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process of hallucination. However, if there are visual images when we hallucinate it seems reasonable that there are visual images when we see. Similarly if dreaming involves visual and auditory images in our minds it seems reasonable to think there are visual and auditory images, or sense-data, when we are awake and perceiving things. This argument has been challenged in a number of different ways. First it has been questioned whether there must be some object present that actually has the experienced qualities, which would then seemingly have to be something like a sense-datum. Why couldn't it be that the perceiver is simply in a state of seeming to experience such an object without any object actually being present? Second, in cases of illusion and perceptual relativity there is an object present which is simply misperceived, usually in readily explainable ways, and no need to suppose that an additional object is also involved. Third, the last part of the perceptual relativity version of the argument has been challenged by questioning whether there is really no experiential difference between veridical and non-veridical perception; and by arguing that even if sense-data are experienced in non-veridical cases and even if the difference between veridical and non-veridical cases is, as claimed, experientially indiscernible, there is still no reason to think that sense-data are the immediate objects of experience in veridical cases. Fourth, do sense-data exist through time or are they momentary? Can they exist when not being perceived? Are they public or private? Can they be themselves misperceived? Do they exist in minds or are they extra-mental, even if not physical? On the basis of the intractability of these questions, it has been argued that the conclusion of the argument from illusion is unacceptable or even unintelligible, even in the absence of a clear diagnosis of exactly where and how it goes wrong.
385:, the object has qualities that no public physical object in that situation has and so must be distinct from any such object. NaĂŻve realism may accommodate these facts as they stand by virtue of its very vagueness (or "open-texture"): it is not specific or detailed enough to be refuted by such cases. A more developed direct realist might respond by showing that various cases of misperception, failed perception, and perceptual relativity do not make it necessary to suppose that sense-data exist. When a stick submerged in water looks bent a direct realist is not compelled to say the stick actually is bent but can say that the stick can have more than one appearance: a straight stick can look bent when light reflected from the stick arrives at one's eye in a crooked pattern, but this appearance is not necessarily a sense-datum in the mind. Similar things can be said about the coin which appears circular from one vantage point and oval-shaped from another. Pressing on your eyeball with a finger creates double vision but assuming the existence of two sense-data is unnecessary: the direct realist can say that they have two eyes, each giving them a different view of the world. Usually the eyes are focused in the same direction; but sometimes they are not.
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to the input. This implies that the colour we experience is actually a cortical occurrence, and that light rays and external surfaces are not themselves coloured. The proportional variations with which cortical colour changes are there in the external world, but not colour as we experience it. Contrary to what
Gilbert Ryle believed, those who argue for sensations being brain processes do not have to hold that there is a "picture" in the brain since this is impossible according to this theory since actual pictures in the external world are not coloured. It is plain that Ryle unthinkingly carried over what the eyes do to the nature of sensation; A. J. Ayer at the time described Ryle's position as "very weak". So there is no "screen" in front of cortical "eyes", no mental objects before one. As
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view, similar to Reid's, is that we do have images of various sorts in our minds when we perceive, dream, hallucinate and imagine but when we actually perceive things, our sensations cannot be considered objects of perception or attention. The only objects of perception are external objects. Even if perception is accompanied by images, or sensations, it is wrong to say we perceive sensations. Direct realism defines perception as perception of external objects where an "external object" is allowed to be a photon in the eye but not an impulse in a nerve leading from the eye. Recent work in neuroscience suggests a shared ontology for perception, imagination and dreaming, with similar areas of brain being used for all of these.
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an informative statement begins with the parties hypothetically assuming that they are referring to the "same" entity or "property", even though their selections from their sensory fields cannot match; we can call this mutually imagined projection the "logical subject" of the statement. The speaker then produces the logical predicate which effects the proposed updating of the "referent". If the statement goes through, the hearer will now have a different percept and concept of the "referent"—perhaps even seeing it now as two things and not one. The radical conclusion is that we are premature in conceiving of the external as already sorted into singular "objects" in the first place, since we only need to behave
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process may have been like. Furthermore, the causal process that intervenes between the external object and the perceptual experience takes time, so that the character of the experience reflects, at the most, an earlier stage of that object than the one existing at the moment of perception. As in observations of astronomical objects the external object may have ceased to exist long before the experience occurs. These facts are claimed to point to the conclusion that the direct object of experience is an entity produced at the end of this causal process, distinct from any physical object that initiates the process."
