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resource for the purpose specified in sub-section (1) of
Section 69 of the Act’. · The Statutory order (S.O.) dated 20.12.2018 has been issued in accordance with rules framed in year 2009 and in vogue since then. · No new powers have been conferred to any of the security or law enforcement agencies by the S.O. dated 20.12.2018. · Notification has been issued to notify the ISPs, TSPs, Intermediaries etc. to codify the existing orders. · Each case of interception, monitoring, decryption is to be approved by the competent authority i.e. Union Home secretary. These powers are also available to the competent authority in the State governments as per IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules 2009. · As per rule 22 of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules 2009, all such cases of interception or monitoring or decryption are to be placed before the review committee headed by Cabinet Secretary, which shall meet at least once in two months to review such cases. In case of State governments, such cases are reviewed by a committee headed by the Chief Secretary concerned. ·S.O dated 20.12.2018 will help in following ways: I. To ensure that any interception, monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer resource is done as per due process of law. II. Notification about the agencies authorized to exercise these powers and preventing any unauthorized use of these powers by any agency, individual or intermediary. III. The above notification will ensure that provisions of law relating to lawful interception or monitoring of computer resource are followed and if any interception, monitoring or decryption is required for purposes specified in Section 69 of the IT Act, the same is done as per due process of law and approval of competent authority i.e. Union Home Secretary.
248:
duration, etc. Call content is namely the stream of data carrying the call. Included in the architecture is the lawful interception management function, which covers interception session set-up and tear-down, scheduling, target identification, etc. Communications between the network operator and LEA are via the handover interfaces (HI). Communications data and content are typically delivered from the network operator to the LEA in an encrypted format over an IP-based VPN. The interception of traditional voice calls still often relies on the establishment of an ISDN channel that is set up at the time of the interception.
369:. The provisions of the Directive apply broadly to almost all public electronic communications and require the capture of most related information, including location, for every communication. The information must be stored for a period of at least six months, up to two years, and made available to law enforcement upon lawful request. The Directive has been widely emulated in other countries. On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the Directive 2006/24/EC invalid for violating fundamental rights.
252:(e.g., destination email address, source email address, time email was transmitted) as well as pertinent header information within the IP packets conveying the message (e.g., source IP address of email server originating the email message). Of course, more in-depth information would be obtained by the interception system so as to avoid the usual email address spoofing that often takes place (e.g., spoofing of source address). Voice-over-IP likewise has its own IRI, including data derived from
490:
personal information from his online service provider— all of which was done without a search warrant. The plaintiff’s attorneys argued that their client’s rights were violated, as he was victim to unlawful search and seizure. Despite the court’s ruling, the evidence gathered from the unwarranted search was used as evidence in trial, as the court claimed that the police were acting in good faith. In accordance to the ruling, the court proclaims that a warrant is not needed if:
89:
52:(PSTN), wireless, and cable systems, lawful interception (LI) was generally performed by accessing the mechanical or digital switches supporting the targets' calls. The introduction of packet-switched networks, softswitch technology, and server-based applications during the past two decades fundamentally altered how LI is undertaken.
508:
argued that police are allowed access to a suspect’s cell phone, but they must abide by very strict guidelines. This ruling came about from the argument of Kevin Fearon who was convicted of armed robbery in 2009. After robbing a
Toronto Jewelry kiosk, Fearon argued that the police unlawfully violated
44:
individual subscribers. Most countries require licensed telecommunications operators to provide their networks with Legal
Interception gateways and nodes for the interception of communications. The interfaces of these gateways have been standardized by telecommunication standardization organizations.
