 2021-11-07
4906:
4895:from the original on 2021-11-07
4881:10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425
4840:
4829:from the original on 2022-02-25
4782:
4631:from the original on 2021-11-06
4520:from the original on 2021-01-26
4458:from the original on 2021-11-06
4403:
4390:
4365:from the original on 2023-07-16
4355:"NATO Must Re-Learn Deterrence"
4346:
4335:from the original on 2023-09-16
4302:from the original on 2023-09-22
4272:from the original on 2023-06-05
4254:
4226:from the original on 2023-08-31
4189:
4178:from the original on 2023-12-01
4164:. Georgetown University Press.
4151:
4140:from the original on 2023-08-31
4085:
4046:
4028:International Studies Quarterly
4015:
3963:
3952:from the original on 2022-03-20
3909:
3898:from the original on 2022-05-07
3843:
3832:from the original on 2022-01-26
3777:
3766:from the original on 2023-04-10
3739:
3691:
3680:from the original on 2022-10-26
3653:
3642:from the original on 2022-01-28
3595:
3584:from the original on 2023-04-05
3567:
3556:from the original on 2023-04-10
3529:
3518:from the original on 2024-02-24
3471:
3460:from the original on 2024-02-24
3413:
3402:from the original on 2021-06-02
3346:
3323:
3291:from the original on 2021-09-11
3236:
3225:from the original on 2021-09-08
3170:
3145:from the original on 2021-04-26
3088:from the original on 2023-04-10
3061:
3015:
2973:from the original on 2021-09-05
2918:
2907:from the original on 2021-09-05
2852:
2818:
2807:from the original on 2021-10-25
2782:
2739:
2728:from the original on 2021-09-06
2685:
2674:from the original on 2024-02-24
2647:
2636:from the original on 2019-12-12
2618:"The General and World War III"
2598:from the original on 2023-04-10
2571:
2522:
2511:from the original on 2024-02-24
2450:from the original on 2021-09-11
2373:from the original on 2024-02-24
2302:from the original on 2023-12-01
2275:
2264:from the original on 2021-09-06
2210:from the original on 2023-04-05
2164:from the original on 2021-08-30
2118:from the original on 2022-05-19
2059:from the original on 2024-02-24
2021:from the original on 2021-08-30
1968:from the original on 2024-02-24
1925:from the original on 2021-08-30
1845:
659:. Other countries, such as the
7867:Subfields of political science
7832:International relations theory
6916:Evolutionarily stable strategy
6133:. Princeton University Press.
5953:Journal of Conflict Resolution
5474:. Cambridge University Press.
5372:. Princeton University Press.
5318:. Princeton University Press.
4795:Journal of Conflict Resolution
4323:Applebaum, Anne (2023-09-11).
3396:Texas National Security Review
3315:Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2",
3074:. Princeton University Press.
3055:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25
2859:Huntington, Samuel P. (1983).
2616:Rhodes, Richard (1995-06-11).
2221:
2175:
2032:
1890:
1865:
1691:its nuclear arsenal secretly.
1432:
1392:International Court of Justice
1272:
816:Signaling and bargaining power
690:
289:Alternative dispute resolution
1:
6844:Simultaneous action selection
6201:. Cambridge University Press.
5766:. June 18, 2011. p. 66.
5455:10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137
5423:10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153
5242:10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811
5100:10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396
4720:10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188
4609:10.1080/01402390.2021.1944856
4559:10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396
4202:The Fragile Balance of Terror
3731:Brodie, Bernard (1959), "8",
3574:Snyder, Glenn Herald (1965).
3496:10.1080/09636412.2022.2038662
3438:10.1080/09636412.2017.1360074
2925:Mearsheimer, John J. (1982).
2548:10.1080/09636412.2021.2010887
2182:Mearsheimer, John J. (1983).
2082:Schelling, Thomas C. (1966).
1858:
1394:against the United States in
1337:
1196:stability–instability paradox
7776:List of games in game theory
6956:Quantal response equilibrium
6946:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
6881:Bayes correlated equilibrium
6670:Related fields and subfields
5820:"Cold Warriors say no nukes"
5760:"The Growing Appeal of Zero"
5410:Contemporary Security Policy
5280:. Cornell University Press.
5230:Journal of Strategic Studies
5175:Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021).
4670:10.1080/09636412.2013.816122
4597:Journal of Strategic Studies
4290:Darcy, Oliver (2023-09-12).
3666:. Cornell University Press.
2692:Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988).
2228:Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988).
1748:Confidence-building measures
1672:mutually assured destruction
1568:
1522:2015 Ukraine power grid hack
1462:by denying to enable needed
856:
626:mutually assured destruction
7:
7245:Optional prisoner's dilemma
6976:Self-confirming equilibrium
5038:Strategic Studies Quarterly
3752:. Oxford University Press.
3608:Political Science Quarterly
3542:. W.W. Norton. p. 20.
2836:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_4
2798:Strategic Studies Quarterly
2756:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3
2578:Glaser, Charles L. (1990).
1999:. Oxford University Press.
1948:Morgan, Patrick M. (1977).
1730:
1587:Russian invasion of Ukraine
10:
7883:
7862:Peace and conflict studies
7710:Principal variation search
7426:Aumann's agreement theorem
7089:Strategy-stealing argument
7001:Trembling hand equilibrium
6931:Markov perfect equilibrium
6926:Mertens-stable equilibrium
6712:Peace and conflict studies
6328:Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
6172:Freedman, Lawrence. 2004.
5818:Ben Goddard (2010-01-27).
5224:Talmadge, Caitlin (2019).
4158:Cohen, Michael D. (2017).
4092:Horowitz, Michael (2009).
3856:International Organization
3790:International Organization
2477:International Interactions
1714:grounds. Scholars such as
1670:As opposed to the extreme
1577:
1493:
1397:Nicaragua v. United States
1328:mutual assured destruction
1308:
884:Mutual assured destruction
873:
828:
734:Rational deterrence theory
616:Furthermore, as Jentleson
573:
511:
438:mutual assured destruction
432:with regard to the use of
356:Peace and conflict studies
263:Mutual assured destruction
18:
7746:Combinatorial game theory
7733:
7692:
7474:
7418:
7405:Princess and monster game
7200:
7102:
7009:
6961:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
6886:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
6867:
6766:
6669:
6621:
6419:
6376:
6351:
6305:
6296:
6283:
6192:Psychology and Deterrence
6176:. New York: Polity Press.
6043:Rock, Stephen R. (1989).
6001:Meyers, Diana T. (1992).
5520:10.1017/9781108910194.008
4931:10.1017/S0002930000016894
4865:10.1017/S0002930000016894
4071:10.1177/00223433211067899
4059:Journal of Peace Research
3868:10.1017/S0020818312000392
3802:10.1017/S0020818312000367
3784:Kroenig, Matthew (2013).
3746:Kroenig, Matthew (2018).
3317:The Diplomacy of Violence
3131:10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47
3068:Snyder, Glenn H. (1966).
2088:. Yale University Press.
1601:Misprediction of behavior
1593:can be seen as rewarding
870:Nuclear deterrence theory
771:Cost-benefit calculations
516:By November 1945 general
7827:Geopolitical terminology
7761:Evolutionary game theory
7494:Antoine Augustin Cournot
7380:Guess 2/3 of the average
7177:Strictly determined game
6971:Satisfaction equilibrium
6789:Escalation of commitment
6010:The Philosophical Review
5709:10.1177/0951629804041117
5561:Sagan, Scott D. (1994).
5443:The Washington Quarterly
4807:10.1177/0022002717737138
4758:Journal of Cybersecurity
4652:Lindsay, Jon R. (2013).
4110:10.1177/0022002708330388
3970:Logan, David C. (2022).
2136:Pape, Robert A. (1996).
1874:A Dictionary of Aviation
1872:Wragg, David W. (1973).
1839:
1439:By the beginning of the
1386:in Nicaragua led to the
1187:The state must maintain
753:Unitary actor assumption
526:Ohio Society of New York
442:second-strike capability
351:Non-aggression principle
309:Conflict style inventory
113:Nonviolent Communication
7766:Glossary of game theory
7365:Stackelberg competition
6991:Strong Nash equilibrium
6687:Foreign policy analysis
6499:International community
6277:International relations
6197:Morgan, Patrick. 2003.
5853:"The new abolitionists"
5366:Jervis, Robert (1976).
5312:Carson, Austin (2018).
4480:Nye, Joseph S. (2017).
4434:Cross-Domain Deterrence
4220:10.7591/j.ctv310vm0j.11
3660:Jervis, Robert (1989).
3602:Jervis, Robert (1979).
