1771:
fundamental assumptions". But, Popper's philosophy is not always qualified of falsificationism in the pejorative manner associated with dogmatic or naive falsificationism. The problems of falsification are acknowledged by the falsificationists. For example, Chalmers points out that falsificationists freely admit that observation is theory impregnated. Thornton, referring to Popper's methodology, says that the predictions inferred from conjectures are not directly compared with the facts simply because all observation-statements are theory-laden. For the critical rationalists, the problems of falsification are not an issue, because they do not try to make experimental falsifications logical or to logically justify them, nor to use them to logically explain progress in science. Instead, their faith rests on critical discussions around these experimental falsifications. Lakatos made a distinction between a "falsification" (with quotation marks) in Popper's philosophy and a falsification (without quotation marks) that can be used in a systematic methodology where rejections are justified. He knew that Popper's philosophy is not and has never been about this kind of justification, but he felt that it should have been. Sometimes, Popper and other falsificationists say that when a theory is falsified it is rejected, which appears as dogmatic falsificationism, but the general context is always critical rationalism in which all decisions are open to critical discussions and can be revised.
2512:, pp. 9–10): "We may if we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency of the system is tested. Secondly, there is the investigation of the logical form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for example, tautological. Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories, chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our various tests. And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. ... Here too the procedure of testing turns out to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements—which we may call 'predictions'—are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts."
3192:.' Actually, I do specify such criteria. But Kuhn probably meant that ' standards have practical force only if they are combined with a time limit (what looks like a degenerating problem shift may be the beginning of a much longer period of advance)'. Since I specify no such time limit, Feyerabend concludes that my standards are no more than 'verbal ornament'. A related point was made by Musgrave in a letter containing some major constructive criticisms of an earlier draft, in which he demanded that I specify, for instance, at what point dogmatic adherence to a programme ought to be explained 'externally' rather than 'internally'. Let me try to explain why such objections are beside the point. One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. What one must not do is to deny its poor public record. Both Feyerabend and Kuhn conflate methodological appraisal of a programme with firm heuristic advice about what to do. It is perfectly rational to play a risky game: what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk. This does not mean as much licence as might appear for those who stick to a degenerating programme. For they can do this mostly only in private."
2961:, p. 111: "Against the view here developed one might be tempted to object (following Duhem 28) that in every test it is not only the theory under investigation which is involved, but also the whole system of our theories and assumptions—in fact, more or less the whole of our knowledge—so that we can never be certain which of all these assumptions is refuted. But this criticism overlooks the fact that if we take each of the two theories (between which the crucial experiment is to decide) together with all this background knowledge, as indeed we must, then we decide between two systems which differ only over the two theories which are at stake. It further overlooks the fact that we do not assert the refutation of the theory as such, but of the theory together with that background knowledge; parts of which, if other crucial experiments can be designed, may indeed one day be rejected as responsible for the failure. (Thus we may even characterize a theory under investigation as that part of a vast system for which we have, if vaguely, an alternative in mind, and for which we try to design crucial tests.)"
2331:, chap. 1, sec. 3: "It seems that almost everybody believes in induction; believes, that is, that we learn by the repetition of observations. Even Hume, in spite of his great discovery that a natural law can neither be established nor made 'probable' by induction, continued to believe firmly that animals and men do learn through repetition: through repeated observations as well as through the formation of habits, or the strengthening of habits, by repetition. And he upheld the theory that induction, though rationally indefensible and resulting in nothing better than unreasoned belief, was nevertheless reliable in the main—more reliable and useful at any rate than reason and the processes of reasoning; and that 'experience' was thus the unreasoned result of a (more or less passive) accumulation of observations. As against all this, I happen to believe that in fact we never draw inductive inferences, or make use of what are now called 'inductive procedures'. Rather, we always discover regularities by the essentially different method of trial and error."
2757:, pp. 52–53, Introduction: "For several years, evolutionary theory has been under attack from critics who argue that the theory is basically a tautology. The tautology is said to arise from the fact that evolutionary biologists have no widely accepted way to independently define 'survival' and 'fitness.' That the statement, 'the fit survive,' is tautological is important, because if the critics are correct in their analysis, the tautology renders meaningless much of contemporary evolutionary theorizing. ... The definition of key evolutionary concepts in terms of natural selection runs the risk of making evolutionary theory a self-contained, logical system which is isolated from the empirical world. No meaningful empirical prediction can be made from one side to the other side of these definitions. One cannot usefully predict that nature selects the fittest organism since the fittest organism is by definition that which nature selects."
1794:, Lakatos and Popper agreed that universal laws cannot be logically deduced (except from laws that say even more). But unlike Popper, Lakatos felt that if the explanation for new laws cannot be deductive, it must be inductive. He urged Popper explicitly to adopt some inductive principle and sets himself the task to find an inductive methodology. However, the methodology that he found did not offer any exact inductive rules. In a response to Kuhn, Feyerabend and Musgrave, Lakatos acknowledged that the methodology depends on the good judgment of the scientists. Feyerabend wrote in "Against Method" that Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes is epistemological anarchism in disguise and Musgrave made a similar comment. In more recent work, Feyerabend says that Lakatos uses rules, but whether or not to follow any of these rules is left to the judgment of the scientists. This is also discussed elsewhere.
3418:: "Astrology is Sir Karl's most frequently cited example of a 'pseudo-science'. He says: 'By making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague they were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of the theory.' Those generalizations catch something of the spirit of the astrological enterprise. But taken at all literally, as they must be if they are to provide a demarcation criterion, they are impossible to support. The history of astrology during the centuries when it was intellectually reputable records many predictions that categorically failed. Not even astrology's most convinced and vehement exponents doubted the recurrence of such failures. Astrology cannot be barred from the sciences because of the form in which its predictions were cast."
906:, Popper discusses informally which statements among those that are considered in the logical structure are basic statements. A logical structure uses universal classes to define laws. For example, in the law "all swans are white" the concept of swans is a universal class. It corresponds to a set of properties that every swan must have. It is not restricted to the swans that exist, existed or will exist. Informally, a basic statement is simply a statement that concerns only a finite number of specific instances in universal classes. In particular, an existential statement such as "there exists a black swan" is not a basic statement, because it is not specific about the instance. On the other hand, "this swan here is black" is a basic statement. Popper says that it is a singular existential statement or simply a singular statement. So, basic statements are singular (existential) statements.
1411:
One of them was that changes in society cannot "be achieved by the use of legal or political means". In Popper's view, this was both testable and subsequently falsified. "Yet instead of accepting the refutations", Popper wrote, "the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. ... They thus gave a 'conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status." Popper's attacks were not directed toward
Marxism, or Marx's theories, which were falsifiable, but toward Marxists who he considered to have ignored the falsifications which had happened. Popper more fundamentally criticized 'historicism' in the sense of any preordained prediction of history, given what he saw as our right, ability and responsibility to control our own destiny.
2769:, pp. 383–384: "Darwin's major contribution was, of course, the suggestion that evolution can be explained by the natural selection of random variations. Natural selection, which was at first considered as though it were a hypothesis that was in need of experimental or observational confirmation, turns out on closer inspection to be a tautology, a statement of an inevitable, although previously unrecognized, relation. It states that the fittest individuals in a population (defined as those which leave most offspring) will leave most offspring. Once the statement is made, its truth is apparent. This fact in no way reduces the magnitude of Darwin's achievement; only after it was clearly formulated, could biologists realize the enormous power of the principle as a weapon of explanation."
1729:
or more competing theories which are both corroborated, considering only falsifications, it is not clear why one theory is chosen above the other, even when one is corroborated more often than the other. In fact, a stronger version of the Quine-Duhem thesis says that it is not always possible to rationally pick one theory over the other using falsifications. Considering only falsifications, it is not clear why often a corroborating experiment is seen as a sign of progress. Popper's critical rationalism uses both falsifications and corroborations to explain progress in science. How corroborations and falsifications can explain progress in science was a subject of disagreement between many philosophers, especially between
Lakatos and Popper.
2986:, p. 91: "It may now be possible for us to answer the question: How and why do we accept one theory in preference to others? The preference is certainly not due to anything like a experiential justification of the statements composing the theory; it is not due to a logical reduction of the theory to experience. We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive. This will be the one which not only has hitherto stood up to the severest tests, but the one which is also testable in the most rigorous way. A theory is a tool which we test by applying it, and which we judge as to its fitness by the results of its applications."
3055:, p. 32): "For the naive falsificationist a theory is falsified by a ('fortified') 'observational' statement which conflicts with it (or which he decides to interpret as conflicting with it). For the sophisticated falsificationist a scientific theory T is falsified if and only if another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: ( 1 ) T' has excess empirical content over T: that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden, by (2) T' explains the previous success of T, that is, all the unrefuted content of T is included (within the limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated."
2379:, p. 19: "Various objections might be raised against the criterion of demarcation here proposed. In the first place, it may well seem somewhat wrong-headed to suggest that science, which is supposed to give us positive information, should be characterized as satisfying a negative requirement such as refutability. However, I shall show, in sections 31 to 46, that this objection has little weight, since the amount of positive information about the world which is conveyed by a scientific statement is the greater the more likely it is to clash, because of its logical character, with possible singular statements. (Not for nothing do we call the laws of nature 'laws': the more they prohibit the more they say.)"
2793:, p. 53, Introduction: "Even if it did not make a tautology of evolution theory, the use of natural selection as a descriptive concept would have serious drawbacks. While it is mathematically tractable and easy to model in the laboratory, the concept is difficult to operationalize in the field. For field biologists, it is really a hypothetical entity. Clear, unambiguous instances of the operation of natural selection are difficult to come by and always greeted with great enthusiasm by biologists (Kettlewell, 1959 ; Shepherd, 1960). Thus, although the concept has much to recommend it as an explanatory one, it seems an overly abstract formulation on which to base a descriptive science."
2940:, p. 2: "several courts have treated the abstract possibility of falsification as sufficient to satisfy this aspect of the screening of scientific evidence. This essay challenges these views. It first explains the distinct meanings of falsification and falsifiability. It then argues that while the Court did not embrace the views of any specific philosopher of science, inquiring into the existence of meaningful attempts at falsification is an appropriate and crucial consideration in admissibility determinations. Consequently, it concludes that recent opinions substituting mere falsifiability for actual empirical testing are misconstruing and misapplying Daubert."
1749:
psychological induction process follows laws of nature, but, for him, this does not imply the existence of a method of justification based on logical rules. In fact, he argued that any induction mechanism, including the mechanism described by his theory, could not be justified logically. Similarly, Popper adopted an evolutionary epistemology, which implies that some laws explain progress in science, but yet insists that the process of trial and error is hardly rigorous and that there is always an element of irrationality in the creative process of science. The absence of a method of justification is a built-in aspect of Popper's trial and error explanation.
836:. For example, the falsifiability of Newton's law of gravitation, as defined by Popper, depends purely on the logical relation it has with a statement such as "The brick fell upwards when released". A brick that falls upwards would not alone falsify Newton's law of gravitation. The capacity to verify the absence of conditions such as a hidden string attached to the brick is also needed for this state of affairs to eventually falsify Newton's law of gravitation. However, these applied methodological considerations are irrelevant in falsifiability, because it is a logical criterion. The empirical requirement on the potential falsifier, also called the
1733:
falsifications and corroborations could be justified using some kind of formal logic. It is a delicate question, because this logic would be inductive: it justifies a universal law in view of instances. Also, falsifications, because they are based on methodological decisions, are useless in a strict justification perspective. The answer of
Lakatos and many others to that question is that it should. In contradistinction, for Popper, the creative and informal part is guided by methodological rules, which naturally say to favour theories that are corroborated over those that are falsified, but this methodology can hardly be made rigorous.
2161:. Thus if the state of affairs is imaginary, then the description is simply false and its negation is a true description of reality, in Tarski's sense." He continues (emphasis added) "Tarski's theory more particularly makes clear just what fact a statement P will correspond to if it corresponds to any fact: namely the fact that p. ... a false statement P is false not because it corresponds to some odd entity like a non-fact, but simply because it does not correspond to any fact: it does not stand in the peculiar relation of correspondence to a fact to anything real, though it stands in a relation like 'describes' to the
1578:
that some convention must be adopted to fix what it means to detect or not a neutrino in this probabilistic context. This is the third kind of decisions mentioned by
Lakatos. For Popper and most philosophers, observations are theory impregnated. In this example, the theory that impregnates observations (and justifies that we conventionally accept the potential falsifier "no neutrino was detected") is statistical. In statistical language, the potential falsifier that can be statistically accepted (not rejected to say it more correctly) is typically the null hypothesis, as understood even in popular accounts on falsifiability.
1297:) and the existence of the melting point. For example, he pointed out that had no neutrino been detected, it could have been because some conservation law is false. Popper did not argue against the problems of falsification per se. He always acknowledged these problems. Popper's response was at the logical level. For example, he pointed out that, if a specific way is given to trap the neutrino, then, at the level of the language, the statement is falsifiable, because "no neutrino was detected after using this specific way" formally contradicts it (and it is inter-subjectively-verifiable—people can repeat the experiment).
2226:, sec. 3: "Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be."
2524:, p. 9: "According to the view that will be put forward here, the method of critically testing theories, and selecting them according to the results of tests, always proceeds on the following lines. From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant statements, so as to find what logical relations (such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between them."
2833:, p. 37: "In some of its earlier formulations (for example in Marx's analysis of the character of the 'coming social revolution') their predictions were testable, and in fact falsified. Yet instead of accepting the refutations the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. In this way they rescued the theory from refutation; but they did so at the price of adopting a device which made it irrefutable. They thus gave a 'conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status."
3390:, pp. 155–156: "It is my view that the methods of the natural as well as the social sciences can be best understood if we admit that science always begins and ends with problems. The progress of science lies, essentially, in the evolution of its problems. And it can be gauged by the increasing refinement, wealth, fertility, and depth of its problems. ... The growth of knowledge always consists in correcting earlier knowledge. Historically, science begins with pre-scientific knowledge, with pre-scientific myths and pre-scientific expectations. And these, in turn, have no 'beginnings'."
869:, Vere and Gibson wrote " been considered problematic because theories are not simply tested through falsification but in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions and background knowledge." Despite the fact that Popper insisted that he is aware that falsifications are impossible and added that this is not an issue for his falsifiability criterion because it has nothing to do with the possibility or impossibility of falsifications, Stove and others, often referring to Lakatos original criticism, continue to maintain that the problems of falsification are a failure of falsifiability.
3366:, p. 802: "I suggest then that Sir Karl has characterized the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts. His emphasis is natural and common: the exploits of a Copernicus or Einstein make better reading than those of a Brahe or Lorentz; Sir Karl would not be the first if he mistook what I call normal science for an intrinsically uninteresting enterprise. Nevertheless, neither science nor the development of knowledge is likely to be understood if research is viewed exclusively through the revolutions it occasionally produces."
2845:, Sec. 2: "The Marxist account of history too, Popper held, is not scientific, although it differs in certain crucial respects from psychoanalysis. For Marxism, Popper believed, had been initially scientific, in that Marx had postulated a theory which was genuinely predictive. However, when these predictions were not in fact borne out, the theory was saved from falsification by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses which made it compatible with the facts. By this means, Popper asserted, a theory which was initially genuinely scientific degenerated into pseudo-scientific dogma."
1239:
says that the time of creation (of a species) measured by the accepted technology is illusory and no accepted technology is proposed to measure the claimed "actual" time of creation. Moreover, if the ad hoc hypothesis says that the world was created as we observe it today without stating further laws, by definition it cannot be contradicted by observations and thus is not falsifiable. This is discussed by Dienes in the case of a variation on the
Omphalos hypothesis, which, in addition, specifies that God made the creation in this way to test our faith.
3305:, p. 168) recognizes that formal rules in a methodology cannot be rational. Yet, at the level of the technology, that is, at the practical level, he says, scientists must nevertheless take decisions. Popper's methodology does not specify formal rules, but non-rational decisions will still have to be taken. He concludes that "Popper and Lakatos differ only over the levels at which they locate non-rationality in science: Lakatos at the level of an inductive principle which justifies technology, and Popper at the lower-level of technology itself."
3292:, p. 112: "It should be pointed out, however, that the methodology of scientific research programmes has more teeth than Duhem's conventionalism: instead of leaving it to Duhem's unarticulated common sense to judge when a 'framework' is to be abandoned, I inject some hard Popperian elements into the appraisal of whether a programme progresses or degenerates or of whether one is overtaking another. That is, I give criteria of progress and stagnation within a programme and also rules for the 'elimination' of whole research programmes."
2427:, pp. 7–8: "This latter is concerned not with questions of fact (Kant's quid facti?), but only with questions of justification or validity (Kant's quid juris?). Its questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be justified? And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it perhaps contradict them? In order that a statement may be logically examined in this way, it must already have been presented to us. Someone must have formulated it, and submitted it to logical examination."
3280:: "There is a sense in which Feyerabend is right. Lakatos fails to give precise mechanical rules for when a theory has been finally falsified. Yet an appropriate question might be whether such rules are possible or necessary to make science rational. ... There are, however, many rough and ready rules, the application of which has to be learned in practical contexts. ... This does not mean that precise rules cannot be used in certain contexts, but we need to use our judgement to decide when those rules are to be used."
806:
psychological explanation for the learning process, especially when psychology is seen as an extension of biology, but he felt that these biological explanations were not within the scope of epistemology. Popper proposed an evolutionary mechanism to explain the success of science, which is much in line with
Johnson-Laird's view that "induction is just something that animals, including human beings, do to make life possible", but Popper did not consider it a part of his epistemology. He wrote that his interest was mainly in the
2805:, p. 342: "However, Darwin's own most important contribution to the theory of evolution, his theory of natural selection, is difficult to test. There are some tests, even some experimental tests; and in some cases, such as the famous phenomenon known as "industrial melanism", we can observe natural selection happening under our very eyes, as it were. Nevertheless, really severe tests of the theory of natural selection are hard to come by, much more so than tests of otherwise comparable theories in physics or chemistry."
2355:, p. 35: "As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.'"
1607:, Hume's argument precludes inductive logic, but only when the logic makes no use "of additional assumptions: in particular, about what is to be assigned positive prior probability". Inductive logic itself is not precluded, especially not when it is a deductively valid application of Bayes' theorem that is used to evaluate the probabilities of the hypotheses using the observed data and what is assumed about the priors. Gelman and Shalizi mentioned that Bayes' statisticians do not have to disagree with the non-inductivists.
1798:
component of science never had to be an inductive methodology. He always viewed this component as a creative process beyond the explanatory reach of any rational methodology, but yet used to decide which theories should be studied and applied, find good problems and guess useful conjectures. Quoting
Einstein to support his view, Popper said that this renders obsolete the need for an inductive methodology or logical path to the laws. For Popper, no inductive methodology was ever proposed to satisfactorily explain science.
1200:
1193:
798:, which are not expected to have a general justification: they may or may not be applicable depending on the background knowledge. Johnson-Laird wrote: "hilosophers have worried about which properties of objects warrant inductive inferences. The answer rests on knowledge: we don't infer that all the passengers on a plane are male because the first ten off the plane are men. We know that this observation doesn't rule out the possibility of a woman passenger." The reasoning pattern that was not applied here is
918:"A theory is scientific if and only if it divides the class of basic statements into the following two non-empty sub-classes: (a) the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent, or which it prohibits—this is the class of its potential falsifiers (i.e., those statements which, if true, falsify the whole theory), and (b) the class of those basic statements with which it is consistent, or which it permits (i.e., those statements which, if true, corroborate it, or bear it out)."
2575:, p. 387: "Before using the terms 'basic' and 'basic statement', I made use of the term 'empirical basis', meaning by it the class of all those statements which may function as tests of empirical theories (that is, as potential falsifiers). In introducing the term 'empirical basis' my intention was, partly, to give an ironical emphasis to my thesis that the empirical basis of our theories is far from firm; that it should be compared to a swamp rather than to solid ground."
2560:"Yet even so, something has been gained. For in the practice of scientific research, demarcation is sometimes of immediate urgency in connection with theoretical systems, whereas in connection with singular statements, doubt as to their empirical character rarely arises. It is true that errors of observation occur and that they give rise to false singular statements, but the scientist scarcely ever has occasion to describe a singular statement as non-empirical or metaphysical."
3354:): "I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. ... Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed."
8202:
1140:
815:, appears to be the best so far". By his own account, because only a negative approach was supported by logic, Popper adopted a negative methodology. The purpose of his methodology is to prevent "the policy of immunizing our theories against refutation". It also supports some "dogmatic attitude" in defending theories against criticism, because this allows the process to be more complete. This negative view of science was much criticized and not only by Johnson-Laird.
1847:
the same line of thought, Kuhn observes that in periods of normal science the scientific theories, which represent some paradigm, are used to routinely solve puzzles and the validity of the paradigm is hardly in question. It is only when important new puzzles emerge that cannot be solved by accepted theories that a revolution might occur. This can be seen as a viewpoint on the distinction made by Popper between the informal and formal process in science (see section
9723:
3378:, p. 28: "Thus we have the following clash: the condition which Kuhn regards as the normal and proper condition of science is a condition which, if it actually obtained, Popper would regard as unscientific, a state of affairs in which critical science had contracted into defensive metaphysics. Popper has suggested that the motto of science should be: Revolution in permanence! For Kuhn, it seems, a more appropriate maxim would be: Not nostrums but normalcy!"
3132:, Part VI, Sec. II: "We have therefore to seek for principles, other than induction, such that, given certain data not of the form “this A is a B”, the generalization “'all A is B”' has a finite probability. Given such principles, and given a generalization to which they apply, induction can make the generalization increasingly probable, with a probability which approaches certainty as a limit when the number of favourable instances in indefinitely increased."
1251:
Popper's view is that it is indeed useful, because Popper considers that metaphysical statements can be useful, but also because it is indirectly corroborated by the corroboration of the falsifiable law "All men die before the age of 150." For Popper, if no such falsifiable law exists, then the metaphysical law is less useful, because it is not indirectly corroborated. This kind of non-falsifiable statements in science was noticed by Carnap as early as 1937.
10415:
3245:, p. 15: "Lakatos realized and admitted that the existing standards of rationality, standards of logic included, are too restrictive and would have hindered science had they been applied with determination. He therefore permitted the scientist to violate them ... However, he demanded that research programmes show certain features in the long run — they must be progressive. In Chapter 16 of (and in my essay 'On the Critique of Scientific Reason':
3068:, p. 15), Kuhn says that the methodological rules are not sufficient to provide a logic of discovery: "rules or conventions like the following: 'Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without 'good reason'. A 'good reason' may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis.'
10425:
1061:, in this semantic perspective, falsifiability as defined by Popper means that in some observation structure (in the collection) there exists a set of observations which refutes the theory. An even stronger notion of falsifiability was considered, which requires, not only that there exists one structure with a contradicting set of observations, but also that all structures in the collection that cannot be expanded to a structure that satisfies
2999:): "In an earlier paper,' I distinguished three Poppers: Popper0, Popper1, and Popper2. Popper0 is the dogmatic falsificationist ... Popper1 is the naive falsificationist, Popper2 the sophisticated falsificationist. ... The real Popper has never explained in detail the appeal procedure by which some 'accepted basic statements', may be eliminated. Thus the real Popper consists of Popper1 together with some elements of Popper2."