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the form of the material object without the matter. What we perceive directly, on this view, are material objects. This changed in the seventeenth century with
Descartes and Locke. who can be read as saying that the primary objects of perception are not things external to the mind but sense-data. Sense-data are the messengers that stand between us and physical objects such as tables and chairs. While indirect realism was the standard view of early modern philosophers, nowadays direct realism is, once again, in fashion.
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out of any such set of related perceptual experiences as the one in which the relevant physical object is itself immediately experienced. The most reasonable conclusion is that the experienced object is always distinct from the physical object or at least that there is no way to identify which, if any, of the immediately experienced objects is the physical object itself. Epistemologically it is as though physical objects were never given, whether or not that is in fact the case.
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553:(the sense-datum) which that act apprehends or is an awareness of. The fundamental idea of the adverbial theory, in contrast, is that there is no need for such objects and the problems that they bring with them (such as whether they are physical or mental or somehow neither). Instead, it is suggested, merely the occurrence of a mental act or mental state with its own intrinsic character is enough to account for the character of immediate experience.
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447:). Although Descartes' duality of natural substances may have echoes in modern physics (Bose and Fermi statistics) no agreed account of 'interpretation' has been formulated. Thus representationalism remains an incomplete description of perception. Aristotle realized this and simply proposed that ideas themselves (representations) must be aware—in other words that there is no further transfer of sense impressions beyond ideas.
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representation. However, this is a distortion of the meaning of the word "see" which the representationalist does not imply. For the representationalist the statement refers to the Eiffel Tower, which implicitly is experienced in the form of a representation. The representationalist does not imply that when a person refers to the Eiffel Tower, they are referring to their
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example, one perceives an object as spherical precisely because of the way the atoms of the sphere are arranged.) Primary qualities cannot be removed by either thought or physical action, and include mass, movement, and, controversially, solidity (although later proponents of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities usually discount solidity).
346:). It has been argued that "informed commonsense" indicates that perceptions often depend on organs of perception. For example, humans would receive visual information very differently if they, like flies, had compound eyes, and may not even be able to imagine how things would appear with entirely different sense organs such as
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shape because an object or entity that literally has that color and shape is directly before my mind. But the nature of these entities and the way in which they are related to the mind are difficult to understand. The adverbial theory has the advantage of being metaphysically simpler, avoiding issues
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specific manner of sensing or of being appeared to accounts for the content of my experience: I am in a certain distinctive sort of experiential state. There need be no object or entity of any sort that is literally silver and elliptical in the material world or in the mind. I experience a silver and
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processes, without change in the external physical object that initiates this process and that may seem to be depicted by the experience. Conversely any process that yields the same sensory/neural results will yield the same perceptual experience, no matter what the physical object that initiated the
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that 'it' is singular. A proponent of this theory can thus ask the direct realist why he or she thinks it is necessary to move to taking the imagining of singularity for real when there is no practical difference in the outcome in action. Therefore, although there are selections from our sensory
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A more fundamental criticism is implied in theories of this type. The differences at the sensory and perceptual levels between agents require that some means of ensuring at least a partial correlation can be achieved that allows the updatings involved in communication to take place. The process in
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with what arrives at the retinas. Just as the currents in a wire going to a loudspeaker vary proportionately with the sounds that emanate from it but have no other likeness, so too does sensation vary proportionately (and not necessarily directly) with what causes it but bears no other resemblance
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The new objection to the
Homunculus Argument claims that it relies on a naive view of sensation. Because the eyes respond to light rays, there is no reason for supposing that the visual field requires eyes to see it. Visual sensation (the argument can be extrapolated to the other senses) bears no
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Furthermore, representative realism claims that we perceive our perceptual intermediaries—we can attend to them—just as we observe our image in a mirror. However, as we can scientifically verify, this is clearly not true of the physiological components of the perceptual process. This also brings up
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is based upon observation then the entire developed memory and knowledge of every perception and of each sense may be as skewed as the bent stick. Since objects with different qualities are experienced from each of the different perspectives there is no apparent experiential basis for regarding one
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The distinction between direct and indirect realism about perception has an interesting history. There was a time when perception was understood to be of things themselves, not of our ideas of things. This is what we find in
Aristotle and Aquinas, who maintain that the mind or understanding grasps
