876:" (his term for an intuition-based thought experiment), "alternative neurosurgery". There are two different ways the neurosurgeon might have accomplished the inversion. First, they might have tinkered with something "early on", so that signals from the eye when you look at grass contain the information "red" rather than "green". This would result in genuine qualia inversion. But they might instead have tinkered with your memory. Here your qualia would remain the same, but your memory would be altered so that your current green experience would contradict your earlier memories of grass. You would still feel that the color of grass had changed, but here the qualia have not changed, but your memories have. Would you be able to tell which of these scenarios is correct? No: your perceptual experience tells you that something has changed but not whether your qualia have changed. Dennett concludes, since (by hypothesis) the two surgical procedures can yield exactly the same introspective effects while only one inverts the qualia, nothing in the subject's experience can favor one hypothesis over the other. So unless he seeks outside help, the state of his own qualia must be as unknowable to him as the state of anyone else's. It is questionable, in short, that we have direct, infallible access to our conscious experience.
903:
evidence. You might still be directly aware of your qualia from the first-person, subjective point of view even if you do not know whether they are the same as the qualia you had yesterday—just as you might really be aware of the article in front of you even if you do not know whether it is the same as the article you saw yesterday. Questions about memory do not necessarily bear on the nature of your awareness of objects present here and now (even if they bear on what you can justifiably claim to know about such objects), whatever those objects happen to be. Dennett's assertion that scientific objectivity requires appealing exclusively to third-person evidence appears mistaken. What scientific objectivity requires is not denial of the first-person subjective point of view but rather a means of communicating inter-subjectively about what one can grasp only from that point of view. Given the relational structure first-person phenomena like qualia appear to exhibit—a structure that
700:. Neuroscientists use the word "representation" to identify the neural circuits' encoding of inputs from the peripheral nervous system in, for example, the visual cortex. But they use the word without according it any commitment to intentional content. In fact, there is an explicit commitment to describing neural representations in terms of structures of neural axonal discharges that are physically isomorphic to the inputs that cause them. Suppose that this way of understanding representation in the brain is preserved in the long-term course of research providing an understanding of how the brain processes and stores information. Then there will be considerable evidence that the brain is a neural network whose physical structure is identical to the aspects of its environment it tracks and whose representations of these features consist in this physical isomorphism.
774:, we could test whether A or B successfully complete a cross-country road trip. If A succeeds while B fails, the pragmatist can say that A holds true information about the world, because A's information allows it to make more accurate predictions (relative to B) about the world and to move around its environment more successfully. Similarly, if brain A has information that enables the biological organism to make more accurate predictions about the world and helps the organism successfully move around in the environment, then A has true information about the world. Although not advocates of eliminativism, John Shook and Tibor Solymosi argue that pragmatism is a promising program for understanding advancements in neuroscience and integrating them into a philosophical picture of the world.
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exactly the same both then and now, only now you like that taste whereas before you disliked it? Or is it that the way beer tastes gradually shifts—so that the taste you did not like at the beginning is not the same taste you now like? In fact most people simply cannot tell which is the correct analysis. But that is to give up again on the idea that we have special and infallible access to our qualia. Further, when forced to choose, many people feel that the second analysis is more plausible. But then if one's reactions to an experience are in any way constitutive of it, the experience is not so "intrinsic" after all—and another qualia property falls.
242:, who rejected the idea of the "self" on the grounds that it was not based on any impression. Most arguments for the view are based on the assumption that people's commonsense view of the mind is actually an implicit theory. It is to be compared and contrasted with other scientific theories in its explanatory success, accuracy, and ability to predict the future. Eliminativists argue that commonsense "folk" psychology has failed and will eventually need to be replaced by explanations derived from neuroscience. These philosophers therefore tend to emphasize the importance of neuroscientific research as well as developments in
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a set of neural circuits that has no trouble coherently carrying this information. There is a possible translation manual that will guide us back from the vocalization or inscription eliminativists express to these circuits. These neural structures will differ from the neural circuits of those who explicitly reject eliminativism in ways that our translation manual will presumably shed some light on, giving us a neurological handle on disagreement and on the structural differences in neural circuitry, if any, between asserting p and asserting not-p when p expresses the eliminativist thesis.
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them for a while, something surprising occurs. They adapt and become able to walk around as easily as before. When you ask them whether they adapted by re-inverting their visual field or simply got used to walking around in an upside-down world, they cannot say. So as in our beer-drinking case, either we simply do not have the special, infallible access to our qualia that would allow us to distinguish the two cases or the way the world looks to us is actually a function of how we respond to the world—in which case qualia are not "intrinsic" properties of experience.
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inherently disjunctive or indeterminate content. This argument leads eliminativists to conclude that we should reject the notion that neural states have specific, determinate informational content corresponding to the discrete, non-disjunctive propositions of folk psychology. This evolutionary argument adds to the eliminativist case that our common-sense understanding of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes is flawed and should be replaced by a neuroscientific account that acknowledges the indeterminate nature of neural representations.
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case of folk psychology. There seems no logical basis, to the eliminativist, to make an exception just because folk psychology has lasted longer and is more intuitive or instinctively plausible than other folk theories. Indeed, the eliminativists warn, considerations of intuitive plausibility may be precisely the result of the deeply entrenched nature in society of folk psychology itself. It may be that people's beliefs and other such states are as theory-laden as external perceptions and hence that intuitions will tend to be biased in their favor.
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just a set of contingent facts that could have been otherwise. Once we have begun discovering things about the universe that work for us, science sets out to explain why they do. It is clear that one explanation for why things work for us that we must rule out as unilluminating, indeed question-begging, is that they work for us because they work for us. If something works for us, enables us to meet our needs and wants, there must be an explanation reflecting facts about us and the world that produce the needs and the means to satisfy them.
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communicability ensures that claims about qualia are epistemologically objective; that is, they can in principle be grasped and evaluated by all competent observers even though they are claims about phenomena that are arguably not metaphysically objective, i.e., about entities that exist only as grasped by a subject of experience. It is only the former sort of objectivity that science requires. It does not require the latter, and cannot plausibly require it if the first-person realm of qualia is what we know better than anything else.
817:. Since qualia are generally regarded as characteristics of mental states, their existence does not seem compatible with eliminativism. Eliminativists such as Dennett and Rey respond by rejecting qualia. Opponents of eliminativism see this response as problematic, since many claim that existence of qualia is perfectly obvious. Many philosophers consider the "elimination" of qualia implausible, if not incomprehensible. They assert that, for instance, the existence of pain is simply beyond denial.
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disagrees that this would support illusionism, saying that the datum illusionism fails to account for is not reports of consciousness but rather first-person consciousness itself. He separates consciousness from beliefs and reports about consciousness, but holds that a fully satisfactory theory of consciousness should explain how the two are "inextricably intertwined" so that their alignment does not require an inexplicable coincidence. Illusionism has also been criticized by the philosopher
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their proximity, these genes are often inherited together - a phenomenon known as genetic linkage. Natural selection cannot distinguish between these linked traits; it can only act on their combined effect on the organism's fitness. Only random processes like genetic crossover - where chromosomes exchange genetic material during reproduction - can break these linkages. Until such a break occurs, natural selection remains "blind" to the individual effects of the linked genes.
