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Frequency agility

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169:(AESAs) further evolved this process. In a PESA the broadcast signal is a single frequency, although that frequency can be easily changed from pulse to pulse. In the AESA, each element is driven at a different frequency (or at least a wide selection of them) even within a single pulse, so there is no high-power signal at any given frequency. The radar unit knows which frequencies were broadcast, and amplifies and combines only those return signals, thereby reconstructing a single powerful echo on reception. An adversary, unaware of which frequencies are active, has no signal to see, making detection on 87:", aluminum foil strips cut to 1/2 the length of the wavelength of the Würzburg, rendering it almost useless. They also produced jammer units, "Carpet" and "Shivers", that broadcast signals on the Würzburg's frequency, producing confusing displays that were useless for aiming. Post-war calculations estimated these efforts reduced the combat effectiveness of the Würzburg by 75%. These countermeasures forced the Germans to upgrade thousands of units in the field to operate on different frequencies. 107:
ultimate incarnation, each radar pulse is sent out on a different frequency and therefore renders single-frequency jamming almost impossible. In this case the jammers are forced to broadcast on every possible frequency at the same time, greatly reducing its output on any one channel. With a wide selection of possible frequencies, jamming can be rendered completely ineffective.
162:, allowed the single klystron to be replaced by a number of separate amplifiers, each one driving a subset of the array but still producing the same amount of total power. Solid-state amplifiers can operate at a wide range of frequencies, unlike a klystron, so solid-state PESAs offered much greater frequency agility, and were much more resistant to jamming. 203:
Frequency agile radars can offer the same advantages. In the case of several aircraft operating in the same location, the radars can select frequencies that are not being used in order to avoid interference. This is not as simple as the case of a cell phone, however, because ideally the radars would
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A radar system that can operate on several different frequencies makes these countermeasures more difficult to implement. For instance, if a jammer is developed to operate against a known frequency, changing that frequency in some of the in-field sets will render the jammer ineffective against those
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One of the primary reasons that early radars did not use more than one frequency was the size of their tube based electronics. As their size was reduced through improved manufacturing, even early systems were upgraded to offer more frequencies. These, however, were not generally able to be switched
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To further frustrate these efforts, a radar can rapidly switch between the two frequencies. No matter how quickly the jammer responds, there will be a delay before it can switch and broadcast on the active frequency. During this period of time the aircraft is unmasked, allowing detection. In its
94:, allowing aircraft to be routed around the radars, or at least be kept at longer distances from them. It also helped them to find new operating frequencies as they were introduced, by selecting the location of known installations when they disappeared and singling them out for further study. 67:
energy and then turning off the broadcaster and listening for the returning echoes from various objects. Because efficient signal reception requires careful tuning throughout the electronics in the transceiver, each operating frequency required a dedicated transceiver. Due to the size of the
200:. When the user wishes to place a call, the cell phone uses a negotiation process to find unused frequencies among the many that are available within its operational area. This allows users to join and leave particular cell towers on-the-fly, their frequencies being given up to other users. 110:
Additionally, having a wide variety of frequencies makes ELINT much more difficult. If only a certain subset of the possible frequencies are used in normal operation the adversary is denied information on what frequencies might be used in a wartime situation. This was the idea behind the
154:(PESA) radars, introduced in the 1960s, used a single microwave source and a series of delays to drive a large number of antenna elements (the array) and electronically steer the radar beam by changing the delay times slightly. The development of solid-state microwave amplifiers, 147:
components dramatically decreased the size of the receivers, allowing several solid-state receivers to fit into the space formerly occupied by a single tube-based system. This space could be used for additional broadcasters and offer some agility even on smaller units.
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change their operating frequencies with every pulse. The algorithms for selecting a set of frequencies for the next pulse cannot be truly random if one wants to avoid all interference with similar systems, but a less-than-random system is subject to
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often have limited agility to allow them to strongly reflect off rain, or alternately, to see through it. By switching the frequencies back and forth, a composite image of the weather can be built up.
