1583:, the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism (predeterminism, theological determinism, etc.) As such, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism (or "Hard Theological Determinism" above) might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism (if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe), or even compatibilism (if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will), if not hard determinism itself. By the same principle, metaphysical libertarianism (a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism) might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism (if it was assumed such free will events were pre-ordained and therefore were destined to occur, but of which whose outcomes were not "predestined" or determined by God). If hard theological determinism is accepted (if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by God), then metaphysical libertarianism is not, however, possible, and would require reclassification (as hard incompatibilism for example, given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic – although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also).
853:
volition – a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm). Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom – intentional actions are rather self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control", rather they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person". Another question raised by such non-causal theory, is how an agent acts upon reason, if the said intentional actions are spontaneous.
2864:
lobe and progressing to the primary motor cortex and then to parietal cortex has been observed. The sense of agency thus appears to normally emerge in conjunction with this orderly sequential network activation incorporating premotor association cortices together with primary motor cortex. In particular, the supplementary motor complex on the medial surface of the frontal lobe appears to activate prior to primary motor cortex presumably in associated with a preparatory pre-movement process. In a recent study using functional magnetic resonance imaging, alien movements were characterized by a relatively isolated activation of the primary motor cortex contralateral to the alien hand, while voluntary movements of the same body part included the natural activation of motor association cortex associated with the premotor process. The clinical definition requires "feeling that one limb is foreign or has a
1918:, have no second-order desire not to take the drug. The second group, "unwilling addicts", have a second-order desire not to take the drug, while the third group, "willing addicts", have a second-order desire to take it. According to Frankfurt, the members of the first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons. The members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug, but their will is overcome by the addiction. Finally, the members of the third group willingly take the drug they are addicted to. Frankfurt's theory can ramify to any number of levels. Critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher-order levels of desire and preference. Others argue that Frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together.
3237:"Do not say: "It was God's doing that I fell away," for what he hates he does not do. Do not say: "He himself has led me astray," for he has no need of the wicked. Abominable wickedness the Lord hates and he does not let it happen to those who fear him. God in the beginning created human beings and made them subject to their own free choice. If you choose, you can keep the commandments; loyalty is doing the will of God. Set before you are fire and water; to whatever you choose, stretch out your hand. Before everyone are life and death, whichever they choose will be given them. Immense is the wisdom of the Lord; mighty in power, he sees all things. The eyes of God behold his works, and he understands every human deed. He never commands anyone to sin, nor shows leniency toward deceivers." - Ben Sira 15:11-20 NABRE
2969:. This is the tendency for people to trust the reliability of their own introspections while distrusting the introspections of other people. The theory implies that people will more readily attribute free will to themselves rather than others. This prediction has been confirmed by three of Pronin and Kugler's experiments. When college students were asked about personal decisions in their own and their roommate's lives, they regarded their own choices as less predictable. Staff at a restaurant described their co-workers' lives as more determined (having fewer future possibilities) than their own lives. When weighing up the influence of different factors on behavior, students gave desires and intentions the strongest weight for their own behavior, but rated personality traits as most predictive of other people.
2423:. The will is "the primary mover of all the powers of the soul... and it is also the efficient cause of motion in the body." Choice falls into five stages: (i) intellectual consideration of whether an objective is desirable, (ii) intellectual consideration of means of attaining the objective, (iii) will arrives at an intent to pursue the objective, (iv) will and intellect jointly decide upon choice of means (v) will elects execution. Free will enters as follows: Free will is an "appetitive power", that is, not a cognitive power of intellect (the term "appetite" from Aquinas's definition "includes all forms of internal inclination"). He states that judgment "concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite ."
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people's responses to moral dilemmas under a deterministic model of reality). Edward Cokely has found that incompatibilism is intuitive – it was naturally adhered to, in that determinism does indeed negate belief in moral responsibility in general. Joshua Knobe and Shaun
Nichols have proposed that incompatibilism may or may not be intuitive, and that it is dependent to some large degree upon the circumstances; whether or not the crime incites an emotional response – for example if it involves harming another human being. They found that belief in free will is a cultural universal, and that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.
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807:
426:, in the traditional phrase. Being responsible for one's choices is the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if a person has free will, then they are the ultimate cause of their actions. If determinism is true, then all of a person's choices are caused by events and facts outside their control. So, if everything someone does is caused by events and facts outside their control, then they cannot be the ultimate cause of their actions. Therefore, they cannot have free will. This argument has also been challenged by various compatibilist philosophers.
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will due to its indeterminacy. This misconception applies both when considering oneself and others. Another contribution is choice. It has been demonstrated that people's belief in free will increases if presented with a simple level of choice. The specificity of the amount of choice is important, as too little or too great a degree of choice may negatively influence belief. It is also likely that the associative relationship between level of choice and perception of free will is influentially bidirectional. It is also possible that one's desire for control, or other basic motivational patterns, act as a third variable.
3255:
885:. The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world.
1616:
926:, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see
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the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
4169:...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.
1911:
desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is identified with their effective first-order desire, that is, the one they act on, and this will is free if it was the desire the person wanted to act upon, that is, the person's second-order desire was effective. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts". All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it.
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test where they would be rewarded with cash. Provoking a rejection of free will has also been associated with increased aggression and less helpful behaviour. However, although these initial studies suggested that believing in free will is associated with more morally praiseworthy behavior, more recent studies (including direct, multi-site replications) with substantially larger sample sizes have reported contradictory findings (typically, no association between belief in free will and moral behavior), casting doubt over the original findings.
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of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.
1455:
1796:
2291:' views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds", he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it. Ultimately he believed that the problem of free will was a metaphysical issue and, therefore, could not be settled by science. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work
2059:
there can be physical restrictions to the body, psychological restrictions to the decision, and rational restrictions to the formation of reasons (desires plus beliefs) that should lead to what we would call a reasonable action. The last two are usually called "restrictions of free will". The restriction at the level of reasons is particularly important since it can be motivated by external reasons that are insufficiently conscious to the agent. One example was the collective suicide led by
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ways, all of them involve aspects of the way people make decisions and initiate actions, which have been studied extensively by neuroscientists. Some of the experimental observations are widely viewed as implying that free will does not exist or is an illusion (but many philosophers see this as a misunderstanding). Third, psychologists have studied the beliefs that the majority of ordinary people hold about free will and its role in assigning moral responsibility.
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14758:
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695:
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observed behavior. However, Wegner has been able to manipulate people's thoughts and behaviors so as to conform to or violate the two requirements for causal inference. Through such work, Wegner has been able to show that people often experience conscious will over behaviors that they have not, in fact, caused – and conversely, that people can be led to experience a lack of will over behaviors they did cause. For instance,
2297:, he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories. He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief" – it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines
2051:
natural occurrences of deterministic deliberation in the brain in terms of the first person perspective of the conscious agent performing the deliberation. Such an approach has been considered a form of identity dualism. A description of "how conscious experience might affect brains" has been provided in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing."
10164:...it is important to be clear about exactly what experience one wants one's subjects to introspect. Of course, explaining to subjects exactly what the experimenter wants them to experience can bring its own problems–...instructions to attend to a particular internally generated experience can easily alter both the timing and the content of that experience and even whether or not it is consciously experienced at all.
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1451:, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God. With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.
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12117:
2495:, the belief that all happiness and suffering arise from previous actions, is considered a wrong view according to Buddhist doctrines. Because Buddhists also reject agenthood, the traditional compatibilist strategies are closed to them as well. Instead, the Buddhist philosophical strategy is to examine the metaphysics of causality. Ancient India had many heated arguments about the nature of causality with
963:) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the
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of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature."
3633:...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
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3452:
988:. It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. Firstly, it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by
2673:", concerning the relative importance of genetics and biology as compared to culture and environment in human behavior. The view of many researchers is that many human behaviors can be explained in terms of humans' brains, genes, and evolutionary histories. This point of view raises the fear that such attribution makes it impossible to hold others responsible for their actions.
2118:
2152:
2280:"Moral" in this case refers to action that is willed, while "imagination" refers to the mental capacity to envision conditions that do not already hold. Both of these functions are necessarily conditions for freedom. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united.
3202:(the belief that God and man cooperate in salvation), Methodism teaches that "Our Lord Jesus Christ did so die for all men as to make salvation attainable by every man that cometh into the world. If men are not saved that fault is entirely their own, lying solely in their own unwillingness to obtain the salvation offered to them. (John 1:9; I Thess. 5:9; Titus 2:11-12)."
1343:, or some other force), including human actions. Predeterminism is frequently taken to mean that human actions cannot interfere with (or have no bearing on) the outcomes of a pre-determined course of events, and that one's destiny was established externally (for example, exclusively by a creator deity). The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking
1356:. It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism – in the context of its capacity to determine future events. Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism. The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of
3085:. This is worrying because counterfactual thinking ("If I had done something different...") is an important part of learning from one's choices, including those that harmed others. Again, this cannot be taken to mean that belief in determinism is to blame; these are the results we would expect from increasing people's belief in fatalism.
1660:
responsible for bodily action, although unconscious brain activity is often caused by external events (for example, the instantaneous reaction to being burned). Cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic – and in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of
6794:"Determinism" is, in essence, the position holding that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position holding that all behavior is caused by conditions predating behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such).
2801:
not a proof of the non-existence of free will, as also unconscious agendas may be free and non-deterministic. According to their suggestion, man has relative freedom, i.e. freedom in degrees, that can be increased or decreased through deliberate choices that involve both conscious and unconscious (panencephalic) processes.
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randomness, mental processes as experienced have no influence on the probabilistic outcomes (such as volition). According to many interpretations, indeterminism enables free will to exist, while others assert the opposite (because the action was not controllable by the physical being who claims to possess the free will).
1886:, claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs."
1288: – that they have independently fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance. In such a case, even if an individual could have influence over their lower level physical system, their choices in regard to this cannot be their own, as is the case with libertarian free will. Omniscience features as an
8182:
3074:. Having participants read articles that simply "disprove free will" is unlikely to increase their understanding of determinism, or the compatibilistic free will that it still permits. In other words, experimental manipulations purporting to "provoke disbelief in free will" may instead cause a belief in
8297:
Circular causality departs so strongly from the classical tenets of necessity, invariance, and precise temporal order that the only reason to call it that is to satisfy the human habitual need for causes.... The very strong appeal of agency to explain events may come from the subjective experience of
5055:
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of
3407:
claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness. As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one
3185:
declared that "the free will of man, moved and excited by God, can by its consent co-operate with God, Who excites and invites its action; and that it can thereby dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification. The will can resist grace if it chooses. It is not like a lifeless thing,
2975:
Regardless of the validity of belief in free will, it may be beneficial to understand where the idea comes from. One contribution is randomness. While it is established that randomness is not the only factor in the perception of the free will, it has been shown that randomness can be mistaken as free
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does not emerge in conjunction with the overt appearance of the purposeful act even though the sense of ownership in relationship to the body part is maintained. This phenomenon corresponds with an impairment in the premotor mechanism manifested temporally by the appearance of the readiness potential
2818:
It has been shown that in several brain-related conditions, individuals cannot entirely control their own actions, though the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will. Neuroscientific studies are valuable tools in developing models of how humans experience free
2614:
From an anthropological perspective, free will can be regarded as an explanation for human behavior that justifies a socially sanctioned system of rewards and punishments. Under this definition, free will may be described as a political ideology. In a society where people are taught to believe that
2426:
A compatibilist interpretation of
Aquinas's view is defended thus: "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause
2050:
Compatibilist models adhere to models of mind in which mental activity (such as deliberation) can be reduced to physical activity without any change in physical outcome. Although compatibilism is generally aligned to (or is at least compatible with) physicalism, some compatibilist models describe the
1363:
The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by a conscious being). While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by
1351:
stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it
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or determinateness is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. This creates a unique problem for free will given that propositions about the future already have a truth value in the present (that is it is already determined as either true
660:
makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by the behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where; "If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then
3078:, which may provide an alternative explanation for previous experimental findings. To test the effects of belief in determinism, it has been argued that future studies would need to provide articles that do not simply "attack free will", but instead focus on explaining determinism and compatibilism.
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subjects with information about an effect increases the probability that a person falsely believes is the cause. The implication for such work is that the perception of conscious will (which he says might be more accurately labelled as 'the emotion of authorship') is not tethered to the execution of
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is the patient's delusion of being controlled by an external force. People with schizophrenia will sometimes report that, although they are acting in the world, they do not recall initiating the particular actions they performed. This is sometimes likened to being a robot controlled by someone else.
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with specialized multivariate analyses to study the temporal dimension in the activation of the cortical network associated with voluntary movement in human subjects, an anterior-to-posterior sequential activation process beginning in the supplementary motor area on the medial surface of the frontal
2800:
argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results. Kornhuber and Deecke underlined that absence of conscious will during the early
Bereitschaftspotential (termed BP1) is
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Science has contributed to the free will problem in at least three ways. First, physics has addressed the question of whether nature is deterministic, which is viewed as crucial by incompatibilists (compatibilists, however, view it as irrelevant). Second, although free will can be defined in various
2593:
However, the preceding quote has often been misinterpreted as
Vivekananda implying that everything is predetermined. What Vivekananda actually meant by lack of free will was that the will was not "free" because it was heavily influenced by the law of cause and effect – "The will is not free, it
2490:
In
Buddhism it is taught that the idea of absolute freedom of choice (that is that any human being could be completely free to make any choice) is unwise, because it denies the reality of one's physical needs and circumstances. Equally incorrect is the idea that humans have no choice in life or that
2383:
Freeman introduces what he calls "circular causality" to "allow for the contribution of self-organizing dynamics", the "formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the patterns of activity of the contributing individuals", applicable to "interactions between neurons and neural masses...