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However, this response is presumably based on previously observed data. If one were to be able to observe nothing other than the stick in the water, with no previous information, it would appear that the stick was bent. Visual depth in particular is a set of inferences, not an actual experience of
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Secondary qualities are qualities that one's experience does not directly resemble; for example, when one sees an object as red, the sensation of seeing redness is not produced by some quality of redness in the object, but by the arrangement of atoms on the surface of the object which reflects and
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of pre-existing singularities, they retain an experimental character. Virtual constructs or no, they remain, however, selections that are causally linked to the real and can surprise us at any time—which removes any danger of solipsism in this theory. This approach dovetails with the philosophy
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Direct realists can potentially deny the existence of any such thing as a mental image but this is difficult to maintain, since we seem able to visually imagine all sorts of things with ease. Even if perception does not involve images other mental processes like imagination certainly seem to. One
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Conversely, direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence. Furthermore, the framework rejects the premise that knowledge arrives via a representational medium, as well as the notion that concepts are interpretations of sensory
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Another potential counter-example involves vivid hallucinations: phantom elephants, for instance, might be interpreted as sense-data. A direct realist response would differentiate hallucination from genuine perception: no perception of elephants is going on, only the different and related mental
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Primary qualities are qualities which are "explanatorily basic" – which is to say, they can be referred to as the explanation for other qualities or phenomena without requiring explanation themselves – and they are distinct in that our sensory experience of them resembles them in reality. (For
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According to the adverbial theory, when, for example, I experience a silver elliptical shape (as when viewing a coin from an angle) I am in a certain specific state of sensing or sensory awareness or of being appeared to: I sense in a certain manner or am appeared to in a certain way, and that
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A potential difficulty with representational realism is that, if we only have knowledge of representations of the world, how can we know that they resemble in any significant way the objects to which they are supposed to correspond? Any creature with a representation in its brain would need to
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interact with the objects that are represented to identify them with the representation. This difficulty would seem reasonably to be covered by the learning by exploration of the world that goes on throughout life. However, there may still be a concern that if the external world is only to be
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in representationalism. If a person says "I see the Eiffel Tower" at a time when they are indeed looking at the Eiffel Tower, to what does the term "Eiffel Tower" refer? The direct realist might say that in the representational account people do not really see the tower but rather 'see' the
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put it: "How do we take notice of sense?—by sense itself". Moreland
Perkins has characterized it thus: that sensing is not like kicking a ball, but rather "kicking a kick". Today there are still philosophers arguing for colour being a property of external surfaces, light sources, etc.
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they are already logically singular. The diagram at the beginning of this entry would thus be thought of as a false picture of the actual case, since to draw "an" object as already selected from the real is only to treat the practically needful, but strictly false, hypothesis of
463:, its 'true likeness' might be quite different from our idea of it. The representational realist would answer to this that "true likeness" is an intuitive concept that falls in the face of logic, since a likeness must always depend on the way in which something is considered.
309:", one particular to ourselves in its detail. The question has to be put how a collective use of language can go on when, not only do we have differing understandings of the words we use, but our sensory registrations differ.
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direct resemblance to the light rays at the retina, nor to the character of what they are reflected from or pass through or what was glowing at the origin of them. The reason given is that they only bear the similarities of
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philosophers prior to Newton, such as
Descartes, for whom physical processes were poorly defined. Descartes held that there is a "homunculus" in the form of the soul, belonging to a form of natural substance known as
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The above argument invites the conclusion of a perceptual dualism that raises the issue of how and whether the object can be known by experience. The adverbial theory proposes "that this dualism is a dualism of
430:, and this need not be implied. This suggests that some phenomenon other than simple data flow and information processing is involved in perception. This is more of an issue now than it was for
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Illusion creates a problem for naĂŻve realists as it suggests our senses are fallible, perceiving things that are not there. In this illusion, the lines are horizontal, despite how they appear.
895:, Hackett Publishing, 2003, p. xviii: "Hegel follows Kant ... in limiting claims to know to the empirically real. In short, he adopts a view very similar to Kant's empirical realism."
289:. Recently, reliance on the private language argument and the "homunculus objection" has itself come under attack. It can be argued that those who argue for "inner presence", to use
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about the nature of sense-data, but we gain no real understanding of the nature of the states in question or of how exactly they account for the character of immediate experience."
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that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the
823:: "Paraphrasing David Hume (1739...; see also Locke 1690, Berkeley 1710, Russell 1912): nothing is ever directly present to the mind in perception except perceptual appearances."