1740:, a way to define how close a theory is to the truth, which he did not consider very significant, except (as an attempt) to describe a concept already clear in practice. Later, it was shown that the specific definition proposed by Popper cannot distinguish between two theories that are false, which is the case for all theories in the history of science. Today, there is still on going research on the general concept of verisimilitude.
253:
3402:, p. 37: "y making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory. It is a typical soothsayer's trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: that they become irrefutable."
849:
methodological decisions. When this distinction is applied to the term "falsifiability", it corresponds to a distinction between two completely different meanings of the term. The same is true for the term "falsifiable". Popper said that he only uses "falsifiability" or "falsifiable" in reference to the logical side and that, when he refers to the methodological side, he speaks instead of "falsification" and its problems.
2605:, Introduction, sec. I: "Einstein's principle of proportionality of inert and (passively) heavy mass. This equivalence principle conflicts with many potential falsifiers: events whose observation is logically possible. Yet despite all attempts (the experiments by Eötvös, more recently refined by Rickle) to realize such a falsification experimentally, the experiments have so far corroborated the principle of equivalence."
25:
10440:
2295:, Introduction 1982: "Although the first sense refers to the logical possibility of a falsification in principle, the second sense refers to a conclusive practical experimental proof of falsity. But anything like conclusive proof to settle an empirical question does not exist. An entire literature rests on the failure to observe this distinction." For a discussion related to this lack of distinction, see
819:
presented as steps of induction, because they refer to laws of probability, even though they do not go beyond deductive logic. This is yet a third notion of induction, which overlaps with deductive logic in the following sense that it is supported by it. These deductive steps are not really inductive, but the overall process that includes the creation of assumptions is inductive in the usual sense. In a
2367:, p. 3: "However, a theory that has successfully withstood critical testing is thereby 'corroborated', and may be regarded as being preferable to falsified rivals. In the case of rival unfalsified theories, for Popper, the higher the informative content of a theory the better it is scientifically, because every gain in content brings with it a commensurate gain in predictive scope and testability."
933:
Lakatos is implicit in this agreement, but the other decisions are not needed. This agreement, if one can speak of agreement when there is not even a discussion, exists only in principle. This is where the distinction between the logical and methodological sides of science becomes important. When an actual falsifier is proposed, the technology used is considered in detail and, as described in section
1255:
2391:: "Karl Popper, an Austrian-born British philosopher of science, in his Logik der Forschung (1935; The Logic of Scientific Discovery), insisted that the meaning criterion should be abandoned and replaced by a criterion of demarcation between empirical (scientific) and transempirical (nonscientific, metaphysical) questions and answers—a criterion that, according to Popper, is to be testability."
3230:, p. 458: "My third criticism concerns the question of whether Lakatos's methodology is in fact a methodology in the old-fashioned sense: whether, that is, it issues in advice to scientists. I shall argue that Lakatos once had sound views on this matter, but was led, mistakenly in my opinion, to renounce them. In renouncing them, he has gone a long way towards epistemological anarchism."
2558:, section 7, page 21: "If falsifiability is to be at all applicable as a criterion of demarcation, then singular statements must be available which can serve as premisses in falsifying inferences. Our criterion therefore appears only to shift the problem—to lead us back from the question of the empirical character of theories to the question of the empirical character of singular statements.
124:
66:
9711:
2821:): "In Marx's view, it is vain to expect that any important change can be achieved by the use of legal or political means; a political revolution can only lead to one set of rulers giving way to another set—a mere exchange of the persons who act as rulers. Only the evolution of the underlying essence, the economic reality can produce any essential or real change—a social revolution."
1851:). In the big picture presented by Kuhn, the routinely solved puzzles are corroborations. Falsifications or otherwise unexplained observations are unsolved puzzles. All of these are used in the informal process that generates a new kind of theory. Kuhn says that Popper emphasizes formal or logical falsifications and fails to explain how the social and informal process works.
183:
1686:
these auxiliary hypotheses. Again, this leads to the critique that it cannot be told if it is the theory or one of the required auxiliary hypotheses that is false. Lakatos gives the example of the path of a planet. If the path contradicts Newton's law, we will not know if it is Newton's law that is false or the assumption that no other body influenced the path.
2665:, p. 611: "It does appear that some people think that I denied scientific character to the historical sciences, such as palaeontology, or the history of the evolution of life on Earth. This is a mistake, and I here wish to affirm that these and other historical sciences have in my opinion scientific character; their hypotheses can in many cases be tested."
315:. He argued that the only way to verify a claim such as "All swans are white" would be if one could theoretically observe all swans, which is not possible. On the other hand, the falsifiability requirement for an anomalous instance, such as the observation of a single black swan, is theoretically reasonable and sufficient to logically falsify the claim.
749:
standpoint, if one finds an observation that does not contradict a law, it does not mean that the law is true. A verification has no value in itself. But, if the law makes risky predictions and these are corroborated, Popper says, there is a reason to prefer this law over another law that makes less risky predictions or no predictions at all. In the
3041:, p. 169): "To repeat: Popper offers a Darwinian account of the progress of knowledge. Progress is supposed to result negatively from the elimination by natural selection of defective alternatives. ... There is no genuine logic of discovery, only a psychology of invention juxtaposed to a methodology which appraises fully fledged theories."
3096:, section 23, 1st paragraph: "The requirement of falsifiability which was a little vague to start with has now been split into two parts. The first, the methodological postulate (cf. section 20), can hardly be made quite precise. The second, the logical criterion, is quite definite as soon as it is clear which statements are to be called 'basic'."
2694:: "This theory is widely held: it has variants in behaviourism, psychoanalysis, individual psychology, utilitarianism, vulgar-marxism, religion, and sociology of knowledge. Clearly this theory, with all its variants, is not falsifiable: no example of an altruistic action can refute the view that there was an egotistic motive hidden behind it."
1890:, arguing that science would not have progressed without making use of any and all available methods to support new theories. He rejected any reliance on a scientific method, along with any special authority for science that might derive from such a method. He said that if one is keen to have a universally valid methodological rule,
2403:, Sec. 1.9: "Quite apart from , I felt that psychology should be regarded as a biological discipline, and especially that any psychological theory of the acquisition of knowledge should be so regarded. Now if we transfer to human and animal psychology , we arrive, clearly, at the well-known method of trial and error-elimination."
2709:, p. 1038: "s indeed is the case in Maxwell's example, when existential statements are verified this is done by means of stronger falsifiable statements. ... What this means is this. Whenever a pure existential statement, by being empirically "confirmed", appears to belong to empirical science, it will in fact do so
1611:
problematic for Popper". Yet, also according to Mayo, Popper acknowledged the useful role of statistical inference in the falsification problems: she mentioned that Popper wrote her (in the context of falsification based on evidence) "I regret not studying statistics" and that her thought was then "not as much as I do".
2745:: "I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term natural selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer, of the Survival of the Fittest, is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient."
3084:, p. 32): "Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without 'good reason'. A 'good reason' may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis."
3207:, p. 6: "Although Paul Feyerabend and Alan Musgrave evaluated in opposite ways, they agreed about its nature. Feyerabend hailed it as an 'anarchism in disguise' (Feyerabend, Against Method, 1975), while Musgrave rather deplored the fact that Lakatos had 'gone a long way towards epistemological anarchism' (
1758:
might seem that this premise is hard to reject, but to avoid circular reasoning we do reject it in the case of deductive logic. It makes sense to also reject this premise in the case of principles to justify induction. Lakatos's proposal of sophisticated falsificationism was very natural in that context.
1865:
Popper often uses astrology as an example of a pseudoscience. He says that it is not falsifiable because both the theory itself and its predictions are too imprecise. Kuhn, as an historian of science, remarked that many predictions made by astrologers in the past were quite precise and they were very
1824:
As an anecdotal example, in one of his articles
Lakatos challenged Popper to show that his theory was falsifiable: he asked "Under what conditions would you give up your demarcation criterion?". Popper replied "I shall give up my theory if Professor Lakatos succeeds in showing that Newton's theory is
1820:
In contradistinction, Popper did not propose his methodology as a tool to reconstruct the history of science. Yet, some times, he did refer to history to corroborate his methodology. For example, he remarked that theories that were considered great successes were also the most likely to be falsified.
1336:
worked out mathematical theorems to help answer questions regarding natural selection. But, for Popper and others, there is no (falsifiable) law of
Natural Selection in this, because these tools only apply to some rare traits. Instead, for Popper, the work of Fisher and others on Natural Selection is
961:
However, there is no need to require that falsifiers have two parts in the definition itself. This removes the requirement that a falsifiable statement must make prediction. In this way, the definition is more general and allows the basic statements themselves to be falsifiable. Criteria that require
932:
As in the case of actual falsifiers, decisions must be taken by scientists to accept a logical structure and its associated empirical basis, but these are usually part of a background knowledge that scientists have in common and, often, no discussion is even necessary. The first decision described by
848:
The methodological part consists, in Popper's view, of informal rules, which are used to guess theories, accept observation statements as factual, etc. These include statistical tests: Popper is aware that observation statements are accepted with the help of statistical methods and that these involve
793:
When
Johnson-Laird says that no justification is needed, he does not refer to a general inductive method of justification that, to avoid a circular reasoning, would not itself require any justification. On the contrary, in agreement with Hume, he means that there is no general method of justification
786:
deductive logic. He even argued that this learning process cannot be justified by any general rules, deductive or not. Popper accepted Hume's argument and therefore viewed progress in science as the result of quasi-induction, which does the same as induction, but has no inference rules to justify it.
1924:
criticised falsifiability. They include this critique in the "Intermezzo" chapter, where they expose their own views on truth in contrast to the extreme epistemological relativism of postmodernism. Even though Popper is clearly not a relativist, Sokal and Bricmont discuss falsifiability because they
1846:
analyzed what he calls periods of normal science as well as revolutions from one period of normal science to another, whereas Popper's view is that only revolutions are relevant. For Popper, the role of science, mathematics and metaphysics, actually the role of any knowledge, is to solve puzzles. In
1728:
According to Lakatos, naive falsificationism is the claim that methodological falsifications can by themselves explain how scientific knowledge progresses. Very often a theory is still useful and used even after it is found in contradiction with some observations. Also, when scientists deal with two
1685:
A dogmatic falsificationist ignores the role of auxiliary hypotheses. The assumptions or auxiliary hypotheses of a particular test are all the hypotheses that are assumed to be accurate in order for the test to work as planned. The predicted observation that is contradicted depends on the theory and
1577:
theory that such emitted neutrinos could be trapped in a certain way". In this manner, in his discussion of the neutrino experiment, Popper did not raise at all the probabilistic aspect of the experiment. Together with Maxwell, who raised the problems of falsification in the experiment, he was aware
1219:
Another example from Popper of a non-basic statement is "This human action is altruistic." It is not a basic statement, because no accepted technology allows us to determine whether or not an action is motivated by self-interest. Because no basic statement falsifies it, the statement that "All human
810:
of science and that epistemology should be concerned with logical aspects only. Instead of asking why science succeeds he considered the pragmatic problem of induction. This problem is not how to justify a theory or what is the global mechanism for the success of science but only what methodology do
1732:
Popper distinguished between the creative and informal process from which theories and accepted basic statements emerge and the logical and formal process where theories are falsified or corroborated. The main issue is whether the decision to select a theory among competing theories in the light of
1656:
A dogmatic falsificationist ignores that every observation is theory-impregnated. Being theory-impregnated means that it goes beyond direct experience. For example, the statement "Here is a glass of water" goes beyond experience, because the concepts of glass and water "denote physical bodies which
1100:
In response to Lakatos who suggested that Newton's theory was as hard to show falsifiable as Freud's psychoanalytic theory, Popper gave the example of an apple that moves from the ground up to a branch and then starts to dance from one branch to another. Popper thought that it was a basic statement
852:
Popper said that methodological problems require proposing methodological rules. For example, one such rule is that, if one refuses to go along with falsifications, then one has retired oneself from the game of science. The logical side does not have such methodological problems, in particular with
785:
studied how human beings obtain new knowledge that goes beyond known laws and observations, including how we can discover new laws. He understood that deductive logic could not explain this learning process and argued in favour of a mental or psychological process of learning that would not require
2308:
Falsifiability does not require falsification. A past, present and even a future falsification would be a problematic requirement: it cannot be achieved, because definitive rigorous falsifications are impossible and, if a theory nevertheless met this requirement, it would not be much better than a
1410:
Popper made a clear distinction between the original theory of Marx and what came to be known as Marxism later on. For Popper, the original theory of Marx contained genuine scientific laws. Though they could not make preordained predictions, these laws constrained how changes can occur in society.
1238:
make an argument (called the Omphalos hypothesis after the Greek word for navel) that the world was created with the appearance of age; e.g., the sudden appearance of a mature chicken capable of laying eggs. This ad hoc hypothesis introduced into young-Earth creationism is unfalsifiable because it
1215:
A simple example of a non-basic statement is "This angel does not have large wings." It is not a basic statement, because though the absence of large wings can be observed, no technology (independent of the presence of wings) exists to identify angels. Even if it is accepted that angels exist, the
966:
must be predictive, just as is required by falsifiability (when applied to laws), Popper wrote, "have been put forward as criteria of the meaningfulness of sentences (rather than as criteria of demarcation applicable to theoretical systems) again and again after the publication of my book, even by
844:
with existing technologies. There is no requirement that the potential falsifier can actually show the law to be false. The purely logical contradiction, together with the material requirement, are sufficient. The logical part consists of theories, statements, and their purely logical relationship
3050:
In Lakatos terminology, the term "falsified" has a different meaning for a naive falsificationist than for a sophisticated falsificationist. Putting aside this confusing terminological aspect, the key point is that Lakatos wanted a formal logical procedure to determine which theories we must keep
1816:
says that both Lakatos's and Popper's methodology are not inductive. Yet Lakatos's methodology extended importantly Popper's methodology: it added a historiographical component to it. This allowed Lakatos to find corroborations for his methodology in the history of science. The basic units in his
1757:
once expressed the view that if Hume's problem cannot be solved, “there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity” and actually proposed a method of justification. He rejected Hume's premise that there is a need to justify any principle that is itself used to justify induction. It
1602:
and argued before by Popper, the individual outcomes described in detail will easily have very small probabilities under available evidence without being genuine anomalies. Nevertheless, Mayo adds, "they can indirectly falsify hypotheses by adding a methodological falsification rule". In general,
1152:
is high." Here "fitness" means "reproductive success over the next generation". It is a basic statement, because it is possible to separately determine the kind of environment, industrial vs natural, and the relative fitness of the white-bodied form (relative to the black-bodied form) in an area,
944:
Popper says that despite the fact that the empirical basis can be shaky, more comparable to a swamp than to solid ground, the definition that is given above is simply the formalization of a natural requirement on scientific theories, without which the whole logical process of science would not be
856:
So observations have two purposes in Popper's view. On the methodological side, observations can be used to show that a law is false, which Popper calls falsification. On the logical side, observations, which are purely logical constructions, do not show a law to be false, but contradict a law to
3070:
Rules like these, and with them the entire logical enterprise described above, are no longer simply syntactic in their import. They require that both the epistemological investigator and the research scientist be able to relate sentences derived from a theory not to other sentences but to actual
1719:
among the basic statements, making statistical laws falsifiable and applying the refutation to the specific theory (instead of an auxiliary hypothesis). The experimental falsifiers and falsifications thus depend on decisions made by scientists in view of the currently accepted technology and its
1289:
is specified. Maxwell said that most scientific laws are metaphysical statements of this kind, which, Popper said, need to be made more precise before they can be indirectly corroborated. In other words, specific technologies must be provided to make the statements inter-subjectively-verifiable,
1250:
discussed statements such as "All men are mortal." This is not falsifiable, because it does not matter how old a man is, maybe he will die next year. Maxwell said that this statement is nevertheless useful, because it is often corroborated. He coined the term "corroboration without demarcation".
805:
Popper was interested in the overall learning process in science, to quasi-induction, which he also called the "path of science". However, Popper did not show much interest in these reasoning patterns, which he globally referred to as psychologism. He did not deny the possibility of some kind of
1825:
no more falsifiable by 'observable states of affairs' than is Freud's." According to David Stove, Lakatos succeeded, since Lakatos showed there is no such thing as a "non-Newtonian" behaviour of an observable object. Stove argued that Popper's counterexamples to Lakatos were either instances of
748:
in the 1910s. It did not matter what observation was presented, psychoanalysis could explain it. Unfortunately, the reason it could explain everything is that it did not exclude anything also. For Popper, this was a failure, because it meant that it could not make any prediction. From a logical
736:
wanted to formalize the idea that, for a law to be scientific, it must be possible to argue on the basis of observations either in favor of its truth or its falsity. There was no consensus among these philosophers about how to achieve that, but the thought expressed by Mach's dictum that "where
1770:
Popper's philosophy is sometimes said to fail to recognize the Quine-Duhem thesis, which would make it a form of dogmatic falsificationism. For example, Watkins wrote "apparently forgetting that he had once said 'Duhem is right ', Popper set out to devise potential falsifiers just for Newton's
1797:
Popper also offered a methodology with rules, but these rules are also not-inductive rules, because they are not by themselves used to accept laws or establish their validity. They do that through the creativity or "good judgment" of the scientists only. For Popper, the required non deductive
1597:
emphasizes the importance of prior probabilities. But, as far as falsification as a yes/no procedure in Popper's methodology is concerned, any approach that provides a way to accept or not a potential falsifier can be used, including approaches that use Bayes' theorem and estimations of prior
1119:
Another example of a basic statement is "The inert mass of this object is ten times larger than its gravitational mass." This is a basic statement because the inert mass and the gravitational mass can both be measured separately, even though it never happens that they are different. It is, as
818:
In practice, some steps based on observations can be justified under assumptions, which can be very natural. For example, Bayesian inductive logic is justified by theorems that make explicit assumptions. These theorems are obtained with deductive logic, not inductive logic. They are sometimes
2259:
as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept—falsifiable in principle, one might say—rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by
1610:
Because statisticians often associate statistical inference with induction, Popper's philosophy is often said to have a hidden form of induction. For example, Mayo wrote "The falsifying hypotheses ... necessitate an evidence-transcending (inductive) statistical inference. This is hugely
1761:
Therefore, Lakatos urged Popper to find an inductive principle behind the trial and error learning process and sophisticated falsificationism was his own approach to address this challenge. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Musgrave and others mentioned and Lakatos himself acknowledged that, as a method of
352:
Popper's response is that falsifiability does not have the Duhem problem because it is a logical criterion. Experimental research has the Duhem problem and other problems, such as the problem of induction, but, according to Popper, statistical tests, which are only possible when a theory is
1748:
Hume explained induction with a theory of the mind that was in part inspired by Newton's theory of gravitation. Popper rejected Hume's explanation of induction and proposed his own mechanism: science progresses by trial and error within an evolutionary epistemology. Hume believed that his
1276:
Maxwell also used the example "All solids have a melting point." This is not falsifiable, because maybe the melting point will be reached at a higher temperature. The law is falsifiable and more useful if we specify an upper bound on melting points or a way to calculate this upper bound.
2439:, Sec. 1.8: "The fundamental difference between my approach and the approach for which I long ago introduced the label 'inductivist' is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted refutations—in short, criticism".
1171:
is " fossil rabbits in the Precambrian era." This is a basic statement because it is possible to find a fossil rabbit and to determine that the date of a fossil is in the Precambrian era, even though it never happens that the date of a rabbit fossil is in the Precambrian era. Despite
2454:, p. 1005: "Newton's theory ... would equally be contradicted if the apples from one of my, or Newton's, apple trees were to rise from the ground (without there being a whirling about), and begin to dance round the branches of the apple tree from which they had fallen."
3108:, Introduction, V: "The hope further to strengthen this theory of the aims of science by the definition of verisimilitude in terms of truth and of content was, unfortunately, vain. But the widely held view that scrapping this definition weakens my theory is completely baseless."
957:
singular statements than we can deduce from the initial conditions alone." A singular statement that has one part only cannot contradict a universal law. A falsifier of a law has always two parts: the initial condition and the singular statement that contradicts the prediction.
891:. They are the statements that can be used to show the falsifiability of a theory. Popper says that basic statements do not have to be possible in practice. It is sufficient that they are accepted by convention as belonging to the empirical language, a language that allows
1395:
wrote, "One reason why mathematics enjoys special esteem, above all other sciences, is that its laws are absolutely certain and indisputable, while those of other sciences are to some extent debatable and in constant danger of being overthrown by newly discovered facts."
768:
a single solution to both: a statement that could not be verified was considered meaningless. In opposition to this view, Popper said that there are meaningful theories that are not scientific, and that, accordingly, a criterion of meaningfulness does not coincide with a
3188:, pp. 116–117: "The methodology of research programmes was criticized both by Feyerabend and by Kuhn. According to Kuhn: ' must specify criteria which can be used at the time to distinguish a degenerative from a progressive research programme; and so on. Otherwise,
2191:
The falsifiability criterion is formulated in terms of basic statements or observation statements without requiring that we know which ones of these observation statements correspond to actual facts. These basic statements break the symmetry, while being purely logical
1622:
divided the problems of falsification in two categories. The first category corresponds to decisions that must be agreed upon by scientists before they can falsify a theory. The other category emerges when one tries to use falsifications and corroborations to explain
3334:): "The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them."
3173:, Sec. 1.2.b: The other alternative is to ... replace the naive versions of methodological falsificationism ... by a sophisticated version which would give a new rationale of falsification and thereby rescue methodology and the idea of scientific progress.
1564:
David H. Kaye said that references to the Daubert majority opinion confused falsifiability and falsification and that "inquiring into the existence of meaningful attempts at falsification is an appropriate and crucial consideration in admissibility determinations."
1817:
methodology, which can be abandoned or pursued, are research programmes. Research programmes can be degenerative or progressive and only degenerative research programmes must be abandoned at some point. For Lakatos, this is mostly corroborated by facts in history.
2343:, part I, chap. 2, sec. 11: " dispense with the principle of induction: not because such a principle is as a matter of fact never used in science, but because I think that it is not needed; that it does not help us; and that it even gives rise to inconsistencies."
1500:
While anybody is free to approach a scientific inquiry in any fashion they choose, they cannot properly describe the methodology as scientific, if they start with the conclusion and refuse to change it regardless of the evidence developed during the course of the
3253:) I have argued that this demand no longer restricts scientific practice. Any development agrees with it. The demand (standard) is rational, but it is also empty. Rationalism and the demands of reason have become purely verbal in the theory of Lakatos." See also
3024:, p. 27: "The theory of method, in so far as it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of the relations between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of methods—with decisions about the way in which scientific statements are to be dealt with."
1431:
case (in 1993) and other cases. A survey of 303 federal judges conducted in 1998 found that "roblems with the nonfalsifiable nature of an expert's underlying theory and difficulties with an unknown or too-large error rate were cited in less than 2% of cases."