2185:Conventional Deterrence
1758:International relations
825:Reputations for resolve
781:The American economist
450:international relations
198:International relations
128:Speaking truth to power
7837:International security
7791:Tragedy of the commons
7771:List of game theorists
7751:Confrontation analysis
7461:Sprague–Grundy theorem
6981:Sequential equilibrium
6901:Correlated equilibrium
5890:washingtonpost dot com
5661:International Security
5567:International Security
5437:Jung, Karsten (2023).
5181:International Security
4486:International Security
4053:Suh, Kyungwon (2022).
3976:International Security
3355:International Security
3119:International Security
3071:Deterrence and Defense
2931:International Security
2865:International Security
2529:Lee, Do Young (2021).
2489:10.1080/03050620210390
2471:Fearon, James (2002).
2329:International Security
1808:Peace through strength
1580:Salami slicing tactics
765:Strategic interactions
580:international security
509:
497:
41:
7564:Jean-François Mertens
5141:10.1017/9781316422724
5032:Lin, Herbert (2012).
4767:10.1093/cybsec/tyw015
3928:10.1017/9781316227305
2789:Wirtz, James (2018).
2704:10.7591/9781501737831
2240:10.7591/9781501737831
1680:nuclear weapon states
1646:Nuclear Tipping Point
1480:Philip Breedlove
1382:. The funding of the
749:: actors are rational
505:
493:
273:Nuclear proliferation
29:
21:Deterrence (penology)
7817:Cold War terminology
7693:Search optimizations
7569:Jennifer Tour Chayes
7456:Revelation principle
7451:Purification theorem
7390:Nash bargaining game
7355:Bertrand competition
7340:El Farol Bar problem
7305:Electronic mail game
7270:Lewis signaling game
6814:Hierarchy of beliefs
6677:Comparative politics
6085:Lee, Steven (1992).
5194:10.1162/isec_a_00418
5129:Maurer, Tim (2018).
4498:10.1162/isec_a_00266
4250:on December 8, 2008.
3989:10.1162/isec_a_00434
3420:Altman, Dan (2018).
2341:10.1162/isec_a_00313
2204:10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2
2158:10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v
1027:Nuclear-armed states
704:Coercive credibility
695:Secondly, Jentleson
339:Paradox of tolerance
7741:Bounded rationality
7360:Cournot competition
7310:Rock paper scissors
7285:Battle of the sexes
7275:Volunteer's dilemma
7147:Perfect information
7074:Dominant strategies
6911:Epsilon-equilibrium
6794:Extensive-form game
6459:Collective security
6343:United Nations (UN)
6130:On War and Morality
5865:on 17 February 2014
5324:10.2307/j.ctv346p45
4992:10.1017/eis.2021.18
4040:10.1093/isq/sqac067
3343:, October 12, 2005.
3341:The Washington Post
2094:10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s
1753:Decapitation strike
1620:nuclear disarmament
1574:Deterrence failures
1560:Intrawar deterrence
1287:sphere of influence
1189:command and control
880:Massive retaliation
630:massive retaliation
602:territorial dispute
520:, who led American
268:Nuclear disarmament
167:Conflict escalation
144:Conflict management
48:Conflict resolution
7720:Paranoid algorithm
7700:Alpha–beta pruning
7579:John Maynard Smith
7410:Rendezvous problem
7250:Traveler's dilemma
7240:Gift-exchange game
7235:Prisoner's dilemma
7152:Large Poisson game
7119:Bargaining problem
7024:Backward induction
6996:Subgame perfection
6951:Proper equilibrium
5934:2017-09-21 at the
5921:2015-06-20 at the
5892:. WP Company LLC.
3335:2019-09-25 at the
2085:Arms and Influence
1813:Prisoner's dilemma
1743:Chainstore paradox
1702:Ethical objections
1684:minimal deterrence
1676:minimum deterrence
1666:Minimum deterrence
1654:Stronger deterrent
1608:perfect deterrence
1426:biological weapons
1418:pre-emptive action
1388:Iran-Contra Affair
1366:, support for the
1283:developing nations
844:Interests at stake
711:economic sanctions
587:Arms and Influence
522:air raids on Japan
386:Track II diplomacy
334:Prisoner's dilemma
304:Conflict continuum
299:Conflict avoidance
84:Dispute resolution
42:
7842:Military strategy
7812:Cold War policies
7799:
7798:
7705:Aspiration window
7674:Suzanne Scotchmer
7629:Oskar Morgenstern
7524:Donald B. Gillies
7466:Zermelo's theorem
7395:Induction puzzles
7350:Fair cake-cutting
7325:Public goods game
7255:Coordination game
7129:Intransitive game
7059:Forward induction
6941:Pareto efficiency
6921:Gibbs equilibrium
6891:Berge equilibrium
6839:Simultaneous game
6725:
6724:
6697:International law
6566:Right of conquest
6531:National interest
6474:Deterrence theory
6372:
6371:
6359:League of Nations
6231:Waltz, Kenneth N.
6225:978-0-226-65002-9
6209:Patrick M. Morgan
6167:978-0-8179-1845-3
6140:978-1-4008-6014-2
5851:(30 March 2012).
5736:. June 16, 2011.
5529:978-1-108-90677-7
5508:"The Nuclear Age"
5481:978-1-108-48986-7
5379:978-1-4008-8511-4
5333:978-0-691-18424-1
5287:978-0-8014-2938-5
5150:978-1-107-12760-9
4451:978-0-19-090864-5
4398:Radio Free Europe
4211:978-1-5017-6701-2
4171:978-1-62616-495-6
3937:978-1-107-10694-9
3759:978-0-19-084918-4
3712:on 12 August 2017
3698:Krepon, Michael.
3673:978-0-8014-9565-6
3549:978-0-393-03810-1
3081:978-1-4008-7716-4
2846:978-94-6265-419-8
2765:978-94-6265-418-1
2713:978-1-5017-3783-1
2667:978-1-4422-3306-5
2591:978-1-4008-6202-3
2249:978-1-5017-3783-1
2195:978-1-5017-1325-5
2149:978-0-8014-3134-0
2103:978-0-300-00221-8
2052:978-1-4422-3306-5
2014:978-0-19-090960-4
1961:978-0-8039-0819-2
1918:978-0-19-090960-4
1798:Nuclear terrorism
1778:Nuclear blackmail
1763:Launch on warning
1738:Balance of terror
1696:nuclear deterrent
1688:nuclear stockpile
1412:document called "
1405:Mikhail Gorbachev
1319:Sino-Soviet Split
1155:
1154:
919:Nuclear explosion
888:Flexible response
568:US foreign policy
564:American politics
560:Frederik Logevall
536:nuclear weapons.
425:Deterrence theory
422:
421:
294:Anti-war movement
258:Nuclear blackmail
162:Communal violence
38:Regulus I missile
7874:
7852:Nuclear strategy
7786:Topological game
7781:No-win situation
7679:Thomas Schelling
7659:Robert B. Wilson
7619:Merrill M. Flood
7589:John von Neumann
7499:Ariel Rubinstein
7484:Albert W. Tucker
7335:War of attrition
7295:Matching pennies
6936:Nash equilibrium
6859:Mechanism design
6824:Normal-form game
6779:Cooperative game
6752:
6745:
6738:
6729:
6728:
6717:Security studies
6509:Internationality
6504:Internationalism
6303:
6302:
6270:
6263:
6256:
6247:
6246:
6184:Richard N. Lebow
6161:, Hoover Press,
6145:
6144:
6124:
6118:
6117:
6091:
6082:
6076:
6075:
6058:(4): 1447–1448.