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The character of experience of a physical object can be altered in major ways by changes in the conditions of perception or of the relevant sense-organs and the resulting
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Harold I. Brown, "Direct
Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 341–363.
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fields which for the time being we treat as if they were objects, they are only provisional, open to corrections at any time, and, hence, far from being direct
362:. More dramatically, sometimes people perceive things which are not there at all, which can be termed instances of "hallucination" or "perceptual delusion".
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language. There is no doubt that each of us has a private understanding of public language, a notion that has been experimentally supported;
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question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our
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are an example of a perceptual delusion. "For, unlike an architectural arch, a rainbow recedes as we approach it, never to be reached."
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Putnam, Hilary. Sep. 1994. "The Dewey
Lectures 1994: Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind."
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293:'s term, are not proposing a private "referent", with the application of language to it being "private" and thus unshareable, but a
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devices. Furthermore, perception systems can misrepresent objects even when in full working order, as shown, for example, by
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objects-as-logically-singular as ontologically given. The proponents of this view thus argue that there is no need actually
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in his seminal essay "Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind". Indirect realism is argued to be problematical because of
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and its relation to representative realism, concerning the incongruous marriage of the metaphysical and the physical.
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Bertrand
Russell and the Nature of Propositions: A History and Defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement
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is assumed then something in the brain must be interpreting incoming data. This something is often described as a
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allegedly shows the need to posit sense-data as the immediate objects of perception. In cases of illusion or
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However, epistemological dualism has come under sustained attack by other contemporary philosophers, such as
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Sellars, Roy Wood (1919), "The epistemology of evolutionary naturalism", Mind, 28:112, 407-26; se p. 414.
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McCreery, C. (2006) "Perception and Hallucination: the Case for Continuity.” Oxford: Oxford Forum.
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absorbs light in a particular way. Secondary qualities include colour, smell, sound, and taste.
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the space between things in a radial direction outward from the observation point. If all
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The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior
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Direct realism, also known as naĂŻve realism, argues we perceive the world directly.
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followed Kant in adopting empirical realism. Direct realism was also defended by
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carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is impressed.
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was a proponent of direct realism. Direct realist views have been attributed to
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On Message Structure: A Framework for the Study of Language and Communication,
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338:)." It is also referred to as the problem of conflicting appearances (e.g.
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Schacter, Daniel (2011). Psychology. Worth Publishers. ISBN 9781429237192.
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This argument was "first offered in a more or less fully explicit form in
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An analysis of empirical arguments for representationalism. Online PDF
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Roger F. Gibson, "McDowell's Direct Realism and Platonic Naturalism",
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in the singularity of an object since we can manage perfectly well by
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Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought
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One concern with indirect realism is that if simple data flow and
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Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of
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The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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that obeyed different laws from those obeyed by solid matter (
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616: – Philosophy that accords primacy only to human thought
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was the first to provide a description of direct realism. In
1004:, a lecture recorded 2014 at Marc Sanders Foundation, Vimeo.
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Elements of Philosophy, The First Section: Concerning Body,
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Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon,
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What Do We Perceive and How Do We Perceive It? (PDF file)
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The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy
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Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning,
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London: John Bohn, p. 389; Perkins, Moreland (1983),
738:. Philosophical Studies Series. Springer. p. 62.
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Neurological explanation for paranormal experiences
832:A. D. Smith, "On Primary and Secondary Qualities",
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69:, are differing models that describe the nature of
1057:After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation,
1174:The Empirical Description of Conscious Experience
1015:Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception
466:A semantic difficulty may arise when considering
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1059:London & New York: Oxford University Press.
1247:Michael Tye (2006), 'The puzzle of true blue',
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1268:Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 103-120.
877:Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism
305:refers to our personal use of language as an "
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1238:Indianapolis IN: Hackett Pub. Co., pp. 286-7.
1208:Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 96-102.
786:Realism and Appearances: An Essay in Ontology
128:he describes how a see-er is informed of the
1185:The Science and Philosophy of Consciousness.
932:Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano
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1266:Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith,
1206:Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith,
788:, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 136.
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938:150, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999, p. 224 n. 1.
801:, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 85.
598:, also known as Hallucinations in the sane
154:Indirect realism was popular with several
111:input derived from a real external world.
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575: – Art depicting Outward Appearances
454:The representational theory of perception
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227:lectures (1889–1915). On the other hand,
30:For representationalism in the arts, see
967:. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 26.
862:, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 288.