872:: consider two people who have different qualia but the same external physical behavior. But now the qualia supporter can present an "intrapersonal" variation. Suppose a neurosurgeon works on your brain and you discover that grass now looks red. Would this not be a case where we could confirm the reality of qualia—by noticing how the qualia have changed while every other aspect of our conscious experience remains the same? Not quite, Dennett replies via the next "
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by coincidence, still less miracle or accident. That means there must be some facts, events, processes that operate in reality and brought about our pragmatic success. The demand that success be explained is a consequence of science's epistemology. If the truth of such explanations consists in the fact that they work for us (as pragmatism requires), then the explanation of why our scientific methods work is that they work. That is not a satisfying explanation.
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one has mental states. Eliminativists object to such a rebuttal of their position by claiming that intuitions often are mistaken. Analogies from the history of science are frequently invoked to buttress this observation: it may appear obvious that the sun travels around the earth, for example, but this was nevertheless proved wrong. Similarly, it may appear obvious that apart from neural events there are also mental conditions, but that could be false.
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semantic properties that could ground intentionality. This physical limitation presents a formidable obstacle to materialist theories of mind that rely on neural representations. It suggests that intentionality, as commonly understood, may be incompatible with a purely physicalist worldview. This suggests that our folk psychological concepts of intentional states will be eliminated in light of scientific understanding.
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be true "of". These locutions are heavy with just the intentionality that eliminativism denies. Here is a problem of underdetermination or holism that eliminativism shares with intentionality-dependent theories of mind. Here, we can only invoke pragmatic criteria for discriminating successful structural representations—the substitution of true ones for unsuccessful ones—the ones we used to call false.
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interpretation, which are not applicable to the internal workings of an individual's brain. One might be tempted to posit a separate neural process that assigns meaning to the "Paris neurons," but this fails. It merely shifts the problem without resolving it, as we would then need to explain how this secondary process possesses the ability to assign meaning, thus initiating an infinite regress.
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content. Natural selection, as Darwin described it, is primarily a process of "selection against" rather than "selection for" traits. It passively filters out traits below a certain fitness threshold, rather than actively choosing beneficial ones. This lack of foresight or purpose in evolution becomes problematic when considering how neural states could represent unique propositions.
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among the first such structural resemblances to be discovered. Macaques and humans have the same peripheral nervous system sensitivities and can make the same tactile discriminations. Subsequent research into neural processing has increasingly vindicated a structural resemblance or physical isomorphism approach to how information enters the brain and is stored and deployed.
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solution. Thus we can think of the brain and its relation to the external world as a very large crossword puzzle that must satisfy exceedingly many constraints to which there is only one possible solution. Therefore, in reality we may end up with only one physical isomorphism between the brain and the external world.
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These alternative ways of understanding eliminative materialism produced considerable confusion about what, exactly, eliminative materialism entailed. Moreover, since it was difficult to see how the second version was significantly different from various forms of reductive materialism (hence, Quine's
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The explanation of why scientific methods work for us must be a causal explanation. It must show what facts about reality make the methods we employ to acquire knowledge suitable for doing so. The explanation must show that our methods work — for example, have reliable technological application — not
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This isomorphism between brain and world is not a matter of some relationship between reality and a map of reality stored in the brain. Maps require interpretation if they are to be about what they map, and eliminativism and neuroscience share a commitment to explaining the appearance of aboutness by
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isolated the structural resemblance between input vibrations the finger feels, measured in cycles per second, and representations of them in neural circuits, measured in action-potential spikes per second. This resemblance between two easily measured variables makes it unsurprising that they would be
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But even if one accepts the susceptibility to error of people's intuitions, the objection can be reformulated: if the existence of mental conditions seems perfectly obvious and is central to our conception of the world, then enormously strong arguments are needed to deny their existence. Furthermore,
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The disjunction problem arises from the fact that natural selection cannot discriminate between coextensive properties. For example, consider two genes located close together on a chromosome. One gene might code for a beneficial trait, while the other codes for a neutral or even harmful trait. Due to
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It has also been argued against folk psychology that the intentionality of mental states like belief implies that they have semantic qualities. Specifically, their meaning is determined by the things they are about in the external world. This makes it difficult to explain how they can play the causal
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Since eliminative materialism arguably claims that future research will fail to find a neuronal basis for various mental phenomena, it may need to wait for science to progress further. One might question the position on these grounds, but philosophers like
Churchland argue that eliminativism is often
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Dennett's third thought experiment involves inverted goggles. Scientists have devised special eyeglasses that invert up and down for the wearer. When you put them on, everything looks upside down. When subjects first put them on, they can barely walk around without stumbling. But after subjects wear
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The physical isomorphism approach faces indeterminacy problems. Any given structure in the brain will be causally related to, and isomorphic in various respects to, many different structures in external reality. But we cannot discriminate the one it is intended to represent or that it is supposed to
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This machinery can be applied to make "sense" of eliminativism in terms of the sentences eliminativists say or write. When we say that eliminativism is true, that the brain does not store information in the form of unique sentences, statements, expressing propositions or anything like them, there is
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The thesis of eliminativism seems so obviously wrong to many critics, who find it undeniable that people know immediately and indubitably that they have minds, that argumentation seems unnecessary. This sort of intuition-pumping is illustrated by asking what happens when one asks oneself honestly if
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Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of them? Does it repudiate the mental state of pain or anger in favor of its physical concomitant, or does it identify the mental state with a state of the physical organism (and so a state of the physical organism with the mental
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function; others, such as
Georges Rey, claim that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience progresses. Consciousness and folk psychology are separate issues, and it is possible to take an eliminative stance on one but not the other. The roots of eliminativism go back to the writings
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Some eliminativists reject intentionality while accepting the existence of qualia. Other eliminativists reject qualia while accepting intentionality. Many philosophers argue that intentionality cannot exist without consciousness and vice versa, and so any philosopher who accepts one while rejecting
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Another argument for eliminative materialism stems from evolutionary theory. This argument suggests that natural selection, the process shaping our neural architecture, cannot solve the "disjunction problem," which challenges the idea that neural states can store specific, determinate propositional
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Traditional analogies fail to explain this phenomenon. Unlike a photograph, neurons do not resemble Paris in any physical sense. Nor can we appeal to conventional symbolism, as we might with a stop sign representing the action of stopping. Such symbols derive their meaning from social agreement and
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The problem of intentionality poses a significant challenge to materialist accounts of cognition. If thoughts are neural processes, we must explain how specific neural networks can be "about" external objects or concepts. When we think about Paris, for instance, there is no clear mechanism by which
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Another line of argument is the meta-induction based on what eliminativists view as the disastrous historical record of folk theories in general. Ancient pre-scientific "theories" of folk biology, folk physics, and folk cosmology have all proven radically wrong. Eliminativists argue the same in the
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Dennett's second thought experiment involves beer. Many people think of beer as an acquired taste: one's first sip is often unpleasant, but one gradually comes to enjoy it. But wait, Dennett asks—what is the "it" here? Compare the flavor of that first taste with the flavor now. Does the beer taste
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Dennett notes that it is possible that such indeterminacy problems remain only hypothetical, not occurring in reality. He constructs a 4x4 "Quinian crossword puzzle" with words that must satisfy both the across and down definitions. Since there are multiple constraints on this puzzle, there is one
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On the other hand, the same philosophers claimed that commonsense mental states simply do not exist. But critics pointed out that eliminativists could not have it both ways: either mental states exist and will ultimately be explained in terms of lower-level neurophysiological processes, or they do
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The reason naturalism cannot be pragmatic in its epistemology starts with its metaphysics. Science tells us that we are components of the natural realm, indeed latecomers in the 13.8-billion-year-old universe. The universe was not organized around our needs and abilities, and what works for us is
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not. Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from people's thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from people's thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.