2213:
through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but liable to necessity; that notwithstanding all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning to the end of his life he must bear the same character that he himself condemns, and, as
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entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if indeterminism is true, incompatibilists have not provided, and cannot provide, an adequate account
1950:
According to
Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist. Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions
1894:
Compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason. Some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher-order brain processing – the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity. Likewise, some modern compatibilists
1540:
This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of
1275:
is the capacity to know everything that there is to know (included in which are all future events), and is a property often attributed to a creator deity. Omniscience implies the existence of destiny. Some authors have claimed that free will cannot coexist with omniscience. One argument asserts that
810:
Various definitions of free will that have been proposed for
Metaphysical Libertarianism (agent/substance causal, centered accounts, and efforts of will theory), along with examples of other common free will positions (Compatibilism, Hard Determinism, and Hard Incompatibilism). Red circles represent
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that causes those negative effects. Kathleen Vohs has found that those whose belief in free will had been eroded were more likely to cheat. In a study conducted by Roy
Baumeister, after participants read an article arguing against free will, they were more likely to lie about their performance on a
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Whether people naturally adhere to an incompatibilist model of free will has been questioned in the research. Eddy
Nahmias has found that incompatibilism is not intuitive – it was not adhered to, in that determinism does not negate belief in moral responsibility (based on an empirical study of
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For example, if a person hears an explosion and sees a tree fall down that person is likely to infer that the explosion caused the tree to fall over. However, if the explosion occurs after the tree falls down (that is, the first requirement is not met), or rather than an explosion, the person hears
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supporting the view that human perception of conscious control is an illusion. Wegner summarizes some empirical evidence that may suggest that the perception of conscious control is open to modification (or even manipulation). Wegner observes that one event is inferred to have caused a second event
872:
Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will
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do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually)
3052:
An alternative explanation builds on the idea that subjects tend to confuse determinism with fatalism... What happens then when agents' self-efficacy is undermined? It is not that their basic desires and drives are defeated. It is rather, I suggest, that they become skeptical that they can control
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A study by Aaron
Schurger and colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), casting doubt on conclusions drawn from studies
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the conscious mental act to do so. Some believe the implication is that free will was not involved in the decision and is an illusion. The first of these experiments reported the brain registered activity related to the move about 0.2 s before movement onset. However, these authors also found that
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in 1965.). Although it was well known that the readiness potential reliably preceded the physical action, Libet asked whether it could be recorded before the conscious intention to move. To determine when subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second hand of a clock. After
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predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all, although evolution of the universal state vector is completely deterministic. Current physical theories cannot resolve the question of whether determinism is true of the world, being very
2334:
in other things (things that cause or necessitate other things). According to Hume, 'causation' is on weak grounds: "Once we realise that 'A must bring about B' is tantamount merely to 'Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A,' then we are left with a
2058:
developed a neocompatibilist theory based on the causal theory of action that is complementary to classical compatibilism. According to him, physical, psychological and rational restrictions can interfere at different levels of the causal chain that would naturally lead to action. Correspondingly,
1946:
and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown
1757:
free will must assert influence on physical reality, and where mind is responsible for such influence (as opposed to ordinary system randomness), it must be distinct from body to accomplish this. Both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction, and those particular models thereof that
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of all events and outcomes by the divinity (that is, they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all. Theological determinism
1104:
agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem. He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible
910:
propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen. An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or
852:
Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or
10978:
Buttrick, Nicholas R.; Aczel, Balazs; Aeschbach, Lena F.; Bakos, Bence E.; Brühlmann, Florian; Claypool, Heather M.; Hüffmeier, Joachim; Kovacs, Marton; Schuepfer, Kurt; Szecsi, Peter; Szuts, Attila; Szöke, Orsolya; Thomae, Manuela; Torka, Ann-Kathrin; Walker, Ryan J.; Wood, Michael J. (September
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in holding that necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary from the perspective of an omniscient. Some philosophers follow
2984:
Since at least 1959, free will belief in individuals has been analysed with respect to traits in social behaviour. In general, the concept of free will researched to date in this context has been that of the incompatibilist, or more specifically, the libertarian, that is freedom from determinism.
2804:
Others have argued that data such as the Bereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That
2765:
Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that
2588:
Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as free-will; the very words are a contradiction, because will is what we know, and everything that we know is within our universe, and everything within our universe is moulded by conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire
2435:
Historically, most of the philosophical effort invested in resolving the dilemma has taken the form of close examination of definitions and ambiguities in the concepts designated by "free", "freedom", "will", "choice" and so forth. Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases
1910:
The notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by Frankfurt. Frankfurt argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order
843:
require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and
433:
in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control
2656:
work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals. A more significant question is whether the indeterminism of quantum mechanics allows for the traditional idea of free will (based on a perception of free will). If a person's action is, however, only a result of complete quantum
2470:, often translated as "dependent origination", "dependent arising" or "conditioned genesis". It teaches that every volition is a conditioned action as a result of ignorance. In part, it states that free will is inherently conditioned and not "free" to begin with. It is also part of the theory of
2275:
Steiner then argues that inner freedom is achieved when we integrate our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, with our thoughts, which lend coherence to these impressions and thereby disclose to us an understandable world. Acknowledging the many influences on our
455:
the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this
450:
The difficulty of this argument for some compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained
419:
Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain". Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that someone must be the
8176:
Kant argued that, in order that human life is not just a "dream" (a random or projected by subjects juxtaposition of moments), the temporality of event A as before or after B must submit to a rule. An established order then implies the existence of some necessary conditions and causes, that is:
2949:
Wegner has applied this principle to the inferences people make about their own conscious will. People typically experience a thought that is consistent with a behavior, and then they observe themselves performing this behavior. As a result, people infer that their thoughts must have caused the
2651:
Assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, one may still object that such indeterminism is for all practical purposes confined to microscopic phenomena. This is not always the case: many macroscopic phenomena are based on quantum effects. For instance, some
2186:
underlying the phenomenal world, is in itself groundless: that is, not subject to time, space, and causality (the forms that governs the world of appearance). Thus, the will, in itself and outside of appearance, is free. Schopenhauer discussed the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in
164:
have done otherwise without physical impediment. Many contemporary compatibilists instead identify free will as a psychological capacity, such as to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason, and there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns,
2846:
response to an unwanted, premonitory urge. Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed. People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics for limited periods, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward. The control exerted (from
822:
Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under
1659:
holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance, the seat of consciousness and intelligence, and is not identical with physical states of the brain or body. It is suggested that although the two worlds do interact, each retains some measure of autonomy. Under cartesian dualism external mind is
11133:
Some studies have been conducted indicating that people react strongly to the way in which mental determinism is described, when reconciling it with moral responsibility. Eddy Nahmias has noted that when people's actions are framed with respect to their beliefs and desires (rather than their
3010:
The researchers also found that people consider acts more "free" when they involve a person opposing external forces, planning, or making random actions. Notably, the last behaviour, "random" actions, may not be possible; when participants attempt to perform tasks in a random manner (such as
2436:
like "ability to do otherwise" or "alternative possibilities". This emphasis upon words has led some philosophers to claim the problem is merely verbal and thus a pseudo-problem. In response, others point out the complexity of decision making and the importance of nuances in the terminology.
156:. Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" means and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatibilists considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if,
3000:
Studies also reveal a correlation between the likelihood of accepting a deterministic model of mind and personality type. For example, Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely found that people of an extrovert personality type are more likely to dissociate belief in determinism from belief in moral
99:
are seen as deserving credit or blame. Whether free will exists, what it is and the implications of whether it exists or not constitute some of the longest running debates of philosophy. Some conceive of free will as the ability to act beyond the limits of external influences or wishes.
1157:
in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing uncaused or
1571:: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely." For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events.
2086:
positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts. Also consistent with both autonomy and
917:
is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of
2805:
ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power... as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".
2375:
suggested at a minimum our decision processes with moral implications lie outside the reach of everyday causality, and lie outside the rules governing material objects. "There is a sharp difference between moral judgments and judgments of fact... Moral judgments... must be
740:. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.
2103:
holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are
1725:) are not ontologically reducible to physical states. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states. In one such construction,
2460:, "There is free action, there is retribution, but I see no agent that passes out from one set of momentary elements into another one, except the of those elements." Buddhists believe in neither absolute free will, nor determinism. It preaches a middle doctrine, named
3213:
For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren; and whom He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also
1162:. The most common form of causal determinism is nomological determinism (or scientific determinism), the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events.
2880:. The standard neurological explanation is that the felt will reported by the speaking left hemisphere does not correspond with the actions performed by the non-speaking right hemisphere, thus suggesting that the two hemispheres may have independent senses of will.
2478:
in Hinduism. In Buddhism, the idea of karma is much less deterministic. The Buddhist notion of karma is primarily focused on the cause and effect of moral actions in this life, while in Hinduism the concept of karma is more often connected with determining one's
8193:
Schopenhauer, who by the way continued and simplified Kant's system, argued (among others basing on optical illusions and the "initial processing") that it is the intellect or even the brain what generates the image of the world out of something else, by
6682:
Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at
752:, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.
376:
Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are logically incompatible, and that the major question regarding whether or not people have free will is thus whether or not their actions are determined. "Hard determinists", such as
2770:; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation..." The bearing of timing experiments upon free will is still under discussion.
7196:
The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World
6735:
Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in
979:
Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world. Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both
1866:, asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [
1825:
positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; though they disagree among themselves about what, in turn,
412:": if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot, then people must not have free will. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as
10177:
2685:". Responsibility does not require that behavior be uncaused, as long as behavior responds to praise and blame. Moreover, it is not certain that environmental determination is any less threatening to free will than genetic determination.
792:, is perhaps more relevant. Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false – yet the intention of their position is sustained by hard incompatibilism.
839:. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with
3053:
those desires; and in the face of that skepticism, they fail to apply the effort that is needed even to try. If they were tempted to behave badly, then coming to believe in fatalism makes them less likely to resist that temptation.
11228:
Stillman, Tyler F.; Roy F. Baumeister; Kathleen D. Vohs; Nathaniel M. Lambert; Frank D. Fincham; Lauren E. Brewer (2010-01-01). "Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance".
3844:
Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been
397:, are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true. Another view is that of hard incompatibilists, which state that free will is incompatible with both
8515:
necessity from God strictly with regard to a concrete ("contingent") act. A typical choice was not separately ordained to be so-and-so by God; St. Thomas says the choice is not necessary, but in fact that apparently means it was
3907:
One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free
2631: – and some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient information would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy. Modern science, on the other hand, is a mixture of deterministic and
2594:
is a phenomenon bound by cause and effect, but there is something behind the will which is free." Vivekananda never said things were absolutely determined and placed emphasis on the power of conscious choice to alter one's past
2325:
approached free will via the notion of causality. It was his position that causality was a mental construct used to explain the repeated association of events, and that one must examine more closely the relation between things
1207:
Destiny or fate is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos.
204:
proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will, so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is". This requirement was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists.
1837:
that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction. Nonetheless, some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments. Some "modern compatibilists", such as
2384:
and between the behaving animal and its environment". In this view, mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example,
2091:, they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics. While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions.
1509:, does not affect the outcome. God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right). A rejection of theological determinism (or
633:
itself may occupy any of the nine positions, that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. However, the most common meaning attached to
8500:, Book III about Providence, c. 88–91 (260–267), where it is postulated that everything has its cause and it is again and again in detail referred also to all individual choices of man etc., even refuting opposite views.
3019:
A recent 2020 survey has shown that compatibilism is quite a popular stance among those who specialize in philosophy (59.2%). Belief in libertarianism amounted to 18.8%, while a lack of belief in free will equaled 11.2%.
1846:, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.
456:
argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider".
284:
from the freedom to enact it. Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition. Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the
3390:
is challenged by most theologians. Free will, according to Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life. Actions taken by people exercising free will are counted on the
2888:
Although the neural mechanisms of schizophrenia are not yet clear, one influential hypothesis is that there is a breakdown in brain systems that compare motor commands with the feedback received from the body (known as
4400:
Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of
275:
have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as humans are not externally constrained or coerced. Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of
706:
Determinism can be divided into causal, logical and theological determinism. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will. Hard determinism is the claim that
2717:
in the 1980s, in which he asked each subject to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he measured the associated activity in their brain; in particular, the build-up of electrical signal called the
438:
of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the
6924:
Many religions of the world have considered that the path of history is predetermined by God or Fate. On this basis, many believe that what will happen will happen, and they accept their destiny with fatalism.
904:. An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model.
1814:
is a non-metaphysical concept. Likewise, some compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his
891:
asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process. This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of
16488:
2129:"Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined."
10614:
Stillman, T.F., R.F. Baumeister, F.D. Fincham, T.E. Joiner, N.M. Lambert, A.R. Mele, and D.M. Tice. 2008. Guilty, free, and wise. Belief in free will promotes learning from negative emotions. Manuscript in
6847:
The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies
6649:
Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.
3115:
The notions of free will and predestination are heavily debated among Christians. Free will in the Christian sense is the ability to choose between good or evil. Among Catholics, there are those holding to
768:
its outcome in advance. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in
2143:
discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a
2042:
may experience a conscious desire to escape addiction, but be unable to do so. The "will" is disconnected from the freedom to act. This situation is related to an abnormal production and distribution of
992:(without an underlying basis for the free will decision). Secondly, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind – a common problem associated with
1806:
Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. They believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance,
249:) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect).
1833:
Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to
1670:
suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the
947:
C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.
193:(3rd century CE): "what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them".
1753:
requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Secondarily,
3814:
Hence the notion of contingency appeared as the very opposition of necessity, so that wherever a thing is considered dependent or relies upon another thing, it is contingent and thus not necessary.
896:(random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by
3007:
and colleagues reviewed literature on the psychological effects of a belief (or disbelief) in free will and found that most people tend to believe in a sort of "naive compatibilistic free will".
10511:
Feltz, Adam; Edward T. Cokely (March 2009). "Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism".
8298:
cause and effect that develops early in human life, before the acquisition of language...the question I raise here is whether brains share this property with other material objects in the world.
7563:
Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.
3028:
79 percent of evolutionary biologists said that they believe in free will according to a survey conducted in 2007, only 14 percent chose no free will, and 7 percent did not answer the question.