882:
In Popper's view of science, statements of observation can be analyzed within a logical structure independently of any factual observations. The set of all purely logical observations that are considered constitutes the empirical basis. Popper calls them the
982:
have studied the semantic aspects of the logical side of falsifiability. These studies were done in the perspective that a logic is a relation between formal sentences in languages and a collection of mathematical structures. The relation, usually denoted
1147:
In a discussion of the theory of evolution, Popper mentioned industrial melanism as an example of a falsifiable law. A corresponding basic statement that acts as a potential falsifier is "In this industrial area, the relative fitness of the white-bodied
5792:
Word and Flux: The Discrete and the Continuous in Computation, Philosophy, and Psychology. Volume I: From Pythagoras to the Digital Computer, The Intellectual Roots of Symbolic Artificial Intelligence, with a Summary of Volume II Continuous Theories of
1598:
probabilities that are made using critical discussions and reasonable assumptions taken from the background knowledge. There is no general rule that considers as falsified an hypothesis with small Bayesian revised probability, because as pointed out by
1192:
1176:, sometimes wrongly attributed to Popper, this shows the scientific character of paleontology or the history of the evolution of life on Earth, because it contradicts the hypothesis in paleontology that all mammals existed in a much more recent era.
2508:, Sec. 4), there is no discussion of factual observations except in those tests that compare the theory with factual observations, but in these tests too the procedure is mostly logical and involves observations that are only logical constructions (
3161:, Sec. 1.1: I shall try to explain—and further strengthen—this stronger Popperian position which, I think, may escape Kuhn's strictures and present scientific revolutions not as constituting religious conversions but rather as rational progress.
1284:
are accompanied with a neutrino emission from the same nucleus." This is also not falsifiable, because maybe the neutrino can be detected in a different manner. The law is falsifiable and much more useful from a scientific point of view, if the
1603:
Bayesian statistic can play a role in critical rationalism in the context of inductive logic, which is said to be inductive because implications are generalized to conditional probabilities. According to Popper and other philosophers such as
1665:
of the theory that celestial bodies are faultless crystal balls. Many considered that it was the optical theory of the telescope that was false, not the theory of celestial bodies. Another example is the theory that neutrinos are emitted in
1710:
replaces the contradicting observation in a falsification with a "contradicting observation" accepted by convention among scientists, a convention that implies four kinds of decisions that have these respective goals: the selection of all
1647:
as his own improvement on Popper's philosophy, but also said that Popper some times appears as a sophisticated falsificationist. Popper responded that Lakatos misrepresented his intellectual history with these terminological distinctions.
1752:
As rational as they can be, these explanations that refer to laws, but cannot be turned into methods of justification (and thus do not contradict Hume's argument or its premises), were not sufficient for some philosophers. In particular,
811:
we use to pick one theory among theories that are already conjectured. His methodological answer to the latter question is that we pick the theory that is the most tested with the available technology: "the one, which in the light of our
2533:
In practice, technologies change. When the interpretation of a theory is modified by an improved technological interpretation of some properties, the new theory can be seen as the same theory with an enlarged scope. For example,
864:
Popper wrote that an entire literature exists because this distinction between the logical aspect and the methodological aspect was not observed. This is still seen in a more recent literature. For example, in their 2019 article
1956: – Encryption techniques where an adversary cannot prove that the plaintext data exists - claim that a ciphertext decrypts to a particular plaintext can be falsified by possible decryption to another potential plaintext
1657:
exhibit a certain law-like behaviour" (Popper). This leads to the critique that it is unclear which theory is falsified. Is it the one that is being studied or the one behind the observation? This is sometimes called the '
790:, professor of psychology, also accepted Hume's conclusion that induction has no justification. For him induction does not require justification and therefore can exist in the same manner as Popper's quasi-induction does.
823:
perspective, a perspective that is widely accepted by philosophers, including Popper, every logical step of learning only creates an assumption or reinstates one that was doubted—that is all that science logically does.
1829:, such as Popper's example of missiles moving in a "non-Newtonian track", or consistent with Newtonian physics, such as objects not falling to the ground without "obvious" countervailing forces against Earth's gravity.
937:, an actual agreement is needed. This may require using a deeper empirical basis, hidden within the current empirical basis, to make sure that the properties or values used in the falsifier were obtained correctly (
2157:, Chap.2, Sec.5: (emphasis added) "uman language is essentially descriptive (and argumentative), and an unambiguous description is always realistic: it is of something—of some state of affairs which may be real or
2781:, p. 90: "If, more especially, we accept that statistical definition of fitness which defines fitness by actual survival, then the theory of the survival of the fittest becomes tautological, and irrefutable."
2542:, p. 43) wrote: "But Popper's falsifiability or testability criterion does not presuppose that a definite distinction between testable and non testable statement is possible ... technology changes. Thus
2318:
Popper's argument is that inductive inference is a fallacy : "I hold with Hume that there simply is no such logical entity as an inductive inference; or, that all so-called inductive inferences are logically
2949:
As Lakatos pointed out, scientists decide among themselves using critical discussions which potential falsifiers are accepted. There is no strict constraints on which method can be used to take the decision.
260:, but even with no black swans to possibly falsify it, "All swans are white" would still be shown falsifiable by "Here is a black swan"—a black swan would still be a state of affairs, only an imaginary one.
1540:
Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.
2729:, p. 46: "he existential quantifier in the symbolized version of "Every solid has a melting point" is not inevitable; rather this statement is actually a negligent phrasing of what we really mean."
1538:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.
1573:
Considering the specific detection procedure that was used in the neutrino experiment, without mentioning its probabilistic aspect, Popper wrote "it provided a test of the much more significant
712:
For Popper, induction is actually never needed in science. Instead, in Popper's view, laws are conjectured in a non-logical manner on the basis of expectations and predispositions. This has led
5959:
Musgrave, Alan (1976). "Method or Madness?: Can the Methodology of Research Programmes Be Rescued From Epistemological Anarchism?". In Cohen, R.S.; Feyerabend, P.K.; Wartofsky, M. W. (eds.).
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1011:
10276:
3012:, p. 32): "Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic"
3037:, p. 149): "The important question of the possibility of a genuine logic of discovery" is the main divergence between Lakatos and Popper. About Popper's view, Zahar wrote (see
1898:
would be the only candidate. For Feyerabend, any special status that science might have, derives from the social and physical value of the results of science rather than its method.
2268:"I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression
853:
regard to the falsifiability of a theory, because basic statements are not required to be possible. Methodological rules are only needed in the context of actual falsifications.
307:
Popper emphasized the asymmetry created by the relation of a universal law with basic observation statements and contrasted falsifiability to the intuitively similar concept of
1643:
does not do anything to address the second type of problems. Lakatos used dogmatic and naive falsificationism to explain how Popper's philosophy changed over time and viewed
1055:
138:
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632:
3120:, Sec. 3: Hume explicitly models his account of the fundamental principles of the mind's operations—the principles of association—on the idea of gravitational attraction.
4868:
586:
494:
1325:, as a synonym for "Natural Selection". Popper and others said that, if one uses the most widely accepted definition of "fitness" in modern biology (see subsection
1079:
1031:
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observations and experiments. This is the context in which Sir Karl's term 'falsification' must function, and Sir Karl is entirely silent about how it can do so."
678:
655:
560:
537:
1293:
In his critique of the falsifiability criterion, Maxwell considered the requirement for decisions in the falsification of, both, the emission of neutrinos (see
606:
514:
471:
451:
6026:
Pera, Marcello (1989). "Methodological Sophisticationism: A Degenerating Project". In Gavroglou, Kōstas; Goudaroulis, Yorgos; Nicolacopoulos, Pantelis (eds.).
914:
Thornton says that basic statements are statements that correspond to particular "observation-reports". He then gives Popper's definition of falsifiability:
1101:
that was a potential falsifier for Newton's theory, because the position of the apple at different times can be measured. Popper's claims on this point are
2854:
Surveys were mailed to all active U.S. district court judges in November 1998 (N = 619). 303 usable surveys were obtained for a response rate of 51%. See
2202:
1821:
Zahar's view was that, with regard to corroborations found in the history of science, there was only a difference of emphasis between Popper and Lakatos.
5611:
345:
says that definitive experimental falsifications are impossible and that no scientific hypothesis is by itself capable of making predictions, because an
5911:
1210:
Even if it is accepted that angels exist, "All angels have large wings" is not falsifiable, because no technology exists to identify and observe angels.
953:
In his analysis of the scientific nature of universal laws, Popper arrived at the conclusion that laws must "allow us to deduce, roughly speaking, more
402:? This is the problem of induction. Suppose we want to put the hypothesis that all swans are white to the test. We come across a white swan. We cannot
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6924:
4807:
11140:
6988:
2178:, to conform to the original, thus refused to make substantial corrections and only added notes and appendices and marked them with an asterisk (see
5471:
1925:
see postmodernist epistemological relativism as a reaction to Popper's description of falsifiability, and more generally, to his theory of science.
1689:
Lakatos says that Popper's solution to these criticisms requires that one relaxes the assumption that an observation can show a theory to be false:
7730:
1679:
1247:
6825:
6293:
Rosende, Diego L. (2009). "Popper on Refutability: Some Philosophical and Historical Questions". In Parusnikova, Zuzana; Cohen, Robert S. (eds.).
3149:, p. 167: "Lakatos urged Popper explicitly to adopt some inductive principle which would synthetically link verisimilitude to corroboration."
2415:, Sec. 85: "What I have here in mind is not a picture of science as a biological phenomenon ...: I have in mind its epistemological aspects."
1358:
8884:
2535:
737:
neither confirmation nor refutation is possible, science is not concerned" was accepted as a basic precept of critical reflection about science.
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6724:
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326:. He insisted that, as a logical criterion, his falsifiability is distinct from the related concept "capacity to be proven wrong" discussed in
423:
Popper's idea to solve this problem is that while it is impossible to verify that every swan is white, finding a single black swan shows that
8841:
6845:. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 25–37.
6099:
4886:
1427:
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6694:
2895:
case and other cases considered the original Daubert factors, but the amended rule, rule 702, even though it is often referred to as the
1762:
justification, this attempt failed, because there was no normative methodology to justify—Lakatos's methodology was anarchy in disguise.
142:
6565:
2471:, Sec. 8.52) liked to refer to invisible strings instead of some abstract law to explain this kind of evidence against Newton's Gravity.
5586:
10453:
4663:
Andersson, Gunnar (2016). "The Problem of the Empirical Basis in Critical Rationalism". In Shearmur, Jeremy; Stokes, Geoffrey (eds.).
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Lakatos says that Popper is not the sophisticated falsificationist that he describes, but not the naive falsificationist either (see
2651:
2266:
in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable").
8940:
1387:. Methods of the mathematical sciences are, however, applied in constructing and testing scientific models dealing with observable
1095:
6654:
11364:
9759:
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5674:
368:, falsifiability has featured prominently in many scientific controversies and applications, even being used as legal precedent.
3211:, p. 458). Musgrave added: 'Lakatos deprived his standards of practical force, and adopted a position of "anything goes"' (
8236:
6030:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 111. Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169–187.
2674:
If the criteria to identify an angel was simply to observe large wings, then "this angel does not have large wings" would be a
1662:
1207:
1105:, since Newtonian physics does not deny that there could be forces acting on the apple that are stronger than Earth's gravity.
1363:
Popper said that not all unfalsifiable statements are useless in science. Mathematical statements are good examples. Like all
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5623:. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press.
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2480:
The requirement that the language must be empirical is known in the literature as the material requirement. For example, see
7516:. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant (1998 ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
7436:
7416:
5260:
5045:
716:, a student and collaborator of Popper, to write "the mission is to classify truths, not to certify them". In contrast, the
10636:
5151:
Feyerabend, Paul (1978). "On the Critique of Scientific Reason". In Wartofsky, M.W.; Feyerabend, P.K.; Cohen, R.S. (eds.).
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5114:
4802:
2209:. Had the presumption concerning black swans in this metaphor be right, the statement would still have been falsifiable.
1114:
6986:
Zahar, E. G. (1983). "The Popper-Lakatos Controversy in the Light of 'Die Beiden Grundprobleme Der Erkenntnistheorie'".
10165:
8912:
8660:
5594:
588:"the specific swan here is not white" (say black), then "all swans are white" is false. More accurately, the statement
7222:
Derksen, A. A. (November 1985). "The Alleged Unity of Popper's Philosophy of Science: Falsifiability as Fake Cement".
4864:
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life
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237:
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5619:
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970) . "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.).
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Different ways are used by statisticians to draw conclusions about hypotheses on the basis of available evidence.
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986:
76:
11316:
10704:
9870:
9533:
2201:"All swans are white" is often chosen as an example of a falsifiable statement, because for some 1500 years, the
895:: "they must be testable by intersubjective observation (the material requirement)". See the examples in section
201:
146:
38:
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794:
for induction and that's ok, because the induction steps do not require justification. Instead, these steps use
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2488:, Sec 2.c. This requirement says that the statements that describe observations, the basic statements, must be
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1593:
proposed approaches that require no prior probabilities on the hypotheses that are being studied. In contrast,
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3820:
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10724:
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10306:
9965:
5926:
4667:. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 125–142.
2974:, pp. 22–25. A fifth decision is mentioned later by Lakatos to allow even more theories to be falsified.
2489:
892:
841:
6636:
Thompson, N.S. (1981). "Toward a falsifiable theory of evolution.". In Bateson, P.G.; Klopfer, P.H. (eds.).
5740:
Lehmann, Erich Leo (1993). "The Fisher, Neyman-Pearson Theories of Testing Hypotheses: One Theory or Two?".
5587:"Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials"
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9847:
9393:
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8710:
7721:
7196:
7108:"Falsificationism and Statistical Learning Theory: Comparing the Popper and Vapnik-Chervonenkis Dimensions"
5585:
Krafka, Carol L.; Miletich, D. Dean P.; Cecil, Joe S.; Dunn, Meghan A.; Johnson, Mary T. (September 2002).
4892:
4656:
Criticism and the History of Science: Kuhn's, Lakatos's and Feyerabend's Criticisms of Critical Rationalism
3702:
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2064:
1306:
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even though it never happens that the white-bodied form has a high relative fitness in an industrial area.
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10311:
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9245:
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8705:
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8521:
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Koterski, Artur (2011). "The Rise and Fall of Falsificationism in the Light of Neurath's Criticism1". In
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Kuhn, Thomas S. (1974) . "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?". In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.).
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Ebbinghaus, H.-D. (2017). "Extended Logics: The General Framework". In Barwise, J.; Feferman, S. (eds.).
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Popper, Karl (1989). "Zwei Bedeutungen von Falsifizierbarkeit ". In Seiffert, H.; Radnitzky, G. (eds.).
7752:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
7715:
7339:"A Vast Graveyard of Undead Theories: Publication Bias and Psychological Science's Aversion to the Null"
5461:
1982:
1548:
he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability
845:
together with this material requirement, which is needed for a connection with the methodological part.
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5907:
5875:
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713:
7949:
Popper, Karl (26 February 1982). "Les chemins de la verite: L'Express va plus loin avec Karl Popper".
7907:
Ploch, Stefan (2003). "Metatheoretical problems in phonology with Occam's Razor and non-ad-hoc-ness".
7598:. Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective. Vol. 2. New York: Springer. pp. 487–498.
5109:
2621:: "Since m measures fitness to survive by the objective fact of representation in future generations,"
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1971:
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1534:, which include falsifiability. The Daubert result cited Popper and other philosophers of science:
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417:
83:
7995:
Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics: From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery
2272:
as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of
2153:
Popper discusses the notion of imaginary state of affairs in the context of scientific realism in
1371:
world, but rather, mathematics is occupied with the theoretical, abstract study of such topics as
680:"the thing here is a white swan". If what is observed is C being true while P is false (formally,
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5525:"On 'Falsification' and 'Falsifiability': The First Daubert Factor and the Philosophy of Science"
1546:); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) (
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Elkana, Yehuda (2018). "Einstein and God". In Galison, P.L.; Holton, G.; Schweber, S.S. (eds.).
6891:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 3. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 3–13.
1354:
1329:), namely reproductive success itself, the expression "survival of the fittest" is a tautology.
757:"falsifications" that show that the law makes risky predictions, which is completely different.
133:
may contain an excessive amount of intricate detail that may interest only a particular audience
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7637:. Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 10. Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier. pp. 43–91.
3008:
Popper clearly distinguishes between the methodological rules and the rules of pure logic (see
2691:
1965:
1807:
1658:
1627:. Lakatos described four kind of falsificationisms in view of how they address these problems.
764:
had mixed two different problems, that of meaning and that of demarcation, and had proposed in
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6179:
4950:
Understanding Psychology as a Science: An Introduction to Scientific and Statistical Inference
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3258:
3250:
3033:
Zahar wrote a brief summary of Lakatos's position regarding Popper's philosophy. He says (see
2504:
In Popper's description of the scientific procedure of testing, as explained by Thornton (see
1635:
addresses the first type of problems by accepting that decisions must be taken by scientists.
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Lakatos, Imre (1974) . "Popper on demarcation and induction". In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.).
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often falsified. He also said that astrologers themselves acknowledged these falsifications.
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861:, these contradictions establish the value of the law, which may eventually be corroborated.
565:
276:
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Binns, Peter (March 1978). "The Supposed Asymmetry between Falsification and Verification".
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Maxwell, Grover (1974). "Corroboration without demarcation". In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.).
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Elgin, Mehmet; Sober, Elliott (2017). "Popper's Shifting Appraisal of Evolutionary Theory".
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1693:
If a theory is falsified , it is proven false; if it is 'falsified' , it may still be true.
753:, contradictions with observations are not used to support eventual falsifications, but for
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Watkins, John (1970). "Against 'Normal Science'". In Lakatos, Imre; Musgrave, Alan (eds.).
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319:
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5155:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Vol. 39. pp. 109–143.
1367:, mathematics is not concerned with the validity of theories based on observations in the
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7289:"Evolution experiments with microorganisms: the dynamics and genetic bases of adaptation"
6887:
Watkins, John (1989). "The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: A Retrospect".
2044:
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1976:
1953:
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On the basic philosophical side of this issue, Popper said that some philosophers of the
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44:
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6647:"29+ Evidences for Macroevolution: The Scientific Case for Common Descent, Version 2.87"
6195:
Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery
4725:
3726:
2924:, United Nations special rapporteur. David H. Kaye is distinguished professor of law at
2597:
Popper put as an example of falsifiable statement with failed falsifications Einstein's
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112 MERCER STREET: Einstein, Russell, Godel, Pauli, and the End of Innocence in Science
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2020: – Paradox arising from the question of what constitutes evidence for a statement
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he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test
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6330:"The Beauty of Kettlewell's Classic Experimental Demonstration of Natural Selection"
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wrote, the possibility that this strength was sufficiently high was a "pious hope".
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i.e., so that scientists know what the falsification or its failure actually means.
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Gawronski, Bertram; Bodenhausen, Galen V. (7 January 2015) . "Theory Evaluation".
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1715:(statements that correspond to logically possible observations), selection of the
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7876:. Synthese Library. Vol. 177. Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 18–60.
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Thornton, Stephen (2007). "Popper, Basic Statements and the Quine-Duhem Thesis".
6302:
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The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers
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The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science
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rejected any prescriptive methodology at all. He rejected Lakatos's argument for
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412:) from "here is a white swan" to "all swans are white"; doing so would require a
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Research Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers
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2702:
2700:
1199:
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The elusive distinction between the logic of science and its applied methodology
275:
standard of evaluation of scientific theories and hypotheses, introduced by the
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The references used may be made clearer with a different or consistent style of
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Popper gives an example of a methodological rule that uses corroborations (see
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that can be deduced is broken into an initial condition and a prediction as in
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Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars
5790:
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Broad, W. J. (2 November 1979). "Paul Feyerabend: Science and the Anarchist".
3405:
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Popper said that a demarcation criterion was possible, but we have to use the
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Einstein for the 21st Century: His Legacy in Science, Art, and Modern Culture
6969:
Einstein for the 21st Century: His Legacy in Science, Art, and Modern Culture
6780:
6585:
6385:
6367:
6320:
6184:
6128:
Popper, Karl (1974). "Replies to my Critics". In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.).
5562:(1st English ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
5100:
4967:
4779:
4757:
4741:
4698:
4690:
3750:
2899:, does not include the original Daubert factors or mention falsifiability or
2867:
The Daubert case and subsequent cases that used it as a reference, including
2697:
2017:
1950: – Reasoning that is rationally compelling, though not deductively valid
1921:
1333:
1120:
described by Popper, a valid falsifier for Einstein's equivalence principle.
761:
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This perspective can be found in any text on model theory. For example, see
1489:
Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and
1220:
actions are egotistic, motivated by self-interest" is thus not falsifiable.
145:
any relevant information, and removing excessive detail that may be against
11146:
10944:
10875:
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10529:
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10355:
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8245:
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8095:
7951:
7710:
7591:
7583:
7472:
Johansson, Lars-Goran (2015). "Theories About the Development of Science".
7364:
7312:
6951:
6821:
6788:
6710:
6355:
6297:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 135–154.
5665:
5401:
5384:
5348:
4733:
3758:
3142:
3140:
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2106: – Degree to which an observation is affected by one's presuppositions
1619:
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1590:
1586:
1465:
729:
8037:
8002:
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2245:, Introduction 1982: "We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions
1139:
750:
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10840:
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10673:
10495:
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10000:
9995:
9925:
9900:
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8276:
6860:
5638:
4749:
2900:
2032: – Interplay between observation, experiment, and theory in science
1959:
1843:
1359:
Philosophy of mathematics § Popper's two senses of number statements
1258:
948:
820:
395:
377:
361:
335:
279:
8862:
8201:
7145:
7049:
6508:"Quantification of Theoretical Terms and the Falsifiability of Theories"
6413:"Falsifiability and the Semantic Eliminability of Theoretical Languages"
6170:
5542:
5091:
Feldman, Burton; Williams, Katherine (2007). Williams, Katherine (ed.).
3135:
2591:
1542:
Green 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 49 (1966) (
872:
744:
of falsifications, which is falsifiability. He cited his encounter with
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2076: – Ability of a scientific theory to generate testable predictions
1917:
1813:
1736:
Popper's way to analyze progress in science was through the concept of
1667:
1496:
In his conclusion related to this criterion Judge Overton stated that:
1368:
1321:, Darwin used "Survival of the fittest", an expression first coined by
1281:
782:
318:
Popper proposed falsifiability as the cornerstone solution to both the
293:
257:
9722:
8074:
Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge
7009:
6531:
6491:
6436:
6188:. Vol. 87, no. 1215. Reed Business Information. p. 611.
4789:"On falsifiability and the null hypothesis in discussions and debates"
3742:
2732:
2527:
1464:
as such (it can be taught as religion). In his testimony, philosopher
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11048:
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10155:
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6467:
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Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science
3269:
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2824:
2715:
by virtue of being a consequence of a corroborated falsifiable theory
2302:
1979: – Principle that allows one to eliminate unlikely explanations
1869:
1860:
1779:
1678:
used to detect the neutrinos was not sufficiently high. At the time,
1376:
733:
272:
8114:
Cognitive Economy: The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge
7978:(in German) (1992 ed.). München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.
7304:
6147:
Popper, Karl (1978). "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind".
5805:
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3581:
3579:
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test of the hypothesis requires one or more background assumptions.
330:. Even being a logical criterion, its purpose is to make the theory
10760:
10100:
9355:
9073:
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7955:(Interview). Interviewed by S. Lannes and A. Boyer. pp. 82–88.