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667:NaĂŻve Realism in Contemporary Philosophy
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242:, indirect realism has been defended by
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1017:, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 15.
908:, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 40.
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799:Kant on Representation and Objectivity
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549:of awareness (or apprehension) and an
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1295:Online papers on representationalism
678:The Function of Conscious Experience
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235:") subscribed to indirect realism.
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1297:, by various authors, compiled by
1072:Indianapolis IN: Hackett Pub. Co.
414:Arguments against indirect realism
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369:Illusions are present in nature.
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1330:The Representationalism Web Site
313:Arguments against direct realism
27:Debate in the philosophy of mind
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604:, also known as Inferentialism
541:." Perceptual dualism implies:
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706:. Dec 5, 2016. Archived from
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592: – Philosophical concept
199:Scottish common sense realism
2026:Dualism (philosophy of mind)
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1839:Internalism and externalism
858:Michael Della Rocca (ed.),
654:Consciousness and Cognition
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197:, a notable member of the
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1965:
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156:early modern philosophers
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1942:Philosophy of perception
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1715:Naturalized epistemology
1230:Hobbes, Thomas (1839 ),
1055:Steiner, George (1998),
209:Late modern philosophers
67:representational realism
47:philosophy of perception
1922:Outline of epistemology
1755:Transcendental idealism
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1070:Color for Philosophers,
1026:Revonsuo, Antti (2006)
621:The Treachery of Images
344:Conflicting Appearances
240:contemporary philosophy
233:Ăśber Sinn und Bedeutung
1869:Problem of other minds
904:Michael Beaney (ed.),
879:, Rodopi, 2010, p. 20.
732:Bernecker, S. (2008).
665:Lehar, Steve. (2000).
641:Lehar, Steve. (2000).
608:Map–territory relation
555:
455:
420:information processing
379:argument from illusion
374:
327:
318:Argument from illusion
42:
1947:Philosophy of science
1927:Faith and rationality
1809:Descriptive knowledge
1680:Feminist epistemology
1620:Nicholas Wolterstorff
1172:Green, Alex. (2003).
1132:University of Reading
1068:Hardin, C. L. (1988)
995:"Real Direct Realism"
871:Daniel Breazeale and
596:Anomalous experiences
543:
522:social constructivism
453:
368:
325:
40:
32:Realism (visual arts)
2021:Metaphysical realism
1879:Procedural knowledge
1864:Problem of induction
1304:This is a simulation
984:(1996), pp. 275–281.
978:Philosophical Issues
930:Robin D. Rollinger,
834:Philosophical Review
360:MĂĽller-Lyer illusion
231:(in his 1892 paper "
1957:Virtue epistemology
1952:Social epistemology
1932:Formal epistemology
1819:Epistemic injustice
1814:Exploratory thought
1615:Ludwig Wittgenstein
1217:Ayer, A. J. (1957)
287:homunculus argument
271:Ludwig Wittgenstein
141:medieval philosophy
1610:Timothy Williamson
1400:Augustine of Hippo
1341:2019-12-10 at the
1323:2008-05-27 at the
1236:Sensing the World,
1179:2011-08-05 at the
1153:2011-07-15 at the
1126:2009-10-02 at the
1102:2011-05-25 at the
1040:Rommetveit, Ragnar
1000:2017-01-16 at the
819:2019-12-09 at the
672:2012-08-11 at the
648:2019-06-03 at the
512:mutually imagining
456:
407:neurophysiological
391:empirical evidence
375:
328:
177:Locke categorized
51:philosophy of mind
43:
2006:Cognitive science
1993:
1992:
1859:Privileged access
1495:Søren Kierkegaard
1144:Gregory, Richard.