2790:
Benjamin Libet's results are quoted in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In
2745:
These studies of the timing between actions and the conscious decision bear upon the role of the brain in understanding free will. A subject's declaration of intention to move a finger appears
4312:
Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)
3877:
The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.
4998:... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description.
3066:
Moreover, whether or not these experimental findings are a result of actual manipulations in belief in free will is a matter of debate. First of all, free will can at least refer to either
4981:
Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.
8198:, e.g. concrete physical objects. Intellect in his works is strictly connected with recognizing causes and effects and associating them, it is somewhat close to the contemporary view of
1231:
implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with
1364:
definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe.
8311:
2205:
of the will, is as such determined, and has entered the form of the phenomenon, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence we get the strange fact that everyone considers himself to be
677:. The relevance of such prospective indeterminate activity to free will is, however, contested, even when chaos theory is introduced to magnify the effects of such microscopic events.
8968:
Libet, Benjamin; Gleason, Curtis A.; Wright, Elwood W.; Pearl, Dennis K. (1983). "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)".
1105:
for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation
6438:
Groblacher, Simon; Paterek, Tomasz; Kaltenbaek, Rainer; Brukner, Caslav; Zukowski, Marek; Aspelmeyer, Markus; Zeilinger, Anton (2007). "An experimental test of non-local realism".
1758:
are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will (i.e. interactionalist dualism and non-reductive physicalism).
1682:, that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include
2276:
choices, he nevertheless points out that they do not preclude freedom unless we fail to recognise them. Steiner argues that outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with
6886:
However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped.
1121:, and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states
777:, the idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment,
230:
On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads them to believe that they have free will. On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken.
8203:
10684:
Gregory W. Graffin and William B. Provine, "Evolution, Religion, and Free Will," American Scientist 95 (July–August 2007), 294–97; results of Cornell Evolution Project survey,
1225:). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur.
922:
have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of
10688:
2491:
their lives are pre-determined. To deny freedom would be to deny the efforts of Buddhists to make moral progress (through our capacity to freely choose compassionate action).
1858:, claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise,
1127:. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as
13414:
11980:
9838:
8032:"Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden. Mit Einleitung von Dr. Rudolf Steiner, Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, o.J. (1894–96)"
2742:
brain activity of the readiness potential leading up to subjects' movements began approximately half a second before the subject was aware of a conscious intention to move.
2055:
416:
on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it remains possible and plausible that we are different from such objects in important ways.
1093:). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to
3042:
Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to cause various negative effects. The authors concluded, in their paper, that it is belief in
1097:
a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose".
2854:, the affected individual's limb will produce unintentional movements without the will of the person. The affected limb effectively demonstrates 'a will of its own.' The
14551:
4107:
Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences,
1568:
8202:
and formation of associations. The intellectuality of all perception implied then of course that causality is rooted in the world, precedes and enables experience. See
3234:
There are also mentions of moral freedom in what are now termed as 'Deuterocanonical' works which the Orthodox and Catholic Churches use. In Sirach 15 the text states:
8953:, 1965. Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkürbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflügers Arch 284: 1–17.
1958:, a fundamental question is: From the standpoint of statistical outcomes, to what extent do the choices of a conscious being have the ability to influence the future?
233:
It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the physical world can be explained entirely by
4825:
10624:
Bar-Hillel, M. 2007. Randomness is too important to trust to chance. Presented at the 2007 Summer Institute in Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth Medical School, NH
10081:
2997:
Studies indicate that peoples' belief in free will is inconsistent. Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler found that people believe they have more free will than others.
1951:
are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance. More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.
1899:
have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character. Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural
219:
The underlying questions are whether we have control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent. These questions predate the early Greek
10751:
Baumeister, R.F.; Masicampo, E.J.; DeWall, C.N. (2009). "Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness".
13354:
2972:
Caveats have, however, been identified in studying a subject's awareness of mental events, in that the process of introspection itself may alter the experience.
2565:
is truly free, and its freedom is also distinct from all feelings, thoughts, actions, or wills, and is thus not at all a freedom of will. The metaphysics of the
1493:
Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of
11499:, 1947 Harvard University Press; Religious Philosophy, 1961 Harvard University Press; and "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy" in Religious Philosophy
2946:
the ring of a telephone (that is, the second requirement is not met), then that person is not likely to infer that either noise caused the tree to fall down.
2252:. The controllable and uncontrollable aspects of decision making thereby are made logically separable, as pointed out in the introduction. This separation of
15826:
2404:
viewed humans as pre-programmed (by virtue of being human) to seek certain goals, but able to choose between routes to achieve these goals (our Aristotelian
1008:
has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following:
719:(see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety. Relevant forms of determinism include:
16492:
9039:
7527:
The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.
2735:
making a movement, the volunteer reported the time on the clock when they first felt the conscious intention to move; this became known as Libet's W time.
1739:
of mental properties correlated with physical properties – implying causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as
1717:
is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. Alternatively,
971:, one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will.
15477:
11610:
2959:. Although many interpret this work as a blow against the argument for free will, both psychologists and philosophers have criticized Wegner's theories.
11033:"Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist"
3921:
359:
determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.
16335:
11520:
8084:
Steiner, R. (1964). Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1964, 1970, 1972, 1979, 230 pp., translated from the 12th German edition of 1962 by Michael Wilson.
3316:
Maimonides's reasoned that human beings must have free will (at least in the context of choosing to do good or evil), as without this, the demands of
1830:
matter. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.
1810:
make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly,
1541:
the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included:
111:
identified this issue, which remains a major focus of philosophical debate. The view that posits free will as incompatible with determinism is called
1505:(terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, while
11535:
10333:
Feltz, Adam; Edward T. Cokely; Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009-02-01). "Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board".
2148:), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.
1221:, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance
9926:
Aarts, H.; Custers, R.; Wegner, D. (2005). "On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information".
11834:
8511:. In order to avoid, at least in concept, the absolution of man of any guilt he then notes the contingency of all that takes place, i.e. lack of
10226:
Feldman, G.; Baumeister, R.F.; Wong, K.F. (2014). "July 30). Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will".
1773:
us to have experiences." According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents
1713:; that is, that there are no non-physical substances (for example physically independent minds). Physicalism can be reductive or non-reductive.
1438:'s omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."
185:(1st century CE): "it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them". According to
11914:
11425:
11136:
Nahmias, Eddy; D. Justin Coates; Trevor Kvaran (2007-09-01). "Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions".
10032:
7366:
2099:
Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. For example,
732:, future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the
788:
Suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism, where something near to, like that informally known as
11408:
8326:
7913:
Stump, Eleonore (1996). "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities". In Howard-Snyder, Daniel; Jordan, Jeff (eds.).
6583:
4296:
Joshua Greene; Jonathan Cohen (2011). "For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything". In Judy Illes; Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.).
1769:: "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane
1368:
asserts that a supremely powerful being has indeed fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance, and is a famous doctrine of the
661:
what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them."
3186:
which remains purely passive. Weakened and diminished by Adam's fall, free will is yet not destroyed in the race (Sess. VI, cap. i and v)."
14527:
5080:
316:, as well as models supporting more minimal criteria; such as the ability to consciously veto an action or competing desire. Yet even with
152:
choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs. determinism a
7928:
Honderich, T. (2001). "Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False and the Real Problem". In Kane, Robert (ed.).
4085:
3309:
1995:
in which the mind is simply part of nature, perhaps merely a feature of many very complex self-programming feedback systems (for example,
313:
8528:, where one can try to show that more and more developed products appearing in the evolution of a universe or, simpler, an automaton are
8177:
sufficient bases (a so-called sufficient reason is the coincidence of all the necessary conditions). Without established causality, both
6366:
Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind; An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; And an Essay on Quantity
967:. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality.
12479:
4365:
1304:
with a good creator deity (i.e. if a deity knew what they were going to choose, then they are responsible for letting them choose it).
10671:
9088:
1979:
models of free will often consider deterministic relationships as discoverable in the physical world (including the brain). Cognitive
479:
for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities:
15773:
15452:
15442:
9600:
Assal, F.; Schwartz, S.; Vuilleumier, P. (2007). "Moving with or without will: Functional neural correlates of alien hand syndrome".
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A study that compared deliberate and arbitrary decisions, found that the early signs of decision are absent for the deliberate ones.
2553:, for instance, matter is without any freedom, and soul lacks any ability to control the unfolding of matter. The only real freedom (
1235:
free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny).
10685:
5137:
2511:, and Buddhists all taking slightly different lines. In many ways, the Buddhist position is closer to a theory of "conditionality" (
1513:) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will.
955:) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow
9791:
Frith, CD; Blakemore, S; Wolpert, DM (2000). "Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action".
728:
The idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen. In its most common form,
11999:
11591:
Gazzaniga, M. & Steven, M.S. (2004) Free Will in the 21st Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience and Law, in Garland, B. (ed.)
10705:
Vohs, K.D.; Schooler, J.W. (2008). "The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating".
9857:
2834:) despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or
1876:
writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains." Similarly,
14794:
14559:
11543:
8504:
6398:
2713:, and researchers can now watch the brain's decision-making process at work. A seminal experiment in this field was conducted by
2047:
in the brain. The neuroscience of free will places restrictions on both compatibilist and incompatibilist free will conceptions.
5532:
Free will is the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives.
1431:
dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."
15462:
12469:
10567:
Baumeister, R.; Crescioni, A.W.; Alquist, J. (2009). "Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture".
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Sartre also provides a psychological version of the argument by claiming that if man's actions are not his own, he would be in
3409:
959:
free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious
11479:
Ockham, William. Predestination, God's Knowledge, and Future Contingents, early 14th century, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and
9495:
8524:
with regard to its direct previous cause in will and intellect. (The contingency, or fortuity, is even intuitive under modern
8096:
See Bricklin, Jonathan, "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will", in Libet (1999),
4978:
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together with observable involuntary motor activity" (emphasis in original). This syndrome is often a result of damage to the
2063:. The suicidal agents were not conscious that their free will have been manipulated by external, even if ungrounded, reasons.
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11993:
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11847:
11821:, Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W. (2000). Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure.
11813:
11767:
11750:
11402:
10368:
Nichols, Shaun; Joshua Knobe (2007-12-01). "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions".
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Physics is simply unable to resolve the question of free will, although, if anything, it probably leans towards determinism.
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to activity in the muscle underlying the movement; the entire process resulting in action involves more steps than just the
1217:
generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate is related to
16282:
16080:
15758:
15447:
14844:
13484:
13404:
10794:
Monroe, Andrew E.; Brady, Garrett L.; Malle, Bertram F. (21 September 2016). "This Isn't the Free Will Worth Looking For".
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Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism
5317:: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state." For further discussion see
2189:
1182:
666:
4831:
2677:'s view is that fear of determinism in the context of "genetics" and "evolution" is a mistake, that it is "a confusion of
2573:
schools strongly suggest a belief in determinism, but do not seem to make explicit claims about determinism or free will.
2178:
and thus liable to necessity. Thus, he argues, humans do not possess free will as conventionally understood. However, the
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recordable on the scalp several hundred milliseconds before the overt appearance of a spontaneous willed movement. Using
2645:
2244:, which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom:
4238:
2209:
quite free, even in his individual actions, and imagines he can at any moment enter upon a different way of life... But
1747:, yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states (see epiphenomenalism).
165:
sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will.
16294:
16249:
15768:
15664:
15341:
8031:
6422:
8520:
with regard to God and the law of nature (as a specific case that could have not existed in other circumstances), and
3338:
133:
to be incompatible with free will and thus free will to be impossible whatever the case may be regarding determinism.
16119:
13675:
12161:
12035:
11959:
11944:
11871:
11795:
11781:
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11576:
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10931:
Nadelhoffer, Thomas; Shepard, Jason; Crone, Damien L.; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Levy, Neil (October 2020).
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8906:
8881:
8856:
8816:
8673:
8018:
7980:
7749:
A thoughtful list of careful distinctions regarding the application of empirical science to these issues is found in
7713:
7693:
7488:
6272:
5365:
4775:
4715:
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4576:
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asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: that mental states (such as
79:, and other judgements which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of
17:
10880:
Caspar, Emilie A.; Vuillaume, Laurène; Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, Pedro A.; Cleeremans, Axel (17 January 2017).
6935:
1777:
core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?" Others however argue that "
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16259:
16239:
16075:
15860:
15748:
15487:
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11032:
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He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the kind intention of His will.
2749:
the brain has begun to implement the action, suggesting to some that unconsciously the brain has made the decision
2653:
1289:
148:
for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of
815:
One kind of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the
107:
suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will.
16543:
16533:
16383:
15866:
15853:
14944:
13334:
10288:
Nahmias, Eddy; Stephen G Morris; Thomas Nadelhoffer; Jason Turner (2006-07-01). "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?".
9692:
Scepkowski, L.A.; Cronin-Golomb, A. (2003). "The alien hand: cases, categorizations, and anatomical correlates".
2342:
of causal law (i.e. that it precedes all experience and is rooted in the construction of the perceivable world):
785:. Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, such as bio-environmental determinism, are even more common.
662:
296:, namely, that if the world is deterministic, then our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an
12133:
10405:
Sarkissian, HAGOP; Amita Chatterjee; Felipe de Brigard; Joshua Knobe; Shaun Nichols; Smita Sirker (2010-06-01).
9070:
5196:
3681:. In Raymond Y. Chiao; Marvin L. Cohen; Anthony J. Leggett; William D. Phillips; Charles L. Harper, Jr. (eds.).
3107:
2669:
have frequently addressed questions related to free will. One of the most heated debates in biology is that of "
1932:, Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book
16254:
15948:
15872:
15512:
14543:
10933:"Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will"
8430:
our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".
8181:
and in the external world, the passing of time would be impossible, because it is essentially directional. See
5404:
4504:
2310:
2175:
1862:. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of
1434:
The second form, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge – "because
7878:
Nida-Rümelin, Julian (1 January 2019). "The Reasons Account of Free Will A Libertarian-Compatibilist Hybrid".