6049:
6040:
6034:
6033:
6007:
5998:
5992:
5991:
5963:
5957:
5945:
5939:
5912:
5906:
5905:
5903:
5901:
5881:
5875:
5874:
5872:
5870:
5861:. Archived from
5845:
5839:
5838:
5836:
5835:
5815:
5809:
5808:
5806:
5805:
5786:
5780:
5779:
5777:
5775:
5756:
5750:
5749:
5747:
5745:
5726:
5720:
5719:
5702:
5682:
5676:
5675:
5673:
5672:
5653:
5647:
5646:
5644:
5643:
5624:
5618:
5617:
5615:
5614:
5558:
5552:
5551:
5550:
5549:
5503:
5497:
5496:
5494:
5493:
5465:
5459:
5458:
5434:
5428:
5427:
5425:
5401:
5395:
5394:
5392:
5391:
5363:
5357:
5356:
5354:
5353:
5309:
5303:
5302:
5300:
5299:
5268:
5262:
5261:
5221:
5215:
5214:
5196:
5172:
5166:
5165:
5163:
5162:
5126:
5120:
5119:
5088:Security Studies
5079:
5073:
5072:
5070:
5069:
5029:
5023:
5022:
5020:
5019:
4971:
4962:
4961:
4959:
4958:
4910:
4904:
4903:
4901:
4900:
4844:
4838:
4837:
4835:
4834:
4786:
4780:
4779:
4769:
4749:
4740:
4739:
4708:Security Studies
4699:
4690:
4689:
4658:Security Studies
4649:
4640:
4639:
4637:
4636:
4588:
4579:
4578:
4547:Security Studies
4538:
4529:
4528:
4526:
4525:
4477:
4466:
4465:
4464:
4463:
4425:
4414:
4407:
4401:
4394:
4388:
4387:
4381:
4373:
4371:
4370:
4350:
4344:
4343:
4341:
4340:
4320:
4311:
4310:
4308:
4307:
4287:
4281:
4280:
4278:
4277:
4258:
4252:
4251:
4246:. Archived from
4240:
4234:
4233:
4232:
4231:
4193:
4187:
4186:
4184:
4183:
4155:
4149:
4148:
4146:
4145:
4089:
4083:
4082:
4050:
4044:
4043:
4019:
4013:
4012:
3991:
3967:
3961:
3960:
3958:
3957:
3913:
3907:
3906:
3904:
3903:
3847:
3841:
3840:
3838:
3837:
3781:
3775:
3774:
3772:
3771:
3743:
3737:
3736:
3728:
3722:
3721:
3719:
3717:
3711:
3704:
3695:
3689:
3688:
3686:
3685:
3657:
3651:
3650:
3648:
3647:
3599:
3593:
3592:
3590:
3589:
3571:
3565:
3564:
3562:
3561:
3533:
3527:
3526:
3524:
3523:
3484:Security Studies
3475:
3469:
3468:
3466:
3465:
3426:Security Studies
3417:
3411:
3410:
3408:
3407:
3388:
3379:
3378:
3350:
3344:
3327:
3321:
3320:
3311:
3300:
3299:
3297:
3296:
3240:
3234:
3233:
3231:
3230:
3174:
3168:
3167:
3159:
3153:
3152:
3151:
3150:
3110:
3097:
3096:
3094:
3093:
3065:
3059:
3058:
3057:
3037:
3022:
3019:
3013:
3012:
2988:
2982:
2981:
2979:
2978:
2922:
2916:
2915:
2913:
2912:
2856:
2850:
2849:
2838:
2822:
2816:
2815:
2813:
2812:
2806:
2795:
2786:
2780:
2779:
2777:
2743:
2737:
2736:
2734:
2733:
2689:
2683:
2682:
2680:
2679:
2651:
2645:
2644:
2642:
2641:
2613:
2607:
2606:
2604:
2603:
2575:
2569:
2568:
2550:
2535:Security Studies
2526:
2520:
2519:
2517:
2516:
2468:
2459:
2458:
2456:
2455:
2399:
2382:
2381:
2379:
2378:
2352:
2320:
2311:
2310:
2308:
2307:
2279:
2273:
2272:
2270:
2269:
2225:
2219:
2218:
2216:
2215:
2179:
2173:
2172:
2170:
2169:
2133:
2127:
2126:
2124:
2123:
2079:
2068:
2067:
2065:
2064:
2036:
2030:
2029:
2027:
2026:
1990:
1977:
1976:
1974:
1973:
1945:
1934:
1933:
1931:
1930:
1894:
1888:
1887:
1869:
1853:
1849:
1823:Security dilemma
1793:Nuclear strategy
1716:Robert L. Holmes
1591:Frozen conflicts
1490:Cyber deterrence
1472:attack on Crimea
1435:-Cold War period
1434:
1299:George F. Kennan
1147:
1140:
1133:
1084:
978:Target selection
906:
892:
891:
876:Nuclear strategy
807:Military balance
783:Thomas Schelling
552:Lesson of Munich
414:
407:
400:
44:
43:
7882:
7881:
7877:
7876:
7875:
7873:
7872:
7871:
7857:Nuclear warfare
7847:Military ethics
7802:
7801:
7800:
7795:
7729:
7715:max^n algorithm
7688:
7684:William Vickrey
7644:Reinhard Selten
7599:Kenneth Binmore
7514:David K. Levine
7509:Daniel Kahneman
7476:
7470:
7446:Negamax theorem
7436:Minimax theorem
7414:
7375:Diner's dilemma
7230:All-pay auction
7196:
7182:Stochastic game
7134:Mean-field game
7105:
7098:
7069:Markov strategy
7005:
6871:
6863:
6834:Sequential game
6819:Information set
6804:Game complexity
6774:Congestion game
6762:
6756:
6726:
6721:
6665:
6656:Postcolonialism
6617:
6546:Non-state actor
6541:Non-belligerent
6536:Neutral country
6521:Interventionism
6454:Co-belligerence
6415:
6368:
6347:
6292:
6279:
6274:
6244:
6188:Janice G. Stein
6154:
6152:Further reading
6149:
6148:
6141:
6125:
6121:
6106:10.2307/2216042
6089:
6083:
6079:
6064:10.2307/1961738
6047:
6041:
6037:
6022:10.2307/2185583
6005:
5999:
5995:
5980:10.2307/1148862
5964:
5960:
5948:Nalebuff, Barry
5946:
5942:
5936:Wayback Machine
5923:Wayback Machine
5913:
5909:
5899:
5897:
5882:
5878:
5868:
5866:
5846:
5842:
5833:
5831:
5816:
5812:
5803:
5801:
5788:
5787:
5783:
5773:
5771:
5758:
5757:
5753:
5743:
5741:
5728:
5727:
5723:
5700:10.1.1.335.7353
5683:
5679:
5670:
5668:
5655:
5654:
5650:
5641:
5639:
5626:
5625:
5621:
5612:
5610:
5579:10.2307/2539178
5559:
5555:
5547:
5545:
5530:
5504:
5500:
5491:
5489:
5482:
5466:
5462:
5435:
5431:
5402:
5398:
5389:
5387:
5380:
5364:
5360:
5351:
5349:
5334:
5310:
5306:
5297:
5295:
5288:
5269:
5265:
5222:
5218:
5173:
5169:
5160:
5158:
5151:
5127:
5123:
5080:
5076:
5067:
5065:
5030:
5026:
5017:
5015:
4972:
4965:
4956:
4954:
4911:
4907:
4898:
4896:
4845:
4841:
4832:
4830:
4787:
4783:
4750:
4743:
4700:
4693:
4650:
4643:
4634:
4632:
4589:
4582:
4539:
4532:
4523:
4521:
4478:
4469:
4461:
4459:
4452:
4426:
4417:
4408:
4404:
4395:
4391:
4375:
4374:
4368:
4366:
4351:
4347:
4338:
4336:
4321:
4314:
4305:
4303:
4288:
4284:
4275:
4273:
4260:
4259:
4255:
4242:
4241:
4237:
4229:
4227:
4212:
4194:
4190:
4181:
4179:
4172:
4156:
4152:
4143:
4141:
4090:
4086:
4051:
4047:
4020:
4016:
3968:
3964:
3955:
3953:
3938:
3914:
3910:
3901:
3899:
3848:
3844:
3835:
3833:
3782:
3778:
3769:
3767:
3760:
3744:
3740:
3729:
3725:
3715:
3713:
3709:
3702:
3696:
3692:
3683:
3681:
3674:
3658:
3654:
3645:
3643:
3620:10.2307/2149629
3600:
3596:
3587:
3585:
3572:
3568:
3559:
3557:
3550:
3534:
3530:
3521:
3519:
3476:
3472:
3463:
3461:
3418:
3414:
3405:
3403:
3390:
3389:
3382:
3367:10.2307/2538549
3351:
3347:
3337:Wayback Machine
3328:
3324:
3312:
3303:
3294:
3292:
3261:10.2307/2010511
3241:
3237:
3228:
3226:
3195:10.2307/2010405
3175:
3171:
3160:
3156:
3148:
3146:
3115:"Who Won Libya"
3111:
3100:
3091:
3089:
3082:
3066:
3062:
3038:
3025:
3020:
3016:
2989:
2985:
2976:
2974:
2943:10.2307/2538686
2923:
2919:
2910:
2908:
2877:10.2307/2538699
2857:
2853:
2847:
2823:
2819:
2810:
2808:
2804:
2793:
2787:
2783:
2766:
2744:
2740:
2731:
2729:
2714:
2690:
2686:
2677:
2675:
2668:
2652:
2648:
2639:
2637:
2614:
2610:
2601:
2599:
2592:
2576:
2572:
2527:
2523:
2514:
2512:
2469:
2462:
2453:
2451:
2420:10.2307/2010184
2400:
2385:
2376:
2374:
2321:
2314:
2305:
2303:
2288:Foreign Affairs
2280:
2276:
2267:
2265:
2250:
2226:
2222:
2213:
2211:
2196:
2180:
2176:
2167:
2165:
2150:
2134:
2130:
2121:
2119:
2104:
2080:
2071:
2062:
2060:
2053:
2037:
2033:
2024:
2022:
2015:
1991:
1980:
1971:
1969:
1962:
1946:
1937:
1928:
1926:
1919:
1895:
1891:
1884:
1870:
1866:
1861:
1856:
1850:
1846:
1842:
1837:
1818:Reagan Doctrine
1803:Nuclear warfare
1733:
1704:
1668:
1656:
1636:Henry Kissinger
1616:
1614:Suicide attacks
1603:
1582:
1576:
1571:
1562:
1502:
1494:Main articles:
1492:
1460:Black Sea fleet
1458:on the Russian
1437:
1340:
1311:
1275:
1263:
1164:nuclear weapons
1151:
1102:
1082:
1072:
1041:
896:Nuclear weapons
890:
874:Main articles:
872:
859:
846:
833:
827:
818:
809:
796:Washington Post
791:Michael Kinsley
736:
706:
693:
673:
671:Proportionality
576:
514:
434:nuclear weapons
418:
346:Liaison officer
253:Nuclear warfare
237:Multilateralism
177:Just war theory
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
7880:
7870:
7869:
7864:
7859:
7854:
7849:
7844:
7839:
7834:
7829:
7824:
7819:
7814:
7797:
7796:
7794:
7793:
7788:
7783:
7778:
7773:
7768:
7763:
7758:
7753:
7748:
7743:
7737:
7735:
7731:
7730:
7728:
7727:
7722:
7717:
7712:
7707:
7702:
7696:
7694:
7690:
7689:
7687:
7686:
7681:
7676:
7671:
7666:
7661:
7656:
7651:
7649:Robert Axelrod
7646:
7641:
7636:
7631:
7626:
7624:Olga Bondareva
7621:
7616:
7614:Melvin Dresher
7611:
7606:
7604:Leonid Hurwicz
7601:
7596:
7591:
7586:
7581:
7576:
7571:
7566:
7561:
7556:
7551:
7546:
7541:
7539:Harold W. Kuhn
7536:
7531:
7529:Drew Fudenberg
7526:
7521:
7519:David M. Kreps
7516:
7511:
7506:
7504:Claude Shannon
7501:
7496:
7491:
7486:
7480:
7478:
7472:
7471:
7469:
7468:
7463:
7458:
7453:
7448:
7443:
7441:Nash's theorem
7438:
7433:
7428:
7422:
7420:
7416:
7415:
7413:
7412:
7407:
7402:
7397:
7392:
7387:
7382:
7377:
7372:
7367:
7362:
7357:
7352:
7347:
7342:
7337:
7332:
7327:
7322:
7317:
7312:
7307:
7302:
7300:Ultimatum game
7297:
7292:
7287:
7282:
7280:Dollar auction
7277:
7272:
7267:
7265:Centipede game
7262:
7257:
7252:
7247:
7242:
7237:
7232:
7227:
7222:
7220:Infinite chess
7217:
7212:
7206:
7204:
7198:
7197:
7195:
7194:
7189:
7187:Symmetric game
7184:
7179:
7174:
7172:Signaling game
7169:
7167:Screening game
7164:
7159:
7157:Potential game
7154:
7149:
7144:
7136:
7131:
7126:
7121:
7116:
7110:
7108:
7100:
7099:
7097:
7096:
7091:
7086:
7084:Mixed strategy
7081:
7076:
7071:
7066:
7061:
7056:
7051:
7046:
7041:
7036:
7031:
7026:
7021:
7015:
7013:
7007:
7006:
7004:
7003:
6998:
6993:
6988:
6983:
6978:
6973:
6968:
6966:Risk dominance
6963:
6958:
6953:
6948:
6943:
6938:
6933:
6928:
6923:
6918:
6913:
6908:
6903:
6898:
6893:
6888:
6883:
6877:
6875:
6865:
6864:
6862:
6861:
6856:
6851:
6846:
6841:
6836:
6831:
6826:
6821:
6816:
6811:
6809:Graphical game
6806:
6801:
6796:
6791:
6786:
6781:
6776:
6770:
6768:
6764:
6763:
6755:
6754:
6747:
6740:
6732:
6723:
6722:
6720:
6719:
6714:
6709:
6704:
6699:
6694:
6689:
6684:
6679:
6673:
6671:
6667:
6666:
6664:
6663:
6658:
6653:
6648:
6643:
6638:
6636:English school
6633:
6631:Constructivism
6627:
6625:
6619:
6618:
6616:
6615:
6610:
6609:
6608:
6603:
6601:Non-aggression
6598:
6593:
6588:
6578:
6573:
6568:
6563:
6558:
6553:
6548:
6543:
6538:
6533:
6528:
6523:
6518:
6517:
6516:
6511:
6501:
6496:
6491:
6486:
6481:
6476:
6471:
6466:
6461:
6456:
6451:
6446:
6445:
6444:
6439:
6434:
6423:
6421:
6417:
6416:
6414:
6413:
6408:
6403:
6398:
6393:
6388:
6382:
6380:
6374:
6373:
6370:
6369:
6367:
6366:
6361:
6355:
6353:
6349:
6348:
6346:
6345:
6340:
6335:
6330:
6325:
6320:
6315:
6309:
6307:
6300:
6294:
6293:
6291:
6290:
6284:
6281:
6280:
6273:
6272:
6265:
6258:
6250:
6243:
6242:External links
6240:
6239:
6238:
6228:
6213:James J. Wirtz
6202:
6199:Deterrence Now
6195:
6180:Jervis, Robert
6177:
6170:
6153:
6150:
6147:
6146:
6139:
6119:
6100:(4): 559–562.
6077:
6035:
6016:(2): 481–484.
5993:
5968:Foreign Policy
5958:
5940:
5907:
5876:
5849:Hugh Gusterson
5840:
5810:
5781:
5751:
5721:
5693:(2): 107–141,
5677:
5648:
5634:. 2023-02-26.
5619:
5553:
5528:
5498:
5480:
5460:
5429:
5416:(4): 544–560.
5396:
5378:
5358:
5332:
5304:
5286:
5272:Legro, Jeffrey
5263:
5236:(6): 864–887.
5216:
5167:
5149:
5121:
5094:(3): 452–481.
5074:
5024:
4986:(4): 401–417.
4963:
4925:(3): 425–479.
4905:
4859:(3): 425–479.
4839:
4801:(2): 317–347.
4781:
4741:
4714:(2): 316–348.
4691:
4664:(3): 365–404.
4641:
4603:(3): 534–569.
4580:
4553:(3): 452–481.
4530:
4467:
4450:
4415:
4402:
4389:
4345:
4312:
4282:
4268:. 2022-03-09.
4253:
4235:
4210:
4188:
4170:
4150:
4104:(2): 234–257.
4084:
4065:(2): 337–351.
4045:
4014:
3982:(4): 172–215.
3962:
3936:
3908:
3862:(1): 173–195.
3842:
3796:(1): 141–171.
3776:
3758:
3738:
3723:
3690:
3672:
3652:
3614:(4): 617–633.
3594:
3566:
3548:
3528:
3470:
3412:
3398:. 2021-06-02.
3380:
3345:
3322:
3301:
3255:(4): 466–501.
3249:World Politics
3235:
3189:(2): 143–169.
3183:World Politics
3169:
3154:
3098:
3080:
3060:
3023:
3014:
2983:
2917:
2851:
2845:
2817:
2781:
2764:
2738:
2712:
2684:
2666:
2646:
2622:The New Yorker
2608:
2590:
2570:
2541:(5): 761–796.
2521:
2460:
2414:(4): 496–526.
2408:World Politics
2383:
2335:(4): 128–169.
2312:
2274:
2248:
2220:
2194:
2174:
2148:
2128:
2102:
2069:
2051:
2031:
2013:
1978:
1960:
1935:
1917:
1889:
1882:
1863:
1862:
1860:
1857:
1855:
1854:
1843:
1841:
1838:
1836:
1835:
1830:
1828:Tripwire force
1825:
1820:
1815:
1810:
1805:
1800:
1795:
1790:
1785:
1783:Nuclear ethics
1780:
1775:
1770:
1765:
1760:
1755:
1750:
1745:
1740:
1734:
1732:
1729:
1703:
1700:
1667:
1664:
1655:
1652:
1618:Advocates for
1615:
1612:
1602:
1599:
1575:
1572:
1570:
1567:
1561:
1558:
1545:
1544:
1541:
1538:
1535:
1532:
1513:
1512:
1509:
1491:
1488:
1468:Anne Applebaum
1436:
1430:
1378:government in
1356:Saddam Hussein
1350:government of
1339:
1336:
1310:
1307:
1274:
1271:
1262:
1259:
1247:Bernard Brodie
1192:
1191:
1185:
1182:
1153:
1152:
1150:
1149:
1142:
1135:
1127:
1124:
1123:
1122:
1121:
1116:
1111:
1106:
1096:
1095:
1090:
1085:
1076:
1066:
1065:
1060:
1055:
1053:United Kingdom
1050:
1045:
1030:
1029:
1023:
1022:
1021:
1020:
1015:
1010:
1005:
1000:
995:
990:
985:
980:
975:
969:
968:
963:
958:
952:
951:
946:
941:
936:
931:
926:
921:
913:
912:
908:
907:
899:
898:
871:
868:
866:of tripwires.