797:A. B. Dickerson,
356:optical illusions
101:cognitive science
16:(Redirected from
2038:
1937:Metaepistemology
1915:Related articles
1889:Regress argument
1824:Epistemic virtue
1575:Bertrand Russell
1550:Duncan Pritchard
1510:Hilary Kornblith
1425:Laurence BonJour
1372:
1365:
1358:
1349:
1348:
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1094:
1073:
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1053:
1047:
1037:
1031:
1024:
1018:
1013:John R. Searle,
1011:
1005:
993:Galen Strawson,
991:
985:
974:
968:
961:
955:
945:
939:
936:Phaenomenologica
928:
922:
915:
909:
902:
896:
886:
880:
869:
863:
856:
850:
845:Patrick Rysiew,
843:
837:
830:
824:
811:
802:
795:
789:
784:John W. Yolton,
782:
773:
772:
766:
765:
729:
720:
719:
717:
715:
696:
690:
687:
681:
663:
657:
639:
579:Critical realism
528:Adverbial theory
473:sense experience
248:Bertrand Russell
221:John Cook Wilson
147:was defended by
134:hylomorphic form
61:, as opposed to
21:
18:Indirect realism
2046:
2045:
2041:
2040:
2039:
2037:
2036:
2035:
1996:
1995:
1994:
1989:
1961:
1910:
1829:Gettier problem
1759:
1690:Foundationalism
1636:
1585:Wilfrid Sellars
1540:Alvin Plantinga
1420:George Berkeley
1387:Epistemologists
1381:
1376:
1343:Wayback Machine
1325:Wayback Machine
1291:
1286:
1285:
1276:
1272:
1263:
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1199:
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1128:Wayback Machine
1119:
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1104:Wayback Machine
1095:
1076:
1067:
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1050:
1038:
1034:
1025:
1021:
1012:
1008:
1002:Wayback Machine
992:
988:
975:
971:
963:John McDowell,
962:
958:
946:
942:
929:
925:
917:Samuel Lebens,
916:
912:
903:
899:
887:
883:
870:
866:
857:
853:
844:
840:
836:(1990), 221–54.
831:
827:
821:Wayback Machine
812:
805:
796:
792:
783:
776:
763:
761:
746:
730:
723:
713:
711:
710:on Apr 26, 2022
698:
697:
693:
688:
684:
674:Wayback Machine
664:
660:
650:Wayback Machine
640:
636:
631:
569:
530:
517:representations
479:the problem of
416:
320:
315:
279:Wilfrid Sellars
117:
35:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2044:
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2031:Theory of mind
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1707:
1702:
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1672:
1667:
1662:
1657:
1655:Constructivism
1652:
1646:
1644:
1638:
1637:
1635:
1634:
1627:
1622:
1617:
1612:
1607:
1605:Baruch Spinoza
1602:
1600:P. F. Strawson
1597:
1592:
1590:Susanna Siegel
1587:
1582:
1577:
1572:
1567:
1565:W. V. O. Quine
1562:
1557:
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1497:
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1465:Nelson Goodman
1462:
1457:
1455:Edmund Gettier
1452:
1447:
1442:
1440:René Descartes
1437:
1432:
1430:Gilles Deleuze
1427:
1422:
1417:
1412:
1407:
1405:William Alston
1402:
1397:
1395:Thomas Aquinas
1391:
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1375:
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1367:
1360:
1352:
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1315:
1310:
1307:
1301:
1299:David Chalmers
1290:
1289:External links
1287:
1284:
1283:
1270:
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1240:
1223:
1210:
1197:
1188:
1165:
1163:, pp. 257-261.
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1048:
1032:
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986:
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965:Mind and World
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529:
526:
415:
412:
340:Myles Burnyeat
319:
316:
314:
311:
303:George Steiner
291:Antti Revonsuo
283:Ryle's regress
264:John R. Searle
260:Galen Strawson
244:Edmund Husserl
217:G. W. F. Hegel
203:Baruch Spinoza
192:
191:
187:
160:René Descartes
149:Thomas Aquinas
145:direct realism
132:by way of the
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26:
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6:
4:
3:
2:
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1720:Phenomenalism
1718:
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1710:NaĂŻve realism
1708:
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1698:
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1686:
1683:
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1660:Contextualism
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1625:Vienna Circle
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1560:Hilary Putnam
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1535:Robert Nozick
1533:
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1530:John McDowell
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1518:
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1498:
1496:
1493:
1491:
1490:Immanuel Kant
1488:
1486:
1483:
1481:
1478:
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1473:
1471:
1468:
1466:
1463:
1461:
1460:Alvin Goldman
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1125:
1122:
1121:NaĂŻve Realism
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745:9781402082191
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609:
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591:
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585:Disjunctivism
583:
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561:
554:
552:
548:
542:
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536:
525:
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509:
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495:
494:Thomas Hobbes
490:
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476:
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439:
433:
429:
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403:
399:
395:
392:
386:
384:
383:hallucination
380:
372:
367:
363:
361:
357:
353:
352:echo-location
350:detectors or
349:
345:
341:
337:
333:
324:
310:
308:
304:
300:
296:
292:
288:
284:
280:
276:
272:
267:
265:
261:
257:
256:John McDowell
253:
252:Hilary Putnam
249:
245:
241:
236:
234:
230:
229:Gottlob Frege
226:
222:
218:
214:
210:
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183:
182:
181:as follows:
180:
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173:
169:
168:G. W. Leibniz
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131:
130:object itself
127:
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98:
94:
90:
85:
83:
79:
76:; out of the
75:
72:
68:
64:
60:
59:naĂŻve realism
56:
52:
48:
39:
33:
19:
1903:
1804:Common sense
1782:A posteriori
1781:
1773:
1744:
1735:Reductionism
1629:
1580:Gilbert Ryle
1450:Fred Dretske
1435:Keith DeRose
1379:Epistemology
1278:
1273:
1265:
1260:
1255:69:1, 48-54.