469:
has been collecting connection metadata for all calls in the United States under the authority of section 215 PATRIOT Act, with the mandatory cooperation of phone companies and with the approval of the FISA court and briefings to
Congress. The government claims it does not access the information in
319:
Individual countries have different legal requirements relating to lawful interception. The Global Lawful
Interception Industry Forum lists many of these, as does the Council of Europe secretariat. For example, in the United Kingdom the law is known as RIPA (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act),
224:
This architecture attempts to define a systematic and extensible means by which network operators and law enforcement agents (LEAs) can interact, especially as networks grow in sophistication and scope of services. Note this architecture applies to not only “traditional” wireline and wireless voice
552:
Rule 4 of the IT (Procedure and
Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules 2009 provides that ‘the competent authority may authorise an agency of the Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer
247:
The call data (known as intercept related information (IRI) in Europe and call data (CD) in the US) consists of information about the targeted communications, including destination of a voice call (e.g., called party’s telephone number), source of a call (caller’s phone number), time of the call,
172:
One of the bases for LI is the interception of telecommunications by law enforcement agencies (LEAs), regulatory or administrative agencies, and intelligence services, in accordance with local law. Under some legal systems, implementations—particularly real-time access to content—may require due
489:
officers need a search warrant before accessing information from internet service providers about users’ identities. The context behind this 8-0 ruling is an adolescent
Saskatchewan man charged with possessing and distributing child pornography. The police used the man’s IP address to access his
251:
As stated above, the ETSI architecture is equally applicable to IP-based services where IRI/CD is dependent on parameters associated with the traffic from a given application to be intercepted. For example, in the case of email IRI would be similar to the header information on an email message
168:
There are many bases for this activity that include infrastructure protection and cybersecurity. In general, the operator of public network infrastructure can undertake LI activities for those purposes. Operators of private network infrastructures in the United States have an inherent right to
588:
was fined $ 100,000,000 in 2006 (or €76,000,000) for failing to secure its systems against unlawful access. According to
Monshizadeh et al., the event is representative of mobile networks and Internet Service Providers vulnerability to cyber attacks because they use outdated LI mechanism.
513:
upon searching his cellphone without a warrant. Although divided, the
Supreme Court laid out very detailed criteria for law enforcement officers to follow when searching a suspect's phone without a warrant. There are four rules which officers must follow in these instances:
531:
To continue a search without a warrant, the situation at-hand would need to meet three of the four guidelines stated above. Nonetheless, the court highly encourages law enforcement to request a warrant before searching a cellphone to promote and protect privacy in Canada.
216:
To ensure systematic procedures for carrying out interception, while also lowering the costs of interception solutions, industry groups and government agencies worldwide have attempted to standardize the technical processes behind lawful interception. One organization,
173:
process and receiving proper authorization from competent authorities—an activity that was formerly known as "wiretapping" and has existed since the inception of electronic communications. The material below primarily treats this narrow segment of LI.
521:“The search must be incidental to the arrest and police need an “objectively reasonable” reason to conduct the search. These include: protecting police/the accused/the public; preserving evidence; discovering evidence such as finding more suspects.”
204:
to install a legal interception gateway (LIG), along legal interception nodes (LIN), which allow them to intercept in real-time the phone calls, SMS messages, emails and some file transfers or instant messages. These LI measures for governmental
348:
Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the Lawful
Interception of Telecommunications (Official Journal C 329) mandated similar measures to CALEA on a pan-European basis. Although some EU member countries reluctantly accepted this resolution
266:
USA interception standards that help network operators and service providers conform to CALEA are mainly those specified by the Federal Communications Commission (which has both plenary legislative and review authority under CALEA),
110:
361:
have been required to support interception capabilities for years. In addition, publicly available statistics indicate that the number of interceptions in Europe exceed by many hundreds of times those undertaken in the U.S.
353:(which are more pronounced in Europe than the US), there appears now to be general agreement with the resolution. Interception mandates in Europe are generally more rigorous than those of the US; for example, both voice and
275:(ATIS). ATIS's standards include new standards for broadband Internet access and VoIP services, as well as legacy J-STD-025B, which updates the earlier J-STD-025A to include packetized voice and CDMA wireless interception.
527:“Police must take detailed notes of what they looked at on the device as well as how it was searched (e.g. which applications or programs they looked at, the extent of search, the time of search, its purpose and duration)”
701:
Drugs, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous; Enforcement, Office of Drug Abuse Law; enforcement, Federal law; agency, Civilian; Michele Leonhart, Administrator; Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief of Operations (2014-08-09).