4530:
4018:
3111:
Augustine's view of free will and predestination would go on to have a profound impact on Christian theology.
2218:
Schopenhauer elaborated on the topic in Book IV of the same work and in even greater depth in his later essay
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1387:. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future.
1255:
125:(the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible). Another incompatibilist position is
10634:
Wagenaar, W.A. (1972). "Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature".
6852:
Garris, M.D.; et al. (1992). "A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS)".
2623:
Early scientific thought often portrayed the universe as deterministic – for example in the thought of
1442:
There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that theological determinism requires
864:
is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities.
16513:
16365:
16183:
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neurological underpinnings), they are more likely to dissociate determinism from moral responsibility. See
3986:
3346:
3067:
1602:
1474:
Strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will, and is a form of
993:
801:
382:
309:
118:
2523:
1423:. Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism.
806:
16538:
16523:
15905:
15832:
15820:
14964:
14787:
14239:
13394:
12333:
8579:" in Freedom and Determinism. Campbell, Joseph Keim; O'Rourke, Michael; and Shier, David. 2004. MIT Press
8178:
3499:
3366:
the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's
2363:(which referenced the so-called intellectuality of representations, that is, in other words, objects and
1754:
1552:
Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by
1467:
1005:
1004:
Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether the world is deterministic or not.
301:
9003:
Libet, B. (1985). "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action".
8766:
5257:
3088:
Along similar lines, Tyler Stillman has found that belief in free will predicts better job performance.
1490:
free will. Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left).
1482:
has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to
16345:
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11299:
9394:"Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition"
8009:
7547:(Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 487
7511:(Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 487
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developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine
3371:
3176:
2321:
2220:
1882:
1683:
1517:
The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows:
1348:
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is false and free will is possible (at least some people have free will). This view is associated with
32:
8419:. The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
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6606:
2536:
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12194:
11085:"'Irresponsible and a Disservice': The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma"
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3249:
2698:
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1996:
1971:
1962:
and other philosophical problems pose questions about free will and predictable outcomes of choices.
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394:
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9040:"Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential)"
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Wegner, D.M.; Wheatley, T. (1999). "Apparent mental causation: sources of the experience of will".
8117:
7609:
Gallagher, S. (2000). "Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science".
6936:
Anne Lockyer Jordan; Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate; Neil Lockyer; Edwin Tate (2004).
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4417:
3519:
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seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.
1671:
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108:
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Baumeister and colleagues also note that volunteers disbelieving in free will are less capable of
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accepts both freedom and determinism (or something similar to it), but despite its focus on human
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http://faculty.bennington.edu/~sherman/Evolution%20in%20America/evol%20religion%20free%20will.pdf
10033:"When consciousness matters: a critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will"
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In this work, he stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can
2079:
1980:
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1297:
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332:
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6103:
Randolph Clarke (1996). "Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action".
3746:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
3240:
The exact meaning of these verses has been debated by Christian theologians throughout history.
1249:
Discussion regarding destiny does not necessitate the existence of supernatural powers. Logical
1211:
Although often used interchangeably, the words "fate" and "destiny" have distinct connotations.
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7541:"Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation"
7505:"Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation"
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is that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3).
348:
335:, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will. For example, logical and
214:
10605:. Unpublished manuscript, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia.
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8376:
8216:
8130:
8057:
7540:
7504:
5320:
4182:
4117:
4062:
3957:
3825:
3708:
3678:
3254:
1497: – and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as
16418:
16244:
16178:
15694:
15654:
15579:
15482:
15361:
14984:
14904:
14599:
14591:
14519:
14475:
13837:
13832:
13727:
13434:
13344:
13215:
12905:
12850:
12845:
12803:
12731:
12665:
12595:
12443:
12418:
12373:
12323:
12272:
12154:
11349:
11227:
10145:
9218:
9146:
8946:
8278:
8245:
7944:
7732:
7246:
7223:
7173:
7140:
6689:
6632:
6005:
5999:
5547:
Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy
5014:
4211:
4150:
3858:
3651:
3610:
3217:
3097:
2727:
2670:
2083:
2035:
2031:
1714:
1630:
1592:
960:
952:
938:
919:
674:
200:) was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE). It has traditionally meant (until
9553:"A comparison of Granger causality and coherency in fMRI-based analysis of the motor system"
9443:"Neural precursors of decisions that matter—an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice"
8746:"Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem"
8543:
8373:
A discussion of the roles of will, intellect and passions in Aquinas' teachings is found in
4948:
4886:
4383:
4318:
3890:
819:
be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.
460:
suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if
16202:
16014:
16009:
15967:
15846:
15684:
15624:
15517:
15321:
15201:
14854:
14716:
13856:
13846:
13827:
13805:
13767:
13705:
13617:
13580:
13542:
13479:
12940:
12915:
12840:
12538:
12519:
12499:
12383:
12328:
12318:
12262:
12189:
11269:
10465:
9346:
9127:
7817:
6861:
6806:
6718:
6673:
6510:
Christosis: Pauline Soteriology in Light of Deification in Irenaeus and Cyril of Alexandria
6457:
5491:
5314:
5020:
4894:
4333:
3195:
2951:
2909:
2762:
of brain activity. The bearing of these results upon notions of free will appears complex.
2641:
2072:
2027:
2023:
2019:
2004:
1959:
1702:
1498:
1186:
1128:
778:
352:
328:
271:
Compatibilists maintain that mental reality is not of itself causally effective. Classical
265:
242:
126:
68:
15252:
14380:
11639:– disembodied, strangers to blood, sweat, and tears – have no occasion for that." (p. 30.)
7348:
3404:
3194:, have free will through which they can choose God and to do good works, with the goal of
2022:). Cognitive naturalism stresses the role of neurological sciences. Overall brain health,
1014:
Determinism (D) is true, D does not imply we lack free will (F), but in fact we do lack F.
811:
mental states; blue circles represent physical states; arrows describe causal interaction.
8:
16466:
16024:
15619:
15532:
15181:
15009:
14829:
14686:
14647:
14623:
14490:
14410:
14390:
14365:
14335:
13747:
13627:
13324:
13160:
13125:
13105:
13060:
12875:
12865:
12835:
12509:
12504:
12403:
12378:
12293:
12049:
11856:
11738:
11624:
8771:
5094:
3770:
3466:
3425:
3181:
thus rejecting free will. In condemnation of Calvin and Luther views, the Roman Catholic
2955:
actual behaviors, but is inferred from various cues through an intricate mental process,
2921:'s contributions to the free will debate have come primarily through social psychologist
2851:
2780:
suggest that the cancelling or "veto" of an action may first arise subconsciously as well
2719:
2453:
2356:
2167:
2155:
1710:
1478:(equivalent to theological fatalism below). It claims that free will does not exist, and
1470:
free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation.
901:
816:
743:
657:
457:
452:
447:
remarks that C.D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s.
61:
13040:
11439:
Jackson, Timothy P. (1998). "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will".
10469:
9350:
8690:
8576:
7476:
7459:
6865:
6722:
6677:
6461:
5495:
5024:
4979:"The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature;
4337:
3740:
McKenna, Michael; Coates, D. Justin (2015). "Compatibilism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
3308:, in a two part treatment, where human free will is specified as part of the universe's
2589:
freedom we have to get beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be found here.
381:, are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, "
103:
Some conceive free will to be the capacity to make choices undetermined by past events.
16518:
16508:
16412:
16044:
15919:
15886:
15689:
15669:
15644:
15639:
15584:
15303:
14924:
14894:
14681:
14676:
14511:
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14320:
13908:
13815:
13800:
13752:
13700:
13514:
13504:
13274:
13264:
12768:
12680:
12438:
12423:
11908:
11883:
Quantum theory and free will : how mental intentions translate into bodily actions
11755:
11723:
11669:
11644:
11419:
11246:
11205:
11180:
11161:
11111:
11084:
11065:
11002:
10960:
10908:
10881:
10857:
10830:
10811:
10776:
10730:
10584:
10544:
10488:
10453:
10434:
10404:
10311:
10270:
10208:
10055:
9986:
9951:
9816:
9753:
9728:
9669:
9644:
9625:
9577:
9552:
9533:
9469:
9442:
9418:
9393:
9369:
9335:"An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement"
9334:
9310:
9283:
9119:
9020:
7945:"Part III: On the origin and nature of the emotions; Postulates (Proposition II, Note)"
7895:
7634:
7438:
7360:
7323:
7062:
7043:
6915:
6877:
6757:
6663:
6489:
6447:
6261:
5774:
5580:
5523:
5481:
5292:
5288:
5062:
5046:
4862:
4858:
4357:
3582:
3395:
because they are their own; however, the free will happens with the permission of God.
3317:
3164:
3156:
2930:
2405:
2000:
1817:
1646:
1598:
1459:
1448:
1373:
1344:
1170:
1146:
737:
733:
723:
699:
593:
may occupy any of the nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to
378:
16484:
15115:
12047:'s assertion that God does not play dice with the universe has been misinterpreted)",
10879:
10120:
9804:
9284:"Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late?"
8727:
8501:
7843:
Lemos, John (2002). "Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–naturalism".
7622:
2456:, it rejects the western concept of a total agent from external sources. According to
2301: – the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.
227:), and some modern philosophers lament the lack of progress over all these centuries.
189:, the notion of incompatibilist free will is perhaps first identified in the works of
16340:
15604:
15564:
15549:
15277:
15206:
15186:
15070:
14954:
14736:
14721:
14711:
14691:
14440:
14271:
14174:
14164:
13893:
13851:
13554:
13284:
13200:
13155:
12741:
12710:
12433:
12393:
12308:
12277:
12184:
12031:
11989:
11969:
11955:
11940:
11926:
11896:
11886:
11867:
11843:
11791:
11777:
11763:
11746:
11674:
11596:
11581:
11572:
11526:
11398:
11210:
11153:
11149:
11116:
11101:
11069:
11006:
10964:
10952:
10913:
10862:
10815:
10768:
10722:
10718:
10588:
10536:
10528:
10493:
10426:
10422:
10391:
10350:
10346:
10315:
10287:
10200:
10153:
10124:
10087:
10011:
9990:
9943:
9908:
9847:
9820:
9808:
9758:
9709:
9674:
9617:
9582:
9525:
9474:
9423:
9374:
9315:
9264:
9254:
9230:
9181:
9152:
9111:
9062:
8985:
8927:
8902:
8877:
8852:
8812:
8669:
8645:
8621:
8596:
8551:
8391:
8286:
8257:
8224:
8138:
8065:
8014:
7976:
7952:
7899:
7860:
7783:
7709:
7689:
7626:
7582:
7552:
7516:
7484:
7315:
7282:
7252:
7185:
7152:
7108:
7015:
6979:
6943:
6563:
6514:
6481:
6473:
6370:
6336:
6302:
6268:
6207:
6200:
6171:
6137:
6076:
6034:
6009:
5971:
5937:
5903:
5869:
5835:
5801:
5778:
5739:
5689:
5655:
5621:
5587:
5551:
5527:
5515:
5507:
5503:
5432:
5361:
5332:
5226:
5163:
5129:
5036:
4954:
4927:
4898:
4866:
4771:
4711:
4686:
4661:
4604:
4572:
4478:
4389:
4349:
4301:
4217:
4190:
4158:
4129:
3965:
3927:
3896:
3866:
3833:
3774:
3720:
3686:
3657:
3616:
3586:
3489:
3457:
3420:
2905:
2823:
2636:
2595:
2577:
2471:
2179:
2008:
1811:
1300:, and is closely related to other such arguments, for example the incompatibility of
1163:
934:
444:
390:
281:
201:
96:
15024:
13045:
11165:
10948:
10780:
10548:
10438:
10212:
10059:
9955:
9629:
9123:
6881:
6781:
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society
5472:
Danko D. Georgiev (2021). "Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will".
5296:
4361:
1781:
plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."
1619:
320:, arguments have been made against libertarianism in that it is difficult to assign
252:
The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the
16461:
16426:
16373:
16306:
16173:
16168:
16148:
16128:
16097:
15778:
15719:
15421:
15406:
15401:
15376:
15336:
15311:
15191:
15161:
15029:
14999:
14979:
14839:
14706:
14631:
14615:
14445:
14430:
14375:
14154:
13936:
13903:
13898:
13795:
13695:
13632:
13612:
13604:
13180:
13165:
13145:
12945:
12757:
12700:
12428:
12398:
12388:
12353:
12267:
12257:
12247:
12211:
12206:
12147:
11922:
11719:
11664:
11656:
11480:
11250:
11238:
11200:
11192:
11145:
11106:
11096:
11055:
11047:
10992:
10944:
10903:
10893:
10852:
10842:
10803:
10760:
10734:
10714:
10653:
10576:
10520:
10483:
10473:
10418:
10387:
10342:
10307:
10262:
10235:
10192:
10116:
10047:
9978:
9935:
9900:
9800:
9748:
9740:
9701:
9664:
9656:
9609:
9572:
9564:
9537:
9517:
9464:
9454:
9413:
9405:
9364:
9354:
9305:
9295:
9103:
9054:
9024:
9012:
8977:
8723:
7887:
7852:
7618:
7430:
7072:
6911:
6907:
6869:
6838:
6726:
6662:
Hooft, G. (2001). "How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale".
6555:
6493:
6465:
6112:
5766:
5729:
5499:
5284:
5121:
5050:
5028:
4854:
4633:
4341:
3766:
3578:
3509:
3494:
3476:
3392:
3205:
3191:
3182:
3148:
3144:
3126:
2786:
suggest models that explain the relationship between conscious intention and action
2704:
2546:
1740:
1726:
1687:
1483:
1244:
1090:
689:
297:
237:. The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either
122:
80:
11808:
Muhm, Myriam (2004). Abolito il libero arbitrio – Colloquio con Wolf Singer.