1252:
1248:
1243:
1235:
1231:
1226:
1218:
1213:
1205:
1200:
1191:
1184:
1168:
1160:
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1035:
1027:
1022:
1014:
1009:
989:
981:
977:
972:
964:
959:
954:(9):445–518.
951:
948:
943:
935:
931:
926:
918:
913:
905:
900:
892:
889:Tom Rockmore
884:
876:
873:Tom Rockmore
867:
859:
854:
846:
841:
833:
828:
798:
793:
785:
768:
762:. Retrieved
734:
712:. Retrieved
708:the original
703:
694:
685:
677:
661:
653:
637:
620:
614:Subjectivism
556:
550:
546:
544:
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531:
516:
511:
507:
502:
499:
489:co-variation
488:
485:
477:
465:
457:
442:
438:res cogitans
436:
417:
404:
400:
396:
387:
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343:
329:
298:
294:
268:
237:
213:J. G. Fichte
207:
193:
176:
158:, including
153:
138:
123:
118:
109:
95:paradigm in
86:
84:experience.
78:metaphysical
66:
62:
58:
54:
44:
1884:Proposition
1854:Objectivity
1740:Reliabilism
1730:Rationalism
1675:Fallibilism
1650:Coherentism
1595:Ernest Sosa
1570:Thomas Reid
1555:James Pryor
1525:G. E. Moore
1515:David Lewis
1505:Saul Kripke
1500:Peter Klein
1480:Susan Haack
1410:Robert Audi
1158:Perception.
444:res extensa
432:rationalist
342:'s article
195:Thomas Reid
125:On the Soul
93:cognitivism
74:experiences
2000:Categories
1985:Discussion
1975:Task Force
1894:Simplicity
1874:Perception
1750:Skepticism
1725:Positivism
1700:Infinitism
1665:Empiricism
1520:John Locke
1485:David Hume
1475:Anil Gupta
1470:Paul Grice
1445:John Dewey
1415:A. J. Ayer
1148:Delusions.
982:Perception
764:2016-03-23
754:2008921236
629:References
590:Enactivism
560:elliptical
539:sense-data
508:to believe
424:homunculus
172:David Hume
164:John Locke
97:psychology
89:perception
1849:Knowledge
1834:Induction
1784:knowledge
1776:knowledge
1253:Analysis,
1249:Analysis,
573:Aspectism
520:known as
468:reference
358:like the
348:infra-red
179:qualities
120:Aristotle
82:conscious
71:conscious
1970:Category
1789:Analysis
1774:A priori
1765:Concepts
1705:Innatism
1642:Theories
1339:Archived
1321:Archived
1177:Archived
1151:Archived
1146:(2003).
1124:Archived
1100:Archived
998:Archived
980:Vol. 7,
875:(eds.),
817:Archived
758:Archived
670:Archived
646:Archived
567:See also
545:both an
461:inferred
371:Rainbows
332:Berkeley
307:idiolect
285:and the
105:idealism
63:indirect
1905:more...
1685:Fideism
1631:more...
1042:(1974)
714:Apr 27,
535:objects
481:dualism
428:regress
297:use of
295:private
223:in his
115:History
45:In the
1799:Belief
1695:Holism
752:
742:
551:object
299:public
277:) and
262:, and
225:Oxford
170:, and
55:direct
1980:Stubs
1899:Truth
1545:Plato
503:as if
273:(the
750:LCCN
740:ISBN
716:2022
377:The
336:1713
246:and
215:and
99:and
49:and
547:act
238:In
205:.
139:In
65:or
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