278:
To ensure the quality of evidence, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) has outlined standards for electronic surveillance once a Title III surveillance application is approved:
212:
To prevent investigations' being compromised, LI systems may be designed in a manner that hides the interception from the telecommunications operator concerned. This is a requirement in some jurisdictions.
762:
485:(Invasion Of Privacy). When evaluating Canada’s position on lawful interception, Canadian courts have issued two major rulings on this issue. In June 2014, the Supreme Court ruled that
229:, email, instant messaging, etc. The architecture is now applied worldwide (in some cases with slight variations in terminology), including in the United States in the context of
1282:
Handover Interface for the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications Traffic, ETSI ES 201 671, under Lawful Interception, Telecommunications Security, version 3.1.1, May 2007.
1241:
1288:
3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification 3GPP TS 33.107 V6.0.0 (2003–09), “Lawful interception architecture and functions (Release 6),” September 2003.
524:“The nature and extent of the search are tailored to the purpose of the search. This means police activity on the phone must be directly linked to the purpose they give.”
316:(Budapest, 23 Nov 2001). The secretariat for the Convention is the Council of Europe. However, the treaty itself has signatories worldwide and provides a global scope.
197:
and the Department of Justice. In the USA, lawful intercept technology is currently patented by a company named Voip-pal.com under the USPTO Publication #: 20100150138.
1291:
3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification 3GPP TS 33.108 V6.3.0 (2003–09), “Handover interface for Lawful Interception (Release 6),” September 2003.
874:
365:
Europe continues to maintain its global leadership role in this sector through the adoption by the European Parliament and Council in 2006 of the far reaching
1314:
300:(IETF) that provide a front-end means of supporting most LI real-time handover standards. All of these standards have been challenged as "deficient" by the
1285:
3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification 3GPP TS 33.106 V5.1.0 (2002–09), “Lawful Interception Requirements (Release 5),” September 2003.
814:
703:
181:
Almost all countries have lawful interception capability requirements and have implemented them using global LI requirements and standards developed by the
189:), or CableLabs organizations—for wireline/Internet, wireless, and cable systems, respectively. In the USA, the comparable requirements are enabled by the
161:
information or, in fewer instances, the content of the communications. If the data are not obtained in real-time, the activity is referred to as access to
1295:
388:
272:
435:
230:
190:
99:
1304:
Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance, ATIS/TIA joint standard, document number J-STD-025B, December 2003 (although challenged as deficient).
1329:
902:
754:
1092:
1240:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 3: Service-specific details for internet access services,
573:
As with many law enforcement tools, LI systems may be subverted for illicit purposes, producing a violation of human rights, as declared by
927:
561:
Most countries worldwide maintain LI requirements similar to those Europe and the U.S., and have moved to the ETSI handover standards. The
1254:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 5: Service-specific details for IP Multimedia Services,
286:
Create a filter to adhere to warrant parameters – time span, types of communications that can be monitored, evidence to be collected, etc.
1319:
1005:
1324:
979:
518:“The arrest must be lawful – This is the case for any situation; it just means if the arrest isn’t lawful, then neither is the search.”
458:
1301:
T1.678, Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (LAES) for Voice over Packet Technologies in Wireline Telecommunications Networks.
1261:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 6: Service-specific details for PSTN/ISDN services,
1247:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 4: Service-specific details for Layer 2 services,
411:
on behalf of a foreign country. The Administrator of the U.S. Courts annual reports indicate that the federal cases are related to
1268:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 7: Service-specific details for Mobile Services,
1233:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 2: Service-specific details for E-mail services,
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953:
1255:
1248:
1202:
1040:
510:
1364:
1349:
378:
1220:
1276:
1226:
ETSI, Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 1: Handover specification for IP delivery,
1140:
1069:
396:
263:
specifications, as well as perfecting the innovative TS102232 standards suite that apply to most contemporary network uses.