858:
855:
845:
842:
829:Main article:
826:
823:
817:
814:
808:
805:
775:
774:
768:
762:
756:
750:
735:
732:
705:
702:
692:
689:
672:
669:
661:United Kingdom
575:
572:
513:
510:
501:game-theoretic
420:
419:
417:
416:
409:
402:
394:
391:
390:
389:
388:
383:
378:
373:
368:
363:
358:
353:
348:
343:
342:
341:
336:
326:
321:
319:Family therapy
316:
311:
306:
301:
296:
291:
283:
282:
278:
277:
276:
275:
270:
265:
260:
255:
247:
246:
242:
241:
240:
239:
234:
229:
224:
219:
214:
209:
201:
200:
194:
193:
192:
191:
190:
189:
179:
174:
169:
164:
156:
155:
149:
148:
147:
146:
138:
137:
133:
132:
131:
130:
125:
120:
115:
110:
109:
108:
106:Party-directed
98:
97:
96:
91:
86:
76:
71:
66:
58:
57:
51:
50:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
7879:
7868:
7865:
7863:
7860:
7858:
7855:
7853:
7850:
7848:
7845:
7843:
7840:
7838:
7835:
7833:
7830:
7828:
7825:
7823:
7820:
7818:
7815:
7813:
7810:
7809:
7807:
7792:
7789:
7787:
7784:
7782:
7779:
7777:
7774:
7772:
7769:
7767:
7764:
7762:
7759:
7757:
7754:
7752:
7749:
7747:
7744:
7742:
7739:
7738:
7736:
7734:Miscellaneous
7732:
7726:
7723:
7721:
7718:
7716:
7713:
7711:
7708:
7706:
7703:
7701:
7698:
7697:
7695:
7691:
7685:
7682:
7680:
7677:
7675:
7672:
7670:
7669:Samuel Bowles
7667:
7665:
7664:Roger Myerson
7662:
7660:
7657:
7655:
7654:Robert Aumann
7652:
7650:
7647:
7645:
7642:
7640:
7637:
7635:
7632:
7630:
7627:
7625:
7622:
7620:
7617:
7615:
7612:
7610:
7609:Lloyd Shapley
7607:
7605:
7602:
7600:
7597:
7595:
7594:Kenneth Arrow
7592:
7590:
7587:
7585:
7582:
7580:
7577:
7575:
7574:John Harsanyi
7572:
7570:
7567:
7565:
7562:
7560:
7557:
7555:
7552:
7550:
7547:
7545:
7544:Herbert Simon
7542:
7540:
7537:
7535:
7532:
7530:
7527:
7525:
7522:
7520:
7517:
7515:
7512:
7510:
7507:
7505:
7502:
7500:
7497:
7495:
7492:
7490:
7487:
7485:
7482:
7481:
7479:
7473:
7467:
7464:
7462:
7459:
7457:
7454:
7452:
7449:
7447:
7444:
7442:
7439:
7437:
7434:
7432:
7429:
7427:
7424:
7423:
7421:
7417:
7411:
7408:
7406:
7403:
7401:
7398:
7396:
7393:
7391:
7388:
7386:
7383:
7381:
7378:
7376:
7373:
7371:
7368:
7366:
7363:
7361:
7358:
7356:
7353:
7351:
7348:
7346:
7345:Fair division
7343:
7341:
7338:
7336:
7333:
7331:
7328:
7326:
7323:
7321:
7320:Dictator game
7318:
7316:
7313:
7311:
7308:
7306:
7303:
7301:
7298:
7296:
7293:
7291:
7288:
7286:
7283:
7281:
7278:
7276:
7273:
7271:
7268:
7266:
7263:
7261:
7258:
7256:
7253:
7251:
7248:
7246:
7243:
7241:
7238:
7236:
7233:
7231:
7228:
7226:
7223:
7221:
7218:
7216:
7213:
7211:
7208:
7207:
7205:
7203:
7199:
7193:
7192:Zero-sum game
7190:
7188:
7185:
7183:
7180:
7178:
7175:
7173:
7170:
7168:
7165:
7163:
7162:Repeated game
7160:
7158:
7155:
7153:
7150:
7148:
7145:
7143:
7141:
7137:
7135:
7132:
7130:
7127:
7125:
7122:
7120:
7117:
7115:
7112:
7111:
7109:
7107:
7101:
7095:
7092:
7090:
7087:
7085:
7082:
7080:
7079:Pure strategy
7077:
7075:
7072:
7070:
7067:
7065:
7062:
7060:
7057:
7055:
7052:
7050:
7047:
7045:
7044:De-escalation
7042:
7040:
7037:
7035:
7032:
7030:
7027:
7025:
7022:
7020:
7017:
7016:
7014:
7012:
7008:
7002:
6999:
6997:
6994:
6992:
6989:
6987:
6986:Shapley value
6984:
6982:
6979:
6977:
6974:
6972:
6969:
6967:
6964:
6962:
6959:
6957:
6954:
6952:
6949:
6947:
6944:
6942:
6939:
6937:
6934:
6932:
6929:
6927:
6924:
6922:
6919:
6917:
6914:
6912:
6909:
6907:
6904:
6902:
6899:
6897:
6894:
6892:
6889:
6887:
6884:
6882:
6879:
6878:
6876:
6874:
6870:
6866:
6860:
6857:
6855:
6854:Succinct game
6852:
6850:
6847:
6845:
6842:
6840:
6837:
6835:
6832:
6830:
6827:
6825:
6822:
6820:
6817:
6815:
6812:
6810:
6807:
6805:
6802:
6800:
6797:
6795:
6792:
6790:
6787:
6785:
6782:
6780:
6777:
6775:
6772:
6771:
6769:
6765:
6761:
6753:
6748:
6746:
6741:
6739:
6734:
6733:
6730:
6718:
6715:
6713:
6710:
6708:
6705:
6703:
6700:
6698:
6695:
6693:
6690:
6688:
6685:
6683:
6680:
6678:
6675:
6674:
6672:
6668:
6662:
6659:
6657:
6654:
6652:
6649:
6647:
6644:
6642:
6639:
6637:
6634:
6632:
6629:
6628:
6626:
6624:
6620:
6614:
6611:
6607:
6604:
6602:
6599:
6597:
6594:
6592:
6589:
6587:
6584:
6583:
6582:
6579:
6577:
6574:
6572:
6569:
6567:
6564:
6562:
6559:
6557:
6554:
6552:
6549:
6547:
6544:
6542:
6539:
6537:
6534:
6532:
6529:
6527:
6524:
6522:
6519:
6515:
6512:
6510:
6507:
6506:
6505:
6502:
6500:
6497:
6495:
6492:
6490:
6487:
6485:
6482:
6480:
6477:
6475:
6472:
6470:
6467:
6465:
6462:
6460:
6457:
6455:
6452:
6450:
6447:
6443:
6440:
6438:
6435:
6433:
6430:
6429:
6428:
6425:
6424:
6422:
6418:
6412:
6409:
6407:
6404:
6402:
6399:
6397:
6394:
6392:
6389:
6387:
6384:
6383:
6381:
6379:
6375:
6365:
6362:
6360:
6357:
6356:
6354:
6350:
6344:
6341:
6339:
6336:
6334:
6331:
6329:
6326:
6324:
6321:
6319:
6316:
6314:
6311:
6310:
6308:
6304:
6301:
6299:
6298:Organizations
6295:
6289:
6286:
6285:
6282:
6278:
6271:
6266:
6264:
6259:
6257:
6252:
6251:
6248:
6236:
6232:
6229:
6226:
6222:
6218:
6214:
6210:
6206:
6203:
6200:
6196:
6193:
6189:
6185:
6181:
6178:
6175:
6171:
6168:
6164:
6160:
6156:
6155:
6142:
6136:
6132:
6131:
6123:
6115:
6111:
6107:
6103:
6099:
6095:
6088:
6081:
6073:
6069:
6065:
6061:
6057:
6053:
6046:
6039:
6031:
6027:
6023:
6019:
6015:
6011:
6004:
5997:
5989:
5985:
5981:
5977:
5973:
5969:
5962:
5955:
5954:
5949:
5944:
5937:
5933:
5930:
5929:
5924:
5920:
5917:
5911:
5895:
5891:
5887:
5884:Nitze, Paul.