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as having phenomenal properties so the hard problem "may not be a genuine problem for non-philosophers (despite its overwhelming obviousness to philosophers), and questions about consciousness may well 'shatter' into more specific questions about particular capacities." In 2022, Anthis published
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devoted great effort to elucidating—such a means seems available: we can communicate what we know about qualia in terms of their structural relations to one another. Dennett fails to see that qualia can be essentially subjective and still relational or non-intrinsic, and thus communicable. This
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Some philosophers argue that folk psychology is quite successful. Simulation theorists doubt that people's understanding of the mental can be explained in terms of a theory at all. Rather they argue that people's understanding of others is based on internal simulations of how they would act and
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Eliminativists argue that if natural selection - the process responsible for shaping our neural architecture - cannot solve the disjunction problem, then our brains cannot store unique, non-disjunctive propositions as required by folk psychology. Instead, they suggest that neural states contain
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The only way to break this regress would be to postulate matter with intrinsic meaning, independent of external interpretation. However, our current understanding of physics precludes the existence of such matter. The fundamental particles and forces described by physics do not possess inherent
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Illusionists generally hold that once it is explained why people believe and say they are conscious, the hard problem of consciousness will dissolve. Chalmers agrees that a mechanism for these beliefs and reports can and should be identified using the standard methods of physical science, but
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like "x is true" as expressing a real property. They are instead construed as logical devices, so that asserting that a sentence is true is just a quoted way of asserting the sentence itself. To say "'God exists' is true" is just to say "God exists". This way, Rey and Devitt argue, insofar as
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Such eliminativists have developed different arguments to show that folk psychology is a seriously mistaken theory and should be abolished. They argue that folk psychology excludes from its purview or has traditionally been mistaken about many important mental phenomena that can and are being
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Edward Feser objects to
Dennett's position as follows. That you need to appeal to third-person neurological evidence to determine whether your memory of your qualia has been tampered with does not seem to show that your qualia themselves—past or present—can be known only by appealing to that
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by ascribing mental conditions to them in such statements as "the sea is angry". Gradually, these everyday folk psychological explanations were replaced by more efficient scientific descriptions. Today, eliminativists argue, there is no reason not to accept an effective scientific account of
568:. Many connectionist models of the brain have been developed in which the processes of language learning and other forms of representation are highly distributed and parallel. This tends to indicate that such discrete and semantically endowed entities as beliefs and desires are unnecessary.
442:, which asserts that "formal argumentation from precise semantics" dissolves the hard problem because of the contradiction between precision implied in philosophical theory and the vagueness in its definition, which implies there is no fact of the matter for phenomenological consciousness.
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will one day reveal that mental states talked about in everyday discourse, using words such as "intend", "believe", "desire", and "love", do not refer to anything real. Because of the inadequacy of natural languages, people mistakenly think that they have such beliefs and desires. Some
549:, and other continuous and distributed effects. Hence, the syntactic structures assumed by folk psychology have no place in such a structure as the brain. To this there have been two responses. On the one hand, some philosophers deny that mental states are linguistic and see this as a
947:, proponents argue that once we can explain consciousness as an illusion without the need for a realist view of consciousness, we can construct a debunking argument against realist views of consciousness. This line of argument draws from other debunking arguments like the
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theory of life) that have all been successfully eliminated in attempting to establish their thesis about the nature of the mental. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions or reductions of these theories, but rejected them altogether as obsolete.
399:. In addition, because eliminativism is essentially predictive in nature, different theorists can and often do predict which aspects of folk psychology will be eliminated from folk psychological vocabulary. None of these philosophers are eliminativists
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intuitions. He argues that a precise analysis shows that the term is in the long run empty and full of contradictions. Eliminativism's claim about qualia is that there is no unbiased evidence for such experiences when regarded as something more than
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purely physical relationships between informational states in the brain and what they "represent". The brain-to-world relationship must be a matter of physical isomorphism—sameness of form, outline, structure—that does not require interpretation.
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believes in folk psychology's success as a theory, because it makes for an effective way of communication in everyday life that can be implemented with few words. Such effectiveness could not be achieved with complex neuroscientific terminology.
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is the relatively new (1960s–70s) idea that certain classes of mental entities that common sense takes for granted, such as beliefs, desires, and the subjective sensation of pain, do not exist. The most common versions are eliminativism about
257:, among others, argues that folk psychology is, in fact, a successful (even indispensable) theory. Another view is that eliminativism assumes the existence of the beliefs and other entities it seeks to "eliminate" and is thus self-refuting.
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hypothesis, which attributes a discrete, combinatorial syntax and other linguistic properties to these mental phenomena. Eliminativists argue that such discrete, combinatorial characteristics have no place in neuroscience, which speaks of
770:, etc.). If computer circuits lack intentionality and do not store information using propositions, then in what sense can computer A have true information about the world while computer B lacks it? If the computers were instantiated in
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Eliminativism is not only motivated by philosophical considerations, but is also a prediction about what form future scientific theories will take. Eliminativist philosophers therefore tend to be concerned with data from the relevant
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When indeterminacy problems arose because the brain is physically isomorphic to multiple structures of the external world, it was urged that a pragmatic approach be used to resolve the problem. Another approach argues that the
665:, supposing that in order to assert something one must believe it. Hence, for eliminativism to be asserted as a thesis, the eliminativist must believe that it is true; if so, there are beliefs, and eliminativism is false.
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in the scientific sense, eliminativists maintain, folk psychology must be evaluated on the basis of its predictive power and explanatory success as a research program for the investigation of the mind/brain.
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and phenomenal aspects of consciousness. One way to summarize the difference between the
Churchlands' view and Dennett's is that the Churchlands are eliminativists about propositional attitudes, but
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that will ultimately give people a correct account of the mind's workings will not employ terms that refer to commonsense mental states like beliefs and desires; these states will not be part of the
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Early eliminativists such as Rorty and
Feyerabend often confused two different notions of the sort of elimination that the term "eliminative materialism" entailed. On the one hand, they claimed, the
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Dennett, D. (1991). Two
Contrasts: Folk Craft versus Folk Science, and Belief versus Opinion, in: Greenwood, J. (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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the other is being inconsistent. They argue that, to be consistent, one must accept both qualia and intentionality or reject them both. Philosophers who argue for such a position include
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is a fully developed but non-formalized theory of human behavior. It is used to explain and make predictions about human mental states and behavior. This view is often referred to as the
641:. Those who accept this objection say that the arguments for eliminativism are far too weak to establish such a radical claim and that there is thus no reason to accept eliminativism.
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these arguments, to be consistent, must be formulated in a way that does not presuppose the existence of entities like "mental states", "logical arguments", and "ideas", lest they be
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already had a folk psychology comparable to modern views. But in contrast to this lack of development, neuroscience is rapidly progressing and, in their view, can explain many
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cognition. If such an explanation existed, then there would be no need for folk-psychological explanations of behavior, and the latter would be eliminated the same way as the
2125:(2017). "Is Realism about Consciousness Compatible with a Scientifically Respectable World View? A response to Keith Frankish's 'Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness'".