593:
404:
734:
462:
325:
1177:
1172:
794:
451:
194:
128:
49:
1029:
The deviant behaviors (...) were ignored as useful to prepare the public to an anticipated judgment incriminating:
466:
810:
297:
574:
154:
259:
ETSI LI Technical Committee work today is primarily focussed on developing the new Retained Data Handover and
1335:
Guide to the one party consent exception to the rule against interception of private communications in Canada
755:"Inside North Korea's cell network: ex-Koryolink technical director reveals all | NK News - North Korea News"
494:“There are exigent circumstances, such as where the information is required to prevent imminent bodily harm.”
350:
292:
Deliver data directly from the source to the mediation device without any human intervention or packet loss
613:
442:
assistance to LEAs in providing evidence and tactical information. In 2005, CALEA was applied to public
253:
283:
Ensure clear access to all data without any loss of information or impact on the network being monitored
473:
Lawful interception can also be authorized under local laws for state and local police investigations.
301:
1234:
1227:
1167:
898:
651:
407:
where the subject of the investigation must be a foreign (non-US) national or a person working as an
1269:
1117:
Monshizadeh, Mehrnoosh; Khatri, Vikramajeet; Varfan, Mohammadali; Kantola, Raimo (September 2018).
1096:
562:
366:
313:
312:
The principal global treaty-based legal instrument relating to LI (including retained data) is the
37:
1124:
2018 26th International Conference on Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks (SoftCOM)
853:
835:
505:
289:
Set the lawful intercept device to capture and/or store data according to the warrant parameters.
260:
1359:
786:
The Telecommunications Handbook: Engineering Guidelines for Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Systems
482:
461:
outside the supervision of the FISA court caused considerable controversy. It was revealed in
392:
221:, has been a major driver in lawful interception standards not only for Europe, but worldwide.
142:
71:
or other collection point is extracted for storage or filtering. It is also separate from the
1354:
1207:
106:
41:
504:
The second court case to refer to is from the same year but in December. Essentially, the
481:
Police ability to lawfully intercept private communications is governed by Part VI of the
8:
64:
1146:
708:
National Corrections Oversight Coalition Reg'd OJP DOJ DHS Intelligence for Corrections
443:
412:
408:
158:
56:
29:
1032:
629:
237:
collection where target-related “call” data and content are extracted from the network
45:
As with many law enforcement tools, LI systems may be subverted for illicit purposes.
1197:
1136:
790:
633:
500:“If the information being sought does not raise a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
206:
201:
60:
33:
1219:
ETSI, Handover interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic,
1150:
1128:
1122:
1118:
625:
439:
431:
345:
1132:
1061:
728:
426:
more effectively carry out wiretap operations, especially in view of the emerging
784:
585:
486:
704:"Communications for Law Enforcement Act Public Law No. 103-414,108 Statute 4279"
169:
maintain LI capabilities within their own networks unless otherwise prohibited.
341:
162:
72:
584:. It also occurred in Greece during the 2004 Olympics: the telephone operator
1343:
637:
579:
447:
427:
384:
321:
226:
68:
1192:
541:
470:
its own database on contacts between American citizens without a warrant.
400:
358:
1275:
ETSI, Handover interface for the request and delivery of retained data,
422:
During the 1990s, as in most countries, to help law enforcement and the
1033:"Caso Craxi, come l'Italia non difese il suo diritto alla riservatezza"
928:"Can law enforcement legally access data on your smartphone in Canada?"
438:(CALEA) in 1994. This act provides the Federal statutory framework for
416:
75:
of metadata that has become a legal requirement in some jurisdictions.
240:
mediation where the data is formatted to conform to specific standards
1182:
268:
243:
delivery of the data and content to the law enforcement agency (LEA).
1006:"What rules must police follow to search a cellphone during arrest?"
544:, law enforcement is entitled to stored private communication data.
1334:
980:"Police can search cellphones without warrant during arrest: court"
296:
Generic global standards have also been developed by Cisco via the
193:(CALEA), with the specific capabilities promulgated jointly by the
150:
146:
387:, three Federal statutes authorize lawful interception. The 1968
256:(SIP) messages that are used to set up and tear down a VOIP call.