7764:
6925:"Testing the null hypothesis: the forgotten legacy of Karl Popper?"
3337:
3238:
3236:
2748:
2656:
2544:
a hypotheses that was first untestable may become testable later on
2097: – Obsolete theories in natural philosophy and natural history
2014: – Evolutionary biology hypothetical posed by J. B. S. Haldane
1458:
1384:
1372:
1337:
part of an important and successful metaphysical research program.
1180:
adds that any other modern animal, such as a hippo, would suffice.
776:
6548:"Philosophie of science and its relevance for the social sciences"
5321:
4499:
4352:
3264:
3152:
2772:
832:
Popper distinguished between the logic of science and its applied
10366:
9955:
9053:
8551:
6468:"Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories"
6452:
3572:
2784:
2430:
1388:
427:
every swan is white. Such falsification uses the valid inference
9737:
6591:
Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science
6230:
The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality
5280:. Continuum Studies in Philosophy. London; New York: Continuum.
3996:
3884:
3882:
3796:
3233:
2668:
2406:
2038: – research collaboration by scientists with opposing views
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10348:
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6084:
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
4256:
3283:
3181:
3179:
3002:
2796:
2394:
1854:
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8032:. Translated by Pickel, Andreas. London; New York: Routledge.
7872:(1984) . "Notes on Popper as Follower of Whewell and Peirce".
4388:
4232:
4220:
4109:
3521:
3357:
2382:
2185:
1832:
1453:
used falsifiability as one of the criteria to determine that "
1254:
1183:
562:"the specific swan here is white", but if what is observed is
252:
11515:
10614:
8765:
8411:
7673:(2017). "Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism".
5195:
Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge
3971:
3969:
3879:
3632:
3630:
2836:
1468:
defined the characteristics which constitute science as (see
1380:
896:
7629:
Lange, Marc (2008). "Hume and the Problem of Induction". In
5866: (Eastern District of Arkansas 5 January 1982),
5725:(1980 ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5721:
Lakatos, Imre (1978). Worrall, John; Curry, Gregory (eds.).
4415:
4340:
3603:
3550:
3548:
3381:
3223:
3221:
3176:
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3074:
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6640:. Vol. 4. New York: Plenum Publishing. pp. 51–73.
6347:
10.1641/0006-3568(2005)055[0369:TBOKCE]2.0.CO;2
4439:
4328:
3615:
3560:
3123:
3099:
1569:
Connections between statistical theories and falsifiability
1216:
sentence "All angels have large wings" is not falsifiable.
1084:
371:
5426:. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. IX–XXI.
5424:
Can theories be refuted?: essays on the Duhem–Quine thesis
5309:
British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology
4764:(4th ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
4607:
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3627:
3460:
3458:
3393:
2370:
2312:
2219:
2217:
2215:
1765:
16:
Property of a statement that can be logically contradicted
6132:. Vol. II. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 961–1197.
5489:
Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief
4631:
4405:
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4364:
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4032:
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2174:
Popper wanted the main text of the 1959 English version,
1814:§ Methodless creativity versus inductive methodology
1102:
1057:—it provides the semantic of the languages. According to
967:
critics who pooh-poohed my criterion of falsifiability."
781:
The problem of induction is often called Hume's problem.
7909:
Living on the Edge: 28 Papers in Honour of Jonathan Kaye
7549:"Hume and Contemporary Philosophy: Legacy and Prospects"
7155:
Why Trust a Theory?: Epistemology of Fundamental Physics
7059:
The Methodology of Economics: Or, How Economists Explain
5991:
Tower of Babel: The Evidence Against the New Creationism
5650:. Vol. II. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 798–819.
3015:
2168:
2149:
2147:
2114: – Questioning of claims lacking empirical evidence
8116:. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp.
8076:. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp.
8030:
The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge
7094:
6362:. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
5835:. Vol. I. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 292–321.
5706:. Vol. I. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 241–273.
4583:
4547:
4535:
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4451:
4193:
3954:
3591:
3455:
3431:
2720:
2212:
2099:
Pages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
2090:
Pages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
1801:
1530:, the court described scientific methodology using the
7152:
5679:(3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
5176:
Problems of Empiricism: Volume 2: Philosophical Papers
4487:
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2447:
2445:
1674:, many would have considered that the strength of the
1351:
Scientific method § Relationship with mathematics
949:
Initial condition and prediction in falsifiers of laws
7153:
Dardashti, R.; Dawid, R.; Thébault, K., eds. (2019).
5385:"Induction versus Popper: substance versus semantics"
4979:. Perspectives in Logic. Cambridge University Press.
4697:
4523:
4358:
4244:
3825:
3823:
3808:
3475:
3473:
2500:
2498:
2144:
2061: – Proposed description of the scientific method
1483:
It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law;
1067:
1039:
1019:
989:
873:
Basic statements and the definition of falsifiability
686:
663:
640:
614:
594:
568:
545:
522:
502:
479:
459:
439:
7916:
Popper, Karl (1976). Bartley III, William W. (ed.).
7804:
Out of Error: Further Essays on Critical Rationalism
7398:
6759:
Waddington, C.H. (1959). "Evolutionary Adaptation".
6113:(2003 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
5937:
Morris, William Edward; Brown, Charlotte R. (2021).
5305:"Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics"
5212:
Fine, Kit (2019). "Verisimilitude and Truthmaking".
4705:. Berkeley, University of California. 18 April 2022.
4511:
4316:
4304:
4181:
4169:
4066:
3906:
3642:
3533:
3200:
3198:
2678:
contradiction and thus not a basic statement anyway.
2346:
2069:
Pages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback
2040:
Pages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback
8028:Popper, Karl (2009) . Eggers Hansen, Troels (ed.).
4619:
4571:
4280:
4268:
4205:
4121:
4094:
3942:
3930:
3765:
3485:
3443:
2903:and neither does the majority opinion delivered by
2442:
2288:
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1108:
909:
857:show its falsifiability. Unlike falsifications and
8144:
8107:
8067:
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6805:
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5858:
4825:The Philosophy of Science: Science and Objectivity
4595:
4115:
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3509:
3470:
2964:
2808:
2608:
2495:
2334:
2195:
2126: – In logic, a statement which is always true
1870:Epistemological anarchism vs the scientific method
1780:Methodless creativity versus inductive methodology
1507:
1081:contain such a contradicting set of observations.
1073:
1049:
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701:
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554:
531:
508:
488:
465:
445:
360:As a key notion in the separation of science from
7922:(2002 ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
7383:Four Central Issues in Popper's Theory of Science
6989:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
6554:. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. pp. 5–20.
6512:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
6472:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
6417:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
5060:
4559:
4376:
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1744:From the problem of induction to falsificationism
1457:" was not scientific and should not be taught in
1242:
970:
11554:
7337:Ferguson, Christopher J.; Heene, Moritz (2012).
7078:Language and Empiricism: After the Vienna Circle
2457:
2283:
2055: – Ability of a theory to explain a subject
777:From Hume's problem to non problematic induction
7993:Popper, Karl (1992) . Bartley III, W.W. (ed.).
7287:Elena, Santiago F.; Lenski, Richard E. (2003).
5881:Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence
5742:Journal of the American Statistical Association
5303:Gelman, Andrew; Shalizi, Cosma Rohilla (2013).
5090:
4703:Understanding Science: how science really works
3344:
2977:
2568:
2566:
2515:
1990: – Philosophical problem-solving principle
1944: – Possible truths which are not necessary
897:§ Examples of demarcation and applications
196:for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling
11141:Fourth Great Debate in international relations
8153:. Vol. I. Illinois: Open Court. pp.
7997:(2005 ed.). London; New York: Routledge.
7911:. Studies in Generative Grammar. Vol. 62.
7834:"Some Hard Questions for Critical Rationalism"
7261:La théorie physique: son objet et sa structure
6971:. Princeton University Press. pp. 35–47.
6889:Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change
6767:(4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 379–401.
6228:Popper, Karl (1994). Notturno, Mark A. (ed.).
6028:Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change
5970:Theories of Scientific Method: an Introduction
5044:. Legal Information Institute. 26 April 2011.
5036:
2888:
2203:black swan existed in the European imagination
2120: – Class of theories in quantum mechanics
1983:Mike Alder § Newton's Flaming Laser Sword
1294:
934:
720:movement, which included such philosophers as
11093:
10630:
10480:
9753:
8878:
8230:
7546:
7336:
6580:
6109:Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach
5854:. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
5513:
5302:
4909:. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
4613:
4262:
3660:
3585:
2989:
2238:
2236:
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1938: – Theory of response to surprise events
1614:
1143:A black-bodied and white-bodied peppered moth
11520:
11130:
11120:
11110:
10826:
8109:"Generality Preference and Falsificationism"
7919:Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography
7379:
6619:Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists
6067:(2002 pbk; 2005 ebook ed.). Routledge.
5912:"Sokal and Bricmont: Back to the Frying Pan"
5768:
5009:. New York: Dover Publications. p. 27.
4887:Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
4002:
2952:
2563:
1855:Unfalsifiability versus falsity of astrology
1651:
1006:{\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}\models \phi }
7510:(1787). Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W (eds.).
7402:Theory and Explanation in Social Psychology
7286:
6967:Yehuda, Elkana (2018). "Einstein and God".
6672:Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society
6410:
5949:
5936:
5150:
4658:. Leiden: New York : Kòln: E.J. Brill.
4394:
3888:
3246:
3117:
3058:
2639:
2026: – Analogy devised by Bertrand Russell
1848:
1833:Normal science versus revolutionary science
1791:
1486:It is testable against the empirical world;
1184:Simple examples of unfalsifiable statements
1167:A famous example of a basic statement from
516:is false. For example, given the statement
53:Learn how and when to remove these messages
10637:
10623:
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9746:
8885:
8871:
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7868:
7806:. Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
6758:
6465:
6193:Popper, Karl (1983) . Bartley, III (ed.).
5967:
5192:
5173:
5129:
5071:. Federal Judiciary of the United States.
5023:
4974:
4589:
4060:
3861:
3731:Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
3724:
3254:
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2481:
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1435:
1198:
1033:is true when interpreted in the structure
353:falsifiable, can still be useful within a
11044:Relationship between religion and science
9541:
9504:Relationship between religion and science
8892:
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7763:
7682:
7642:
7596:Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation
7471:
7354:
7157:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7135:
7125:
7113:Journal for General Philosophy of Science
6922:
6466:Simon, Herbert A.; Groen, Guy J. (1973).
6345:
5963:. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 457–491.
5788:
5459:
5440:
5400:
5389:International Epidemiological Association
5382:
5338:
5320:
5246:The genetical theory of natural selection
4844:Evolutionary Biology: A Plant Perspective
4662:
4653:
4637:
4409:
4346:
4238:
4226:
4163:
3527:
3425:
1968: – Variety of philosophical idealism
1723:
1355:Mathematics § Mathematics as science
938:
238:Learn how and when to remove this message
220:Learn how and when to remove this message
165:Learn how and when to remove this message
106:Learn how and when to remove this message
10277:Fundamental theory of Catholic canon law
7581:
7270:The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory
6682:
6669:
6644:
6635:
5958:
5799:(Book in preparation, comments invited).
5355:
5001:
4822:
4756:
4481:
4469:
4457:
4072:
3912:
3684:
3539:
3464:
3273:
3227:
3212:
3208:
2842:
2790:
2754:
2505:
2364:
2223:
1307:Survival of the fittest § Tautology
1253:
1138:
1085:Examples of demarcation and applications
924:
372:The problem of induction and demarcation
251:
11365:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
8142:
8102:
8062:
7948:
7745:
7669:
7221:
7075:
6913:
6886:
6867:
6840:
6401:
6392:
6292:
5986:
5943:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5830:
5775:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5739:
5720:
5701:
5676:The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
5417:
5278:Popper's Theory of Science: An Apologia
5038:"Federal Rules of Evidence 702 (Notes)"
4923:
4899:
4883:
4786:
4541:
4493:
4445:
4433:
4421:
4370:
4322:
4298:
4199:
4187:
4175:
4151:
4127:
4048:
4021:
3975:
3948:
3936:
3814:
3566:
3449:
3375:
3289:
3204:
3185:
3170:
3158:
3129:
3052:
2996:
2971:
2848:
2468:
2296:
2207:metaphor for that which could not exist
2088: – Method of statistical inference
1808:Imre Lakatos § Research programmes
1766:Falsificationism in Popper's philosophy
1699:
1556:
1469:
1414:
859:free from the problems of falsification
709:), we can infer that the law is false.
11555:
10720:Machian positivism (empirio-criticism)
8069:"Confirmationism vs. Falsificationism"
8027:
7992:
7973:
7915:
7828:
7798:
7709:
7675:Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment
7553:David Hume and Contemporary Philosophy
7547:Kasavin, Ilya; Blinov, Evgeny (2012).
7327:
6966:
6803:
6278:(3rd ed.). Blackwell Publishing.
6273:
6262:
6227:
6192:
6177:
6146:
6127:
6104:
6081:
6060:
5906:
5874:
5803:
5769:Leitgeb, Hannes; Carus, André (2021).
5584:
5486:
5275:
5242:
4947:
4891: (US Supreme Court 1993),
4871:from the original on 17 September 2011
4860:
4841:
4795:
4625:
4577:
4553:
4529:
4517:
4505:
4334:
4250:
4139:
4084:
4036:
3960:
3924:
3845:
3829:
3802:
3708:
3696:
3672:
3648:
3636:
3621:
3609:
3597:
3554:
3515:
3491:
3479:
3399:
3387:
3327:
3314:
3105:
3093:
3081:
3021:
3009:
2983:
2970:These four decisions are mentioned in
2958:
2855:
2830:
2814:
2802:
2778:
2738:
2706:
2687:
2662:
2647:
2631:
2614:
2602:
2572:
2555:
2521:
2509:
2451:
2436:
2424:
2412:
2400:
2376:
2352:
2340:
2328:
2292:
2242:
2179:
2154:
2003: – Ability to deny responsibility
1223:
1128:
11092:
10618:
10468:
9741:
8866:
8218:
7976:Handlexikon der Wissenschaftstheorie
7906:
7677:. London: UCL Press. pp. 42–89.
7628:
7343:Perspectives on Psychological Science
7267:
7263:(in French). Chevalier & Rivière.
7258:
7056:
7025:
6985:
6843:Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
6828:from the original on 9 September 2019
6739:
6727:from the original on 25 February 2021
6709:
6616:
6545:
6505:
6404:Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits
6327:
5968:Nola, Robert; Sankey, Howard (2014).
5862:McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education
5621:Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
5557:
5099:
5078:from the original on 19 November 2017
4867:(5th ed.). London: John Murray.
4709:
4601:
4103:
3990:
3900:
3873:
3774:
3503:
3302:
3146:
3038:
3034:
2726:
2539:
2388:
2082: – Aspect of scientific research
1901:
1637:Naive methodological falsificationism
1280:Another example from Maxwell is "All
1156:
1096:Newton's law of universal gravitation
539:"all swans are white", we can deduce
327:
8179:
7555:. Cambridge Scholars. pp. 1–9.
7506:
7476:. Cham: Springer. pp. 106–108.
7474:Philosophy of Science for Scientists
7431:
7380:Garcia-Duque, Carlos Emilio (2002).
6761:Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
6453:"Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science"
6450:
6354:
6086:(2002 ed.). London: Routledge.
6025:
5849:
5818:from the original on 4 November 2019
5672:
5645:
5618:
5522:
5211:
5178:. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
5005:(2010) . "Geometry and Experience".
4565:
4382:
4310:
4286:
4274:
4214:
3786:
3727:"Evidence-based medicine as science"
3725:Vere, Joseph; Gibson, Barry (2019).
3437:
3411:
3363:
3065:
2937:
2485:
1802:Ahistorical versus historiographical
1670:. Had they not been observed in the
1473:
1419:Falsifiability has been used in the
1300:
176:
117:
59:
18:
10439:
10205:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
7936:from the original on 5 October 2020
7584:Dieks, Dennis Geert Bernardus Johan
7202:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
6720:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
6690:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
6568:from the original on 18 August 2016
6458:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5811:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5467:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5452:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4803:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1912:(from 1997, published in the UK as
1515:
1042:
992:
877:
13:
10997:Nomothetic–idiographic distinction
7209:from the original on 17 March 2019
7042:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1978.tb01300.x
7018:
6697:from the original on 18 March 2019
6163:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1978.tb01321.x
5595:Psychology, Public Policy, and Law
5441:Hawthorne, James (19 March 2018).
5117:from the original on 22 April 2020
4762:What Is This Thing Called Science?
3317:, Sec. Elimination of Psychologism
2879:, resulted in an amendment of the
1663:An example is Galileo's refutation
1089:
867:Evidence based medicine as science
693:
569:
480:
14:
11594:
11325:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
11309:Materialism and Empirio-criticism
11165:The Course in Positive Philosophy
10562:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
9767:
9524:Sociology of scientific knowledge
9519:Sociology of scientific ignorance
9472:History and philosophy of science
8194:
8149:. In Schilpp, Paul Arthur (ed.).
7856:from the original on 12 June 2018
7733:from the original on 14 June 2020
7386:(Thesis). University of Florida.
6804:Wallis, Claudia (7 August 2005).
6742:Archaeological Theory in Practice
6064:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
5263:from the original on 12 June 2020
5048:from the original on 12 June 2018
4810:from the original on 14 June 2020
4665:The Cambridge Companion to Popper
2176:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
2132: – Method of problem-solving
904:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
285:The Logic of Scientific Discovery
34:This article has multiple issues.
10578:The Open Society and Its Enemies
10438:
10423:
10414:
10413:
9721:
9709:
8244:
8200:
7746:Merritt, David (February 2017).
7419:from the original on 7 June 2020
6657:from the original on 14 May 2011
6266:The Open Society and Its Enemies
5961:Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos
5474:from the original on 3 July 2019
5331:10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x
5153:Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos
4952:. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
3308:
2931:
1774:
1672:Cowan–Reines neutrino experiment
1631:ignores both types of problems.
1295:§ Dogmatic falsificationism
1191:
1115:Einstein's equivalence principle
1109:Einstein's equivalence principle
935:§ Dogmatic falsificationism
910:The definition of falsifiability
840:, is only that it is observable
181:
122:
64:
23:
11317:History and Class Consciousness
10494:
8146:"The Unity of Popper's Thought"
6411:Rynasiewicz, Robert A. (1983).
6232:. London; New York: Routledge.
6197:. London; New York: Routledge.
3718:
3064:In his critique of Popper (see
2914:
2861:
2624:
1962: – Philosophical principle
1708:Methodological falsificationism
1633:Methodological falsificationism
1510:, at the end of section IV. (C)
1311:In the 5th and 6th editions of
1050:{\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}}
657:"the thing here is a swan" and
338:, and thus useful in practice.
42:or discuss these issues on the
11181:Critical History of Philosophy
10644:
10235:Natural Law and Natural Rights
8913:Analytic–synthetic distinction
8661:Analytic–synthetic distinction
7272:. Princeton University Press.
7137:11858/00-001M-0000-0013-C3E9-3
7061:. Cambridge University Press.
6872:. Princeton University Press.
6001:10.7551/mitpress/6870.001.0001
5995:. A Bradford Book. MIT Press.
5095:. New York: Arcade Publishing.
2909:General Electric Co. v. Joiner
2870:General Electric Co. v. Joiner
2095:Superseded scientific theories
2086:Statistical hypothesis testing
1645:sophisticated falsificationism
1406:Historicism § Karl Popper
1399:
1340:
1326:
1243:Useful metaphysical statements
971:Falsifiability in model theory
702:{\displaystyle C\wedge \neg P}
627:{\displaystyle C\Rightarrow P}
618:
1:
11389:Knowledge and Human Interests
10725:Rankean historical positivism
8205:The dictionary definition of
8151:The Philosophy of Karl Popper
7965:: CS1 maint: date and year (
7332:. Princeton University Press.
7199:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
6717:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
6687:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
6645:Theobald, Douglas L. (2006).
6130:The Philosophy of Karl Popper
5954:. Cambridge University Press.
5833:The Philosophy of Karl Popper
5704:The Philosophy of Karl Popper
5648:The Philosophy of Karl Popper
5560:The Philosophy of Karl Popper
5514:Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006).
5464:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
5165:: CS1 maint: date and year (
4800:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
4646:
3190:he has told us nothing at all
2067: – Philosophy of Science
1849:§ Naive falsificationism
1792:§ Naive falsificationism
1287:method to detect the neutrino
1266:
902:In more than twelve pages of
893:intersubjective verifiability
11507:
11173:A General View of Positivism
7722:The New York Review of Books
7604:10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_33
7197:"Kant and Hume on Causality"
6944:10.1080/02640414.2012.753636
6303:10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_11
5789:MacLennan, Bruce J. (2021).
5773:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4842:Cruzan, Mitchell B. (2018).
4673:10.1017/cco9781139046503.005
2893:Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
2876:Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
2490:intersubjectively verifiable
2065:Models of scientific inquiry
1480:It is guided by natural law;
1317:, following a suggestion of
1123:
751:definition of falsifiability
390:One of the questions in the
296:is falsifiable if it can be
147:Knowledge's inclusion policy
7:
11373:Conjectures and Refutations
11205:The Logic of Modern Physics
11022:Deductive-nomological model
10586:Conjectures and Refutations
10312:Libertarian theories of law
9246:Hypothetico-deductive model
9221:Deductive-nomological model
9206:Constructivist epistemology
8706:Internalism and externalism
7882:10.1007/978-94-017-1978-0_3
7783:10.1016/j.shpsb.2016.12.002
7729:(21 November 2002): 46–50.
7482:10.1007/978-3-319-26551-3_6
7444:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6868:Watkins, John W.N. (1984).
6683:Thornton, Stephen (2016) .
6402:Russell, Bertrand (1948) .
6393:Russell, Bertrand (1998) .
5987:Pennock, Robert T. (2000).
5497:10.1093/0198250371.001.0001
5491:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5062:"Federal Rules of Evidence"
4846:. Oxford University Press.
4699:"Bundle up your hypotheses"
3345:Feldman & Williams 2007
2887:, p. 15, Rule 702 and
2059:Hypothetico-deductive model
2049: – Critical experiment
1928:
1528:United States Supreme Court
1013:, says the formal sentence
394:is: how does one move from
10:
11599:
11333:The Poverty of Historicism
11229:The Universe in a Nutshell
11213:Language, Truth, and Logic
11197:The Analysis of Sensations
10570:The Poverty of Historicism
9823:International legal theory
7748:"Cosmology and convention"
7716:"Looking for a Black Swan"
7684:10.14324/111.9781787350397
7586:; Gonzalez, Wenceslao J.;
7438:A Treatise of Human Nature
6932:Journal of Sports Sciences
6506:Simon, Herbert A. (1985).
6406:. George Allen and Uunwin.
6397:. Oxford University Press.
6395:The Problems of Philosophy
5952:Human Evolutionary Biology
5950:Muehlenbein, M.P. (2010).
5518:. Oxford University Press.
5462:"The Problem of Induction"
5383:Greenland, Sander (1998).
5276:Garcia, Carlos E. (2006).
5228:10.1007/s10670-019-00152-z
5193:Feyerabend, Paul (1993) .
4654:Andersson, Gunnar (1994).