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accepts the existence of intentionality but holds to illusionism about consciousness because he rejects qualia. Goff notes that beliefs are a kind of propositional thought.
253:, argue that folk psychology is not a theory, but depends on internal simulation of others, and therefore is not subject to falsification in the same way that theories are.
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Admitting that the existence of qualia seems obvious, Dennett nevertheless holds that "qualia" is a theoretical term from an outdated metaphysics stemming from
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Folk psychology retains characteristics of now obsolete theories or legends from the past. Ancient societies tried to explain the physical mysteries of
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While it was a minority view in the 1960s, eliminative materialism gained prominence and acceptance during the 1980s. Proponents of this view, such as
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abilities. Furthermore, they argue, folk psychology's development in the last 2,500 years has not been significant and it is therefore stagnant. The
829:. In other words, it does not deny that pain exists, but holds that it exists independently of its effect on behavior. Influenced by Wittgenstein's
40:
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Ramsey, W., Stich, S. and Garon, J. (1990). Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk
Psychology, Philosophical Perspectives 4: 499-533.
696:, have developed a theory of structural resemblance or physical isomorphism that could explain how neural states can instantiate truth within the
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skepticism about the difference between elimination and explication) it also raised doubts about the distinctiveness of eliminative materialism.
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necessary in order to open the minds of thinkers to new evidence and better explanations. Views closely related to eliminativism include
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Rey, G. (1988). A Question About
Consciousness, in H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Dorderecht: Reidel, pp. 5-24.
2308:"Frequency discrimination in the sense of flutter: psychophysical measurements correlated with postcentral events in behaving monkey"
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Various arguments have been made for and against eliminative materialism over the last 50 years. The view's history can be traced to
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The
Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1
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points out that such philosophers expect more attention to their works that "we would give to the scribblings of a mere automaton".
536:). Eliminativists point out that these states are generally ascribed syntactic and semantic properties. An example of this is the
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was also an important inspiration for eliminativism, particularly with his attack on "private objects" as "grammatical fictions".
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argument. The other view is represented by those who subscribe to "a language of thought". They assert that mental states can be
657:, since the theory presupposes the existence of mental phenomena. If eliminativism is true, then eliminativists must accept an
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Dennett offers philosophical thought experiments to argue that qualia do not exist. First he lists five properties of qualia:
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have made various arguments for eliminativism. Elizabeth Irvine has argued that both science and folk psychology do not treat
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dispositional replacements of "claims" and deflationary accounts of "true" are coherent, eliminativism is not self-refuting.
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The first thought experiment
Dennett uses to demonstrate that qualia lack the listed necessary properties to exist involves
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Rey, G. (1983). "A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness", in R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.),
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371:, such as Skinner, argued that folk psychology is already obsolete and should be replaced by descriptions of histories of
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should be used from the start to decide whether certain neural circuits store true information about the external world.
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Philosophers who argue against eliminativism may take several approaches. Simulation theorists, like Robert Gordon and
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and that functional characterizations are just higher-level characterizations of what happens at the physical level.
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about qualia, while Dennett is an anti-reductionist about propositional attitudes and an eliminativist about qualia.
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214:. An intermediate position, revisionary materialism, often argues the mental state in question will prove to be
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of a mature cognitive science. But critics immediately countered that this view was indistinguishable from the
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Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that the class of entities does not exist. For example,
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Horgan, T. and Graham, G. (1990). In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism, Philosophical Studies 62: 107-134.
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Today, the eliminativist view is most closely associated with the Churchlands, who deny the existence of
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2008:"How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to Anti-Darwinism, and how we can avoid the same fate"
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Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis",
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268:(blue), but that theories that are in principle irreducible will eventually be eliminated (orange).
179:(subjective interpretations about particular instances of subjective experience), as expressed by
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Dennett, Daniel Clement (1991). "Qualia Disqualified; A Philosophical Fantasy: Inverted Qualia".
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Another problem for the eliminativist is the consideration that human beings undergo subjective
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948:
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554:
533:
407:
164:
2007:
1757:
1512:
Sellars W. (1956). "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" in: Feigl H. and Scriven M. (eds.)
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1972:
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278:
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Eliminativism maintains that the commonsense understanding of the mind is mistaken, and that
203:
2164:
1724:
1626:
On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press: 65-79.
3540:
3530:
3448:
3181:
1666:
Churchland, P.M. (1985). "Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Inspection of Brain States," in
1071:
2075:
Rosenberg, Alex (2018). "Philosophical Challenges for Scientism (and How to Meet Them?)".
8:
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767:
763:
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680:
654:
638:
537:
368:
315:
172:
155:
122:
333:. Quine himself wondered what exactly was so eliminative about eliminative materialism:
3481:
3356:
3206:
2877:
2502:
2337:
2327:
2210:
2027:
1882:(1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
1793:
Heal, J. (1994) "Simulation vs. Theory-Theory: What's at Issue?" In C. Peacocke (ed.),
1401:
1393:
759:
90:
1433:
Goldman, A. (1992). In Defense of the Simulation Theory, Mind and Language 7: 104-119.
3418:
3275:
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2794:
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2742:
2727:
2632:
2525:
2506:
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2442:
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1934:
1909:
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1405:
1354:
1273:
1235:
1225:
1066:
869:
529:
501:
430:
396:
355:
322:
218:
reducible to physical phenomena—with some changes needed to the commonsense concept.
188:
130:
2988:
2403:
Nagel, T. 1974 "What is it like to be a Bat?" Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 435-456.
3260:
3253:
3218:
3186:
3008:
2484:
2332:
2322:
2019:
1385:
1346:
1265:
1051:
1026:
1006:
1001:
936:
771:
542:
351:
350:, often made parallels to previous superseded scientific theories (such as that of
211:
110:
102:
3201:
1853:
McLaughlin, B. and Warfield, T. (1994). "The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined",
1681:
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.
1532:
Savitt, S. (1974). Rorty's Disappearance Theory, Philosophical Studies 28: 433-36.
3545:
3103:
2963:
2923:
2436:
1753:
1546:
996:
932:
650:
485:
456:
380:
379:. Such views were eventually abandoned. Patricia and Paul Churchland argued that
303:
295:
168:
121:
should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. Other versions
98:
71:
Philosophical view that some states of mind, as commonly understood, do not exist
1269:
847:
They are "directly" or "immediately" graspable during our conscious experiences.
113:, since they are poorly defined. The argument is that psychological concepts of
3363:
3213:
3108:
3018:
2983:
2953:
2938:
2908:
2606:
2273:
2118:
1421:
Gordon, R. (1986). Folk psychology as Simulation, Mind and Language 1: 158-171.