7638:
7180:(A lecture given in Mannheim, 8 May 1972 ed.). Psychology Press. pp. 23
4887:
3471:
2513:
1454:
121:(the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible) and
16456:
15783:
15594:
15544:
15272:
15216:
15176:
15136:
15014:
14919:
14761:
14495:
14234:
14189:
14149:
14097:
14042:
14032:
13956:
13931:
13913:
13866:
13757:
13690:
13685:
13573:
13294:
13225:
13210:
13130:
13110:
13085:
12895:
12705:
12640:
12413:
12408:
12348:
12303:
12252:
12070:
12044:
11829:
11567:
11295:
10692:
10524:
10196:
9939:
9409:
9248:
8508:
8199:
7576:
7379:
7100:
7007:
6971:
6937:
6779:
6508:
6426:
6364:
6330:
6296:
6235:
6165:
6131:
6070:
5965:
5931:
5897:
5863:
5829:
5794:
5683:
5649:
5615:
5545:
5426:
5220:
5155:
4655:
4598:
4568:
4472:
4246:
4183:"Chapter 9: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will"
4022:
3863:
Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power
3561:
To state it briefly, we define "free will" as a will unimpeded by any compulsion.
3413:
3273:
2869:
2855:
2792:
2694:
2198:
2105:
2039:
1955:
1934:
1900:
1839:
1822:
1750:
1661:
1580:
1232:
981:
956:
942:
712:
371:
293:
186:
113:
16436:
11805:. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. Collected essays by scientists and philosophers.
10051:
9729:"Subjective experience, involuntary movement, and posterior alien hand syndrome"
9222:
8950:
2731:
1169:
Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is likely to be
362:
Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings.
16446:
16431:
16398:
16158:
15793:
15743:
15371:
15282:
15211:
15196:
15166:
15141:
15095:
15080:
15075:
14974:
14914:
14899:
14879:
14869:
14864:
14834:
14731:
14485:
14385:
14370:
14345:
14340:
14224:
14114:
14052:
13971:
13961:
13951:
13861:
13742:
13737:
13722:
13662:
13647:
13622:
13424:
13205:
13195:
13050:
13035:
12980:
12751:
12610:
12514:
12448:
12226:
12221:
12066:
11562:
10981:"Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1"
10239:
9904:
7951:(Original work published 1677 ed.). Digireads.com Publishing. p. 54.
6559:
6116:
5734:
5717:
3892:
Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will
3554:
3387:
3269:
3136:
3121:
3059:
3004:
2889:
2797:
2714:
2457:
2401:
2237:
2130:
2121:
1904:
1843:
1642:
1557:
1443:
1409:
1365:
1324:
1319:
1313:
1285:
1277:
1178:
1101:
897:
413:
409:
238:
144:
compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is
92:
11367:
11051:
10580:
9982:
9174:"Chapter 6: Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will"
9107:
9058:
9016:
8981:
7538:
7502:
7141:"Chapter 5: Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalizing theory"
6730:
5770:
5125:
4180:
3955:
2557:) consists in realizing the ultimate separateness of matter and self. For the
2240:, who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work, wrote
1903:, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a
1678:. Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called
1637:(for example, consciousness, memory, and judgment) and body (for example, the
1017:
D is true, D does not imply we lack F, but in fact we don't know if we have F.
673:
in nature, fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in the
177:
literature. The notion of compatibilist free will has been attributed to both
16502:
16153:
16143:
15609:
15267:
15257:
15247:
15237:
15171:
15156:
15151:
15146:
15110:
15105:
15100:
15085:
15044:
14939:
14803:
14415:
14355:
14305:
14144:
14082:
14067:
13966:
13881:
13810:
13762:
13670:
13652:
13494:
13220:
13170:
13135:
13115:
13095:
12660:
12368:
12343:
12338:
12040:
11900:
11839:
11686:
11242:
11196:
11157:
10997:
10980:
10898:
10847:
10807:
10764:
10532:
10430:
10354:
10319:
9705:
9300:
9201:
8548:
The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates
8442:
8351:
7864:
7319:
6477:
5743:
5511:
3645:
3524:
3433:
3337:
At the same time, Maimonides – and other thinkers – recognizes the
3171:
3071:
3037:
2922:
2893:
2884:
2883:
In addition, one of the most important ("first rank") diagnostic symptoms of
2674:
2584:, offers a good example of the worry about free will in the Hindu tradition.
2484:
2372:
2346:
2288:
2100:
1992:
1976:
1855:
1807:
1799:
1790:
1778:
1730:
1576:
1527:
1487:
1428:
1327:
is the idea that all events are determined in advance. Predeterminism is the
1190:
1174:
948:
761:
715:, so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to
670:
646:
605:. The position (1) of hard determinism adds to the table the contention that
402:
317:
272:
153:
137:
130:
10478:
10111:
Pronin, Emily (2009). "The Introspection Illusion". In Mark P. Zanna (ed.).
9359:
8035:
7891:
7856:
6419:
4345:
2808:
Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.
2602:. But it is the strong man who stands up and says I will make my own fate."
2549:
do not agree with each other entirely on the question of free will. For the
2408:). His view has been associated with both compatibilism and libertarianism.
1427:
The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a
16451:
16124:
15763:
15709:
15034:
14909:
14859:
14696:
14639:
14470:
14465:
14460:
14435:
14405:
14139:
14012:
13946:
13941:
13876:
13732:
13717:
13474:
13240:
13175:
13065:
12975:
12825:
12695:
12605:
12585:
12313:
11678:
11660:
11606:
11492:
11214:
11120:
10956:
10917:
10866:
10772:
10726:
10540:
10497:
10204:
9947:
9912:
9812:
9762:
9713:
9621:
9586:
9529:
9478:
9427:
9378:
9319:
9143:
A brief discussion of possible interpretation of these results is found in
9115:
8529:
8525:
8004:
7630:
7421:
Frankfurt, H. (1971). "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person".
6777:
6485:
6167:
Oxford Hb Of Free Will:Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories
5757:
Mark Balaguer (1999). "Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View".
5519:
5133:
4435:
Libet, Benjamin (2003). "Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity?".
4353:
3577:. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 50. pp. 1–52.
3429:
2965:
has argued that the subjective experience of free will is supported by the
2962:
2913:
2827:
2628:
2615:
humans have free will, free will may be described as a political doctrine.
2508:
2229:
only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."
2197:
But the fact is overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as
2015:
2003:), and so must be studied by the methods of empirical science, such as the
1943:
1938:. The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful
1795:
1762:
1664:
free will. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called
1549:, although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism.
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is untrue, and the position (2) of libertarianism adds the contention that
234:
88:
10003:
9678:
9660:
9521:
9066:
8989:
8924:
It Ain't Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and other Illusions
8496:
Further discussion of this compatibilistic theory can be found in Thomas'
8463:
8217:"Chapter 7: The critique of morality: The three pillars of Kantian ethics"
7769:
3412:
is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and
1690:. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is
1462:
of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism
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13150:
13080:
13030:
12808:
12736:
12715:
12670:
12635:
12590:
12561:
11878:
9744:
5095:"On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain"
3504:
3342:
3187:
3160:
3140:
3043:
2767:
2710:
2570:
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is not subordinate to the laws of necessity (causality) and is thus free.
1984:
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104:
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It would seem that undetermined events in the brain or body would occur
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3683:
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3190:, the father of the Methodist tradition, taught that humans, enabled by
2158:
claimed that phenomena do not have freedom of the will, but the will as
1530:
foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do)
1276:
an omniscient creator not only implies destiny but a form of high level
16350:
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15788:
15589:
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seems to have held views on predestination similar to Calvinism in his
2632:
2624:
2338:
This empiricist view was often denied by trying to prove the so-called
2316:
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2265:
2140:
1896:
1873:
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1413:
1369:
1328:
1082:
968:
773:
Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as
430:
224:
84:
10406:
9613:
9568:
6873:
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15527:
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15131:
15065:
15004:
14671:
14583:
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13524:
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182:
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10266:
7434:
6826:
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4012:
The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will
2773:
More studies have since been conducted, including some that try to:
694:
16388:
16133:
16092:
15674:
15629:
15346:
14701:
14666:
14300:
14285:
14209:
14204:
14169:
14159:
14072:
14007:
13981:
13464:
13025:
12880:
12655:
12620:
12494:
12199:
8577:
Buddhism and the Freedom of the Will: Pali and Mahayanist Responses
8159:
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4494:
4111:), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?
3758:
3378:
were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant
3132:
3075:
3011:
generating random numbers), their behaviour betrays many patterns.
2873:
2766:
basis "...free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150–350
2474:. The concept of karma in Buddhism is different from the notion of
2467:
2449:
2330:
one another (descriptions of regularity in nature) and things that
2261:
2183:
2159:
2044:
1877:
1553:
1384:
1150:
261:
220:
39:
12100:
12085:
12064:
11627:
is what distinguishes us from machines. For biological creatures,
11265:"The Battle of the Will, Part 4: John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards"
10831:"Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not)"
9268:
9086:
7753:"Physicalism: §12 – Physicalism and the physicalist world picture"
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The first event is consistent with having caused the second event.
1533:
Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise)
16114:
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14325:
14214:
14179:
14134:
14129:
14124:
14037:
14027:
13314:
13020:
12950:
12920:
12885:
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come from acting in the world and experiencing the consequences.
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2504:
2480:
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2214:
it were, must play to the end the part he has taken upon himself.
1332:
1228:
1202:
1029:
D isn't true, we do have F, and would have F even if D were true.
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1335:, past, present and future, have been decided or are known (by
420:"ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. They must be
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4120:. In John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister (eds.).
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1173:. Although the scientific method cannot be used to rule out
941:) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book
760:
The idea that the future is already determined, either by a
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2558:
2496:
2272:
causes from the internal disposition receiving this cause.
1634:
1340:
1214:
1181:, it can be used to identify indeterminism in natural law.
861:
832:
828:
408:
Traditional arguments for incompatibilism are based on an "
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12139:
10985:
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5405:"Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will"
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The first event immediately precedes the second event, and
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1849:
1032:
D isn't true, we don't have F, but F is compatible with D.
911:
responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision.
15422:
Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)
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13565:
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Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward
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In facing choices, he argued that humans are governed by
2034:
clearly influence mental activity, and their impact upon
1868:
1435:
1408:
stating that all events that happen are pre-ordained, or
1336:
1293:
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over these matters, we also can have no control over the
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9599:
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5225:. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 21.
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3604:
3602:
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which was formulated by the French Reformed theologian,
2395:
1193:, and are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.
1117:, one must have been responsible for the way one was at
1109:, one must have been responsible for the way one was at
669:, and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic
327:
Free will here is predominantly treated with respect to
268:
for actions if they are caused entirely by past events.
13355:
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A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by
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3432:, in holding that free will is a feature of a human's
3304:) is foundational. The most succinct statement is by
2598:: "It is the coward and the fool who says this is his
15827:
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10454:"People believe they have more free will than others"
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4319:"The self as a responding and responsible artifact"
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680:Below these positions are examined in more detail.
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4315:referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by
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3208:discusses Predestination in some of his Epistles.
2830:make involuntary movements and utterances (called
974:
11790:McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages
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11586:Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science.
10083:Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will
8464:"Summa Theologica: Free-will (Prima Pars, Q. 83)"
7304:"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical"
7272:
7221:
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4381:
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2872:, either when it is severed to treat intractable
1633:, that is, consideration of the relation between
304:is the form of incompatibilism which posits that
160:one counterfactually wanted to do otherwise, one
16500:
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10793:
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5537:
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4040:"How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?"
3987:"Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of
3649:
3572:
3023:
2783:explain the underlying brain structures involved
2430:
1942:, and other such possibilities, then because of
1921:
173:The problem of free will has been identified in
11968:, Wij Zijn Ons Brein, Publishing Centre, 2010.
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9726:
8374:
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7824:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
7778:. Jones & Bartlett Learning. pp. 1061
7750:
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6969:
6929:
6197:
6102:
5827:
4911:
4884:
3676:
3031:
1419:, or that they are destined to occur given its
629:as meaning both concepts are of dubious value.
292:A different approach to the dilemma is that of
264:dilemma as well: the question of how to assign
67:Free will is closely linked to the concepts of
11952:How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?
11617:, Princeton University Press, 2023, 333 pp.),
10407:"Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?"
10178:"March 1). Mistaking randomness for free will"
9880:
9037:
7666:
7574:
7568:
7498:
7496:
7138:
7092:
6999:
6939:Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition
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5929:
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5647:
5345:
5318:
5207:
4946:
4033:
4031:
4007:never count as self-evident proof of anything.
3951:
3949:
3947:
3945:
3943:
3919:
3888:
3759:"Did Epicurus discover the free-will problem?"
3706:
3573:Baumeister, Roy F.; Monroe, Andrew E. (2014).
3349:. (In fact the problem may be seen to overlap
3167:views on predestination put forth in his work
1872:]." In articulating this crucial proviso,
1383:Predeterminism has therefore been compared to
951:physical models (particularly those involving
856:Some non-causal explanations involve invoking
795:
95:. Traditionally, only actions that are freely
16210:
15975:
14788:
13581:
12546:
12155:
10143:
9694:Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews
9642:
9240:
9087:Lars Strother; Sukhvinder Singh Obhi (2009).
8663:
8544:"I. The free will problem – real or illusory"
8386:. Routledge (Psychology Press). pp. 278
8279:"Consciousness, intentionality and causality"
7730:
7416:
7414:
7174:"Notes of a realist on the body-mind problem"
6633:"Some Varieties of Free Will and Determinism"
6500:
6288:
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6133:Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action
5895:
5791:
5756:
5465:
5147:
4953:(2nd ed.). Psychology Press. p. 8.
4060:
3856:
3739:
2392:) jointly decide upon the behaviour of both.
1821:, and the Stoic Chrysippus. In contrast, the
1075:, and any position that includes having F as
16479:This article incorporates material from the
14528:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
12098:
11615:Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will
11466:Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence",
11292:Discipline of the Immanuel Missionary Church
11231:Social Psychological and Personality Science
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10835:Social Psychological and Personality Science
10796:Social Psychological and Personality Science
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8214:
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7667:Fischer, John Martin; Ravizza, Mark (1998).