4359:Understanding Science 2021
2922:David Kaye (law professor)
2463:In a spirit of criticism,
1873:
1858:
1836:
1805:
1783:
1615:Lakatos's falsificationism
1519:
1403:
1344:
1304:
1227:
1160:
1132:
1112:
1093:
473:, but what is observed is
375:
328:Lakatos's falsificationism
11541:
11489:
11423:
11413:The Rhetoric of Economics
11300:
11239:
11156:
11103:
11099:
11094:Positivist-related debate
11088:
10915:
10884:
10799:
10743:
10687:
10656:
10652:
10602:The Myth of the Framework
10553:
10502:
10409:
10340:
10257:
10164:
9846:
9788:
9775:
9700:
9532:
9434:
9364:
9307:Semantic view of theories
9226:Epistemological anarchism
9178:
9163:dependent and independent
8900:
8832:
8781:
8630:
8537:Evolutionary epistemology
8507:
8252:
7551:. In Ilya Kasavin (ed.).
7405:. Guilford Publications.
7127:10.1007/s10838-009-9091-3
7076:Chapman, Siobhan (2008).
6897:10.1007/978-94-009-3025-4
6740:Urban, Patricia (2016) .
6550:. In Burton, Dawn (ed.).
6036:10.1007/978-94-009-3025-4
5850:Mayo, Deborah G. (2018).
5673:Kuhn, Thomas S. (1996) .
5608:10.1037/1076-8971.8.3.309
5358:The history of philosophy
5174:Feyerabend, Paul (1981).
5133:Science in a Free Society
5130:Feyerabend, Paul (1978).
4933:. New York: Basic Books.
4823:Couvalis, George (1997).
4796:Creath, Richard (2017) .
4614:Sokal & Bricmont 1998
4263:Gelman & Shalizi 2013
3661:Gelman & Shalizi 2013
2881:Federal Rules of Evidence
2165:state of affairs that p."
2036:Adversarial collaboration
1996:Philosophy of mathematics
1892:epistemological anarchism
1876:Epistemological anarchism
1717:accepted basic statements
1652:Dogmatic falsificationism
1629:Dogmatic falsificationism
927:, at the end of section 3
311:that was then current in
11573:Epistemological theories
11349:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
11066:Structural functionalism
10992:Naturalism in literature
10394:Rational-legal authority
10282:German historical school
10267:Analytical jurisprudence
9049:Intertheoretic reduction
9038:Ignoramus et ignorabimus
9015:Functional contextualism
8809:Philosophy of perception
8612:Representational realism
8582:Naturalized epistemology
7594:; Weber, Marcel (eds.).
7522:10.1017/cbo9780511804649
7356:10.1177/1745691612459059
7205:(Winter 2013 ed.).
6923:Wilkinson, Mick (2013).
6723:(Summer 2017 ed.).
6693:(Summer 2017 ed.).
6651:The Talk.Origins Archive
6638:Perspectives in ethology
6546:Smith, Peter K. (2000).
6368:10.1017/CBO9780511676338
6328:Rudge, David W. (2005).
6100:Science as Falsification
5925:: 156–73. Archived from
5558:Keuth, Herbert (2005) .
5470:(Summer 2018 ed.).
5460:Henderson, Leah (2018).
5418:Harding, Sandra (1976).
5007:Sidelights on Relativity
4861:Darwin, Charles (1869).
4142:, p. 17 in archived pdf.
4003:Leitgeb & Carus 2021
2920:Not to be confused with
2484:, pp. 256, 268 and
2137:
1972:Methodological solipsism
1942:Contingency (philosophy)
1790:As described in section
1786:The problem of induction
1526:In several cases of the
1314:On the Origin of Species
1174:opinions to the contrary
771:criterion of demarcation
496:, we infer that the law
418:affirming the consequent
11568:Epistemology of science
11476:Willard Van Orman Quine
11189:Idealism and Positivism
10781:Critique of metaphysics
10715:Sociological positivism
10362:Judicial interpretation
9534:Philosophers of science
9312:Scientific essentialism
9261:Model-dependent realism
9196:Constructive empiricism
9089:Evidence-based practice
8789:Outline of epistemology
8622:Transcendental idealism
8182:"Beyond Falsifiability"
7874:Is Science Progressive?
7838:Discusiones Filosóficas
7513:Critique of Pure Reason
7293:Nature Reviews Genetics
7268:Duhem, Pierre (1991) .
5884:. Chicago: Open Court.
5523:Kaye, David H. (2005).
5356:Grayling, A.C. (2019).
5197:(3rd ed.). Verso.
5110:Encyclopædia Britannica
4948:Dienes, Zoltan (2008).
4395:Morris & Brown 2021
4116:McLean v. Arkansas 1982
3118:Morris & Brown 2021
2858:, p. 9 in archived pdf.
1914:Intellectual Impostures
1508:McLean v. Arkansas 1982
1236:young-Earth creationism
975:Scientists such as the
788:Philip N. Johnson-Laird
581:{\displaystyle \neg Q=}
11521:
11490:Concepts in contention
11131:
11121:
11111:
11002:Objectivity in science
10900:Non-Euclidean geometry
10866:Methodological dualism
10827:
10449:WikiProject Philosophy
9803:Critical legal studies
9617:Alfred North Whitehead
9607:Charles Sanders Peirce
8736:Problem of other minds
8143:Watkins, John (1974).
7633:; Woods, John (eds.).
7259:Duhem, Pierre (1906).
7080:. Palgrave Macmillan.
6870:Science and Scepticism
6617:Stove, David (1982) .
6451:Shea, Brendan (2020).
6263:Popper, Karl (1995) .
5806:"Science and Ideology"
5487:Howson, Colin (2000).
4977:Model-Theoretic Logics
4806:(Fall 2017 ed.).
4734:10.1126/science.386510
4061:Elgin & Sober 2017
3862:Simon & Groen 1973
3426:Abbreviated references
2885:Rules of Evidence 2017
2711:not on its own account
2482:Nola & Sankey 2014
2280:and of its problems)."
1966:Metaphysical solipsism
1724:Naive falsificationism
1705:
1641:naive falsificationism
1562:
1513:
1273:
1144:
1075:
1051:
1027:
1007:
941:gives some examples).
930:
703:
674:
651:
628:
602:
582:
556:
533:
510:
490:
489:{\displaystyle \neg Q}
467:
447:
416:such as, for example,
324:problem of demarcation
277:philosopher of science
261:
11397:The Poverty of Theory
11017:Philosophy of science
10906:Uncertainty principle
10540:Popper's three worlds
10372:Law without the state
9716:Philosophy portal
9467:Hard and soft science
9462:Faith and rationality
9331:Scientific skepticism
9111:Scientific Revolution
8894:Philosophy of science
8814:Philosophy of science
8794:Faith and rationality
8676:Descriptive knowledge
8547:Feminist epistemology
8487:Nicholas Wolterstorff
8038:10.4324/9780203371107
8003:10.4324/9780203713990
7577:on 17 September 2016.
7224:Philosophical Studies
7163:10.1017/9781108671224
7002:10.1093/bjps/34.2.149
6914:Wigmore, Ivy (2017).
6773:10.1353/pbm.1959.0027
6594:. New York: Picador.
6524:10.1093/bjps/36.3.291
6484:10.1093/bjps/24.4.367
6429:10.1093/bjps/34.3.225
6274:Ridley, Mark (2003).
6238:10.4324/9780203535806
6203:10.4324/9780203713969
6178:Popper, Karl (1980).
6105:Popper, Karl (1972).
6082:Popper, Karl (1962).
6061:Popper, Karl (1959).
5932:on 28 September 2007.
5804:Martin, Eric (2017).
5360:. New York: Penguin.
5243:Fisher, R.A. (1930).
4985:10.1017/9781316717158
4827:. SAGE Publications.
2599:equivalence principle
2182:, Translators' note).
2112:Scientific skepticism
2001:Plausible deniability
1691:
1676:beta-inverse reaction
1550:) (emphasis deleted).
1536:
1498:
1443:In the ruling of the
1319:Alfred Russel Wallace
1257:
1142:
1076:
1074:{\displaystyle \phi }
1052:
1028:
1026:{\displaystyle \phi }
1008:
916:
800:enumerative induction
796:patterns of induction
704:
675:
652:
629:
603:
583:
557:
534:
511:
491:
468:
448:
255:
11405:The Scientific Image
11076:Structuration theory
11039:Qualitative research
10940:Criticism of science
10935:Critical rationalism
10871:Problem of induction
10515:Critical rationalism
10332:Virtue jurisprudence
10272:Deontological ethics
9442:Criticism of science
9317:Scientific formalism
9201:Constructive realism
9106:Scientific pluralism
9079:Problem of induction
8746:Procedural knowledge
8731:Problem of induction
8180:Woit, Peter (2018).
7189:De Pierris, Graciela
7057:Blaug, Mark (1992).
6807:"The Evolution Wars"
5402:10.1093/ije/27.4.543
5069:United States Courts
4906:The Blind Watchmaker
4798:"Logical Empiricism"
3343:Einstein wrote (see
3326:Einstein wrote (see
2817:, Chap.15 sec. III (
1948:Defeasible reasoning
1909:Fashionable Nonsense
1827:begging the question
1532:five Daubert factors
1425:case (in 1982), the
1415:Use in courts of law
1065:
1037:
1017:
987:
838:material requirement
684:
661:
638:
612:
592:
566:
543:
520:
500:
477:
457:
453:we logically deduce
437:
382:Problem of induction
320:problem of induction
11583:Razors (philosophy)
11563:Analytic philosophy
11381:One-Dimensional Man
10829:Geisteswissenschaft
10812:Confirmation holism
10535:Popper's experiment
10525:Growth of knowledge
9509:Rhetoric of science
9447:Descriptive science
9191:Confirmation holism
9084:Scientific evidence
9044:Inductive reasoning
8973:Demarcation problem
8824:Virtue epistemology
8819:Social epistemology
8799:Formal epistemology
8686:Epistemic injustice
8681:Exploratory thought
8482:Ludwig Wittgenstein
7774:2017SHPMP..57...41M
7758:. Elsevier: 41–52.
7100:Schölkopf, Bernhard
4726:1979Sci...206..534B
4436:, Part VI, Sec. II.
3978:, pp. 294–295.
2889:Rule 702 Notes 2011
2046:Experimentum crucis
1977:Philosophical razor
1954:Deniable encryption
1720:associated theory.
1659:Duhem–Quine problem
1625:progress in science
1263:neutrino experiment
1230:Omphalos hypothesis
1224:Omphalos hypothesis
1135:Industrial melanism
1129:Industrial melanism
923:Thornton, Stephen,
813:critical discussion
742:logical possibility
386:Demarcation problem
355:critical discussion
300:contradicted by an
11456:Hans-Georg Gadamer
11257:Alexander Bogdanov
11133:Positivismusstreit
10928:Post-behavioralism
10892:history of science
10744:Principal concepts
10700:Logical positivism
10225:The Concept of Law
10215:Pure Theory of Law
9728:Science portal
9657:Carl Gustav Hempel
9612:Wilhelm Windelband
9499:Questionable cause
9322:Scientific realism
9143:Underdetermination
8978:Empirical evidence
8968:Creative synthesis
8477:Timothy Williamson
8267:Augustine of Hippo
7467:on 10 August 2019.
7236:10.1007/BF01305393
6621:. Pergamon Press.
5042:Cornell Law School
4508:, Chap. 1; Sec IX.
3586:Johnson-Laird 2006
2652:website complement
2012:Precambrian rabbit
1902:Sokal and Bricmont
1595:Bayesian inference
1492:It is falsifiable.
1446:McLean v. Arkansas
1437:McLean v. Arkansas
1422:McLean v. Arkansas
1347:Mathematical proof
1274:
1234:Some adherents of
1163:Precambrian rabbit
1157:Precambrian rabbit
1145:
1071:
1047:
1023:
1003:
842:inter-subjectively
718:logical empiricism
699:
673:{\displaystyle P=}
670:
650:{\displaystyle C=}
647:
624:
598:
578:
555:{\displaystyle Q=}
552:
532:{\displaystyle L=}
529:
506:
486:
463:
443:
343:Duhem–Quine thesis
313:logical positivism
262:
200:You can assist by
11550:
11549:
11537:
11536:
11533:
11532:
11431:Theodor W. Adorno
11247:Richard Avenarius
11123:Werturteilsstreit
11084:
11083:
11032:Sense-data theory
10730:Polish positivism
10705:Positivist school
10612:
10611:
10462:
10461:
10434:Philosophy portal
10195:The Spirit of Law
9833:Philosophy of law
9813:Economic analysis
9798:Constitutionalism
9735:
9734:
9577:
9576:
9489:Normative science
9346:Uniformitarianism
9101:Scientific method
8995:Explanatory power
8860:
8859:
8726:Privileged access
8362:Søren Kierkegaard
8104:Rescher, Nicholas
8064:Rescher, Nicholas
8047:978-0-415-39431-4
7870:Niiniluoto, Ilkka
7813:978-0-7546-5068-3
7694:978-1-78735-039-7
7671:Maxwell, Nicholas
7654:978-0-444-52936-7
7613:978-94-007-1179-2
7588:Hartmann, Stephan
7562:978-1-4438-4131-3
7531:978-0-521-35402-8
7491:978-3-319-26549-0
7412:978-1-4625-1848-7
7193:Friedman, Michael
7172:978-1-108-67122-4
7087:978-0-230-52476-7
7068:978-0-521-43678-6
6978:978-0-691-17790-8
6906:978-94-010-7860-3
6751:978-1-351-57619-2
6628:978-0-080-26792-0
6377:978-0-521-75594-8
6312:978-1-4020-9337-1
6295:Rethinking Popper
6247:978-0-415-11320-5
6120:978-0-19-875024-6
6093:978-0-415-28594-0
6074:978-0-415-27844-7
6010:978-0-262-66165-2
5979:978-1-317-49348-8
5891:978-0-8126-9197-9
5842:978-0-87548-141-8
5748:(424): 1242–249.
5686:978-0-226-45807-6
5614:on 11 April 2020.
5569:978-0-521-54830-4
5506:978-0-19-825037-1
5443:"Inductive Logic"
5433:978-90-277-0630-0
5367:978-0-241-30455-6
5256:978-1-176-62502-0
5249:. Рипол Классик.
5204:978-0-86091-646-8
5185:978-0-521-31641-5
5016:978-0-486-24511-9
4994:978-1-316-71715-8
4959:978-0-230-54230-3
4930:River Out of Eden
4853:978-0-19-088268-6
4834:978-0-7619-5101-8
4771:978-1-62466-038-2
4758:Chalmers, Alan F.
4720:(4418): 534–537.
4682:978-1-139-04650-3
4373:, pp. 96–97.
4301:, pp. 12–30.
4265:, pp. 26–27.
3993:, pp. 44–45.
3963:, pp. 18–19.
3850:p. 65 Footnote *1
3805:, sec. 13–15, 28.
3743:10.1111/jep.13090
2905:William Rehnquist
2630:For example, see
2309:falsified theory.
2124:Tautology (logic)
2053:Explanatory power
2030:Scientific method
1936:Black swan theory
1916:) the physicists
1506:William Overton,
1472:, p. 5, and
1301:Natural selection
601:{\displaystyle Q}
509:{\displaystyle L}
466:{\displaystyle Q}
446:{\displaystyle L}
392:scientific method
341:By contrast, the
248:
247:
240:
230:
229:
222:
175:
174:
167:
116:
115:
108:
57:
11590:
11526:
11512:
11436:Gaston Bachelard
11357:Truth and Method
11341:World Hypotheses
11221:The Two Cultures
11136:
11126:
11116:
11101:
11100:
11090:
11089:
10832:
10786:Unity of science
10695:Legal positivism
10654:
10653:
10639:
10632:
10625:
10616:
10615:
10489:
10482:
10475:
10466:
10465:
10442:
10441:
10427:
10417:
10416:
10297:Legal positivism
10250:
10240:
10230:
10220:
10210:
10200:
10190:
10180:
9838:Sociology of law
9762:
9755:
9748:
9739:
9738:
9726:
9725:
9714:
9713:
9712:
9687:Bas van Fraassen
9642:Hans Reichenbach
9622:Bertrand Russell
9539:
9538:
9365:Philosophy of...
9148:Unity of science
8941:Commensurability
8887:
8880:
8873:
8864:
8863:
8804:Metaepistemology
8782:Related articles
8756:Regress argument
8691:Epistemic virtue
8442:Bertrand Russell
8417:Duncan Pritchard
8377:Hilary Kornblith
8292:Laurence BonJour
8239:
8232:
8225:
8216:
8215:
8204:
8189:
8176:
8148:
8139:
8111:
8099:
8071:
8059:
8024:
7989:
7970:
7964:
7956:
7945:
7943:
7941:
7912:
7903:
7865:
7863:
7861:
7825:
7795:
7785:
7767:
7742:
7740:
7738:
7718:
7706:
7686:
7666:
7646:
7625:
7578:
7573:. Archived from
7543:
7503:
7468:
7466:
7460:. Archived from
7458:Internet Archive
7443:
7428:
7426:
7424:
7395:
7376:
7358:
7333:
7324:
7283:
7264:
7255:
7218:
7216:
7214:
7184:
7149:
7139:
7129:
7104:Vapnik, Vladimir
7091:
7072:
7053:
7013:
6982:
6963:
6929:
6919:
6916:"Falsifiability"
6910:
6883:
6864:
6837:
6835:
6833:
6809:
6800:
6755:
6736:
6734:
6732:
6706:
6704:
6702:
6679:
6666:
6664:
6662:
6641:
6632:
6613:
6577:
6575:
6573:
6542:
6540:
6538:
6502:
6500:
6498:
6462:
6447:
6445:
6443:
6407:
6398:
6389:
6351:
6349:
6324:
6289:
6270:
6259:
6224:
6189:
6174:
6157:(3/4): 339–355.
6143:
6124:
6112:
6097:
6078:
6057:
6022:
5994:
5983:
5964:
5955:
5946:
5933:
5931:
5916:
5903:
5871:
5865:
5855:
5846:
5827:
5825:
5823:
5800:
5798:
5785:
5783:
5781:
5765:
5736:
5717:
5698:
5669:
5642:
5615:
5610:. Archived from
5591:
5581:
5554:
5519:
5510:
5483:
5481:
5479:
5456:
5447:Zalta, Edward N.
5437:
5414:
5404:
5379:
5352:
5342:
5324:
5299:
5272:
5270:
5268:
5239:
5222:(5): 1239–1276.
5208:
5189:
5170:
5164:
5156:
5147:
5126:
5124:
5122:
5096:
5087:
5085:
5083:
5077:
5066:
5057:
5055:
5053:
5033:
5020:
5003:Einstein, Albert
4998:
4971:
4944:
4925:Dawkins, Richard
4920:
4901:Dawkins, Richard
4896:
4890:
4880:
4878:
4876:
4857:
4838:
4819:
4817:
4815:
4792:
4787:Chiasma (2017).
4783:
4753:
4706:
4694:
4659:
4641:
4635:
4629:
4623:
4617:
4611:
4605:
4599:
4593:
4587:
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4455:
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4413:
4407:
4398:
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4386:
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4374:
4368:
4362:
4356:
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4332:
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4308:
4302:
4296:
4290:
4284:
4278:
4272:
4266:
4260:
4254:
4248:
4242:
4236:
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4203:
4197:
4191:
4185:
4179:
4173:
4167:
4161:
4155:
4149:
4143:
4137:
4131:
4125:
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4113:
4107:
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4092:
4082:
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4025:
4019:
4006:
4000:
3994:
3988:
3979:
3973:
3964:
3958:
3952:
3946:
3940:
3934:
3928:
3922:
3916:
3910:
3904:
3898:
3892:
3889:Rynasiewicz 1983
3886:
3877:
3871:
3865:
3859:
3853:
3843:
3837:
3827:
3818:
3812:
3806:
3800:
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3507:
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3483:
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3335:
3324:
3318:
3312:
3306:
3299:
3293:
3287:
3281:
3271:
3262:
3247:Feyerabend 1978b
3240:
3231:
3225:
3216:
3215:, p. 478)."
3202:
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3019:
3013:
3006:
3000:
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2987:
2981:
2975:
2968:
2962:
2956:
2950:
2947:
2941:
2935:
2929:
2918:
2912:
2897:Daubert standard
2865:
2859:
2852:
2846:
2840:
2834:
2828:
2822:
2812:
2806:
2800:
2794:
2788:
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2770:
2764:
2758:
2752:
2746:
2736:
2730:
2724:
2718:
2704:
2695:
2692:Introduction, xx
2685:
2679:
2672:
2666:
2660:
2654:
2640:Muehlenbein 2010
2628:
2622:
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2595:
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2240:
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2210:
2199:
2193:
2189:
2183:
2172:
2166:
2151:
2118:Superdeterminism
2104:Theory-ladenness
2100:
2091:
2074:Predictive power
2070:
2041:
2024:Russell's teapot
1713:basic statements
1703:
1560:
1555:Harry Blackmun,
1522:Daubert standard
1516:Daubert standard
1511:
1455:creation science
1327:§ Evolution
1271:
1268:
1202:
1195:
1169:J. B. S. Haldane
1080:
1078:
1077:
1072:
1056:
1054:
1053:
1048:
1046:
1045:
1032:
1030:
1029:
1024:
1012:
1010:
1009:
1004:
996:
995:
980:Herbert A. Simon
928:
885:basic statements
878:Basic statements
708:
706:
705:
700:
679:
677:
676:
671:
656:
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648:
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631:
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579:
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558:
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538:
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507:
495:
493:
492:
487:
472:
470:
469:
464:
452:
450:
449:
444:
433:: if from a law
243:
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214:
211:
205:
185:
184:
177:
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163:
159:
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150:
126:
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118:
111:
104:
100:
97:
91:
68:
67:
60:
49:
27:
26:
19:
11598:
11597:
11593:
11592:
11591:
11589:
11588:
11587:
11553:
11552:
11551:
11546:
11529:
11485:
11451:Paul Feyerabend
11446:Wilhelm Dilthey
11419:
11296:
11235:
11152:
11095:
11080:
11027:Ramsey sentence
10982:Instrumentalism
10911:
10889:
10887:paradigm shifts
10880:
10817:Critical theory
10795:
10791:Verificationism
10739:
10735:Russian Machism
10683:
10648:
10643:
10613:
10608:
10549:
10510:Bold hypothesis
10498:
10493:
10463:
10458:
10444:WikiProject Law
10405:
10389:Question of law
10336:
10253:
10248:
10238:
10228:
10218:
10208:
10198:
10188:
10185:Treatise on Law
10178:
10160:
9842:
9808:Comparative law
9784:
9771:
9766:
9736:
9731:
9720:
9710:
9708:
9696:
9677:Paul Feyerabend
9637:Michael Polanyi
9573:
9559:Galileo Galilei
9528:
9514:Science studies
9430:
9360:
9351:Verificationism
9256:Instrumentalism
9241:Foundationalism
9216:Conventionalism
9174:
9010:Feminist method
8896:
8891:
8861:
8856:
8828:
8777:
8696:Gettier problem
8626:
8557:Foundationalism
8503:
8452:Wilfrid Sellars
8407:Alvin Plantinga
8287:George Berkeley
8254:Epistemologists
8248:
8243:
8197:
8192:
8165:
8128:
8088:
8048:
8013:
7986:
7958:
7957:
7939:
7937:
7930:
7892:
7859:
7857:
7814:
7736:
7734:
7695:
7655:
7644:10.1.1.504.2727
7635:Inductive Logic
7614:
7563:
7532:
7492:
7464:
7441:
7422:
7420:
7413:
7305:10.1038/nrg1088
7280:
7212:
7210:
7195:(4 June 2008).