955:. Such arguments note that morality is explained by evolution without positing
944:
928:
924:
873:
762:
is true is to say that it makes more accurate predictions than other theories (
672:
658:
621:
497:
460:
415:
411:
314:
in 1968 while describing a version of physicalism endorsed by Rorty. The later
180:
2023:
3524:
3443:
3368:
3321:
3238:
3228:
3133:
3088:
3083:
3058:
3033:
3023:
3003:
2928:
2161:"THE INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY"
1879:
1358:
956:
904:
751:
565:
481:
464:
372:
307:
286:
282:
250:
1470:
1258:"Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of Consciousness"
1239:
150:
3398:
3388:
3383:
3346:
3296:
3093:
3073:
3063:
2993:
2913:
1931:
How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories
1653:
Dennett, D. (1988) "Quining Qualia" in: Marcel, A. and Bisiach, E. (eds.),
1056:
513:
434:
423:
392:
384:
347:
273:
265:
260:
94:
2656:
2346:
1750:
Consciousness as a scientific concept: a philosophy of science perspective
564:
In recent years, this latter argument has been fortified by the theory of
440:
Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of Consciousness
3464:
3438:
3248:
3161:
3138:
3113:
3098:
2998:
2973:
2948:
2943:
1517:
1448:
1264:. Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 1032. pp. 20–41.
1041:
969:
952:
797:
668:
546:
254:
195:
184:
137:
86:
3068:
1118:
Lycan, W. G. & Pappas, G. (1972) "What is eliminative materialism?"
3301:
3223:
3123:
3043:
3013:
2968:
1397:
1350:
986:
810:
743:
359:
239:
199:
145:
118:
2811:
2592:
Rethinking Consciousness: A Scientific Theory of Subjective Experience
1822:
Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. (1990). "In Defense of Folk Psychology".
1101:(Winter 2016 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
101:
do not exist. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent
3373:
3306:
3270:
2933:
2898:
2846:
2387:
Lahav, R. (1992). "The Amazing Predictive Power of Folk Psychology",
1311:(Spring 2022 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1257:
1061:
550:
264:
Schematic overview: Eliminativists suggest that some sciences can be
1389:
853:
They are "private": no one can directly access anyone else's qualia.
1031:
620:, Terence Horgan, Uriah Kriegal, and John Tienson. The philosopher
489:
467:, for it theorizes the existence of an unacknowledged theory. As a
363:
326:
114:
1188:
Rorty, Richard (1970). "In Defence of Eliminative Materialism" in
3316:
2823:
Eliminative and Multiplicative Materialism by Albert P. Carpenter
2211:"A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism"
1453:
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
704:
610:
476:
examined and explained by modern neuroscience. Some examples are
2782:
Rorty, Richard. "Mind-body Identity, Privacy and Categories" in
3433:
2629:
The Atheist's Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions
2374:
Kitcher, P. S. (1984). "In Defense of Intentional Psychology",
2306:
Mountcastle, V.B.; Steinmetz, M.A.; Romo, R. (September 1990).
1906:
The Atheist's Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions
1752:. Studies in brain and mind. Vol. 5. Dordrecht; New York:
1021:
943:
and postulates that consciousness is an illusion. According to
919:
is an active program within eliminative materialism to explain
814:
508:
493:
468:
455:
Eliminativists such as Paul and Patricia Churchland argue that
419:
212:
directly correspond to the physical state of the nervous system
176:
106:
105:
will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as
3078:
2362:
Pragmatist Neurophilosophy: American Philosophy and the Brain
1373:
662:
653:, have attempted to show that eliminativism is in some sense
477:
310:. The term "eliminative materialism" was first introduced by
290:
2840:
3408:
3336:
2047:
Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life
1603:
Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain
1374:"The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity"
141:
126:
2756:
New York, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
2245:
Boghossian, P. (1991). "The Status of Content Revisited."
959:, so there is a sufficient basis to debunk moral realism.
206:, arguing that mental states as conventionally understood
523:
2305:
1811:
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.
1516:. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 253-329.
1206:
Feyerabend, P. (1963) "Mental Events and the Brain" in
2520:
Feser, Edward (2006). "Consciousness; Eliminativism".
1795:
Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness
588:
2045:
Dennett, Daniel (1996). "The Evolution of Meanings".
418:, who is generally considered an eliminativist about
2103:
Dennett, Daniel (2013). "More Tools about Meaning".
1219:
859:
They are "intrinsic" and "simple" or "unanalyzable."
571:
528:
Much of folk psychology involves the attribution of
125:
the nonexistence of conscious mental states such as
923:as an illusion. It is promoted by the philosophers
561:roles they are supposed to in cognitive processes.
31:
may be too technical for most readers to understand
2627:Rosenberg, Alex (2012). "Morality: The Bad News".
1262:Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 2021
692:Several philosophers, such as the Churchlands and
605:
1482:
1480:
1222:On the contrary : critical essays, 1987-1997
687:
3522:
2786:XIX:24-54. Reprinted Rosenthal, D.M. (ed.) 1971.
1908:. W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 164–193.
754:, and later refined by our understanding of the
154:; and modern physicists are eliminativist about
2650:
2648:
2631:. W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 94–115.
2474:
2472:
2470:
2468:
2466:
2464:
2462:
2460:
2458:
2441:. Little, Brown and Company. pp. 369–412.
2107:. W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 151–197.
1657:, pp. 42-77, New York, Oxford University Press.
1550:. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts (p. 265).
1486:Boghossian, P. (1990). "The Status of Content"
1220:Churchland, Patricia; Churchland, Paul (1998).
879:
2817:Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: An Annotated
2754:Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.
1619:Churchland, P.M. and Churcland, P. S. (1998).
1499:Jackson, Frank (1982) "Epiphenomenal Qualia",
1477:
1429:
1427:
1335:"The united shades of eliminative materialism"
790:
611:Intentionality and consciousness are identical
450:
445:
2862:
2726:, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2359:
2158:
1703:"The Eliminativist Approach to Consciousness"
1417:
1415:
1298:
1296:
813:and hence their conscious mental states have
577:neurons could inherently represent the city.
2645:
2481:Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science
2455:
2117:
2105:Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking
1597:
1595:
1593:
1566:. Page 156. Oxford University Press (2002).
732:
148:; modern biologists are eliminativist about
2524:. Oneworld Publications. pp. 116–121.
2262:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 87-100.
1558:
1556:
1424:
2869:
2855:
2479:Dennett, Daniel (1993). "Quining Qualia".
2271:
2049:. Simon & Schuster. pp. 401–428.
2012:European Journal for Philosophy of Science
1805:
1803:
1615:
1613:
1611:
1412:
1293:
144:; modern chemists are eliminativist about
2771:Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
2682:
2626:
2562:Illusionism: As a Theory of Consciousness
2336:
2326:
2128:Illusionism: As a Theory of Consciousness
2074:
2005:
1928:
1903:
1590:
1528:
1526:
1192:. Reprinted Rosenthal, D.M. (ed.) (1971).
627:
59:Learn how and when to remove this message
43:, without removing the technical details.
2724:Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism
2654:
2604:
2589:
2574:
2559:
2399:
2397:
2204:
2202:
1784:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1553:
1251:
1249:
1154:
1152:
1150:
1148:
1146:
941:attention schema theory of consciousness
259:
2812:Bibliography on Eliminative Materialism
2544:
2522:Philosophy of Mind (A Beginner's Guide)
2478:
2434:
2368:
2159:Horgan, Terence; Tienson, John (2002).