7532:
6963:
6898:Sherman, H. (1981). "Marx and determinism".
6851:
6824:
6164:Timothy O'Connor (2005). Robert Kane (ed.).
6129:
6062:
6028:
5750:
4596:
4477:. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. p. 39.
4148:
4115:
4083:
3823:
3293:
129:, which holds not only determinism but also
11730:Harnad, Stevan (2009) The Explanatory Gap #
11336:Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam
10175:
9685:
9229:. University Press of America, Lanham, MD,
8128:
8064:. Cambridge University Press. p. 529.
8049:
7774:. In Andrew R Marks; Ushma S Neill (eds.).
7719:
7493:
7394:
7392:
7384:Freedom and Determinism in Stoic Philosophy
7281:1991 ed.). Penguin Books. p. ix.
7133:
7131:
6897:
6771:
6708:
6362:
6157:
6123:
5997:
5963:
5889:
5855:
5821:
5675:
5607:
5577:
5424:
5420:
5418:
5383:Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam
5303:
4880:
4878:
4876:
4653:
4562:
4209:
4037:
4028:
3940:
3685:. Cambridge University Press. p. 603.
3612:Determinism and freedom in Stoic philosophy
2709:It has become possible to study the living
2284:Free will as a pragmatically useful concept
2112:
1113:. To be responsible for the way one was at
27:Ability to make choices without constraints
16217:
16203:
15982:
15968:
14795:
14781:
13588:
13574:
12553:
12539:
12480:Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness
12162:
12148:
11913:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
11642:
11424:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
11026:
11024:
11022:
11020:
11018:
11016:
10753:Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
9769:
9508:Zinner, S.H. (2000). "Tourette disorder".
9490:
9488:
9253:. Bradford Books. MIT Press. p. 131.
9165:
9137:
8641:
8639:
8637:
8595:. Cambridge University Press. p. 73.
8151:
7460:Chapter XXI.: "Of the liberty of subjects"
7411:
7365:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
7238:
7083:
6639:. philosophy.lander.edu. 10 September 2009
6541:
6539:
6537:
6258:
6227:
5923:
5785:
5571:
5012:
4428:
4326:Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
4316:
4266:
4264:
3679:"§28.2: Compatibilism and incompatibilism"
3653:Research In Psychology: Methods and Design
3347:Divine providence as understood in Judaism
2899:
1390:
312:constructions, including both traditional
15453:Electromagnetic theories of consciousness
11668:
11536:Sri Aurobindo about freedom and free will
11512:Hawking, Stephen, and Mlodinow, Leonard,
11204:
11110:
11100:
11059:
10996:
10907:
10897:
10856:
10846:
10828:
10647:
10601:Paulhus, D.L. and Margesson. A., (1994).
10487:
10477:
10381:
10301:
10228:Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
9968:
9894:
9775:
9752:
9668:
9576:
9468:
9458:
9417:
9368:
9358:
9309:
9299:
9080:
8836:(4th ed.). W.H. Freeman and Company.
8743:
8404:
7973:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
7927:
7608:
7420:
7265:
7228:Consciousness: §9.9 Non-physical theories
7209:
7147:. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 69
6747:
6667:
6661:
6451:
6410:
6408:
6252:
6096:
5733:
5485:
5162:. Taylor & Francis. pp. 891–92.
5115:
4940:
4770:. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4624:Fischer, J.M. (1983). "Incompatibilism".
4528:
4468:
4466:
4464:
4462:
4460:
4448:
3865:. Columbia University Press. p. 37.
3072:compatibilistic (deterministic) free will
2979:
1854:Most "classical compatibilists", such as
12065:Timothy O’Connor, Christopher Franklin.
11828:
11443:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11284:
11257:
11185:Personality and Social Psychology Review
10633:
10290:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
10137:
9720:
9246:
8921:
8571:
8569:
8567:
8270:
7936:
7880:Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
7671:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7389:
7128:
7105:The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
6356:
6329:George Berkeley; Jonathan Dancy (1998).
6191:
5991:
5957:
5641:
5544:Christoph Lumer; Sandro Nannini (2007).
5415:
5402:
5255:
5194:
4972:
4970:
4873:
4705:
4592:
4590:
4588:
4558:
4556:
4502:
4475:Four Views on Free Will (Libertarianism)
4388:. Columbia University Press. p. 5.
4375:
4236:
4230:
4203:
4189:. Oxford University Press. p. 193.
4124:. Oxford University Press. pp. 128
4010:Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs:
3984:
3832:. Oxford University Press. p. 112.
3799:
3543:
3253:
3163:. John Calvin was heavily influenced by
3106:
2925:'s work on conscious will. In his book,
2605:
2150:
2116:
1794:
1614:
1507:knowing their actions before they happen
1453:
1166:poses a serious challenge to this view.
867:
805:
693:
640:
451:standing, if she had so desired. But it
14560:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
12083:
11978:
11473:
11438:
11348:
11013:
10562:
10560:
10558:
10252:
10030:
9836:
9544:
9501:
9485:
8963:
8961:
8959:
8871:
8634:
8609:
8349:
8312:"Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian"
7822:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7763:
7680:
7678:
7581:. Oxford University Press. p. 96.
7449:
7405:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7398:
7165:
6554:. SAGE Publications. pp. 1035–36.
6545:
6534:
6399:An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
6072:Person And Object: A Metaphysical Study
6029:Kane, Robert (2007). "Libertarianism".
6022:
5409:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5351:
5262:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5201:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5008:
5006:
4809:van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. (1998).
4804:
4802:
4750:
4623:
4547:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4540:
4535:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4509:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4422:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4415:
4261:
4174:
4157:. Oxford University Press. p. 14.
4142:
3756:
3743:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
3699:
3608:
3068:libertarian (indeterministic) free will
1850:Free will as lack of physical restraint
1145:Causal determinism is the concept that
999:
730:nomological (or scientific) determinism
168:
14:
16501:
15463:Higher-order theories of consciousness
11923:Free Will Under the Light of the Quran
11705:
11685:
11030:
10110:
10073:
9832:
9830:
9793:Brain Research. Brain Research Reviews
9784:
9636:
9593:
9507:
9385:
9200:
9031:
8896:
8846:
8713:
8688:
8615:
8550:. Oxford University Press. p. 5.
8535:
8367:
8309:
8237:
8108:
8106:
7698:
7651:
7462:(1968 edition). London: Penguin Books.
7202:
6405:
5274:
5190:
5188:
5186:
4976:
4730:
4649:
4647:
4457:
4289:
4054:
3850:
2988:
2929:Wegner summarizes what he believes is
2444:
2268:(279–206 BCE), who separated external
1238:
1023:D is true, we have F, and F implies D.
873:have been created, referenced here as
847:
827:, which claims that some non-physical
621:is untrue. Position (9) may be called
60:between different possible courses of
16198:
15963:
15478:Lamme's recurrent feedback hypothesis
14776:
13569:
13385:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
12534:
12485:Universal Declaration of Human Rights
12143:
12028:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
12018:Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue
11877:
11609:, "The Fate of Free Will" (review of
11387:
11082:
10603:Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale
10007:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
9002:
8890:
8865:
8806:
8588:
8575:Gier, Nicholas and Kjellberg, Paul. "
8564:
8208:
8122:
7912:
7842:
7815:
7465:
7347:
7301:
7273:Tor Nørretranders (1998). "Preface".
6978:. Taylor & Francis. p. 194.
6854:Science of Artificial Neural Networks
5093:Lewis, E.R.; MacGregor, R.J. (2006).
4967:
4844:
4790:
4585:
4553:
4434:
4187:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
4122:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
4077:
3978:
3962:Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
3817:
3800:Schopenhauer, A. "What is freedom?".
3670:
3638:
3549:
3408:can do for it, is to be truly free."
3147:, and formulated by Dutch theologian
3135:which was put forth by Jesuit priest
3014:
2861:functional magnetic resonance imaging
2537:Free will in theology § Hinduism
2439:
2396:Free will according to Thomas Aquinas
1352:is categorised as a specific type of
1347:, implying that there is an unbroken
1254:or false), and is referred to as the
1134:
208:
16081:Correlation does not imply causation
15944:
13485:Interpretations of quantum mechanics
13405:The World as Will and Representation
12030:. Oxford University Press, New York
11544:"There's No Such Thing as Free Will"
11541:
11330:
11089:British Journal of Social Psychology
10555:
10079:
9038:Benjamin Libet; et al. (1983).
8956:
8915:
8800:
8383:Arguments of the philosophers series
7993:The World as Will and Representation
7809:
7675:
7656:. New York: Oxford University Press.
7041:
7012:Encyclopedia of science and religion
6416:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5380:
5374:
5003:
4799:
4680:
4243:Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy
4118:"Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural"
3763:Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
3250:Free will in theology § Judaism
3169:On the Predestination of the Saints.
2190:The World as Will and Representation
1965:
1586:
1183:Interpretations of quantum mechanics
667:interpretations of quantum mechanics
14576:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
12106:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
12091:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
12076:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
9827:
8876:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8695:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
8164:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
8103:
8029:
7216:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7212:"The hard problem of consciousness"
7088:. Touchstone:New York. p. 149.
6202:Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality
5458:Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach,
5222:Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion
5183:
5103:Journal of Integrative Neuroscience
5019:. Vol. 131. pp. 457–459.
4823:
4765:
4685:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4644:
4245:. London: Routledge. Archived from
3656:(6th ed.). Wiley. p. 11.
3410:Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense
3351:several others in Jewish Philosophy
3294:
3277:
2530:
2124:thought that there is no free will.
2038:is also important. For example, an
1735:on physical events, describing the
1466:There are various implications for
1196:
683:
665:is currently disputed by prominent
464:had actually obtained in the past.
24:
16250:Novikov self-consistency principle
15769:Subjective character of experience
15665:Neural correlates of consciousness
11939:New York: Oxford University Press
11776:New York: Oxford University Press
11724:10.1002/j.2326-1951.2001.tb03561.x
11555:
11470:, new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–12.
11441:Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard
11179:Epstude, K.; Roese, N. J. (2008).
10312:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x
10176:Ebert, J.P.; Wegner, D.M. (2011).
10150:Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
9727:Bundick, T.; Spinella, M. (2000).
9645:"The alien hand and related signs"
9282:Guggisberg, AG; Mottaz, A (2013).
9178:Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
8787:"Infidels. "Metaphysical Freedom""
8767:"The Quantum Physics of Free Will"
8542:Paul Russell; Oisin Deery (2013).
8283:Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
8100:(Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic).
7816:Ridge, Michael (3 February 2014).
7277:(Jonathan Sydenham translation of
7222:Robert Van Gulick (Jan 14, 2014).
5289:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00266.x
4859:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x
4710:. London: George Allen and Unwin.
4271:O'Connor, Timothy (Oct 29, 2010).
3771:10.1093/oso/9780199242269.003.0008
3583:10.1016/B978-0-12-800284-1.00001-1
2618:
1890:Free will as a psychological state
1486:, although it does not invalidate
365:
25:
16560:
15799:Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation
15448:Damasio's theory of consciousness
14802:
12101:"FMedieval Theories of Free Will"
12058:
8502:Here the online text of the Summa
8443:"Catholic Encyclopedia: Appetite"
8411:Timothy O'Connor (Oct 29, 2010).
8350:Hartung, Christopher (May 2013).
8158:CM Lorkowski (November 7, 2010).
7353:Aristotle on Moral Responsibility
7099:Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (1996).
5327:. Psychology Press. pp. 197
3345:, and further (ii) the nature of
3332:justice could not be administered
2777:support Libet's original findings
2654:hardware random number generators
2066:
1697:A contrasting approach is called
1307:
1063:Pereboom calls positions 3 and 4
16260:Quantum mechanics of time travel
16240:Chronology protection conjecture
16076:Proximate and ultimate causation
15943:
15934:
15933:
15861:Journal of Consciousness Studies
15749:Sociology of human consciousness
15585:Dual consciousness (split-brain)
15488:Orchestrated objective reduction
14757:
14756:
13548:
13538:
13537:
12127:
12115:
11691:"Consciousness: An Afterthought"
11486:
11460:
11447:
11432:
11414:from the original on 2013-05-28.
11381:
11360:
11342:
11324:
11315:
11306:
11221:
11172:
11150:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00158.x
11127:
11102:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02077.x
11076:
10971:
10924:
10873:
10822:
10787:
10719:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02045.x
10678:
10664:
10627:
10618:
10608:
10595:
10504:
10445:
10423:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x
10398:
10392:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
10361:
10347:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01351.x
10326:
10281:
10219:
10169:
10104:
10024:
9997:
9962:
9919:
9874:
9643:Doody, RS; Jankovic, J. (1992).
9434:
9326:
9275:
9212:
9194:
8996:
8940:
8901:. London: Penguin. p. 179.
8840:
8825:
8779:
8759:
8737:
8707:
8664:Boniolo, G.; Vidali, P. (1999).
8657:
8582:
8490:
8477:
8456:
8435:
8356:(Thesis). University of Delaware
8343:
8303:
8187:
8170:
8090:
8078:
8023:
7998:
7985:
7965:
7947:. In R.H.M. Elwes, trans (ed.).
7921:
7906:
7871:
7836:
7796:
7725:A key exponent of this view was
7706:The Oxford Handbook to Free Will
7660:
7645:
7602:
7373:
7341:
7295:
7077:
7054:
7035:
5617:Free Will: A Philosophical Study
5504:10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104474
5143:from the original on 2011-06-08.
4795:. Random House. pp. 87–104.
4437:Journal of Consciousness Studies
4371:from the original on 2009-11-09.
4069:. Longmans, Green. pp. 145
4044:Journal of Consciousness Studies
3995:Journal of Consciousness Studies
3450:
2838:, because they are not strictly
2689:Neuroscience and neurophilosophy
2335:very weak notion of necessity."