7173:
7096:Corfield, David
7088:
7069:
7021:
7019:Further reading
7016:
6979:
6927:
6907:
6880:
6853:
6831:
6829:
6752:
6730:
6728:
6715:"Vienna Circle"
6700:
6698:
6660:
6658:
6629:
6602:
6571:
6569:
6562:
6536:
6534:
6496:
6494:
6441:
6439:
6378:
6313:
6286:
6248:
6213:
6140:
6121:
6094:
6075:
6046:
6011:
5980:
5929:
5914:
5892:
5859:
5843:
5821:
5819:
5796:
5779:
5777:
5771:"Rudolf Carnap"
5754:10.2307/2291263
5733:
5714:
5687:
5658:
5631:
5589:
5570:
5507:
5477:
5475:
5434:
5368:
5288:
5266:
5264:
5257:
5205:
5186:
5158:
5157:
5144:
5136:. London: NLB.
5120:
5118:
5081:
5079:
5075:
5064:
5051:
5049:
5017:
4995:
4960:
4941:
4917:
4884:
4874:
4872:
4854:
4835:
4813:
4811:
4772:
4683:
4649:
4644:
4636:
4632:
4624:
4620:
4612:
4608:
4600:
4596:
4590:Feyerabend 1993
4588:
4584:
4576:
4572:
4564:
4560:
4556:, p. 1010.
4552:
4548:
4540:
4536:
4528:
4524:
4516:
4512:
4504:
4500:
4492:
4488:
4480:
4476:
4468:
4464:
4456:
4452:
4444:
4440:
4432:
4428:
4420:
4416:
4408:
4401:
4393:
4389:
4381:
4377:
4369:
4365:
4357:
4353:
4345:
4341:
4333:
4329:
4321:
4317:
4309:
4305:
4297:
4293:
4285:
4281:
4273:
4269:
4261:
4257:
4249:
4245:
4237:
4233:
4225:
4221:
4213:
4206:
4198:
4194:
4186:
4182:
4174:
4170:
4162:
4158:
4150:
4146:
4138:
4134:
4126:
4122:
4114:
4110:
4102:
4095:
4083:
4079:
4071:
4067:
4059:
4055:
4047:
4043:
4039:, p. 1038.
4035:
4028:
4020:
4009:
4001:
3997:
3989:
3982:
3974:
3967:
3959:
3955:
3947:
3943:
3935:
3931:
3923:
3919:
3911:
3907:
3899:
3895:
3887:
3880:
3872:
3868:
3860:
3856:
3844:
3840:
3828:
3821:
3813:
3809:
3801:
3797:
3785:
3781:
3773:
3766:
3737:(6): 997–1002.
3723:
3719:
3707:
3703:
3695:
3691:
3683:
3679:
3675:, p. xxxv.
3671:
3667:
3659:
3655:
3647:
3643:
3635:
3628:
3620:
3616:
3608:
3604:
3596:
3592:
3584:
3573:
3565:
3561:
3553:
3546:
3538:
3534:
3526:
3522:
3514:
3510:
3502:
3498:
3490:
3486:
3478:
3471:
3463:
3456:
3448:
3444:
3436:
3432:
3428:
3423:
3422:
3410:
3406:
3398:
3394:
3386:
3382:
3374:
3370:
3362:
3358:
3342:
3338:
3325:
3321:
3313:
3309:
3300:
3296:
3288:
3284:
3272:
3265:
3255:Feyerabend 1981
3243:Feyerabend 1978
3241:
3234:
3226:
3219:
3203:
3196:
3184:
3177:
3169:
3165:
3157:
3153:
3145:
3136:
3128:
3124:
3116:
3112:
3104:
3100:
3092:
3088:
3079:
3075:
3069:
3063:
3059:
3049:
3045:
3032:
3028:
3020:
3016:
3007:
3003:
2994:
2990:
2982:
2978:
2969:
2965:
2957:
2953:
2948:
2944:
2936:
2932:
2919:
2915:
2866:
2862:
2853:
2849:
2841:
2837:
2829:
2825:
2813:
2809:
2801:
2797:
2789:
2785:
2777:
2773:
2767:Waddington 1959
2765:
2761:
2753:
2749:
2737:
2733:
2725:
2721:
2705:
2698:
2686:
2682:
2673:
2669:
2661:
2657:
2629:
2625:
2613:
2609:
2596:
2592:
2586:Ebbinghaus 2017
2583:
2579:
2571:
2564:
2559:
2554:
2550:
2532:
2528:
2520:
2516:
2503:
2496:
2479:
2475:
2462:
2458:
2450:
2443:
2435:
2431:
2423:
2419:
2411:
2407:
2399:
2395:
2387:
2383:
2375:
2371:
2363:
2359:
2351:
2347:
2339:
2335:
2327:
2323:
2317:
2313:
2307:
2303:
2299:, p. 142.
2291:
2284:
2267:
2261:
2254:
2241:
2230:
2222:
2213:
2200:
2196:
2190:
2186:
2173:
2169:
2152:
2145:
2140:
2135:
2130:Trial and error
2098:
2089:
2080:Reproducibility
2068:
2039:
2007:Pragmatic maxim
1931:
1904:
1881:Paul Feyerabend
1878:
1872:
1863:
1857:
1841:
1835:
1810:
1804:
1788:
1782:
1777:
1768:
1746:
1726:
1704:
1697:
1654:
1617:
1571:
1561:
1554:
1524:
1518:
1512:
1505:
1451:William Overton
1441:
1417:
1408:
1402:
1393:Albert Einstein
1365:formal sciences
1361:
1343:
1323:Herbert Spencer
1309:
1303:
1269:
1261:conducting the
1245:
1232:
1226:
1213:
1212:
1211:
1209:
1204:
1203:
1196:
1186:
1178:Richard Dawkins
1165:
1159:
1137:
1131:
1126:
1117:
1111:
1098:
1092:
1090:Newton's theory
1087:
1066:
1063:
1062:
1041:
1040:
1038:
1035:
1034:
1018:
1015:
1014:
991:
990:
988:
985:
984:
973:
951:
929:
922:
912:
889:test statements
880:
875:
830:
779:
766:verificationism
685:
682:
681:
662:
659:
658:
639:
636:
635:
613:
610:
609:
593:
590:
589:
567:
564:
563:
544:
541:
540:
521:
518:
517:
501:
498:
497:
478:
475:
474:
458:
455:
454:
438:
435:
434:
414:logical fallacy
400:scientific laws
388:
374:
244:
233:
232:
231:
226:
215:
209:
206:
199:
186:
182:
171:
160:
154:
151:
137:Please help by
136:
127:
123:
112:
101:
95:
92:
81:
75:has an unclear
69:
65:
28:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
11596:
11586:
11585:
11580:
11575:
11570:
11565:
11548:
11547:
11542:
11539:
11538:
11535:
11534:
11531:
11530:
11528:
11527:
11518:
11513:
11504:
11499:
11493:
11491:
11487:
11486:
11484:
11483:
11478:
11473:
11468:
11463:
11458:
11453:
11448:
11443:
11438:
11433:
11427:
11425:
11421:
11420:
11418:
11417:
11409:
11401:
11393:
11385:
11377:
11369:
11361:
11353:
11345:
11337:
11329:
11321:
11313:
11304:
11302:
11298:
11297:
11295:
11294:
11289:
11284:
11279:
11274:
11272:Émile Durkheim
11269:
11264:
11259:
11254:
11249:
11243:
11241:
11237:
11236:
11234:
11233:
11225:
11217:
11209:
11201:
11193:
11185:
11177:
11169:
11160:
11158:
11154:
11153:
11151:
11150:
11144:
11138:
11128:
11118:
11113:Methodenstreit
11107:
11105:
11097:
11096:
11086:
11085:
11082:
11081:
11079:
11078:
11073:
11068:
11063:
11062:
11061:
11054:Social science
11051:
11046:
11041:
11036:
11035:
11034:
11029:
11024:
11014:
11009:
11007:Operationalism
11004:
10999:
10994:
10989:
10984:
10979:
10974:
10973:
10972:
10967:
10962:
10957:
10952:
10942:
10937:
10932:
10931:
10930:
10919:
10917:
10916:Related topics
10913:
10912:
10910:
10909:
10903:
10896:
10894:
10882:
10881:
10879:
10878:
10873:
10868:
10863:
10858:
10853:
10848:
10843:
10838:
10833:
10824:
10822:Falsifiability
10819:
10814:
10809:
10807:Antipositivism
10803:
10801:
10797:
10796:
10794:
10793:
10788:
10783:
10778:
10773:
10768:
10763:
10758:
10753:
10747:
10745:
10741:
10740:
10738:
10737:
10732:
10727:
10722:
10717:
10712:
10710:Postpositivism
10707:
10702:
10697:
10691:
10689:
10685:
10684:
10682:
10681:
10676:
10671:
10666:
10660:
10658:
10650:
10649:
10642:
10641:
10634:
10627:
10619:
10610:
10609:
10607:
10606:
10598:
10590:
10582:
10574:
10566:
10557:
10555:
10551:
10550:
10548:
10547:
10545:Verisimilitude
10542:
10537:
10532:
10527:
10522:
10520:Falsifiability
10517:
10512:
10506:
10504:
10500:
10499:
10492:
10491:
10484:
10477:
10469:
10460:
10459:
10457:
10456:
10451:
10446:
10436:
10431:
10421:
10410:
10407:
10406:
10404:
10403:
10396:
10391:
10386:
10379:
10374:
10369:
10364:
10359:
10352:
10344:
10342:
10338:
10337:
10335:
10334:
10329:
10327:Utilitarianism
10324:
10319:
10314:
10309:
10304:
10299:
10294:
10292:Legal moralism
10289:
10287:Interpretivism
10284:
10279:
10274:
10269:
10263:
10261:
10255:
10254:
10252:
10251:
10241:
10231:
10221:
10211:
10201:
10191:
10181:
10170:
10168:
10162:
10161:
10159:
10158:
10153:
10148:
10143:
10138:
10133:
10128:
10123:
10118:
10113:
10108:
10103:
10098:
10093:
10088:
10083:
10078:
10073:
10068:
10063:
10058:
10053:
10048:
10043:
10038:
10033:
10028:
10023:
10018:
10013:
10008:
10003:
9998:
9993:
9988:
9983:
9978:
9973:
9968:
9963:
9958:
9953:
9948:
9943:
9938:
9933:
9928:
9923:
9918:
9913:
9908:
9903:
9898:
9893:
9888:
9883:
9878:
9873:
9868:
9863:
9858:
9852:
9850:
9844:
9843:
9841:
9840:
9835:
9830:
9825:
9820:
9815:
9810:
9805:
9800:
9794:
9792:
9786:
9785:
9783:
9782:
9776:
9773:
9772:
9765:
9764:
9757:
9750:
9742:
9733:
9732:
9730:
9718:
9706:
9701:
9698:
9697:
9695:
9694:
9689:
9684:
9679:
9674:
9669:
9664:
9662:W. V. O. Quine
9659:
9654:
9649:
9644:
9639:
9634:
9629:
9624:
9619:
9614:
9609:
9604:
9599:
9597:Rudolf Steiner
9594:
9589:
9587:Henri Poincaré
9584:
9578:
9575:
9574:
9572:
9571:
9566:
9561:
9556:
9551:
9545:
9543:
9536:
9530:
9529:
9527:
9526:
9521:
9516:
9511:
9506:
9501:
9496:
9491:
9486:
9485:
9484:
9474:
9469:
9464:
9459:
9457:Exact sciences
9454:
9449:
9444:
9438:
9436:
9435:Related topics
9432:
9431:
9429:
9428:
9427:
9426:
9421:
9416:
9411:
9406:
9401:
9394:Social science
9391:
9390:
9389:
9387:Space and time
9379:
9374:
9368:
9366:
9362:
9361:
9359:
9358:
9353:
9348:
9343:
9338:
9333:
9328:
9319:
9314:
9309:
9300:
9291:
9286:
9273:
9268:
9263:
9258:
9253:
9248:
9243:
9238:
9233:
9228:
9223:
9218:
9213:
9208:
9203:
9198:
9193:
9188:
9182:
9180:
9176:
9175:
9173:
9172:
9167:
9166:
9165:
9160:
9150:
9145:
9140:
9139:
9138:
9133:
9128:
9118:
9113:
9108:
9103:
9098:
9096:Scientific law
9093:
9092:
9091:
9081:
9076:
9071:
9066:
9061:
9056:
9051:
9046:
9041:
9034:
9033:
9032:
9027:
9017:
9012:
9007:
9005:Falsifiability
9002:
8997:
8992:
8991:
8990:
8980:
8975:
8970:
8965:
8964:
8963:
8953:
8948:
8943:
8938:
8937:
8936:
8934:Mill's Methods
8926:
8915:
8910:
8904:
8902:
8898:
8897:
8890:
8889:
8882:
8875:
8867:
8858:
8857:
8855:
8854:
8849:
8844:
8839:
8833:
8830:
8829:
8827:
8826:
8821:
8816:
8811:
8806:
8801:
8796:
8791:
8785:
8783:
8779:
8778:
8776:
8775:
8768:
8763:
8758:
8753:
8748:
8743:
8738:
8733:
8728:
8723:
8718:
8713:
8708:
8703:
8698:
8693:
8688:
8683:
8678:
8673:
8668:
8663:
8658:
8653:
8645:
8636:
8634:
8628:
8627:
8625:
8624:
8619:
8614:
8609:
8604:
8599:
8594:
8589:
8584:
8579:
8574:
8569:
8564:
8559:
8554:
8549:
8544:
8539:
8534:
8529:
8524:
8522:Constructivism
8519:
8513:
8511:
8505:
8504:
8502:
8501:
8494:
8489:
8484:
8479:
8474:
8472:Baruch Spinoza
8469:
8467:P. F. Strawson
8464:
8459:
8457:Susanna Siegel
8454:
8449:
8444:
8439:
8434:
8432:W. V. O. Quine
8429:
8424:
8419:
8414:
8409:
8404:
8399:
8394:
8389:
8384:
8379:
8374:
8369:
8364:
8359:
8354:
8349:
8344:
8339:
8334:
8332:Nelson Goodman
8329:
8324:
8322:Edmund Gettier
8319:
8314:
8309:
8307:René Descartes
8304:
8299:
8297:Gilles Deleuze
8294:
8289:
8284:
8279:
8274:
8272:William Alston
8269:
8264:
8262:Thomas Aquinas
8258:
8256:
8250:
8249:
8242:
8241:
8234:
8227:
8219:
8213:
8212:
8208:falsifiability
8196:
8195:External links
8193:
8191:
8190:
8186:Not even wrong
8177:
8163:
8140:
8126:
8100:
8086:
8060:
8046:
8025:
8011:
7990:
7984:
7971:
7961:cite interview
7946:
7928:
7913:
7904:
7890:
7866:
7826:
7812:
7796:
7743:
7707:
7693:
7667:
7653:
7631:Gabbay, Dov M.
7626:
7612:
7579:
7561:
7544:
7530:
7508:Kant, Immanuel
7504:
7490:
7469:
7454:Falsifiability
7429:
7411:
7396:
7377:
7349:(6): 555–561.
7334:
7325:
7299:(6): 457–469.
7284:
7278:
7265:
7256:
7230:(3): 313–336.
7219:
7185:
7171:
7150:
7092:
7086:
7073:
7067:
7054:
7022:
7020:
7017:
7015:
7014:
6996:(2): 149–171.
6983:
6977:
6964:
6938:(9): 919–920.
6920:
6911:
6905:
6884:
6878:
6865:
6851:
6838:
6801:
6756:
6750:
6737:
6707:
6680:
6667:
6642:
6633:
6627:
6614:
6600:
6586:Bricmont, Jean
6582:Sokal, Alan D.
6578:
6560:
6543:
6518:(3): 291–298.
6503:
6478:(4): 367–380.
6463:
6448:
6423:(3): 225–241.
6408:
6399:
6390:
6376:
6352:
6340:(4): 369–375.
6325:
6311:
6290:
6284:
6271:
6260:
6246:
6225:
6211:
6190:
6175:
6144:
6138:
6125:
6119:
6102:
6092:
6079:
6073:
6058:
6044:
6023:
6009:
5984:
5978:
5965:
5956:
5947:
5934:
5904:
5890:
5872:
5856:
5847:
5841:
5828:
5801:
5786:
5766:
5737:
5731:
5718:
5712:
5699:
5685:
5670:
5656:
5643:
5629:
5616:
5602:(3): 309–332.
5582:
5568:
5555:
5537:(4): 473–481.
5520:
5511:
5505:
5484:
5457:
5438:
5432:
5420:"Introduction"
5415:
5395:(4): 543–548.
5380:
5366:
5353:
5300:
5286:
5273:
5255:
5240:
5209:
5203:
5190:
5184:
5171:
5148:
5142:
5127:
5101:Feigl, Herbert
5097:
5088:
5058:
5034:
5021:
5015:
4999:
4993:
4972:
4958:
4945:
4939:
4921:
4915:
4897:
4881:
4858:
4852:
4839:
4833:
4820:
4793:
4784:
4770:
4754:
4707:
4695:
4681:
4660:
4650:
4648:
4645:
4643:
4642:
4640:, p. 545.
4638:Greenland 1998
4630:
4618:
4606:
4594:
4582:
4570:
4558:
4546:
4544:, p. 245.
4534:
4522:
4510:
4498:
4486:
4474:
4462:
4450:
4438:
4426:
4414:
4410:Henderson 2018
4399:
4387:
4375:
4363:
4351:
4347:Andersson 1994
4339:
4327:
4315:
4313:, p. 362.
4303:
4291:
4279:
4267:
4255:
4243:
4239:Hawthorne 2018
4231:
4227:Hawthorne 2018
4219:
4204:
4202:, p. 201.
4192:
4180:
4168:
4164:Wilkinson 2013
4156:
4144:
4132:
4120:
4108:
4093:
4077:
4065:
4053:
4051:, p. 295.
4041:
4026:
4024:, p. 299.
4007:
3995:
3980:
3965:
3953:
3941:
3929:
3917:
3905:
3893:
3878:
3866:
3854:
3838:
3819:
3807:
3795:
3779:
3764:
3717:
3701:
3689:
3677:
3665:
3653:
3641:
3626:
3614:
3602:
3590:
3571:
3559:
3544:
3532:
3528:MacLennan 2021
3520:
3508:
3496:
3484:
3469:
3467:, p. 397.
3454:
3442:
3429:
3427:
3424:
3421:
3420:
3404:
3392:
3380:
3368:
3356:
3336:
3319:
3307:
3294:
3282:
3263:
3232:
3217:
3194:
3175:
3163:
3151:
3134:
3122:
3110:
3098:
3086:
3073:
3057:
3043:
3026:
3014:
3001:
2988:
2976:
2963:
2951:
2942:
2930:
2926:Penn State Law
2913:
2860:
2847:
2835:
2823:
2807:
2795:
2783:
2771:
2759:
2747:
2731:
2719:
2696:
2680:
2667:
2655:
2623:
2607:
2590:
2577:
2562:
2548:
2526:
2514:
2494:
2473:
2456:
2441:
2429:
2417:
2405:
2393:
2381:
2369:
2357:
2345:
2333:
2321:
2311:
2301:
2282:
2276:but rather of
2274:falsifiability
2251:falsifiability
2228:
2211:
2194:
2184:
2167:
2142:
2141:
2139:
2136:
2134:
2133:
2127:
2121:
2115:
2109:
2108:
2107:
2101:
2092:
2083:
2077:
2071:
2062:
2056:
2050:
2042:
2027:
2021:
2015:
2009:
2004:
1998:
1993:
1992:
1991:
1985:
1974:
1969:
1963:
1957:
1951:
1945:
1939:
1932:
1930:
1927:
1906:In their book
1903:
1900:
1874:Main article:
1871:
1868:
1859:Main article:
1856:
1853:
1839:Paradigm shift
1837:Main article:
1834:
1831:
1806:Main article:
1803:
1800:
1784:Main article:
1781:
1778:
1776:
1773:
1767:
1764:
1745:
1742:
1738:verisimilitude
1725:
1722:
1698:Imre Lakatos,
1695:
1680:Grover Maxwell
1653:
1650:
1616:
1613:
1570:
1567:
1552:
1520:Main article:
1517:
1514:
1503:
1501:investigation.