2102:
2044:
1800:
1700:
1608:
1332:
1309:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1202:
1200:
1198:
1184:
1182:
1180:
1138:Consciousness and Self-Regulation Vol 3
1114:
1112:
1110:
1108:
1099:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
758:. According to pragmatism, to say that
3523:
2876:
2425:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
1780:Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. (1996)
1747:
1722:
1639:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
1605:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
1523:
1302:
1255:
1092:
524:Specific problems with folk psychology
93:. It is the idea that the majority of
3470:Philosophy of artificial intelligence
2850:
2769:Matter and Consciousness, revised Ed.
2688:
2519:
2394:
2360:Shook, John; Solymosi, Tibor (2014).
2199:
2098:
2096:
2070:
2068:
2066:
2001:
1999:
1997:
1995:
1962:
1958:
1956:
1954:
1952:
1950:
1899:
1897:
1683:Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
1655:Consciousness in Contemporary Science
1649:
1647:
1645:
1535:
1447:
1443:
1441:
1439:
1371:
1246:
1143:
1132:
1130:
1128:
532:(or more specifically as a subclass,
41:make it understandable to non-experts
1195:
1177:
1105:
1088:
1086:
675:reply to this objection by invoking
140:tends to be eliminativist about the
15:
2830:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2793:New York: Oxford University Press.
2657:"The Meta-Problem of Consciousness"
2607:"The Meta-Problem Of Consciousness"
1813:Journal of Philosophy 78(2): 67-90.
888:
589:Evolution eliminates intentionality
202:, eliminativism is the opposite of
13:
2716:
2620:
2577:Consciousness and the Social Brain
2389:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
2328:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.10-09-03032.1990
2134:. Imprint Academic. Archived from
2093:
2063:
1992:
1947:
1933:. The MIT Press. pp. 95–111.
1894:
1642:
1629:
1436:
1158:
1125:
1120:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
863:
644:
14:
3557:
2805:
2739:The Mind and its Place in Nature.
2272:Churchland, Paul (January 2012).
2258:Devitt, M. & Rey, G. (1991).
2208:
2077:Scientism: Prospects and Problems
1624:: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide.
1083:
838:
572:Physics eliminates intentionality
429:More recently, Brian Tomasik and
2695:Journal of Consciousness Studies
2664:Journal of Consciousness Studies
2614:Journal of Consciousness Studies
1797:Oxford: Oxford University Press.
516:explanations the ancients used.
223:
20:
2828:Eliminative Materialism at the
2741:London, Routledge & Kegan.
2598:
2583:
2568:
2553:
2538:
2513:
2428:
2415:
2406:
2381:
2353:
2299:
2265:
2260:Transcending Transcendentalism,
2252:
2247:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
2239:
2227:
2152:
2111:
2038:
1922:
1885:
1873:
1860:
1847:
1838:
1829:
1816:
1787:
1774:
1741:
1716:
1694:
1673:
1660:
1577:
1506:
1493:
1365:
1326:
949:evolutionary debunking argument
796:respond in similar situations.
606:Arguments against eliminativism
2489:10.7551/mitpress/5782.003.0022
1705:. The Center on Long-Term Risk
1213:
1190:The Review of Metaphysics XXIV
1093:Ramsey, William (2016-01-01).
962:
911:
897:
777:
703:Experiments in the 1980s with
698:correspondence theory of truth
688:Correspondence theory of truth
677:deflationary semantic theories
383:will be gradually replaced as
1:
3327:Hard problem of consciousness
2594:. W. W. Norton & Company.
1965:"Eliminativism without Tears"
1701:Tomasik, Brian (2014-08-09).
1097:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
1077:
850:We are infallible about them.
504:that folk psychology cannot.
2549:. Little, Brown and Company.
1782:Theories of Theories of Mind
939:. Graziano has advanced the
880:The experienced beer drinker
832:Philosophical Investigations
719:
285:does not exist except as an
7:
2315:The Journal of Neuroscience
1723:Anthis, Jacy (2018-06-21).
1564:Critical Scientific Realism
1501:The Philosophical Quarterly
1270:10.1007/978-3-030-96993-6_3
992:Constructivist epistemology
975:
791:Efficacy of folk psychology
649:Some philosophers, such as
451:Problems with folk theories
446:Arguments for eliminativism
233:
10:
3562:
2590:Graziano, Michael (2019).
2579:. Oxford University Press.
2575:Graziano, Michael (2013).
2278:. MIT Press. p. 108.
1748:Irvine, Elizabeth (2013).
1585:Beyond Freedom and Dignity
175:, and eliminativism about
3490:
3457:
3284:
3154:
3049:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
3039:David Lewis (philosopher)
2884:
2784:The Review of Metaphysics
2767:Churchland, P.M. (1988).
2752:Churchland, P.M. (1979).
2024:10.1007/s13194-012-0055-9
1679:Churchland, P.M. (1992).
1587:. New York: Alfred Knopf.
1408:– via Project MUSE.
1305:"Eliminative Materialism"
1161:"Eliminative Materialism"
1140:. New York, Plenum: 1-39.
1095:"Eliminative Materialism"
935:, and the neuroscientist
804:
740:pragmatic theory of truth
733:Pragmatic theory of truth
2836:What Is Left of the Mind
2791:Deconstructing the Mind.
2655:Chalmers, David (2018).
2605:Chalmers, David (2018).
2560:Frankish, Keith (2017).
2545:Dennett, Daniel (1991).
2006:Rosenberg, Alex (2012).
1929:Rosenberg, Alex (2018).
1904:Rosenberg, Alex (2012).
1809:Churchland, P.M. (1981)
1622:Intertheoretic Reduction
1601:Churchland, P.S. (1986)
1378:Philosophy East and West
1333:TĂĽmkaya, Serdal (2022).
1303:Ramsey, William (2022),
921:phenomenal consciousness
277:eliminativists, such as
3177:Eliminative materialism
2547:Consciousness Explained
2438:Consciousness Explained
1339:The Philosophical Forum
982:Attention schema theory
827:propositional attitudes
534:propositional attitudes
408:propositional attitudes
331:identity theory of mind
244:artificial intelligence
165:propositional attitudes
79:Eliminative materialism
3429:Propositional attitude
3424:Problem of other minds
3332:Hypostatic abstraction
2423:The Intentional Stance
2187:Cite journal requires
1980:Cite journal requires
1637:The Intentional Stance
1583:Skinner, B.F. (1971).
748:Charles Sanders Peirce
628:Intuitive reservations
340:
269:
3500:Philosophers category
3404:Mental representation
3167:Biological naturalism
3054:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
3029:Frank Cameron Jackson
2737:Broad, C. D. (1925).
2691:"Against Illusionism"
2689:Prinz, Jesse (2016).
2376:Journal of Philosophy
1824:Philosophical Studies
1668:Journal of Philosophy
1372:Giles, James (1993).
1256:Anthis, Jacy (2022).
1208:Journal of Philosophy
1047:Principle of locality
756:philosophy of science
679:that avoid analyzing
335:
263:
204:reductive materialism
3182:Emergent materialism
2421:Dennett, D. (1978).
1725:"What is sentience?"
1488:Philosophical Review
1072:Vertiginous question
369:Radical behaviorists
3536:Metaphysics of mind
3379:Language of thought
3129:Ludwig Wittgenstein
2959:Patricia Churchland
2749:(2001 Reprint Ed.).
2564:. Imprint Academic.
2079:. pp. 83–105.
1729:Sentience Institute
1635:Dennett, D. (1978)
1562:Niiniluoto, Ilkka.