700:
677:
233:
conformance. Three stages are called for in the architecture:
1187:
727:
Lumme, Martti; Eloranta, Jaana; Jokinen, Hannu (Apr 25, 2002),
1315:
White Paper on Interception of Voice over LTE (VoLTE) Networks
1116:
209:
have been in place since the beginning of digital telephony.
849:
329:
218:
186:
182:
1325:
White Paper on Interception of 3G and 4G Wireless Networks
423:
354:
324:
there is an array of federal and state criminal law, in
457:
In the 2000s, surveillance focus turned to terrorism.
1298:, Cable Television Laboratories Inc., 13 January 2004.
183:
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
954:"Supreme Court says warrant needed for Internet info"
145:
data pursuant to lawful authority for the purpose of
16:
Permission for law enforcement to wiretap subscribers
1237:, version 3.7.1, 2014-02-21. (HTML, Word, & zip)
726:
1294:PacketCable Electronic Surveillance Specification,
875:"Electronic Surveillance of Private Communications"
419:as the dominant form of intercepted communication.
391:, Title III pertains mainly to lawful interception
1230:, version 3.7.1, 2014-07-25. (PDF, Word & zip)
497:“If there is a reasonable law authorizing access.”
273:Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
40:with court orders or other legal authorization to
1279:, version 1.7.1, October 2010. (PDF-File, 561 KB)
1244:, version 2.2.1, January 2009. (PDF-File, 430 KB)
436:Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
191:Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
1341:
1251:, version 3.4.1, August 2017. (PDF-file, 241 KB)
1272:, version 2.1.1, August 2008. (PDF-File, 66 KB)
1223:, version 3.15.1, June 2018. (PDF-File, 728 KB)
1265:, version 3.3.1, March 2014. (PDF-File, 90 KB)
1258:, version 3.2.1, June 2012. (PDF-File, 209 KB)
1330:3GPP Lawful Interception requirements for GSM
977:
1320:White Paper on Interception of IP Networks
434:at the time, the U.S. Congress passed the
389:Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
1119:"LiaaS: Lawful Interception as a Service"
1093:"Vodafone fined EUR 76 million in Greece"
1090:
782:
129:Learn how and when to remove this message
450:services that are interconnected to the
225:calls, but to IP-based services such as
185:, Third Generation Partnership Project (
176:
1203:Mass surveillance in the United Kingdom
1095:. Nordic Wireless Watch. Archived from
1030:
978:Blanchfield, Mike (December 11, 2014).
100:not related to the topic of the article
1342:
1003:
925:
614:"The mechanics of lawful interception"
611:
379:Mass surveillance in the United States
1091:Poropudas, Timo (December 16, 2006).
1037:Diritto&Giustizia Edizione Online
951:
921:
919:
783:Penttinen, Jyrki T. J. (2015-03-16).
397:Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
55:Lawful interception differs from the
926:Bogart, Nicole (February 25, 2016).
675:
82:
1062:"Greek scandal sees Vodafone fined"
1004:Tucker, Erika (December 11, 2014).
13:
916:
463:2013 mass surveillance disclosures
326:Commonwealth of Independent States
14:
1376:
1308:
1178:Network Monitoring Interface Card
1173:Telecommunications data retention
452:Public Switched Telephone Network
195:Federal Communications Commission
153:. Such data generally consist of
141:Lawful interception is obtaining
50:public switched telephone network
594:Greek wiretapping case 2004–2005
467:National Security Administration
372:
357:public network operators in the
87:
1110:
1084:
1072:from the original on 2008-11-23
1054:
1043:from the original on 2016-03-24
1023:
997:
971:
945:
905:from the original on 2014-04-26
891:
867:
856:from the original on 2018-10-06
842:
817:from the original on 2010-12-23
765:from the original on 2016-02-16
737:from the original on 2016-04-02
298:Internet Engineering Task Force
828:
803:
776:
747:
730:Interception system and method
720:
694:
669:
644:
612:Gleave, Stephen (2007-05-01).