1494:
1493:
1490:
1487:
1484:
1481:
1462:public schools
1440:
1434:
1416:
1413:
1401:
1398:
1342:
1339:
1305:Main article:
1302:
1299:
1248:Grover Maxwell
1244:
1241:
1228:Main article:
1225:
1222:
1206:
1205:
1197:
1190:
1189:
1188:
1187:
1185:
1182:
1161:Main article:
1158:
1155:
1133:Main article:
1130:
1127:
1125:
1122:
1113:Main article:
1110:
1107:
1094:Main article:
1091:
1088:
1086:
1083:
1070:
1044:
1022:
1002:
999:
994:
977:Nobel laureate
972:
969:
950:
947:
939:Andersson 2016
920:
911:
908:
879:
876:
874:
871:
829:
826:
778:
775:
746:psychoanalysis
722:Moritz Schlick
698:
695:
692:
689:
669:
666:
646:
643:
623:
620:
617:
597:
577:
574:
571:
551:
548:
528:
525:
505:
485:
482:
462:
442:
373:
370:
302:empirical test
265:Falsifiability
246:
245:
228:
227:
210:September 2024
189:
187:
180:
173:
172:
155:September 2024
130:
128:
121:
114:
113:
96:September 2024
77:citation style
72:
70:
63:
58:
32:
31:
29:
22:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
11595:
11584:
11581:
11579:
11576:
11574:
11571:
11569:
11566:
11564:
11561:
11560:
11558:
11545:
11540:
11525:
11524:
11519:
11517:
11514:
11511:
11510:
11505:
11503:
11500:
11498:
11495:
11494:
11492:
11488:
11482:
11479:
11477:
11474:
11472:
11469:
11467:
11466:György Lukács
11464:
11462:
11459:
11457:
11454:
11452:
11449:
11447:
11444:
11442:
11439:
11437:
11434:
11432:
11429:
11428:
11426:
11422:
11415:
11414:
11410:
11407:
11406:
11402:
11399:
11398:
11394:
11391:
11390:
11386:
11383:
11382:
11378:
11375:
11374:
11370:
11367:
11366:
11362:
11359:
11358:
11354:
11351:
11350:
11346:
11343:
11342:
11338:
11335:
11334:
11330:
11327:
11326:
11322:
11319:
11318:
11314:
11311:
11310:
11306:
11305:
11303:
11299:
11293:
11292:Vienna Circle
11290:
11288:
11287:Berlin Circle
11285:
11283:
11280:
11278:
11275:
11273:
11270:
11268:
11267:Eugen Dühring
11265:
11263:
11262:Auguste Comte
11260:
11258:
11255:
11253:
11250:
11248:
11245:
11244:
11242:
11238:
11231:
11230:
11226:
11223:
11222:
11218:
11215:
11214:
11210:
11207:
11206:
11202:
11199:
11198:
11194:
11191:
11190:
11186:
11183:
11182:
11178:
11175:
11174:
11170:
11167:
11166:
11162:
11161:
11159:
11157:Contributions
11155:
11148:
11145:
11142:
11139:
11135:
11134:
11129:
11125:
11124:
11119:
11115:
11114:
11109:
11108:
11106:
11102:
11098:
11091:
11087:
11077:
11074:
11072:
11071:Structuralism
11069:
11067:
11064:
11060:
11057:
11056:
11055:
11052:
11050:
11047:
11045:
11042:
11040:
11037:
11033:
11030:
11028:
11025:
11023:
11020:
11019:
11018:
11015:
11013:
11012:Phenomenalism
11010:
11008:
11005:
11003:
11000:
10998:
10995:
10993:
10990:
10988:
10985:
10983:
10980:
10978:
10975:
10971:
10968:
10966:
10963:
10961:
10958:
10956:
10953:
10951:
10948:
10947:
10946:
10943:
10941:
10938:
10936:
10933:
10929:
10926:
10925:
10924:
10923:Behavioralism
10921:
10920:
10918:
10914:
10907:
10904:
10901:
10898:
10897:
10895:
10893:
10888:
10883:
10877:
10874:
10872:
10869:
10867:
10864:
10862:
10859:
10857:
10854:
10852:
10851:Human science
10849:
10847:
10844:
10842:
10839:
10837:
10834:
10831:
10830:
10825:
10823:
10820:
10818:
10815:
10813:
10810:
10808:
10805:
10804:
10802:
10798:
10792:
10789:
10787:
10784:
10782:
10779:
10777:
10776:Pseudoscience
10774:
10772:
10771:Justification
10769:
10767:
10764:
10762:
10759:
10757:
10754:
10752:
10749:
10748:
10746:
10742:
10736:
10733:
10731:
10728:
10726:
10723:
10721:
10718:
10716:
10713:
10711:
10708:
10706:
10703:
10701:
10698:
10696:
10693:
10692:
10690:
10686:
10680:
10677:
10675:
10672:
10670:
10667:
10665:
10662:
10661:
10659:
10655:
10651:
10647:
10640:
10635:
10633:
10628:
10626:
10621:
10620:
10617:
10604:
10603:
10599:
10596:
10595:
10594:Unended Quest
10591:
10588:
10587:
10583:
10580:
10579:
10575:
10572:
10571:
10567:
10564:
10563:
10559:
10558:
10556:
10552:
10546:
10543:
10541:
10538:
10536:
10533:
10531:
10528:
10526:
10523:
10521:
10518:
10516:
10513:
10511:
10508:
10507:
10505:
10501:
10497:
10490:
10485:
10483:
10478:
10476:
10471:
10470:
10467:
10455:
10452:
10450:
10447:
10445:
10437:
10435:
10432:
10430:
10426:
10422:
10420:
10412:
10411:
10408:
10402:
10401:
10397:
10395:
10392:
10390:
10387:
10385:
10384:
10380:
10378:
10375:
10373:
10370:
10368:
10365:
10363:
10360:
10358:
10357:
10353:
10351:
10350:
10346:
10345:
10343:
10339:
10333:
10330:
10328:
10325:
10323:
10320:
10318:
10315:
10313:
10310:
10308:
10305:
10303:
10302:Legal realism
10300:
10298:
10295:
10293:
10290:
10288:
10285:
10283:
10280:
10278:
10275:
10273:
10270:
10268:
10265:
10264:
10262:
10260:
10256:
10247:
10246:
10242:
10237:
10236:
10232:
10227:
10226:
10222:
10217:
10216:
10212:
10207:
10206:
10202:
10197:
10196:
10192:
10187:
10186:
10182:
10177:
10176:
10172:
10171:
10169:
10167:
10163:
10157:
10154:
10152:
10149:
10147:
10144:
10142:
10139:
10137:
10134:
10132:
10129:
10127:
10124:
10122:
10119:
10117:
10114:
10112:
10109:
10107:
10104:
10102:
10099:
10097:
10094:
10092:
10089:
10087:
10084:
10082:
10079:
10077:
10074:
10072:
10069:
10067:
10064:
10062:
10059:
10057:
10054:
10052:
10049:
10047:
10044:
10042:
10039:
10037:
10034:
10032:
10029:
10027:
10024:
10022:
10019:
10017:
10014:
10012:
10009:
10007:
10004:
10002:
9999:
9997:
9994:
9992:
9989:
9987:
9984:
9982:
9979:
9977:
9974:
9972:
9969:
9967:
9964:
9962:
9959:
9957:
9954:
9952:
9949:
9947:
9944:
9942:
9939:
9937:
9934:
9932:
9929:
9927:
9924:
9922:
9919:
9917:
9914:
9912:
9909:
9907:
9904:
9902:
9899:
9897:
9894:
9892:
9889:
9887:
9884:
9882:
9879:
9877:
9874:
9872:
9869:
9867:
9864:
9862:
9859:
9857:
9854:
9853:
9851:
9849:
9845:
9839:
9836:
9834:
9831:
9829:
9828:Legal history
9826:
9824:
9821:
9819:
9816:
9814:
9811:
9809:
9806:
9804:
9801:
9799:
9796:
9795:
9793:
9791:
9787:
9781:
9778:
9777:
9774:
9770:
9769:Jurisprudence
9763:
9758:
9756:
9751:
9749:
9744:
9743:
9740:
9729:
9724:
9719:
9717:
9707:
9705:
9702:
9699:
9693:
9690:
9688:
9685:
9683:
9680:
9678:
9675:
9673:
9670:
9668:
9665:
9663:
9660:
9658:
9655:
9653:
9650:
9648:
9647:Rudolf Carnap
9645:
9643:
9640:
9638:
9635:
9633:
9630:
9628:
9625:
9623:
9620:
9618:
9615:
9613:
9610:
9608:
9605:
9603:
9600:
9598:
9595:
9593:
9590:
9588:
9585:
9583:
9582:Auguste Comte
9580:
9579:
9570:
9567:
9565:
9562:
9560:
9557:
9555:
9554:Francis Bacon
9552:
9550:
9547:
9546:
9544:
9540:
9537:
9535:
9531:
9525:
9522:
9520:
9517:
9515:
9512:
9510:
9507:
9505:
9502:
9500:
9497:
9495:
9492:
9490:
9487:
9483:
9482:Pseudoscience
9480:
9479:
9478:
9475:
9473:
9470:
9468:
9465:
9463:
9460:
9458:
9455:
9453:
9450:
9448:
9445:
9443:
9440:
9439:
9437:
9433:
9425:
9422:
9420:
9417:
9415:
9412:
9410:
9407:
9405:
9402:
9400:
9397:
9396:
9395:
9392:
9388:
9385:
9384:
9383:
9380:
9378:
9375:
9373:
9370:
9369:
9367:
9363:
9357:
9354:
9352:
9349:
9347:
9344:
9342:
9341:Structuralism
9339:
9337:
9334:
9332:
9329:
9327:
9323:
9320:
9318:
9315:
9313:
9310:
9308:
9304:
9303:Received view
9301:
9299:
9295:
9292:
9290:
9287:
9285:
9281:
9277:
9274:
9272:
9269:
9267:
9264:
9262:
9259:
9257:
9254:
9252:
9249:
9247:
9244:
9242:
9239:
9237:
9234:
9232:
9229:
9227:
9224:
9222:
9219:
9217:
9214:
9212:
9211:Contextualism
9209:
9207:
9204:
9202:
9199:
9197:
9194:
9192:
9189:
9187:
9184:
9183:
9181:
9177:
9171:
9168:
9164:
9161:
9159:
9156:
9155:
9154:
9151:
9149:
9146:
9144:
9141:
9137:
9134:
9132:
9129:
9127:
9124:
9123:
9122:
9119:
9117:
9114:
9112:
9109:
9107:
9104:
9102:
9099:
9097:
9094:
9090:
9087:
9086:
9085:
9082:
9080:
9077:
9075:
9072:
9070:
9067:
9065:
9062:
9060:
9057:
9055:
9052:
9050:
9047:
9045:
9042:
9040:
9039:
9035:
9031:
9028:
9026:
9023:
9022:
9021:
9018:
9016:
9013:
9011:
9008:
9006:
9003:
9001:
8998:
8996:
8993:
8989:
8986:
8985:
8984:
8981:
8979:
8976:
8974:
8971:
8969:
8966:
8962:
8959:
8958:
8957:
8954:
8952:
8949:
8947:
8944:
8942:
8939:
8935:
8932:
8931:
8930:
8927:
8925:
8924:
8920:
8916:
8914:
8911:
8909:
8906:
8905:
8903:
8899:
8895:
8888:
8883:
8881:
8876:
8874:
8869:
8868:
8865:
8853:
8850:
8848:
8845:
8843:
8840:
8838:
8835:
8834:
8831:
8825:
8822:
8820:
8817:
8815:
8812:
8810:
8807:
8805:
8802:
8800:
8797:
8795:
8792:
8790:
8787:
8786:
8784:
8780:
8774:
8773:
8769:
8767:
8764:
8762:
8759:
8757:
8754:
8752:
8749:
8747:
8744:
8742:
8739:
8737:
8734:
8732:
8729:
8727:
8724:
8722:
8719:
8717:
8714:
8712:
8711:Justification
8709:
8707:
8704:
8702:
8699:
8697:
8694:
8692:
8689:
8687:
8684:
8682:
8679:
8677:
8674:
8672:
8669:
8667:
8664:
8662:
8659:
8657:
8654:
8652:
8650:
8646:
8644:
8642:
8638:
8637:
8635:
8633:
8629:
8623:
8620:
8618:
8615:
8613:
8610:
8608:
8605:
8603:
8600:
8598:
8595:
8593:
8590:
8588:
8587:Phenomenalism
8585:
8583:
8580:
8578:
8577:Naïve realism
8575:
8573:
8570:
8568:
8565:
8563:
8560:
8558:
8555:
8553:
8550:
8548:
8545:
8543:
8540:
8538:
8535:
8533:
8530:
8528:
8527:Contextualism
8525:
8523:
8520:
8518:
8515:
8514:
8512:
8510:
8506:
8500:
8499:
8495:
8493:
8492:Vienna Circle
8490:
8488:
8485:
8483:
8480:
8478:
8475:
8473:
8470:
8468:
8465:
8463:
8460:
8458:
8455:
8453:
8450:
8448:
8445:
8443:
8440:
8438:
8435:
8433:
8430:
8428:
8427:Hilary Putnam
8425:
8423:
8420:
8418:
8415:
8413:
8410:
8408:
8405:
8403:
8402:Robert Nozick
8400:
8398:
8397:John McDowell
8395:
8393:
8390:
8388:
8385:
8383:
8380:
8378:
8375:
8373:
8370:
8368:
8365:
8363:
8360:
8358:
8357:Immanuel Kant
8355:
8353:
8350:
8348:
8345:
8343:
8340:
8338:
8335:
8333:
8330:
8328:
8327:Alvin Goldman
8325:
8323:
8320:
8318:
8315:
8313:
8310:
8308:
8305:
8303:
8300:
8298:
8295:
8293:
8290:
8288:
8285:
8283:
8280:
8278:
8275:
8273:
8270:
8268:
8265:
8263:
8260:
8259:
8257:
8255:
8251:
8247:
8240:
8235:
8233:
8228:
8226:
8221:
8220:
8217:
8211:at Wiktionary
8210:
8209:
8203:
8199:
8198:
8187:
8183:
8178:
8174:
8170:
8166:
8164:0-87548-141-8
8160:
8156:
8152:
8147:
8141:
8137:
8133:
8129:
8127:0-8229-3617-8
8123:
8119:
8115:
8110:
8105:
8101:
8097:
8093:
8089:
8087:0-87395-372-X
8083:
8079:
8075:
8070:
8065:
8061:
8057:
8053:
8049:
8043:
8039:
8035:
8031:
8026:
8022:
8018:
8014:
8012:0-415-09112-8
8008:
8004:
8000:
7996:
7991:
7987:
7985:3-423-04586-8
7981:
7977:
7972:
7968:
7962:
7954:
7953:
7947:
7935:
7931:
7929:0-415-28589-5
7925:
7921:
7920:
7914:
7910:
7905:
7901:
7897:
7893:
7891:90-277-1835-0
7887:
7883:
7879:
7875:
7871:
7867:
7855:
7851:
7847:
7844:(24): 15–40.
7843:
7839:
7835:
7831:
7830:Miller, David
7827:
7823:
7819:
7815:
7809:
7805:
7801:
7800:Miller, David
7797:
7793:
7789:
7784:
7779:
7775:
7771:
7766:
7761:
7757:
7753:
7749:
7744:
7732:
7728:
7724:
7723:
7717:
7712:
7711:McGinn, Colin
7708:
7704:
7700:
7696:
7690:
7685:
7680:
7676:
7672:
7668:
7664:
7660:
7656:
7650:
7645:
7640:
7636:
7632:
7627:
7623:
7619:
7615:
7609:
7605:
7601:
7597:
7593:
7592:Uebel, Thomas
7589:
7585:
7580:
7576:
7572:
7568:
7564:
7558:
7554:
7550:
7545:
7541:
7537:
7533:
7527:
7523:
7519:
7515:
7514:
7509:
7505:
7501:
7497:
7493:
7487:
7483:
7479:
7475:
7470:
7463:
7459:
7456: at the
7455:
7451:
7447:
7440:
7439:
7434:
7430:
7418:
7414:
7408:
7404:
7403:
7397:
7393:
7389:
7385:
7384:
7378:
7374:
7370:
7366:
7362:
7357:
7352:
7348:
7344:
7340:
7335:
7331:
7326:
7322:
7318:
7314:
7310:
7306:
7302:
7298:
7294:
7290:
7285:
7281:
7279:0-691-02524-X
7275:
7271:
7266:
7262:
7257:
7253:
7249:
7245:
7241:
7237:
7233:
7229:
7225:
7220:
7208:
7204:
7203:
7198:
7194:
7190:
7186:
7182:
7178:
7174:
7168:
7164:
7160:
7156:
7151:
7147:
7143:
7138:
7133:
7128:
7123:
7119:
7115:
7114:
7109:
7106:(July 2009).
7105:
7101:
7097:
7093:
7089:
7083:
7079:
7074:
7070:
7064:
7060:
7055:
7051:
7047:
7043:
7039:
7035:
7031:
7030:
7024:
7023:
7011:
7007:
7003:
6999:
6995:
6991:
6990:
6984:
6980:
6974:
6970:
6965:
6961:
6957:
6953:
6949:
6945:
6941:
6937:
6933:
6926:
6921:
6917:
6912:
6908:
6902:
6898:
6894:
6890:
6885:
6881:
6879:0-691-07294-9
6875:
6871:
6866:
6862:
6858:
6854:
6852:0-521-07826-1
6848:
6844:
6839:
6827:
6823:
6819:
6815:
6814:
6808:
6802:
6798:
6794:
6790:
6786:
6782:
6778:
6774:
6770:
6766:
6762:
6757:
6753:
6747:
6744:. Routledge.
6743:
6738:
6726:
6722:
6721:
6716:
6712:
6711:Uebel, Thomas
6708:
6696:
6692:
6691:
6686:
6685:"Karl Popper"
6681:
6677:
6673:
6668:
6656:
6652:
6648:
6643:
6639:
6634:
6630:
6624:
6620:
6615:
6611:
6607:
6603:
6601:0-312-19545-1
6597:
6593:
6592:
6587:
6583:
6579:
6567:
6563:
6561:0-7619-6351-0
6557:
6553:
6549:
6544:
6533:
6529:
6525:
6521:
6517:
6513:
6509:
6504:
6493:
6489:
6485:
6481:
6477:
6473:
6469:
6464:
6460:
6459:
6454:
6449:
6438:
6434:
6430:
6426:
6422:
6418:
6414:
6409:
6405:
6400:
6396:
6391:
6387:
6383:
6379:
6373:
6369:
6365:
6361:
6357:
6356:Ruse, Michael
6353:
6348:
6343:
6339:
6335:
6331:
6326:
6322:
6318:
6314:
6308:
6304:
6300:
6296:
6291:
6287:
6285:1-4051-0345-0
6281:
6277:
6272:
6268:
6267:
6261:
6257:
6253:
6249:
6243:
6239:
6235:
6231:
6226:
6222:
6218:
6214:
6212:0-415-08400-8
6208:
6204:
6200:
6196:
6191:
6187:
6186:
6185:New Scientist
6181:
6176:
6172:
6168:
6164:
6160:
6156:
6152:
6151:
6145:
6141:
6139:0-87548-142-6
6135:
6131:
6126:
6122:
6116:
6111:
6110:
6103:
6101:
6095:
6089:
6085:
6080:
6076:
6070:
6066:
6065:
6059:
6055:
6051:
6047:
6045:90-277-2766-X
6041:
6037:
6033:
6029:
6024:
6020:
6016:
6012:
6006:
6002:
5998:
5993:
5992:
5985:
5981:
5975:
5972:. Routledge.
5971:
5966:
5962:
5957:
5953:
5948:
5944:
5940:
5935:
5928:
5924:
5920:
5913:
5909:
5908:Miller, David
5905:
5901:
5897:
5893:
5887:
5883:
5882:
5877:
5876:Miller, David
5873:
5869:
5864:
5863:
5857:
5853:
5848:
5844:
5838:
5834:
5829:
5817:
5813:
5812:
5807:
5802:
5795:
5794:
5787:
5776:
5772:
5767:
5763:
5759:
5755:
5751:
5747:
5743:
5738:
5734:
5732:0-521-28031-1
5728:
5724:
5719:
5715:
5713:0-87548-141-8
5709:
5705:
5700:
5696:
5692:
5688:
5682:
5678:
5677:
5671:
5667:
5663:
5659:
5657:0-87548-142-6
5653:
5649:
5644:
5640:
5636:
5632:
5630:0-521-07826-1
5626:
5622:
5617:
5613:
5609:
5605:
5601:
5597:
5596:
5588:
5583:
5579:
5575:
5571:
5565:
5561:
5556:
5552:
5548:
5544:
5540:
5536:
5532:
5531:
5526:
5521:
5517:
5516:How we reason
5512:
5508:
5502:
5498:
5494:
5490:
5485:
5473:
5469:
5468:
5463:
5458:
5454:
5453:
5448:
5444:
5439:
5435:
5429:
5425:
5421:
5416:
5412:
5408:
5403:
5398:
5394:
5390:
5386:
5381:
5377:
5373:
5369:
5363:
5359:
5354:
5350:
5346:
5341:
5336:
5332:
5328:
5323:
5318:
5314:
5310:
5306:
5301:
5297:
5293:
5289:
5287:0-8264-9026-3
5283:
5279:
5274:
5262:
5258:
5252:
5248:
5247:
5241:
5237:
5233:
5229:
5225:
5221:
5217:
5216:
5210:
5206:
5200:
5196:
5191:
5187:
5181:
5177:
5172:
5168:
5162:
5154:
5149:
5145:
5143:0-86091-008-3
5139:
5135:
5134:
5128:
5116:
5112:
5111:
5106:
5102:
5098:
5094:
5089:
5074:
5070:
5063:
5059:
5047:
5043:
5039:
5035:
5031:
5027:
5022:
5018:
5012:
5008:
5004:
5000:
4996:
4990:
4986:
4982:
4978:
4973:
4969:
4965:
4961:
4955:
4951:
4946:
4942:
4940:0-465-06990-8
4936:
4932:
4931:
4926:
4922:
4918:
4916:0-393-31570-3
4912:
4908:
4907:
4902:
4898:
4894:
4889:
4888:
4882:
4870:
4866:
4865:
4859:
4855:
4849:
4845:
4840:
4836:
4830:
4826:
4821:
4809:
4805:
4804:
4799:
4794:
4790:
4785:
4781:
4777:
4773:
4767:
4763:
4759:
4755:
4751:
4747:
4743:
4739:
4735:
4731:
4727:
4723:
4719:
4715:
4714:
4708:
4704:
4700:
4696:
4692:
4688:
4684:
4678:
4674:
4670:
4666:
4661:
4657:
4652:
4651:
4639:
4634:
4627:
4622:
4615:
4610:
4603:
4598:
4591:
4586:
4579:
4574:
4567:
4562:
4555:
4550:
4543:
4538:
4532:, p. 30.
4531:
4526:
4519:
4514:
4507:
4502:
4496:, p. 36.
4495:
4490:
4483:
4482:Thornton 2016
4478:
4472:, p. 60.
4471:
4470:Chalmers 2013
4466:
4460:, p. 59.
4459:
4458:Chalmers 2013
4454:
4447:
4442:
4435:
4430:
4423:
4418:
4411:
4406:
4404:
4396:
4391:
4384:
4379:
4372:
4367:
4360:
4355:
4348:
4343:
4336:
4331:
4324:
4319:
4312:
4307:
4300:
4295:
4289:, p. 86.
4288:
4283:
4277:, p. 83.
4276:
4271:
4264:
4259:
4253:, p. 88.
4252:
4247:
4240:
4235:
4228:
4223:
4217:, p. 82.
4216:
4211:
4209:
4201:
4196:
4189:
4184:
4177:
4172:
4165:
4160:
4154:, p. 25.
4153:
4148:
4141:
4136:
4129:
4124:
4117:
4112:
4106:, p. 12.
4105:
4100:
4098:
4090:
4086:
4081:
4074:
4073:Einstein 2010
4069:
4062:
4057:
4050:
4045:
4038:
4033:
4031:
4023:
4018:
4016:
4014:
4012:
4004:
3999:
3992:
3987:
3985:
3977:
3972:
3970:
3962:
3957:
3950:
3945:
3938:
3933:
3926:
3921:
3914:
3913:Theobald 2006
3909:
3902:
3897:
3890:
3885:
3883:
3875:
3870:
3863:
3858:
3851:
3847:
3842:
3835:
3831:
3826:
3824:
3817:, p. 22.
3816:
3811:
3804:
3799:
3792:
3788:
3783:
3777:, p. 92.
3776:
3771:
3769:
3760:
3756:
3752:
3748:
3744:
3740:
3736:
3732:
3728:
3721:
3714:
3710:
3705:
3698:
3693:
3687:, p. 62.
3686:
3685:Chalmers 2013
3681:
3674:
3669:
3662:
3657:
3651:, p. 30.
3650:
3645:
3638:
3633:
3631:
3623:
3618:
3612:, App. 1.III.