5880:
5864:
5860:
5859:
5854:
5850:
5844:
5829:
5825:
5821:
5814:
5799:
5795:
5791:
5785:
5769:
5765:
5764:The Economist
5761:
5755:
5739:
5735:
5734:The Economist
5731:
5725:
5718:
5714:
5710:
5706:
5701:
5696:
5692:
5688:
5681:
5666:
5662:
5658:
5652:
5637:
5633:
5629:
5623:
5608:
5604:
5600:
5596:
5592:
5588:
5584:
5580:
5576:
5573:(4): 66–107.
5572:
5568:
5564:
5557:
5543:
5539:
5535:
5531:
5525:
5521:
5517:
5513:
5509:
5502:
5487:
5483:
5477:
5473:
5472:
5464:
5456:
5452:
5448:
5444:
5440:
5433:
5424:
5419:
5415:
5411:
5407:
5400:
5385:
5381:
5375:
5371:
5370:
5362:
5347:
5343:
5339:
5335:
5329:
5325:
5321:
5317:
5316:
5308:
5293:
5289:
5283:
5279:
5278:
5273:
5267:
5259:
5255:
5251:
5247:
5243:
5239:
5235:
5231:
5227:
5220:
5212:
5208:
5204:
5200:
5195:
5190:
5186:
5182:
5178:
5171:
5156:
5152:
5146:
5142:
5138:
5134:
5133:
5125:
5117:
5113:
5109:
5105:
5101:
5097:
5093:
5089:
5085:
5078:
5063:
5059:
5055:
5051:
5047:
5043:
5039:
5035:
5028:
5013:
5009:
5005:
5001:
4997:
4993:
4989:
4985:
4981:
4977:
4970:
4968:
4952:
4948:
4944:
4940:
4936:
4932:
4928:
4924:
4920:
4916:
4909:
4894:
4890:
4886:
4882:
4878:
4874:
4870:
4866:
4862:
4858:
4854:
4850:
4843:
4828:
4824:
4820:
4816:
4812:
4808:
4804:
4800:
4796:
4792:
4785:
4777:
4773:
4768:
4763:
4759:
4755:
4748:
4746:
4737:
4733:
4729:
4725:
4721:
4717:
4713:
4709:
4705:
4698:
4696:
4687:
4683:
4679:
4675:
4671:
4667:
4663:
4659:
4655:
4648:
4646:
4630:
4626:
4622:
4618:
4614:
4610:
4606:
4602:
4598:
4594:
4587:
4585:
4576:
4572:
4568:
4564:
4560:
4556:
4552:
4548:
4544:
4537:
4535:
4519:
4515:
4511:
4507:
4503:
4499:
4495:
4491:
4487:
4483:
4476:
4474:
4472:
4457:
4453:
4447:
4443:
4439:
4435:
4431:
4424:
4422:
4420:
4412:
4406:
4399:
4393:
4385:
4379:
4364:
4360:
4356:
4349:
4334:
4330:
4326:
4319:
4317:
4301:
4297:
4293:
4286:
4271:
4267:
4263:
4257:
4249:
4245:
4239:
4225:
4221:
4217:
4213:
4207:
4203:
4199:
4192:
4177:
4173:
4167:
4163:
4162:
4154:
4139:
4135:
4131:
4127:
4123:
4119:
4115:
4111:
4107:
4103:
4099:
4095:
4088:
4080:
4076:
4072:
4068:
4064:
4060:
4056:
4049:
4041:
4037:
4033:
4029:
4025:
4018:
4011:
4007:
4003:
3999:
3995:
3990:
3985:
3981:
3977:
3973:
3966:
3951:
3947:
3943:
3939:
3933:
3929:
3925:
3921:
3920:
3912:
3897:
3893:
3889:
3885:
3881:
3877:
3873:
3869:
3865:
3861:
3857:
3853:
3846:
3831:
3827:
3823:
3819:
3815:
3811:
3807:
3803:
3799:
3795:
3791:
3787:
3780:
3765:
3761:
3755:
3751:
3750:
3742:
3734:
3727:
3708:
3701:
3694:
3679:
3675:
3669:
3665:
3664:
3656:
3641:
3637:
3633:
3629:
3625:
3621:
3617:
3613:
3609:
3605:
3598:
3583:
3579:
3578:
3570:
3555:
3551:
3545:
3541:
3540:
3532:
3517:
3513:
3509:
3505:
3501:
3497:
3493:
3489:
3485:
3481:
3474:
3459:
3455:
3451:
3447:
3443:
3439:
3435:
3431:
3427:
3423:
3416:
3401:
3397:
3393:
3387:
3385:
3376:
3372:
3368:
3364:
3360:
3356:
3349:
3342:
3338:
3334:
3331:
3326:
3318:
3310:
3308:
3306:
3290:
3286:
3282:
3278:
3274:
3270:
3266:
3262:
3258:
3254:
3250:
3246:
3239:
3224:
3220:
3216:
3212:
3208:
3204:
3200:
3196:
3192:
3188:
3184:
3180:
3173:
3165:
3158:
3144:
3140:
3136:
3132:
3128:
3124:
3120:
3116:
3109:
3107:
3105:
3103:
3087:
3083:
3077:
3073:
3072:
3064:
3056:
3051:
3047:
3043:
3036:
3034:
3032:
3030:
3028:
3018:
3010:
3006:
3002:
2998:
2997:World Affairs
2994:
2987:
2972:
2968:
2964:
2960:
2956:
2952:
2948:
2944:
2940:
2936:
2932:
2928:
2921:
2906:
2902:
2898:
2894:
2890:
2886:
2882:
2878:
2874:
2870:
2866:
2862:
2855:
2848:
2842:
2837:
2832:
2828:
2821:
2803:
2799:
2792:
2785:
2776:
2771:
2767:
2761:
2757:
2753:
2749:
2742:
2727:
2723:
2719:
2715:
2709:
2705:
2701:
2697:
2696:
2688:
2673:
2669:
2663:
2659:
2658:
2650:
2635:
2631:
2627:
2623:
2619:
2612:
2597:
2593:
2587:
2583:
2582:
2574:
2566:
2562:
2558:
2554:
2549:
2544:
2540:
2536:
2532:
2525:
2510:
2506:
2502:
2498:
2494:
2490:
2486:
2482:
2478:
2474:
2467:
2465:
2449:
2445:
2441:
2437:
2433:
2429:
2425:
2421:
2417:
2413:
2409:
2405:
2398:
2396:
2394:
2392:
2390:
2388:
2372:
2368:
2364:
2360:
2356:
2351:
2350:1721.1/118651
2346:
2342:
2338:
2334:
2330:
2326:
2319:
2317:
2301:
2297:
2293:
2289:
2285:
2278:
2263:
2259:
2255:
2251:
2245:
2241:
2237:
2233:
2232:
2224:
2209:
2205:
2201:
2197:
2191:
2187:
2186:
2178:
2163:
2159:
2155:
2151:
2145:
2141:
2140:
2132:
2117:
2113:
2109:
2105:
2099:
2095:
2091:
2087:
2086:
2078:
2076:
2074:
2058:
2054:
2048:
2044:
2043:
2035:
2020:
2016:
2010:
2006:
2002:
1998:
1997:
1989:
1987:
1985:
1983:
1967:
1963:
1957:
1953:
1952:
1944:
1942:
1940:
1924:
1920:
1914:
1910:
1906:
1902:
1901:
1893:
1885:
1883:9780850451634
1879:
1875:
1868:
1864:
1848:
1844:
1834:
1831:
1829:
1826:
1824:
1821:
1819:
1816:
1814:
1811:
1809:
1806:
1804:
1801:
1799:
1796:
1794:
1791:
1789:
1788:Nuclear peace
1786:
1784:
1781:
1779:
1776:
1774:
1771:
1769:
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1759:
1756:
1754:
1751:
1749:
1746:
1744:
1741:
1739:
1736:
1735:
1728:
1725:
1721:
1720:deontological
1717:
1713:
1709:
1699:
1697:
1692:
1689:
1685:
1681:
1677:
1673:
1663:
1660:
1651:
1648:
1647:
1641:
1640:George Shultz
1637:
1633:
1632:William Perry
1629:
1625:
1621:
1611:
1609:
1598:
1596:
1592:
1588:
1581:
1566:
1557:
1553:
1551:
1550:Tanisha Fazal
1542:
1539:
1536:
1533:
1530:
1529:
1528:
1525:
1523:
1519:
1510:
1507:
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1505:
1501:
1497:
1487:
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1481:
1475:
1473:
1469:
1465:
1461:
1457:
1456:drone attacks
1453:
1448:
1446:
1442:
1429:
1427:
1423:
1419:
1415:
1409:
1406:
1401:
1399:
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1389:
1385:
1381:
1377:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1364:Iran–Iraq War
1361:
1357:
1353:
1349:
1348:revolutionary
1345:
1344:Ronald Reagan
1335:
1333:
1329:
1324:
1320:
1316:
1306:
1304:
1303:Long Telegram
1300:
1296:
1292:
1288:
1284:
1280:
1270:
1268:
1258:
1254:
1250:
1248:
1244:
1242:
1238:
1234:
1230:
1226:
1222:
1218:
1214:
1210:
1206:
1205:United States
1202:
1197:
1190:
1186:
1183:
1181:
1180:second strike
1177:
1176:
1175:
1173:
1172:Kenneth Waltz
1170:According to
1168:
1165:
1161:
1148:
1143:
1141:
1136:
1134:
1129:
1128:
1126:
1125:
1120:
1117:
1115:
1112:
1110:
1107:
1105:
1101:
1098:
1097:
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1091:
1089:
1086:
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1077:
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1071:
1068:
1067:
1064:
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1059:
1056:
1054:
1051:
1049:
1046:
1044:
1043:United States
1040:
1038:
1034:
1033:
1032:
1031:
1028:
1025:
1024:
1019:
1016:
1014:
1011:
1009:
1006:
1004:
1001:
999:
998:Proliferation
996:
994:
991:
989:
986:
984:
981:
979:
976:
974:
971:
970:
967:
964:
962:
959:
957:
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947:
945:
942:
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937:
935:
932:
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927:
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922:
920:
917:
916:
915:
914:
910:
909:
905:
901:
900:
897:
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893:
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885:
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877:
867:
863:
854:
850:
841:
837:
832:
822:
813:
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801:
798:
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792:
787:
784:
779:
772:
769:
766:
763:
760:
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751:
748:
745:
744:
743:
741:
731:
728:
723:
721:
717:
712:
701:
698:
688:
686:
685:regime change
681:
678:
668:
666:
662:
658:
654:
650:
646:
645:United States
642:
641:nuclear triad
638:
637:second-strike
633:
631:
627:
622:
619:
614:
610:
607:
603:
597:
593:
591:
588:
583:
581:
571:
569:
565:
561:
557:
553:
549:
546:
543:
541:
537:
533:
531:
527:
523:
519:
508:
504:
502:
496:
492:
489:
484:
479:
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470:
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462:
458:
453:
451:
447:
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439:
435:
431:
426:
415:
410:
408:
403:
401:
396:
395:
393:
392:
387:
384:
382:
379:
377:
374:
372:
371:Peacebuilding
369:
367:
364:
362:
361:Peace process
359:
357:
354:
352:
349:
347:
344:
340:
337:
335:
332:
331:
330:
327:
325:
322:
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280:
279:
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269:
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205:
204:
203:
202:
199:
196:
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188:
185:
184:
183:
180:
178:
175:
173:
172:De-escalation
170:
168:
165:
163:
160:
159:
158:
157:
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150:
145:
142:
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140:
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129:
126:
124:
121:
119:
116:
114:
111:
107:
104:
103:
102:
99:
95:
94:Collaborative
92:
90:
87:
85:
82:
81:
80:
77:
75:
72:
70:
67:
65:
62:
61:
60:
59:
56:
53:
52:
49:
46:
45:
39:
35:
34:
28:
22:
7639:Peyton Young
7634:Paul Milgrom
7549:Hervé Moulin
7489:Amos Tversky
7431:Folk theorem
7142:-player game
7139:
7064:Grim trigger
7048:
6596:Multilateral
6526:Isolationism
6479:Expansionism
6473:
6234:
6216:
6198:
6191:
6173:
6158:
6129:
6122:
6097:
6093:
6080:
6055:
6051:
6038:
6013:
6009:
5996:
5974:(75): 3–33.
5971:
5967:
5961:
5951:
5943:
5927:
5910:
5898:. Retrieved
5889:
5879:
5867:. Retrieved
5863:the original
5856:
5843:
5832:. Retrieved
5823:
5813:
5802:. Retrieved
5793:
5784:
5772:. Retrieved
5763:
5754:
5742:. Retrieved
5733:
5724:
5690:
5686:
5680:
5669:. Retrieved
5660:
5651:
5640:. Retrieved
5631:
5622:
5611:. Retrieved
5570:
5566:
5556:
5546:, retrieved
5511:
5501:
5490:. Retrieved
5470:
5463:
5446:
5442:
5432:
5413:
5409:
5399:
5388:. Retrieved
5368:
5361:
5350:. Retrieved
5314:
5307:
5296:. Retrieved
5276:
5266:
5233:
5229:
5219:
5187:(2): 51–90.
5184:
5180:
5170:
5159:. Retrieved
5131:
5124:
5091:
5087:
5077:
5066:. Retrieved
5044:(3): 46–70.
5041:
5037:
5027:
5016:. Retrieved
4983:
4979:
4955:. Retrieved
4922:
4918:
4908:
4897:. Retrieved
4856:
4852:
4842:
4831:. Retrieved
4798:
4794:
4784:
4757:
4711:
4707:
4661:
4657:
4633:. Retrieved
4600:
4596:
4550:
4546:
4522:. Retrieved
4492:(3): 44–71.
4489:
4485:
4460:, retrieved
4433:
4410:
4405:
4397:
4392:
4367:. Retrieved
4358:
4348:
4337:. Retrieved
4329:The Atlantic
4328:
4304:. Retrieved
4295:
4285:
4274:. Retrieved
4265:
4256:
4248:the original
4238:
4228:, retrieved
4201:
4191:
4180:. Retrieved
4160:
4153:
4142:. Retrieved
4101:
4097:
4087:
4062:
4058:
4048:
4031:
4027:
4017:
4009:
3979:
3975:
3965:
3954:. Retrieved
3918:
3911:
3900:. Retrieved
3859:
3855:
3845:
3834:. Retrieved
3793:
3789:
3779:
3768:. Retrieved
3748:
3741:
3732:
3726:
3714:. Retrieved
3707:the original
3693:
3682:. Retrieved
3662:
3655:
3644:. Retrieved
3611:
3607:
3597:
3586:. Retrieved
3576:
3569:
3558:. Retrieved
3538:
3531:
3520:. Retrieved
3487:
3483:
3473:
3462:. Retrieved
3432:(1): 58–88.
3429:
3425:
3415:
3404:. Retrieved
3395:
3358:
3354:
3348:
3340:
3325:
3316:
3293:. Retrieved
3252:
3248:
3238:
3227:. Retrieved
3186:
3182:
3172:
3163:
3157:
3147:, retrieved
3125:(3): 47–86,
3122:
3118:
3090:. Retrieved
3070:
3063:
3045:
3041:
3017:
3003:(2): 13–26.
3000:
2996:
2986:
2975:. Retrieved
2934:
2930:
2920:
2909:. Retrieved
2871:(3): 32–56.
2868:
2864:
2854:
2826:
2820:
2809:. Retrieved
2797:
2784:
2747:
2741:
2730:. Retrieved
2694:
2687:
2676:. Retrieved
2656:
2649:
2638:. Retrieved
2621:
2611:
2600:. Retrieved
2580:
2573:
2538:
2534:
2524:
2513:. Retrieved
2480:
2476:
2452:. Retrieved
2411:
2407:
2375:. Retrieved
2332:
2328:
2304:. Retrieved
2287:
2277:
2266:. Retrieved
2230:
2223:
2212:. Retrieved
2184:
2177:
2166:. Retrieved
2138:
2131:
2120:. Retrieved
2084:
2061:. Retrieved
2041:
2034:
2023:. Retrieved
1995:
1970:. Retrieved
1950:
1927:. Retrieved
1899:
1892:
1873:
1867:
1847:
1773:N-deterrence
1706:In the post
1705:
1693:
1669:
1657:
1644:
1617:
1607:
1604:
1583:
1563:
1554:
1546:
1526:
1514:
1503:
1496:Cyberwarfare
1476:
1449:
1438:
1410:
1402:
1395:
1341:
1332:New Cold War
1312:
1276:
1264:
1255:
1251:
1245:
1209:Soviet Union
1193:
1169:
1156:
1104:South Africa
1099:
1083:(undeclared)
1069:
1035:
864:
860:
851:
847:
838:
834:
819:
810:
794:
788:
780:
776:
770:
764:
758:
752:
746:
737:
726:
724:
707:
696:
694:
682:
676:
674:
634:
623:
617:
615:
611:
598:
594:
590:
586:
584:
577:
550:
547:
544:
538:
534:
528:that since "
518:Curtis LeMay
515:
506:
498:
494:
487:
482:
480:
473:
454:
445:
424:
423:
366:Peace treaty
231:
217:Brinkmanship
74:Conciliation
32:
7756:Coopetition
7559:Jean Tirole
7554:John Conway
7534:Eric Maskin
7330:Blotto game
7315:Pirate game
7124:Global game
7094:Tit for tat
7029:Bid shading
7019:Appeasement
6869:Equilibrium
6849:Solved game
6784:Determinacy
6767:Definitions
6760:game theory
6692:Geopolitics
6571:Sovereignty
6551:Imperialism
6464:Colonialism
6449:Appeasement
6364:Warsaw Pact
5869:15 November
5774:January 17,
5744:January 17,
5315:Secret Wars
4413:, March 24.