2305:Free will and views of causality
2233:Free will as "moral imagination"
1784:
1290:incompatible-properties argument
256:or sometimes referred to as the
16487:", which is licensed under the
16224:
15989:
15867:Online Consciousness Conference
15854:How the Self Controls Its Brain
13335:Meditations on First Philosophy
12560:
11979:Wegener, Daniel Merton (2002).
11645:"Responsibility and punishment"
11516:, New York, Bantam Books, 2010.
11506:
10949:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104342
10086:. US: Oxford University Press.
9837:Wegener, Daniel Merton (2002).
9780:. New York: Grune and Stratton.
9494:Tourette Syndrome Association.
8620:(5th ed.). Prentice Hall.
8532:with regard to its principles.)
8131:"Notes to pages 74–81, note 22"
8116:(1979 edition). Cambridge, MA:
7915:Faith, Freedom, and Rationality
7751:Stoljar, Daniel (Sep 9, 2009).
7545:Oxford Handbook of Human Action
7509:Oxford Handbook of Human Action
7308:Philosophy & Public Affairs
6942:. Nelson Thornes. p. 211.
6891:
6813:. Merriam-Webster, Incorporated
6799:
6741:
6654:
6625:
6576:
6390:
5682:Daniel Clement Dennett (1981).
5452:
5268:
5197:"Arguments for Incompatibilism"
5086:
4922:. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 44
4838:
4817:
4784:
4759:
4744:
4724:
4699:
4674:
4617:
4505:"Arguments for Incompatibilism"
3913:
3882:
3808:
3131:There are also some holding to
3102:
2934:when two requirements are met:
2927:The Illusion of Conscious Will,
2842:: they may be experienced as a
2400:Thirteenth century philosopher
1521:Assume divine foreknowledge or
975:Agent/substance-causal theories
860:, the theory that a quality of
844:agent/substance-caused events.
15513:Altered state of consciousness
14544:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
13914:Value monism – Value pluralism
12470:Liberty, equality, brotherhood
11982:The Illusion of Conscious Will
11774:The Significance of Free Will.
10146:"The neuroscience of movement"
9840:The Illusion of Conscious Will
9206:The Illusion of Conscious Will
9180:. MIT Press. pp. 119–21.
8789:. Infidels.org. 25 August 2000
8653:. ramakrishnavivekananda.info.
7731:Hylton, Peter (Apr 30, 2010).
7006:Wentzel Van Huyssteen (2003).
6976:Dictionary of World Philosophy
6912:10.1080/00213624.1981.11503814
6267:. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
6136:. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
6033:. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 9.
5614:Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2000).
5354:God, Foreknowledge and Freedom
5219:Raymond J. VanArragon (2010).
4811:Metaphysics: The Big Questions
4603:. Cambridge University Press.
4385:How Brains Make Up Their Minds
4298:Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics
4239:"Free will. In E. Craig (Ed.)"
3895:. Lexington Books. p. 8.
3793:
3750:
3733:
3428:, a philosopher known for his
3370:, or divine commanding power.
3091:
2311:Principle of sufficient reason
2176:principle of sufficient reason
2094:
1802:was a classical compatibilist.
1709:is no more extensive than its
1653:and non-physical expositions.
1447:can also be seen as a form of
1261:
1177:with respect to violations of
653:completely by laws of physics.
56:is the capacity or ability to
13:
1:
16356:Parallel universes in fiction
15615:Hard problem of consciousness
15473:Integrated information theory
11138:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
10121:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00401-2
9971:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
9805:10.1016/S0165-0173(99)00052-1
9005:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
8728:10.1016/S0262-4079(06)61122-6
8421:Philosophers who distinguish
8135:The significance of free will
7623:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5
7403:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
7048:The Consolation of Philosophy
6295:Michael J. Zimmerman (1984).
6069:Roderick M. Chisholm (2004).
5967:The Significance of Free Will
5462:(London, 1797), Vol. 1, p. 92
5352:Fischer, John Martin (1989).
5277:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
5199:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).
4683:The Significance of Free Will
4531:"Foreknowledge and Free Will"
3531:
3263:U.S. House of Representatives
3139:. Among Protestants there is
3024:Among evolutionary biologists
2812:such as Libet's and Fried's.
2644:, and open to many different
2431:Free will as a pseudo-problem
1922:Free will as unpredictability
1767:hard problem of consciousness
1705:holding that everything that
1256:problem of future contingents
1100:The contemporary philosopher
1026:D is unproven, but we have F.
944:Miracles: A preliminary study
16366:Philosophy of space and time
16184:Libertarianism (metaphysics)
15913:What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
15900:The Science of Consciousness
15774:Subjectivity and objectivity
14608:On the Genealogy of Morality
14568:Critique of Practical Reason
13520:Philosophy of space and time
11786:Lawhead, William F. (2005).
11620:The New York Review of Books
11483:1982, Hackett, esp pp. 46–47
11391:Guide to Understanding Islam
10525:10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001
10255:American Sociological Review
10197:10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.012
9940:10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001
9410:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045
8415:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
8244:Herbert James Paton (1971).
7943:Benedict de Spinoza (2008).
7755:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
7735:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
7611:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
7226:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
7172:Karl Raimund Popper (1999).
7143:. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.).
7061:Aquinas, St. Thomas (1923).
6827:"Freedom and psycho-genesis"
6513:. Mohr Siebeck. p. 50.
6206:. Cornell University Press.
6049:and would be more likely to
5800:. Harvard University Press.
5586:. Cornell University Press.
5407:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
5260:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
5013:Niels Bohr (April 1, 1933).
4989:. Robert O. Doyle, publisher
4827:How to think about free will
4753:The Metaphysics of Free Will
4545:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4533:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4507:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4420:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4275:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
4063:"The dilemma of determinism"
3926:. Beacon Press. p. 38.
3575:Recent Research on Free Will
3536:
3272:the concept of "Free will" (
3032:Effects of the belief itself
2170:, the actions of humans, as
1860:if the person had decided to
1647:Philosophical models of mind
1603:Dualism (philosophy of mind)
1503:soft theological determinism
1476:hard theological determinism
1020:D is true, and we do have F.
802:Libertarianism (metaphysics)
289:to make rational decisions.
7:
15906:Understanding Consciousness
15833:Consciousness and Cognition
15821:A Universe of Consciousness
13395:The Phenomenology of Spirit
12334:Freedom from discrimination
12169:
12016:Williams, Clifford (1980).
11935:Van Inwagen, Peter (1986).
11542:Cave, Stephen (June 2016).
11453:Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848)
11356:. Harvard University Press.
10513:Consciousness and Cognition
10185:Consciousness and Cognition
10052:10.1080/0951508021000042049
9928:Consciousness and Cognition
9498:. Retrieved 19 August 2006.
9208:. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9145:David A. Rosenbaum (2009).
8353:Thomas Aquinas on Free Will
8277:Freeman, Walter J. (2009).
8034:(in German). Archived from
7708:. Oxford University Press.
7245:E. Bruce Goldstein (2010).
7178:All Life is Problem Solving
7107:. Oxford University Press.
6335:. Oxford University Press.
5970:. Oxford University Press.
5654:. Oxford University Press.
5550:. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
5431:. Oxford University Press.
5160:Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
4300:. Oxford University Press.
4213:Understanding Consciousness
4084:John A Bargh (2007-11-16).
3615:. Oxford University Press.
3500:Problem of mental causation
3443:
3300:
3288:
2660:
1987:approach to studying human
1761:It has been noted that the
796:Metaphysical libertarianism
713:incompatible with free will
475:for "true" and "false" and
302:Metaphysical libertarianism
175:ancient Greek philosophical
119:metaphysical libertarianism
10:
16565:
16346:Many-worlds interpretation
16233:General terms and concepts
15880:The Astonishing Hypothesis
15575:Disorders of consciousness
14536:A Treatise of Human Nature
13595:
12195:Personification of Liberty
12043:, "Is the Cosmos Random? (
12022:Hackett Publishing Company
11866:, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
11862:On the Freedom of the Will
11695:Cognition and Brain Theory
11522:Laws, Mind, and Free Will.
11300:Immanuel Missionary Church
10240:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.012
9905:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480
9250:Consciousness Reconsidered
8013:, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
8010:On the Freedom of the Will
7932:. Oxford University Press.
7473:A Treatise of Human Nature
6900:Journal of Economic Issues
6811:Merriam-Webster Dictionary
6611:Collins English Dictionary
6560:10.4135/9781412963961.n191
6117:10.5840/philtopics19962427
5862:Peter Van Inwagen (1983).
5796:Philosophical Explanations
5735:10.5840/faithphil199512123
4768:Freedom and Responsibility
4382:Walter J. Freeman (2000).
4014:For full text on line see
3923:Freedom of choice affirmed
3859:"The problem of free will"
3802:On the Freedom of the Will
3715:. Routledge. pp. 142
3472:Angst#Existentialist angst
3436:, and thus that non-human
3247:
3243:
3177:On the Bondage of the Will
3095:
3035:
2903:
2896:and delusions of control.
2726:, which was discovered by
2702:
2692:
2534:
2322:A Treatise of Human Nature
2308:
2221:On the Freedom of the Will
2070:
1969:
1883:Dictionnaire philosophique
1788:
1684:psychophysical parallelism
1596:
1590:
1394:
1349:chain of prior occurrences
1317:
1311:
1265:
1242:
1200:
1138:
1089:, a similar stance on the
1087:theological noncognitivism
889:Deliberative indeterminism
875:deliberative indeterminism
799:
687:
369:
260:. This dilemma leads to a
212:
45:
33:Free will (disambiguation)
29:
16407:
16364:
16328:
16305:
16268:
16232:
16063:
15997:
15929:
15812:
15660:Minimally conscious state
15570:Consciousness after death
15500:
15430:
15302:
15295:
15230:
15124:
15058:
14817:
14810:
14752:
14659:
14504:
14270:
13995:
13924:
13786:
13661:
13603:
13533:
13457:
13256:
12996:
12724:
12568:
12475:All men are created equal
12462:
12286:
12240:
12177:
11954:Exeter: Imprint Academic
11643:Goodenough, O.R. (2004).
11571:. New York: Viking Press
11397:. Istanbul. p. 209.
11338:. London: Luzac & Co.
11052:10.1007/s12152-009-9046-8
10581:10.1007/s12152-010-9058-4
10152:. MIT Press. p. 19.
9983:10.1017/S0140525X04300154
9172:Gallagher, Shaun (2009).
9108:10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7
9017:10.1017/S0140525X00044903
8851:. New York: McGraw-Hill.
8310:Staley, Kevin M. (2005).
8285:. MIT Press. p. 88.
8246:"§2 Moral judgements are
7733:"Willard van Orman Quine"
7399:McKenna, Michael (2004).
7386:, Oxford 1998, Chapter 6.
7008:"theological determinism"
6731:10.1080/13604819608900044
6507:Ben C. Blackwell (2011).
6004:. HarperCollins. p.
5403:Randolph, Clarke (2008).
5385:. London: Luzac & Co.
5381:Watt, Montgomery (1948).
5358:Stanford University Press
5256:Eshleman, Andrew (2009).
5154:G.H.R. Parkinson (2012).
5126:10.1142/S0219635206001112
4541:McKenna, Michael (2009).
4529:Zagzebski, Linda (2011).
4416:McKenna, Michael (2009).
4237:Strawson, Galen (2011) .
4086:"Free will is un-natural"
3757:Bobzien, Susanne (2000).
3650:C. James Goodwin (2009).
3609:Bobzien, Susanne (1998).
3419:Some philosophers follow
3398:
2822:For example, people with
2699:Neuroscience of free will
2242:The Philosophy of Freedom
2078:Alternatives to strictly
1972:Neuroscience of free will
1719:non-reductive physicalism
1680:epistemological pluralism
1672:"three-world" formulation
965:neuroscience of free will
928:non-reductive physicalism
783:psychological determinism
553:
518:
513:
510:
507:
504:
501:
498:
495:
492:
489:
383:metaphysical libertarians
16255:Self-fulfilling prophecy
16088:Contingency (philosophy)
15523:Artificial consciousness
15040:William Kingdon Clifford
13887:Universal prescriptivism
13510:Philosophy of psychology
13445:Simulacra and Simulation
11637:Artificial intelligences
11595:, New York: Dana Press,
11243:10.1177/1948550609351600
11197:10.1177/1088868308316091
11031:Holton, Richard (2011).
10998:10.1177/2515245920917931
10899:10.3389/FPSYG.2017.00020
10848:10.1177/1948550618780732
10808:10.1177/1948550616667616
10765:10.1177/0146167208327217
10080:Mele, Alfred R. (2009).
10040:Philosophical Psychology
9778:Clinical Psychopathology
9706:10.1177/1534582303260119
9301:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385
8651:"Sayings and utterances"
8375:Stump, Eleonore (2003).
8319:The Saint Anselm Journal
8204:online text of his proof
8183:online text of his proof
8118:Harvard University Press
7477:Of liberty and necessity
7248:Sensation and Perception
7101:"chapter 6, section 2.1"
6970:A. Pabl Iannone (2001).
6298:An essay on human action
6198:William L. Rowe (1991).
6053:our freedom rather than
5828:Richard Sorabji (1980).
5195:Vihvelin, Kadri (2003).
4885:Strawson, Galen (2010).
4793:Freedom and Determinisim
4600:Living without Free Will
4563:van Invagen, P. (1983).
4503:Vihvelin, Kadri (2011).
3677:Robert C Bishop (2010).
3520:Voluntarism (philosophy)
3357:
3143:, held primarily by the
2892:), leading to attendant
2754:awareness of action was
2545:) schools of thought in
2113:Free will as an illusion
2071:Not to be confused with
1765:have yet to resolve the
1755:metaphysical libertarian
1667:interactionalist dualism
1545:Deny the truth value of
1468:metaphysical libertarian
1073:classical libertarianism
1047:Living without Free Will
994:interactionalist dualism
711:is true, and that it is
191:Alexander of Aphrodisias
109:Ancient Greek philosophy
46:Not to be confused with
16529:Concepts in metaphysics
15840:Consciousness Explained
15759:Stream of consciousness
15734:Secondary consciousness
15458:Global workspace theory
15443:Dynamic core hypothesis
15438:Attention schema theory
15412:Revisionary materialism
15327:Eliminative materialism
14850:Charles Augustus Strong
13676:Artificial intelligence
13375:Critique of Pure Reason
11706:Harnad, Stevan (2001).