3611:
3606:
3599:
3594:
3587:
3582:
3580:
3578:
3576:
3568:
3563:
3556:
3551:
3549:
3541:
3540:Thornton 2007
3536:
3529:
3524:
3517:
3512:
3505:
3500:
3493:
3488:
3481:
3476:
3474:
3466:
3465:Grayling 2019
3461:
3459:
3451:
3446:
3439:
3434:
3430:
3417:
3413:
3408:
3401:
3396:
3389:
3384:
3377:
3372:
3365:
3360:
3353:
3350:
3346:
3340:
3333:
3329:
3323:
3316:
3311:
3304:
3298:
3291:
3286:
3279:
3275:
3274:Couvalis 1997
3270:
3268:
3260:
3256:
3252:
3248:
3244:
3239:
3237:
3229:
3228:Musgrave 1976
3224:
3222:
3214:
3213:Musgrave 1976
3210:
3209:Musgrave 1976
3206:
3201:
3199:
3191:
3187:
3182:
3180:
3172:
3167:
3160:
3155:
3148:
3143:
3141:
3139:
3131:
3126:
3119:
3114:
3107:
3102:
3095:
3090:
3083:
3077:
3067:
3061:
3054:
3047:
3040:
3036:
3030:
3023:
3018:
3011:
3005:
2998:
2992:
2985:
2980:
2973:
2967:
2960:
2955:
2946:
2939:
2934:
2927:
2923:
2917:
2910:
2906:
2902:
2898:
2894:
2890:
2886:
2882:
2878:
2877:
2872:
2871:
2864:
2857:
2851:
2844:
2843:Thornton 2016
2839:
2832:
2827:
2820:
2819:page 101 here
2816:
2811:
2804:
2799:
2792:
2791:Thompson 1981
2787:
2780:
2775:
2768:
2763:
2756:
2755:Thompson 1981
2751:
2744:
2740:
2735:
2728:
2723:
2716:
2712:
2708:
2703:
2701:
2693:
2689:
2684:
2677:
2671:
2664:
2659:
2653:
2649:
2645:
2641:
2637:
2633:
2627:
2620:
2616:
2611:
2604:
2600:
2594:
2587:
2581:
2574:
2569:
2567:
2557:
2552:
2545:
2541:
2537:
2536:Herbert Keuth
2530:
2523:
2518:
2511:
2507:
2506:Thornton 2016
2501:
2499:
2491:
2487:
2483:
2477:
2470:
2466:
2460:
2453:
2448:
2446:
2438:
2433:
2426:
2421:
2414:
2409:
2402:
2397:
2390:
2385:
2378:
2373:
2366:
2365:Thornton 2007
2361:
2354:
2349:
2342:
2337:
2330:
2325:
2315:
2305:
2298:
2294:
2289:
2287:
2279:
2278:falsification
2275:
2271:
2265:
2258:
2252:
2248:
2244:
2239:
2237:
2235:
2233:
2225:
2224:Thornton 2016
2220:
2218:
2216:
2208:
2204:
2198:
2188:
2181:
2177:
2171:
2164:
2160:
2156:
2150:
2148:
2143:
2131:
2128:
2125:
2122:
2119:
2116:
2113:
2110:
2105:
2102:
2096:
2093:
2087:
2084:
2081:
2078:
2075:
2072:
2066:
2063:
2060:
2057:
2054:
2051:
2048:
2047:
2043:
2037:
2034:
2033:
2031:
2028:
2025:
2022:
2019:
2018:Raven paradox
2016:
2013:
2010:
2008:
2005:
2002:
1999:
1997:
1994:
1989:
1988:Occam's razor
1986:
1984:
1981:
1980:
1978:
1975:
1973:
1970:
1967:
1964:
1961:
1958:
1955:
1952:
1949:
1946:
1943:
1940:
1937:
1934:
1933:
1926:
1923:
1922:Jean Bricmont
1919:
1915:
1911:
1910:
1899:
1897:
1896:anything goes
1893:
1889:
1887:
1882:
1877:
1867:
1862:
1852:
1850:
1845:
1840:
1830:
1828:
1822:
1818:
1815:
1809:
1799:
1795:
1793:
1787:
1775:Controversies
1772:
1763:
1759:
1756:
1750:
1741:
1739:
1734:
1730:
1721:
1718:
1714:
1709:
1701:
1694:
1690:
1687:
1683:
1681:
1677:
1673:
1669:
1664:
1660:
1649:
1646:
1642:
1638:
1634:
1630:
1626:
1621:
1612:
1608:
1606:
1601:
1596:
1592:
1588:
1584:
1579:
1576:
1566:
1559:, p. 593
1558:
1551:
1549:
1545:
1541:
1535:
1533:
1529:
1523:
1509:
1502:
1497:
1491:
1488:
1485:
1482:
1479:
1478:
1477:
1475:
1471:
1467:
1463:
1460:
1456:
1452:
1448:
1447:
1438:
1433:
1430:
1429:
1424:
1423:
1412:
1407:
1397:
1394:
1390:
1386:
1382:
1378:
1374:
1370:
1366:
1360:
1356:
1352:
1348:
1338:
1335:
1334:Ronald Fisher
1330:
1328:
1324:
1320:
1316:
1315:
1308:
1298:
1296:
1291:
1288:
1283:
1278:
1264:
1260:
1256:
1252:
1249:
1240:
1237:
1231:
1221:
1217:
1208:
1201:
1194:
1181:
1179:
1175:
1170:
1164:
1154:
1151:
1150:peppered moth
1141:
1136:
1121:
1116:
1106:
1104:
1103:controversial
1097:
1082:
1068:
1060:
1020:
1000:
997:
981:
978:
968:
965:
959:
956:
946:
942:
940:
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926:
925:Thornton 2016
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762:Vienna Circle
758:
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747:
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735:
731:
727:
726:Rudolf Carnap
723:
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430:modus tollens
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366:pseudoscience
363:
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309:verifiability
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256:Here are two
254:
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190:This article
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11227:
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11203:
11195:
11187:
11179:
11171:
11163:
11147:Science wars
10945:Epistemology
10876:Reflectivism
10836:Hermeneutics
10821:
10688:Declinations
10664:Antihumanism
10657:Perspectives
10600:
10592:
10584:
10576:
10568:
10560:
10530:Open society
10519:
10400:Usul al-Fiqh
10398:
10381:
10377:Legal system
10354:
10347:
10245:Law's Empire
10243:
10233:
10223:
10213:
10203:
10193:
10183:
10173:
9848:Philosophers
9790:Legal theory
9692:Larry Laudan
9672:Imre Lakatos
9627:Otto Neurath
9602:Karl Pearson
9592:Pierre Duhem
9564:Isaac Newton
9494:Protoscience
9452:Epistemology
9326:Anti-realism
9324: /
9305: /
9296: /
9282: /
9280:Reductionism
9278: /
9251:Inductionism
9231:Evolutionism
9036:
9004:
8923:a posteriori
8922:
8918:
8770:
8671:Common sense
8649:A posteriori
8648:
8640:
8602:Reductionism
8496:
8447:Gilbert Ryle
8317:Fred Dretske
8302:Keith DeRose
8246:Epistemology
8207:
8185:
8150:
8113:
8073:
8029:
7994:
7975:
7950:
7938:. Retrieved
7918:
7908:
7873:
7858:. Retrieved
7841:
7837:
7803:
7755:
7751:
7735:. Retrieved
7726:
7720:
7674:
7634:
7595:
7575:the original
7552:
7511:
7473:
7462:the original
7437:
7421:. Retrieved
7401:
7382:
7346:
7342:
7329:
7296:
7292:
7269:
7260:
7227:
7223:
7211:. Retrieved
7200:
7154:
7120:(1): 51–58.
7117:
7111:
7077:
7058:
7036:(1): 29–40.
7033:
7027:
6993:
6987:
6968:
6935:
6931:
6888:
6869:
6842:
6830:. Retrieved
6811:
6764:
6760:
6741:
6729:. Retrieved
6718:
6699:. Retrieved
6688:
6675:
6671:
6659:. Retrieved
6650:
6637:
6618:
6590:
6570:. Retrieved
6551:
6535:. Retrieved
6515:
6511:
6495:. Retrieved
6475:
6471:
6456:
6440:. Retrieved
6420:
6416:
6403:
6394:
6359:
6337:
6333:
6294:
6275:
6269:. Routledge.
6264:
6229:
6194:
6183:
6154:
6148:
6129:
6108:
6083:
6062:
6027:
5990:
5969:
5960:
5951:
5942:
5939:"David Hume"
5927:the original
5922:
5918:
5880:
5860:
5851:
5832:
5820:. Retrieved
5809:
5791:
5780:11 September
5778:. Retrieved
5774:
5745:
5741:
5722:
5703:
5675:
5647:
5620:
5612:the original
5599:
5593:
5559:
5534:
5528:
5515:
5488:
5476:. Retrieved
5465:
5450:
5423:
5392:
5388:
5357:
5312:
5308:
5277:
5265:. Retrieved
5245:
5219:
5213:
5194:
5175:
5152:
5131:
5119:. Retrieved
5108:
5105:"Positivism"
5092:
5080:. Retrieved
5068:
5050:. Retrieved
5041:
5029:
5025:
5006:
4976:
4949:
4929:
4905:
4885:
4873:. Retrieved
4863:
4843:
4824:
4812:. Retrieved
4801:
4761:
4717:
4711:
4702:
4664:
4655:
4633:
4621:
4609:
4597:
4585:
4573:
4561:
4549:
4542:Lakatos 1974
4537:
4525:
4520:, p. 7.
4513:
4501:
4494:Lakatos 1978
4489:
4477:
4465:
4453:
4446:Watkins 1984
4441:
4434:Russell 1948
4429:
4422:Russell 1998
4417:
4390:
4378:
4371:Lakatos 1978
4366:
4354:
4342:
4330:
4323:Lakatos 1974
4318:
4306:
4299:Lakatos 1978
4294:
4282:
4270:
4258:
4246:
4234:
4222:
4200:Lehmann 1993
4195:
4188:Wigmore 2017
4183:
4176:Chiasma 2017
4171:
4159:
4152:Lakatos 1978
4147:
4135:
4128:Daubert 1993
4123:
4111:
4080:
4068:
4056:
4049:Maxwell 1974
4044:
4022:Maxwell 1974
3998:
3976:Maxwell 1974
3956:
3949:Dawkins 1986
3944:
3937:Dawkins 1995
3932:
3920:
3908:
3896:
3869:
3857:
3841:
3815:Lakatos 1978
3810:
3798:
3782:
3734:
3730:
3720:
3704:
3692:
3680:
3668:
3656:
3644:
3624:, App. 1.II.
3617:
3605:
3593:
3567:Watkins 1984
3562:
3535:
3530:, Chap. 8.1.
3523:
3511:
3499:
3494:, p. 1.
3487:
3452:, p. X.
3450:Harding 1976
3445:
3433:
3407:
3395:
3383:
3376:Watkins 1970
3371:
3359:
3339:
3322:
3310:
3297:
3290:Lakatos 1978
3285:
3205:Watkins 1989
3189:
3186:Lakatos 1978
3171:Lakatos 1978
3166:
3159:Lakatos 1978
3154:
3130:Russell 1948
3125:
3113:
3101:
3089:
3076:
3060:
3053:Lakatos 1978
3046:
3029:
3017:
3004:
2997:Lakatos 1978
2991:
2979:
2972:Lakatos 1978
2966:
2954:
2945:
2933:
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2908:
2892:
2874:
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2593:
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2551:
2543:
2529:
2517:
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2459:
2432:
2420:
2408:
2396:
2384:
2372:
2360:
2348:
2336:
2324:
2314:
2304:
2297:Rosende 2009
2277:
2273:
2269:
2263:
2256:
2250:
2246:
2197:
2187:
2175:
2170:
2162:
2158:
2045:
1913:
1907:
1905:
1895:
1885:
1879:
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1842:
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1811:
1796:
1789:
1769:
1760:
1751:
1747:
1735:
1731:
1727:
1716:
1712:
1707:
1706:
1702:, p. 24
1700:Lakatos 1978
1692:
1688:
1684:
1655:
1644:
1640:
1636:
1632:
1628:
1620:Imre Lakatos
1618:
1609:
1605:Colin Howson
1580:
1574:
1572:
1563:
1557:Daubert 1993
1547:
1543:
1539:
1537:
1525:
1499:
1495:
1470:Pennock 2000
1466:Michael Ruse
1449:case, Judge
1444:
1442:
1436:
1426:
1420:
1418:
1409:
1362:
1331:
1312:
1310:
1292:
1279:
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1246:
1233:
1218:
1214:
1166:
1146:
1118:
1099:
974:
963:
960:
954:
952:
943:
931:
917:
913:
903:
901:
888:
884:
881:
866:
863:
858:
855:
851:
847:
837:
833:
831:
817:
812:
807:
804:
792:
780:
759:
754:
741:
739:
730:Otto Neurath
714:David Miller
711:
428:
424:
422:
407:
396:observations
389:
359:
351:
340:
317:
306:
297:
283:
282:in his book
269:refutability
268:
264:
263:
249:
234:
216:
207:
194:copy editing
192:may require
191:
161:
152:
139:spinning off
132:
102:
93:
74:
50:
43:
37:
36:Please help
33:
11578:Karl Popper
11502:Objectivity
11471:Karl Popper
11461:Thomas Kuhn
11441:Mario Bunge
11192:(1879–1884)
11127:(1909–1959)
10861:Metaphysics
10841:Historicism
10756:Demarcation
10751:Consilience
10674:Rationalism
10496:Karl Popper
10322:Paternalism
10317:Natural law
10179:(c. 355 BC)
10026:Montesquieu
9818:Legal norms
9682:Ian Hacking
9667:Thomas Kuhn
9652:Karl Popper
9632:C. D. Broad
9549:Roger Bacon
9477:Non-science
9419:Linguistics
9399:Archaeology
9294:Rationalism
9284:Determinism
9271:Physicalism
9236:Fallibilism
9186:Coherentism
9116:Testability
9069:Observation
9064:Objectivity
9025:alternative
8956:Correlation
8946:Consilience
8751:Proposition
8721:Objectivity
8607:Reliabilism
8597:Rationalism
8542:Fallibilism
8517:Coherentism
8462:Ernest Sosa
8437:Thomas Reid
8422:James Pryor
8392:G. E. Moore
8382:David Lewis
8372:Saul Kripke
8367:Peter Klein
8347:Susan Haack
8277:Robert Audi
7940:3 September
7433:Hume, David
6182:. Letters.
6180:"Evolution"
5530:Jurimetrics
5315:(1): 8–38.
5082:19 November
5032:(1): 31–55.
4875:22 February
4626:Miller 2000
4578:Martin 2017
4554:Popper 1974
4530:Garcia 2006
4518:Miller 1994
4506:Popper 1962
4424:, Chap. VI.
4337:, Note 70a.
4335:Popper 1974
4251:Howson 2000
4241:, Sec. 2.1.
4229:, Sec. 3.2.
4140:Krafka 2002
4085:Popper 1995
4037:Popper 1974
4005:, Sec. 8.1.
3961:Dienes 2008
3925:Wallis 2005
3846:Popper 1959
3832:, pp.
3830:Popper 1959
3803:Popper 1959
3709:Popper 1959
3697:Popper 1959
3673:Popper 1983
3649:Popper 1972
3639:, Sec. 1.9.
3637:Popper 1972
3622:Popper 1972
3610:Popper 1972
3598:Popper 1959
3588:, Chap. 13.
3569:, Sec. 7.2.
3555:Popper 1959
3516:Creath 2017
3492:Miller 1994
3480:Popper 1972
3440:, Sec. 2.3.
3414:, pp.
3400:Popper 1962
3388:Popper 1994
3328:Yehuda 2018
3315:Popper 1959
3276:, pp.
3106:Popper 1983
3094:Popper 1959
3082:Popper 1959
3022:Popper 1959
3010:Popper 1959
2984:Popper 1959
2959:Popper 1962
2901:testability
2856:Krafka 2002
2831:Popper 1962
2815:Popper 1995
2803:Popper 1978
2779:Popper 1994
2741:, pp.
2739:Darwin 1869
2707:Popper 1974
2688:Popper 1983
2663:Popper 1980
2648:Ridley 2003
2632:Cruzan 2018
2615:Fisher 1930
2603:Popper 1983
2573:Popper 1962
2556:Popper 1959
2522:Popper 1959
2510:Popper 1959
2469:Watkins1984
2452:Popper 1974
2437:Popper 1972
2425:Popper 1959
2413:Popper 1959
2401:Popper 1972
2377:Popper 1959
2353:Popper 1962
2341:Popper 1959
2329:Popper 1983
2293:Popper 1983
2270:falsifiable
2264:Falsifiable
2257:Falsifiable
2247:falsifiable
2243:Popper 1983
2180:Popper 1959
2155:Popper 1972
1960:Fallibilism
1844:Thomas Kuhn
1668:beta decays
1575:falsifiable
1400:Historicism
1341:Mathematics
1282:beta decays
1270: 1956
1259:Clyde Cowan
1059:Rynasiewicz
834:methodology
821:fallibilist
378:Inductivism
362:non-science
280:Karl Popper
258:black swans
11557:Categories
11282:Ernst Mach
11277:Ernst Laas
11252:A. J. Ayer
11240:Proponents
11059:Philosophy
10856:Humanities
10800:Antitheses
10669:Empiricism
10646:Positivism
10503:Philosophy
10429:Law portal
10056:Petrażycki
10046:Pashukanis
10041:Olivecrona
9976:Hägerström
9891:Blackstone
9569:David Hume
9542:Precursors
9424:Psychology
9404:Economics
9298:Empiricism
9289:Pragmatism
9276:Positivism
9266:Naturalism
9136:scientific
9020:Hypothesis
8983:Experiment
8852:Discussion
8842:Task Force
8761:Simplicity
8741:Perception
8617:Skepticism
8592:Positivism
8567:Infinitism
8532:Empiricism
8387:John Locke
8352:David Hume
8342:Anil Gupta
8337:Paul Grice
8312:John Dewey
8282:A. J. Ayer
7765:1703.02389
7703:1004353997
7029:Dialectica
6572:27 January
6334:BioScience
6150:Dialectica
5822:4 November
5376:1054371393
5215:Erkenntnis
4647:References
4602:Broad 1979
4448:, Sec 8.5.
4104:Smith 2000
3991:Keuth 2005
3901:Rudge 2005
3874:Simon 1985
3775:Stove 1982
3711:, p.
3699:, Sec. 68.
3557:, Sec. 85.
3504:Uebel 2019
3347:, p.
3330:, p.
3303:Zahar 1983
3257:, p.
3249:, p.
3147:Zahar 1983
3039:Zahar 1983
3035:Zahar 1983
2727:Keuth 2005
2642:, p.
2634:, p.
2617:, p.
2540:Keuth 2005
2389:Feigl 1978
1918:Alan Sokal
1888:hypothesis
1404:See also:
1345:See also:
1332:Darwinist
945:possible.
783:David Hume
406:argue (or
376:See also:
332:predictive
294:hypothesis
288:(1934). A
202:editing it
143:relocating
88:footnoting
39:improve it
11523:Verstehen
11509:Phronesis
11497:Knowledge
11481:Max Weber
11301:Criticism
11049:Sociology
10987:Modernism
10965:pluralism
10950:anarchism
10846:Historism
10766:Induction
10679:Scientism
10189:(c. 1270)
10071:Pufendorf
10006:Llewellyn
9866:Aristotle
9409:Geography
9377:Chemistry
9336:Scientism
9131:ladenness
8951:Construct
8929:Causality
8716:Knowledge
8701:Induction
8651:knowledge
8643:knowledge
8056:212627154
7952:L'Express
7850:0124-6127
7792:119401938
7639:CiteSeerX
7622:706920414
7571:817562250
7500:923649072
7435:(1896) .
7252:171003093
7181:219957500
6960:205512848
6832:9 January
6781:1529-8795
6713:(2019) .
6588:(1998) .
6386:366517438
6321:260208425
6276:Evolution
6098:excerpt:
5793:Knowledge
5478:7 January
5322:1006.3868
5236:203071483
5161:cite book
4968:182663275
4780:847985678
4742:0036-8075
4691:925355415
4566:Kuhn 1996
4397:, Sec. 4.
4383:Fine 2019
4349:, Chap 3.
4311:Pera 1989
4287:Mayo 2018
4275:Mayo 2018
4215:Mayo 2018
3891:, Sec. 2.
3787:Shea 2020
3751:1356-1294
3438:Mayo 2018
3412:Kuhn 1970
3364:Kuhn 1974
3066:Kuhn 1970
2938:Kaye 2005
2486:Shea 2020
2319:invalid".
2192:concepts.
2159:imaginary
1861:Astrology
1474:Ruse 2010
1377:structure
1369:empirical
1124:Evolution
1069:ϕ
1021:ϕ
1001:ϕ
998:⊨
955:empirical
734:A.J. Ayer
694:¬
691:∧
634:in which
619:⇒
570:¬
481:¬
347:empirical
298:logically
273:deductive
45:talk page
11544:Category
10960:nihilism
10955:idealism
10885:Related
10761:Evidence
10419:Category
10341:Concepts
10307:Legalism
10259:Theories
10146:Voegelin
10116:Scaevola
10076:Radbruch
10051:Perelman
10036:Nussbaum
9981:Jellinek
9946:Habermas
9941:Gurvitch
9911:Durkheim
9881:Beccaria
9704:Category
9356:Vitalism
9179:Theories
9153:Variable
9074:Paradigm
8961:function
8919:A priori
8908:Analysis
8901:Concepts
8837:Category
8656:Analysis
8641:A priori
8632:Concepts
8572:Innatism
8509:Theories
8136:19264362
8106:(1989).
8066:(1977).
8021:26159482
7934:Archived
7900:10996819
7854:Archived
7832:(2014).
7822:57641308
7802:(2006).
7737:22 April
7731:Archived
7713:(2002).
7663:54111232
7540:36438781
7417:Archived
7392:51946605
7365:26168112
7313:12776215
7207:Archived
7146:40390670
7050:42971398
6952:23249368
6826:Archived
6822:16116981
6789:13667389
6731:22 April
6725:Archived
6695:Archived
6661:21 April
6655:Archived
6610:39605994
6566:Archived
6358:(2010).
6256:30156902
6221:25130665
6171:42970324
6054:17982125
6019:39262003
5910:(2000).
5900:30353251
5878:(1994).
5816:Archived
5695:34548541
5578:54503549
5543:29762910
5472:Archived
5349:22364575
5296:62742611
5261:Archived
5115:Archived
5103:(1978).
5073:Archived
5046:Archived
4927:(1995).
4903:(1986).
4869:Archived
4814:21 April
4808:Archived
4760:(2013).
4484:, Sec 5.
4089:Chap. 15
3791:Sec. 2.c
3759:30575209
3600:, Sec 2.
2163:spurious
1929:See also
1812:Section
1696:—
1553:—
1504:—
1459:Arkansas
1373:quantity
921:—
336:testable
322:and the
84:citation
11424:Critics
11149:(1990s)
11143:(1980s)
11137:(1960s)
11117:(1890s)
10970:realism
10902:(1830s)
10890:in the
10454:changes
10367:Justice
10121:Schmitt
10111:Savigny
10091:Reinach
10016:Maistre
10011:Luhmann
9986:Jhering
9936:Grotius
9921:Ehrlich
9916:Dworkin
9906:Cardozo
9886:Bentham
9876:Bastiat
9861:Aquinas
9414:History
9382:Physics
9372:Biology
9170:more...
9158:control
9054:Inquiry
8772:more...
8552:Fideism
8498:more...
8173:2580491
8155:371–412
8118:118–123
8096:3034395
8078:119–123
7860:11 June
7770:Bibcode
7373:6100616
7244:4319794
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