72:, were generally limited to operating on a single frequency. Knowing this operating frequency gives an adversary enormous power to interfere with radar operation or gather further intelligence. 123:. The Type 85 had twelve klystrons that could be mixed to produce sixty output frequencies, but only four of the klystrons were used in peacetime, in order to deny the 234: 314: 103:
units. To counter this, the jammer has to listen on both frequencies, and broadcast on the one that particular radar is using.
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on the fly through the electronics itself, but were controlled manually and thus were not really agile in the modern sense.
151: 166: 46:, but it remains most closely associated with the radar field and these other roles generally use the more generic term " 363: 353: 112: 30:, mutual interference with friendly sources, or to make it more difficult to locate the radar broadcaster through 43: 311: 224: 90:
Knowing the frequency of the Würzburg also helped the British in their attempts to locate the systems using
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tube-based electronics used to construct the transceivers, early radar systems, like those deployed in
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but less common on smaller units where the size of klystrons remained a problem. In the 1960s
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Alan Levine, "The Strategic Bombing of Germany", Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992, pg. 61
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system to quickly shift its operating frequency to account for atmospheric effects,
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Another reason for adding frequency agility has nothing to do with military use;
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use thousands of broadcaster/receiver modules, one for each antenna element.
124: 69: 39: 139:"Brute force" frequency agility, like the Linesman, was common on large 196:
can be used at the same time in the same location is due to the use of
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Gaspare Galati, "Advanced radar techniques and systems", IET, 1993,
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Ian Faulconbridge, "Radar Fundamentals", Argos Press, June 2002,
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any information about what signals would be used during a war.
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Radar systems generally operate by sending out short pulses of
205: 64: 35: 23: 155: 34:. The term can also be applied to other fields, including 75:
The British used the frequency information about the
372: 330:Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson and Julia Layton, 299:"Linesman/Mediator system, Radar Type 85" 284: 282: 280: 130: 373: 277: 167:active electronically scanned arrays 152:Passive electronically scanned array 187: 13: 208:methods to determine the pattern. 14: 392: 341: 44:frequency-division multiplexing 324: 304: 291: 261: 252: 53: 1: 240: 225:Variable-frequency oscillator 245: 7: 218: 10: 397: 321:shows about 1600 elements. 58: 274:, January 1946, pg. 92-97 192:The reason that several 97: 268:"Radar Countermeasures" 176:Modern radars like the 171:radar warning receivers 92:radio direction finders 32:radio direction finding 332:"How Cell Phones Work" 310:Visual inspection of 173:extremely difficult. 131:Improving electronics 115:Type 85 radar in the 165:The introduction of 141:early warning radars 22:is the ability of a 334:, howstuffworks.com 235:Frequency diversity 366:, pp. 481–503 317:2011-01-03 at the 40:radio transceivers 230:Frequency hopping 198:frequency hopping 117:Linesman/Mediator 48:frequency hopping 20:Frequency agility 388: 335: 328: 322: 308: 302: 295: 289: 286: 275: 265: 259: 256: 188:Other advantages 81:Operation Biting 16:Radar technology 396: 395: 391: 390: 389: 387: 386: 385: 371: 370: 369: 344: 339: 338: 329: 325: 319:Wayback Machine 309: 305: 296: 292: 287: 278: 266: 262: 257: 253: 248: 243: 221: 190: 133: 119:network in the 100: 61: 56: 38:or traditional 17: 12: 11: 5: 394: 384: 383: 368: 367: 356: 345: 343: 340: 337: 336: 323: 303: 301:, 4 April 2004 297:Dick Barrett, 290: 276: 260: 250: 249: 247: 244: 242: 239: 238: 237: 232: 227: 220: 217: 213:weather radars 189: 186: 132: 129: 121:United Kingdom 99: 96: 77:Würzburg radar 60: 57: 55: 52: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 393: 382: 379: 378: 376: 365: 364:0-86341-172-X 361: 357: 355: 354:0-9580238-1-6 351: 347: 346: 333: 327: 320: 316: 313: 307: 300: 294: 285: 283: 281: 273: 269: 264: 255: 251: 236: 233: 231: 228: 226: 223: 222: 216: 214: 209: 207: 201: 199: 195: 185: 183: 179: 174: 172: 168: 163: 161: 157: 153: 149: 146: 142: 137: 128: 126: 122: 118: 114: 108: 104: 95: 93: 88: 86: 82: 78: 73: 71: 66: 51: 49: 45: 41: 37: 33: 29: 25: 21: 342:Bibliography 326: 306: 293: 271: 263: 254: 210: 202: 191: 175: 164: 150: 138: 134: 125:Soviet Union 109: 105: 101: 89: 83:to produce " 79:gathered in 74: 70:World War II 62: 19: 18: 312:the antenna 272:Electronics 194:cell phones 145:solid state 54:Description 241:References 246:Footnotes 182:AN/APG-81 375:Category 315:Archived 219:See also 160:MESFETs 59:Jamming 28:jamming 362:  352:  288:Galati 85:Window 42:using 36:lasers 381:Radar 206:ELINT 156:JFETs 98:Agile 65:radio 24:radar 360:ISBN 350:ISBN 178:F-35 158:and 113:AMES 180:'s 50:". 377:: 279:^ 270:,

Index

radar
jamming
radio direction finding
lasers
radio transceivers
frequency-division multiplexing
frequency hopping
radio
World War II
Würzburg radar
Operation Biting
Window
radio direction finders
AMES
Linesman/Mediator
United Kingdom
Soviet Union
early warning radars
solid state
Passive electronically scanned array
JFETs
MESFETs
active electronically scanned arrays
radar warning receivers
F-35
AN/APG-81
cell phones
frequency hopping
ELINT
weather radars

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