856:They are ineffable.
768:Aristotle's physics
764:Newtonian mechanics
538:language of thought
502:cognitive processes
316:Ludwig Wittgenstein
173:Patricia Churchland
3207:Neurophenomenology
2878:Philosophy of mind
2789:Stich, S. (1996).
2722:Baker, L. (1987).
2215:www.newdualism.org
1351:10.1111/phil.12310
1165:plato.stanford.edu
760:general relativity
639:self-contradictory
530:intentional states
412:intentional states
397:cognitive sciences
323:cognitive sciences
270:
198:understandings of
194:In the context of
167:, as expressed by
156:luminiferous ether
131:visual perceptions
91:philosophy of mind
3518:
3517:
3414:Mind–body problem
3312:Cognitive closure
3276:Substance dualism
2894:G. E. M. Anscombe
2234:John Polkinghorne
1963:Rosenberg, Alex.
1279:978-3-030-96992-9
1159:Ramsey, William.
1067:Substance dualism
1017:Mind–body problem
555:multiply realized
543:action potentials
431:Jacy Reese Anthis
356:phlogiston theory
189:Jacy Reese Anthis
69:
68:
61:
3553:
3266:Representational
3261:Property dualism
3254:Type physicalism
3219:New mysterianism
3187:Epiphenomenalism
3009:Martin Heidegger
2871:
2864:
2857:
2848:
2847:
2711:
2710:
2708:
2706:
2701:(11–12): 186–196
2686:
2680:
2679:
2677:
2675:
2661:
2652:
2643:
2642:
2624:
2618:
2617:
2611:
2602:
2596:
2595:
2587:
2581:
2580:
2572:
2566:
2565:
2557:
2551:
2550:
2542:
2536:
2535:
2517:
2511:
2510:
2476:
2453:
2452:
2432:
2426:
2419:
2413:
2410:
2404:
2401:
2392:
2385:
2379:
2372:
2366:
2365:
2357:
2351:
2350:
2340:
2330:
2321:(9): 3032–3044.
2312:
2303:
2297:
2296:
2294:
2292:
2269:
2263:
2256:
2250:
2243:
2237:
2231:
2225:
2224:
2222:
2221:
2209:Lycan, William.
2206:
2197:
2196:
2190:
2185:
2183:
2175:
2173:
2172:
2163:. Archived from
2156:
2150:
2149:
2147:
2146:
2140:
2133:
2115:
2109:
2108:
2100:
2091:
2090:
2072:
2061:
2060:
2042:
2036:
2035:
2003:
1990:
1989:
1983:
1978:
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1968:
1960:
1945:
1944:
1926:
1920:
1919:
1901:
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1877:
1871:
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1745:
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1714:
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1640:
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1599:
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1575:
1560:
1551:
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1510:
1504:
1497:
1491:
1484:
1475:
1474:
1445:
1434:
1431:
1422:
1419:
1410:
1409:
1369:
1363:
1362:
1330:
1324:
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1317:
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1300:
1291:
1290:
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1253:
1244:
1243:
1217:
1211:
1204:
1193:
1186:
1175:
1174:
1172:
1171:
1156:
1141:
1134:
1123:
1116:
1103:
1102:
1090:
1052:Property dualism
1027:New mysterianism
1007:Epiphenomenalism
1002:Deconstructivism
951:in the field of
937:Michael Graziano
889:Inverted goggles
486:mental disorders
352:the four humours
89:position in the
64:
57:
53:
50:
44:
24:
23:
16:
3561:
3560:
3556:
3555:
3554:
3552:
3551:
3550:
3521:
3520:
3519:
3514:
3486:
3453:
3399:Mental property
3292:Abstract object
3280:
3150:
3104:Wilfrid Sellars
2979:Donald Davidson
2964:Paul Churchland
2924:George Berkeley
2880:
2875:
2808:
2719:
2717:Further reading
2714:
2704:
2702:
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2518:
2514:
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2304:
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2240:
2232:
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2219:
2217:
2207:
2200:
2188:
2186:
2177:
2176:
2170:
2168:
2157:
2153:
2144:
2142:
2138:
2131:
2119:Frankish, Keith
2116:
2112:
2101:
2094:
2087:
2073:
2064:
2057:
2043:
2039:
2004:
1993:
1981:
1979:
1970:
1969:
1961:
1948:
1941:
1927:
1923:
1916:
1902:
1895:
1890:
1886:
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1865:
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1779:
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1768:
1754:Springer-Verlag
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1643:
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1591:
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1578:
1561:
1554:
1547:Word and Object
1540:
1536:
1531:
1524:
1511:
1507:
1498:
1494:
1485:
1478:
1463:
1446:
1437:
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1425:
1420:
1413:
1390:10.2307/1399612
1370:
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1327:
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1178:
1169:
1167:
1157:
1144:
1135:
1126:
1117:
1106:
1091:
1084:
1080:
997:Cotard delusion
978:
965:
914:
900:
891:
882:
870:inverted qualia
866:
864:Inverted qualia
841:
807:
793:
780:
772:autonomous cars
746:was founded by
735:
722:
690:
651:Paul Boghossian
647:
645:Self-refutation
630:
613:
608:
591:
574:
526:
492:processes, and
463:or just simply
457:folk psychology
453:
448:
410:(a subclass of
381:folk psychology
304:Paul Feyerabend
296:Wilfred Sellars
236:
99:folk psychology
72:
65:
54:
48:
45:
37:help improve it
34:
25:
21:
12:
11:
5:
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3431:
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3416:
3411:
3406:
3401:
3396:
3394:Mental process
3391:
3386:
3381:
3376:
3371:
3366:
3364:Intentionality
3361:
3360:
3359:
3354:
3344:
3339:
3334:
3329:
3324:
3319:
3314:
3309:
3304:
3299:
3294:
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3279:
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3273:
3268:
3263:
3258:
3257:
3256:
3246:
3241:
3236:
3231:
3226:
3221:
3216:
3214:Neutral monism
3211:
3210:
3209:
3199:
3197:Interactionism
3194:
3189:
3184:
3179:
3174:
3169:
3164:
3158:
3156:
3152:
3151:
3149:
3148:
3141:
3136:
3131:
3126:
3121:
3116:
3111:
3109:Baruch Spinoza
3106:
3101:
3096:
3091:
3086:
3081:
3076:
3071:
3066:
3061:
3056:
3051:
3046:
3041:
3036:
3031:
3026:
3021:
3019:Edmund Husserl
3016:
3011:
3006:
3001:
2996:
2991:
2989:René Descartes
2986:
2984:Daniel Dennett
2981:
2976:
2971:
2966:
2961:
2956:
2954:David Chalmers
2951:
2946:
2941:
2939:Franz Brentano
2936:
2931:
2926:
2921:
2919:Alexander Bain
2916:
2911:
2909:Thomas Aquinas
2906:
2901:
2896:
2890:
2888:
2882:
2881:
2874:
2873:
2866:
2859:
2851:
2845:
2844:
2841:3 Quarks Daily
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2825:
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2807:
2806:External links
2804:
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1982:|journal=
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1828:
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1670:, 82, p. 8-28.
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1384:(2): 175–200.