4400:, April 07.
3361:(3): 3–30.
2937:(1): 3–39.
2483:(1): 5–29.
2112:j.ctt5vm52s
1724:prima facie
1624:Global Zero
1500:Cyberweapon
1445:John Bolton
1372:Afghanistan
1362:during the
1315:US drawdown
1279:containment
1273:Containment
1241:third world
1237:Afghanistan
1229:Middle East
1093:North Korea
1003:Disarmament
747:Rationality
740:game theory
691:Reciprocity
606:great power
600:there is a
556:appeasement
461:compellence
381:Rule of man
376:Peacemaking
329:Game theory
207:Appeasement
123:Negotiation
89:Rule of law
64:Arbitration
55:Nonviolence
7806:Categories
7400:Trust game
7385:Kuhn poker
7054:Escalation
7049:Deterrence
7039:Cheap talk
7011:Strategies
6829:Preference
6758:Topics of
6646:Liberalism
6591:Friendship
6576:Suzerainty
6174:Deterrence
5834:2013-11-15
5804:2010-06-10
5671:2023-03-04
5642:2023-03-04
5613:2022-02-14
5548:2021-12-17
5492:2021-11-20
5390:2021-11-20
5352:2021-12-07
5298:2021-12-07
5161:2021-11-07
5068:2021-11-06
5018:2021-11-06
4957:2021-11-06
4899:2021-11-06
4833:2021-11-15
4635:2021-11-06
4524:2021-11-06
4462:2021-11-06
4369:2023-08-11
4339:2023-09-12
4306:2023-09-15
4276:2023-08-11
4230:2023-08-31
4182:2023-08-31
4144:2023-08-31
3956:2022-05-07
3902:2022-05-07
3836:2022-05-07
3770:2022-05-07
3684:2022-01-28
3646:2022-01-28
3588:2022-01-28
3560:2022-02-15
3522:2022-02-21
3490:: 92–117.
3464:2021-06-03
3406:2021-06-03
3295:2021-09-11
3229:2021-09-11
3149:2021-07-14
3092:2021-11-20
2977:2021-09-05
2911:2021-09-05
2811:2021-09-05
2732:2021-09-06
2678:2021-08-28
2640:2023-11-30
2602:2021-09-18
2515:2021-09-06
2454:2021-09-11
2377:2021-09-06
2306:2023-12-01
2268:2021-09-06
2214:2021-09-05
2168:2021-08-30
2122:2021-08-30
2063:2021-08-28
2025:2021-08-30
1972:2021-08-30
1929:2021-08-30
1859:References
1768:Long Peace
1659:Paul Nitze
1622:, such as
1595:aggression
1578:See also:
1376:Sandinista
1368:mujahideen
1338:Reagan era
1295:Korean War
1291:proxy wars
1285:under its
1213:proxy wars
1114:Kazakhstan
1039:recognized
1013:Opposition
911:Background
675:Jentleson
446:Deterrence
232:Deterrence
7584:John Nash
7290:Stag hunt
7034:Collusion
6682:Diplomacy
6586:Bilateral
6484:Grey-zone
6437:Coalition
6396:1919–1939
6391:1814–1919
6386:1648–1814
6205:T.V. Paul
5695:CiteSeerX
5603:153925234
5587:0162-2889
5538:244858515
5449:: 25–43.
5342:240182441
5258:202312573
5250:0140-2390
5211:239770382
5203:0162-2889
5108:0963-6412
5050:1936-1815
5008:238358851
5000:2057-5637
4947:151870657
4939:0002-9300
4889:151870657
4873:0002-9300
4815:0022-0027
4776:2057-2085
4728:0963-6412
4686:154019562
4678:0963-6412
4625:238842794
4617:0140-2390
4567:0963-6412
4506:0162-2889
4411:Quillette
4118:0022-0027
4079:248609130
4006:248723655
3998:0162-2889
3946:157599829
3892:154642193
3876:0020-8183
3826:155075459
3810:0020-8183
3716:12 August
3628:0032-3195
3512:247040733
3504:0963-6412
3454:148987375
3446:0963-6412
3285:154490426
3269:0043-8871
3219:153591618
3203:0043-8871
3048:: 25–48,
2967:154732192
2951:0162-2889
2901:154133787
2885:0162-2889
2722:243305936
2630:0028-792X
2565:246241390
2557:0963-6412
2497:0305-0629
2444:153596965
2428:0043-8871
2359:0162-2889
2296:0015-7120
2258:243305936
1833:Wargaming
1569:Criticism
1452:Elon Musk
1380:Nicaragua
1313:With the
1233:Nicaragua
1008:Terrorism
993:Espionage
988:Blackmail
983:Arms race
857:Tripwires
503:terms as:
488:immediate
314:Democracy
227:Diplomacy
222:Ceasefire
212:Armistice
136:Workplace
101:Mediation
31:USS
7725:Lazy SMP
7419:Theorems
7370:Deadlock
7225:Checkers
7106:of games
6873:concepts
6641:Feminism
6494:Idealism
6489:Hegemony
6442:Military
6427:Alliance
6420:Concepts
6406:Cold War
6288:Glossary
6190:. 1985.
5932:Archived
5919:Archived
5894:Archived
5828:Archived
5824:The Hill
5798:Archived
5768:Archived
5738:Archived
5717:13900591
5665:Archived
5663:. 2023.
5636:Archived
5607:Archived
5542:archived
5486:Archived
5384:Archived
5346:Archived
5292:Archived
5274:(1995).
5155:Archived
5116:46356854
5062:Archived
5058:26267261
5012:Archived
4951:Archived
4893:Archived
4827:Archived
4823:44364372
4629:Archived
4575:46356854
4518:Archived
4514:29361290
4456:archived
4378:cite web
4363:Archived
4333:Archived
4300:Archived
4270:Archived
4224:archived
4176:Archived
4138:Archived
4134:55200649
4126:20684583
3950:Archived
3896:Archived
3884:43282156
3830:Archived
3818:43282155
3764:Archived
3678:Archived
3640:Archived
3582:Archived
3554:Archived
3516:Archived
3458:Archived
3400:Archived
3333:Archived
3289:Archived
3223:Archived
3143:archived
3139:57572461
3086:Archived
3009:27870285
2971:Archived
2905:Archived
2802:Archived
2726:Archived
2672:Archived
2634:Archived
2596:Archived
2509:Archived
2505:35580738
2448:Archived
2371:Archived
2367:57570578
2300:Archived
2262:Archived
2208:Archived
2162:Archived
2116:Archived
2057:Archived
2019:Archived
1966:Archived
1923:Archived
1731:See also
1708:cold war
1628:Sam Nunn
1422:chemical
1267:Cold War
1207:and the
1201:Cold War
1109:Belarus
1088:Pakistan
973:Arsenals
944:Delivery
554:, where
476:credible
465:coercion
457:dissuade
430:Cold War
153:Violence
118:Pacifism
7477:figures
7260:Chicken
7114:Auction
7104:Classes
6661:Realism
6651:Marxism
6514:Liberal
6432:Entente
6378:History
6306:Present
6169:, 2015.
6114:2216042
6072:1961738
6030:2185583
5988:1148862
5900:July 2,
5796:. NPR.
5794:NPR.org
5632:Lawfare
5595:2539178
4736:4830861
3636:2149629
3375:2538549
3277:2010511
3211:2010405
2959:2538686
2893:2538699
2775:7711749
2436:2010184
1712:ethical
1518:Stuxnet
1384:Contras
1323:détente
1309:DĂ©tente
1221:Vietnam
1119:Ukraine
961:Workers
956:Effects
939:Testing
929:Warfare
924:History
574:Concept
512:History
469:defense
245:Nuclear
187:studies
69:Auction
33:Growler
6623:Theory
6581:Treaty
6469:Crisis
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