605:
575:European Court of Human Rights
568:
78:
28:) refers to the facilities in
1:
1365:Law enforcement agency powers
1350:Privacy of telecommunications
1213:
1133:10.23919/softcom.2018.8555753
630:10.1016/S1353-4858(07)70034-X
399:, or FISA, as amended by the
109:or discuss this issue on the
565:requires such capabilities.
556:
459:NSA warrantless surveillance
395:. The second law, the 1978
7:
1161:
1031:Buonomo, Giampiero (2003).
811:"EUR-Lex - 31996G1104 - EN"
254:Session Initiation Protocol
67:, where all data passing a
10:
1381:
759:NK News - North Korea News
591:
403:, governs wiretapping for
376:
302:U.S. Department of Justice
1168:Secrecy of correspondence
789:. John Wiley & Sons.
535:
476:
413:illegal drug distribution
335:
598:
563:Convention on Cybercrime
547:
367:Data Retention Directive
314:Convention on Cybercrime
38:law enforcement agencies
952:Staff (June 13, 2014).
506:Supreme Court of Canada
483:Criminal Code of Canada
393:criminal investigations
351:out of privacy concerns
307:
261:next-generation network
202:phone service providers
1127:. IEEE. pp. 1–6.
143:communications network
1296:PKT-SP-ESP-I03-040113
1208:Targeted surveillance
836:"Wiretap Report 2018"
652:"Lawful Interception"
592:Further information:
465:that since 2007, the
405:intelligence purposes
177:Technical description
98:may contain material
65:intelligence agencies
1068:. 15 December 2006.
446:Internet access and
200:Governments require
107:improve this section
879:www.americanbar.org
304:pursuant to CALEA.
42:selectively wiretap
22:Lawful interception
761:. 20 August 2015.
444:broadband networks
159:network management
69:fiber-optic splice
63:sometimes done by
34:telephone networks
30:telecommunications
1270:ETSI TS 102 232-7
1263:ETSI TS 102 232-6
1256:ETSI TS 102 232-5
1249:ETSI TS 102 232-4
1242:ETSI TS 102 232-3
1235:ETSI TS 101 232-2
1228:ETSI TS 101 232-1
1198:Mass surveillance
1142:978-953-290-087-3
676:Wireless, Argos.
432:wireless networks
139:
138:
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61:mass surveillance
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1099:on March 5, 2016
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440:network operator
346:European Council
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48:With the legacy
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899:"Criminal Code"
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1355:Surveillance
1193:Surveillance
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1097:the original
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1010:Global News
984:Global News
958:Global News
932:Global News
624:(5): 8–11.
569:Illegal use
417:cell phones
401:Patriot Act
359:Netherlands
79:Terminology
36:that allow
1344:Categories
1214:References
1103:2007-11-25
1047:2016-04-03
909:2014-04-22
884:2020-10-31
860:2018-12-31
850:"AskCALEA"
821:2009-10-21
769:2016-02-13
741:2016-02-13
713:2020-10-23
687:2020-10-23
662:2021-04-13
377:See also:
271:, and the
1183:SS7 probe
638:1353-4858
557:Elsewhere
269:CableLabs
155:signaling
111:talk page
1162:See also
1151:54442783
1070:Archived
1066:BBC News
1041:Archived
903:Archived
854:Archived
815:Archived
763:Archived
735:archived
454:(PSTN).
151:evidence
147:analysis
540:Due to
415:, with
383:In the
340:In the
320:in the
57:dragnet
1188:SIGINT
1149:
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678:"Home"
636:
536:Russia
477:Canada
344:, the
336:Europe
165:(RD).
59:-type
1147:S2CID
1076:7 May
599:Notes
548:India
409:agent
231:CALEA
1137:ISBN
1078:2010
1017:2020
991:2020
965:2020
939:2020
791:ISBN
634:ISSN
622:2007
509:his
430:and
330:SORM
308:Laws
219:ETSI
187:3GPP
32:and
1129:doi
626:doi
424:FBI
355:ISP
157:or
149:or
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