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989:
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964:
961:
945:David Chalmers
929:Keith Frankish
925:Daniel Dennett
913:
910:
899:
896:
890:
887:
881:
878:
874:intuition pump
865:
862:
861:
860:
857:
854:
851:
848:
840:
839:Quining qualia
837:
806:
803:
792:
789:
779:
776:
734:
731:
721:
718:
694:Alex Rosenberg
689:
686:
673:Michael Devitt
661:property like
646:
643:
629:
626:
622:Keith Frankish
612:
609:
607:
604:
590:
587:
573:
570:
525:
522:
498:ancient Greeks
461:theory of mind
452:
449:
447:
444:
416:Daniel Dennett
235:
232:
181:Daniel Dennett
158:. Eliminative
70:
67:
66:
28:
26:
19:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3558:
3547:
3544:
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3475:
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3468:
3466:
3463:
3462:
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3456:
3450:
3447:
3445:
3444:Understanding
3442:
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3430:
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3417:
3415:
3412:
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3395:
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3385:
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3380:
3377:
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3369:Introspection
3367:
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3358:
3355:
3353:
3350:
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3348:
3345:
3343:
3340:
3338:
3335:
3333:
3330:
3328:
3325:
3323:
3322:Consciousness
3320:
3318:
3315:
3313:
3310:
3308:
3305:
3303:
3300:
3298:
3295:
3293:
3290:
3289:
3287:
3283:
3277:
3274:
3272:
3269:
3267:
3264:
3262:
3259:
3255:
3252:
3251:
3250:
3247:
3245:
3244:Phenomenology
3242:
3240:
3239:Phenomenalism
3237:
3235:
3232:
3230:
3229:Occasionalism
3227:
3225:
3222:
3220:
3217:
3215:
3212:
3208:
3205:
3204:
3203:
3202:NaĂŻve realism
3200:
3198:
3195:
3193:
3192:Functionalism
3190:
3188:
3185:
3183:
3180:
3178:
3175:
3173:
3170:
3168:
3165:
3163:
3160:
3159:
3157:
3153:
3147:
3146:
3142:
3140:
3137:
3135:
3134:Stephen Yablo
3132:
3130:
3127:
3125:
3122:
3120:
3117:
3115:
3112:
3110:
3107:
3105:
3102:
3100:
3097:
3095:
3092:
3090:
3089:Richard Rorty
3087:
3085:
3084:Hilary Putnam
3082:
3080:
3077:
3075:
3072:
3070:
3067:
3065:
3062:
3060:
3059:Marvin Minsky
3057:
3055:
3052:
3050:
3047:
3045:
3042:
3040:
3037:
3035:
3034:Immanuel Kant
3032:
3030:
3027:
3025:
3024:William James
3022:
3020:
3017:
3015:
3012:
3010:
3007:
3005:
3002:
3000:
2997:
2995:
2992:
2990:
2987:
2985:
2982:
2980:
2977:
2975:
2972:
2970:
2967:
2965:
2962:
2960:
2957:
2955:
2952:
2950:
2947:
2945:
2942:
2940:
2937:
2935:
2932:
2930:
2929:Henri Bergson
2927:
2925:
2922:
2920:
2917:
2915:
2912:
2910:
2907:
2905:
2902:
2900:
2897:
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2800:
2799:0-19-512666-1
2796:
2792:
2788:
2785:
2781:
2778:
2777:0-262-53074-0
2774:
2770:
2766:
2763:
2762:0-521-33827-1
2759:
2755:
2751:
2748:
2747:0-415-22552-3
2744:
2740:
2736:
2733:
2732:0-691-02050-7
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2531:9781851684786
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2498:9780262287814
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2448:9780316180658
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2418:
2409:
2400:
2398:
2390:
2384:
2377:
2371:
2364:. Bloomsbury.
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2255:
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2203:
2194:
2181:
2167:on 2022-01-08
2166:
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2155:
2141:on 2022-12-09
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2086:9780190462758
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2056:9780684824710
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2017:
2013:
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1917:
1915:9780393344110
1911:
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1900:
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1881:
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1869:
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1857:101: 365-400.
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1572:0-19-925161-4
1569:
1565:
1559:
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1549:
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1542:Quine, W.V.O.
1538:
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1502:
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1462:9780262061063
1458:
1455:. MIT Press.
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1345:(2): 95–113.
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1227:
1224:. MIT Press.
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752:William James
749:
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713:
709:
706:
701:
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682:
678:
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655:self-refuting
652:
642:
640:
634:
625:
623:
619:
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578:
569:
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566:connectionism
562:
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531:
521:
517:
515:
510:
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503:
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482:consciousness
479:
473:
470:
466:
465:theory-theory
462:
458:
443:
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3384:Mental event
3347:Intelligence
3297:Chinese room
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3074:Derek Parfit
3064:Thomas Nagel
2994:Fred Dretske
2914:J. L. Austin
2886:Philosophers
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3531:Materialism
3474:information
3465:Metaphysics
3439:Tabula rasa
3249:Physicalism
3234:Parallelism
3162:Behaviorism
3119:Michael Tye
3114:Alan Turing
3099:John Searle
2974:Dharmakirti
2949:Tyler Burge
2944:C. D. Broad
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2378:81: 89-106.
2291:1 September
2249:71: 264-78.
1490:99: 157-84.
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1042:Physicalism
970:Jesse Prinz
917:Illusionism
912:Illusionism
811:experiences
798:Jerry Fodor
669:Georges Rey
659:intentional
618:Philip Goff
547:frequencies
364:vital force
255:Jerry Fodor
224:illusionism
210:exist, and
196:materialist
185:Georges Rey
160:materialism
138:materialism
87:materialist
3525:Categories
3510:Task Force
3478:perception
3352:Artificial
3302:Creativity
3224:Nondualism
3124:Vasubandhu
3044:John Locke
3014:David Hume
2969:Andy Clark
2674:6 February
2220:2022-07-08
2171:2022-08-26
2145:2022-08-26
1940:0262038579
1826:59: 31-54.
1756:. p.
1734:2020-05-17
1709:2020-05-17
1691:. Chapt. 3
1315:2022-08-13
1210:40: 295-6.
1170:2022-07-08
1078:References
987:Blindsight
953:metaethics
744:Pragmatism
681:predicates
545:, spiking
401:tout court
377:punishment
362:, and the
360:combustion
240:David Hume
200:psychology
151:Ă©lan vital
146:phlogiston
119:experience
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3374:Intuition
3307:Cognition
3271:Solipsism
2934:Ned Block
2904:Armstrong
2899:Aristotle
2507:151197302
2032:170870133
1880:Stich, S.
1870:28: 3-71.
1868:Cognition
1406:147497625
1359:0031-806X
1062:Scientism
963:Criticism
898:Criticism
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778:Criticism
720:Criticism
551:straw man
387:matures.
3495:Category
3342:Identity
3285:Concepts
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3069:Alva Noë
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1855:Synthese
1471:45844220
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1240:42328879
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705:macaques
490:learning
478:dreaming
327:ontology
234:Overview
228:quietism
216:somewhat
115:behavior
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187:, and
177:qualia
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111:desire
107:belief
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3079:Plato
2999:Fodor
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2028:S2CID
1402:S2CID
1394:JSTOR
663:truth
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291:brain
3482:self
3419:Pain
3409:Mind
3337:Idea
2795:ISBN
2773:ISBN
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