11354:The Philosophy of Kalam
10886:Frontiers in Psychology
10479:10.1073/pnas.1012046108
9360:10.1073/pnas.1210467109
9247:Flanagan, O.J. (1992).
9059:10.1093/brain/106.3.623
8982:10.1093/brain/106.3.623
8926:. New York: NYREV Inc.
8666:Filosofia della Scienza
8325:(2): 74. Archived from
8160:"David Hume: Causation"
7892:10.25162/arsp-2019-0001
7857:10.1111/1467-9973.00240
7727:Willard van Orman Quine
7575:Saul Smilansky (2000).
7481:Oxford University Press
7139:Sandro Nannini (2004).
6234:Richard Taylor (1966).
5930:John R. Searle (2001).
5771:10.1023/a:1004218827363
5648:Alfred R. Mele (2006).
5319:John T Roberts (2006).
5264:(Winter 2009 ed.).
5203:(Winter 2003 ed.).
4947:Alex Rosenberg (2005).
4830:, p. 15, archived from
4708:On Selfhood and Godhood
4706:Campbell, C.A. (1957).
4549:(Winter 2009 ed.).
4511:(Spring 2011 ed.).
4346:10.1196/annals.1279.003
4003:Feelings or intuitions
3920:Corliss Lamont (1969).
3889:Gregg D Caruso (2012).
3707:Janet Richards (2001).
3339:paradox that will arise
3083:counterfactual thinking
2919:Experimental psychology
2900:Experimental psychology
2351:Critique of Pure Reason
1947:and unknowable future.
1569:Alternate Possibilities
1402:Theological determinism
1397:Theological determinism
1391:Theological determinism
1378:theological determinism
1298:argument from free will
1282:theological determinism
1223:theological determinism
1071:, position 6 a form of
1067:, position 1 a form of
823:physics. This includes
756:Theological determinism
717:nomological determinism
483:Galen Strawson's table
462:different circumstances
337:theological determinism
333:nomological determinism
331:in the strict sense of
247:nomological determinism
16544:Philosophy of religion
16534:Philosophical problems
16419:closed timelike curves
16270:Time travel in fiction
16164:Metaphysical necessity
15894:The Emperor's New Mind
15700:Problem of other minds
15635:Introspection illusion
15468:Holonomic brain theory
14825:Alfred North Whitehead
12966:Type–token distinction
12794:Hypostatic abstraction
12576:Abstract object theory
12132:Quotations related to
11937:An Essay on Free Will.
11661:10.1098/rstb.2004.1548
11519:Horst, Steven (2011),
10636:Psychological Bulletin
10144:Susan Pockett (2009).
10031:Nahmias, Eddy (2002).
9776:Schneider, K. (1959).
7991:Schopenhauer, Arthur.
7930:The Free Will Handbook
7818:"Moral Non-Naturalism"
7578:Free Will and Illusion
7407:(Summer 200 ed.).
6697:Cite journal requires
6637:Philosophy 302: Ethics
6590:. 2010. Archived from
5896:Ted Honderich (1973).
5792:Robert Nozick (1981).
5311:scientific determinism
5258:"Moral Responsibility"
4751:Fischer, R.M. (1994).
4061:William James (1896).
3857:John R Searle (2013).
3330:("commandments"), and
3265:
3112:
3055:
2980:Believing in free will
2967:introspection illusion
2724:Bereitschaftspotential
2591:
2367:perceived with senses)
2216:
2163:
2125:
1803:
1622:
1567:Deny the Principle of
1463:
1358:biological determinism
915:Efforts of will theory
883:efforts of will theory
825:interactionist dualism
812:
775:biological determinism
703:
654:
601:, and position (2) is
318:physical indeterminism
280:, that is, separating
258:dilemma of determinism
215:Free will in antiquity
196:The term "free will" (
181:(4th century BCE) and
16467:Traversable wormholes
16245:Closed timelike curve
16179:Uncertainty principle
15695:Primary consciousness
15580:Divided consciousness
15483:Multiple drafts model
14985:Maurice Merleau-Ponty
14600:The Methods of Ethics
13838:Divine command theory
13833:Ideal observer theory
13555:Philosophy portal
13435:Being and Nothingness
12851:Mental representation
11921:Tosun, Ender (2020).
11885:. Cham, Switzerland.
11823:Psychological Review.
11772:Kane, Robert (1998).
11388:Tosun, Ender (2012).
11368:"Man and His Destiny"
10707:Psychological Science
9883:American Psychologist
9661:10.1136/jnnp.55.9.806
9522:10.1542/pir.21-11-372
8922:Lewontin, R. (2000).
8811:. Prentice Hall Inc.
8689:Hoefer, Carl (2008).
8589:Flood, Gavin (2004).
8498:Summa contra gentiles
8445:. Newadvent.org. 1907
8215:R Kevin Hill (2003).
8056:Keimpe Algra (1999).
7423:Journal of Philosophy
6825:Ormond, A.T. (1894).
6130:Alan Donagan (1987).
5933:Rationality in Action
5865:An Essay on Free Will
5759:Philosophical Studies
5411:(Fall 2008 ed.).
5079:Full text on line at
4733:Being and Nothingness
4731:Sartre, J.P. (1943).
4626:Philosophical Studies
4597:Pereboom, D. (2003).
4565:An Essay on Free Will
4537:(Fall 2011 ed.).
4149:Paul Russell (2002).
4116:John A Bargh (2008).
3830:The View From Nowhere
3824:Thomas Nagel (1989).
3261:of Maimonides in the
3257:
3110:
3098:Free will in theology
3050:
2957:authorship processing
2738:Libet found that the
2671:nature versus nurture
2640:far from a potential
2606:Scientific approaches
2586:
2264:and the teachings of
2195:
2174:, are subject to the
2154:
2120:
2032:personality disorders
1954:In the philosophy of
1798:
1715:Reductive physicalism
1629:is one aspect of the
1618:
1575:In the definition of
1457:
1292:for the existence of
953:quantum indeterminacy
933:Although at the time
868:Event-causal theories
809:
697:
675:uncertainty principle
644:
117:and encompasses both
16278:Timelines in fiction
16120:Deterministic system
15847:Cosmic Consciousness
15685:Philosophical zombie
15625:Higher consciousness
15518:Animal consciousness
15322:Double-aspect theory
14855:Christopher Peacocke
14717:Political philosophy
13480:Feminist metaphysics
12520:Right-libertarianism
12500:Civil libertarianism
12454:Water and sanitation
12190:Moral responsibility
12124:at Wikimedia Commons
11950:Velmans, Max (2003)
11857:Schopenhauer, Arthur
11760:I Am A Strange Loop.
11270:The Gospel Coalition
11083:Miles, J.B. (2011).
9745:10.1136/jnnp.68.1.83
9510:Pediatrics in Review
8872:Dawkins, R. (1976).
8807:Pinel, P.J. (1990).
8691:"Causal Determinism"
8668:. Milan: Mondadori.
8377:"Intellect and will"
8129:Robert Kane (1998).
7302:Rawls, John (1985).
7063:"Ia, q. 14, art 13."
6831:Psychological Review
6594:on September 4, 2012
6363:Thomas Reid (2012).
6105:Philosophical Topics
6075:. Psychology Press.
5998:Lewis, C.S. (1947).
5964:Robert Kane (1996).
5722:Faith and Philosophy
5578:Hugh McCann (1998).
5425:Robert Kane (2005).
4813:. Oxford: Blackwell.
4755:. Oxford: Blackwell.
4654:Dennett, D. (1984).
4210:Max Velmans (2009).
4038:Max Velmans (2002).
3989:The Volitional Brain
3196:Christian perfection
3155:held by most in the
3151:; and there is also
3120:, adopted from what
2910:Cognitive psychology
2642:theory of everything
2524:Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
2328:regularly succeeding
2073:Religious naturalism
2024:substance dependence
2020:cognitive psychology
1703:philosophical theory
1511:divine foreknowledge
1499:theological fatalism
1185:at present are both
1129:hard incompatibilism
1000:Hard incompatibilism
790:adequate determinism
779:cultural determinism
748:The notion that all
663:Physical determinism
623:hard incompatibilism
441:consequence argument
329:physical determinism
254:problem of free will
243:physical determinism
169:History of free will
140:hold that free will
127:hard incompatibilism
69:moral responsibility
31:For other uses, see
16514:Action (philosophy)
16315:Grandfather paradox
15620:Heterophenomenology
15533:Attentional control
15182:Lawrence Weiskrantz
15010:Patricia Churchland
14845:Brian O'Shaughnessy
14830:Arthur Schopenhauer
14687:Evolutionary ethics
14648:Reasons and Persons
14624:A Theory of Justice
13778:Uncertain sentience
13325:Daneshnameh-ye Alai
12836:Linguistic modality
12510:Left-libertarianism
12505:Drug liberalization
12050:Scientific American
11830:Sapolsky, Robert M.
11756:Hofstadter, Douglas
11588:Complexity, IV (5).
11455:Journals and Papers
11321:Rambam Teshuvah 5:5
11312:Rambam Teshuvah 5:4
10470:2010PNAS..10722469P
10411:Mind & Language
10335:Mind & Language
9602:Annals of Neurology
9557:Human Brain Mapping
9460:10.7554/elife.39787
9351:2012PNAS..109E2904S
9148:Human Motor Control
8897:Pinker, S. (2002).
8847:Morris, D. (1967).
8834:Behavioral Genetics
8772:Scientific American
8616:Koller, J. (2007).
7684:Dennett, D. (2003)
7652:Watson, D. (1982).
7084:C.S. Lewis (1980).
6866:1992SPIE.1710..714G
6723:1996City....1..181S
6678:2001hep.th....4219T
6588:Oxford Dictionaries
6470:10.1038/nature05677
6462:2007Natur.446..871G
6259:John Thorp (1980).
5868:. Clarendon Press.
5496:2021BiSys.20804474G
5025:1933Natur.131..457B
4338:2003NYASA1001...39D
4317:DC Dennett (2003).
3467:Agency in Mormonism
3426:Philo of Alexandria
2989:What people believe
2852:alien hand syndrome
2720:readiness potential
2445:Buddhist philosophy
2193:, Book 2, Sec. 23:
2168:Arthur Schopenhauer
2156:Arthur Schopenhauer
1711:physical properties
1701:. Physicalism is a
1331:that all events of
1239:Logical determinism
902:John Martin Fischer
848:Non-causal theories
835:overrides physical
744:Logical determinism
484:
16539:Philosophy of life
16524:Concepts in ethics
16491:but not under the
16413:general relativity
16336:Alternative future
16329:Parallel timelines
16307:Temporal paradoxes
16283:in science fiction
15920:Wider than the Sky
15887:The Conscious Mind
15690:Philosophy of mind
15670:Neurophenomenology
15645:Locked-in syndrome
15640:Knowledge argument
15304:Philosophy of mind
14925:George Henry Lewes
14895:Douglas Hofstadter
14682:Ethics in religion
14677:Descriptive ethics
14512:Nicomachean Ethics
13515:Philosophy of self
13505:Philosophy of mind
12769:Embodied cognition
12681:Scientific realism
12099:Colleen McClusky.
11563:Dennett, Daniel C.
11302:. 1986. p. 7.
10691:2016-06-17 at the
9288:Front Hum Neurosci
8618:Asian Philosophies
8507:2017-11-23 at the
7479:" (1967 edition).
7455:Hobbes, T. (1651)
7349:Meyer, Susan Sauve
7145:Mind and Causality
7044:"Book V, Prose vi"
6750:Studia Leibnitiana
6425:2007-08-25 at the
6396:Locke, J. (1689).
6237:Action and purpose
5651:Free Will and Luck
5620:. Westview Press.
4889:Freedom and belief
4660:. Bradford Books.
4638:10.1007/BF01112527
4424:(Winter ed.).
4021:2013-05-05 at the
3705:See, for example,
3483:De libero arbitrio
3266:
3165:Augustine of Hippo
3157:Reformed tradition
3145:Methodist Churches
3113:
3015:Among philosophers
2931:empirical evidence
2541:The six orthodox (
2440:Eastern philosophy
2278:moral imagination.
2246:freedom of thought
2164:
2126:
2009:cognitive sciences
1818:Nicomachean Ethics
1804:
1623:
1599:Philosophy of mind
1547:future contingents
1464:
1449:causal determinism
1374:Christian theology
1345:causal determinism
1135:Causal determinism
813:
734:thought experiment
724:Causal determinism
704:
655:
625:if one interprets
597:. Position (1) is
482:
209:Western philosophy
16475:
16474:
16427:Alcubierre metric
16341:Alternate history
16192:
16191:
15957:
15956:
15655:Mind–body problem
15605:Flash suppression
15565:Cartesian theater
15550:Binocular rivalry
15496:
15495:
15362:Mind–body dualism
15291:
15290:
15278:Victor J. Stenger
15253:Erwin Schrödinger
15207:Stanislas Dehaene
15187:Michael Gazzaniga
15071:Donald D. Hoffman
14955:John Polkinghorne
14935:Gottfried Leibniz
14770:
14769:
14737:Social philosophy
14722:Population ethics
14712:Philosophy of law
14692:History of ethics
14175:Political freedom
13852:Euthyphro dilemma
13643:Suffering-focused
13563:
13562:
12742:Category of being
12711:Truthmaker theory
12528:
12527:
12185:Cognitive liberty
12120:Media related to
11995:978-0-262-23222-7
11974:978-90-254-3522-6
11931:978-605-63198-2-2
11892:978-3-319-58301-3
11849:978-0-5255-6097-5
11768:978-0-465-03078-1
11751:978-1-4516-8340-0
11708:"No Easy Way Out"
11655:(1451): 1805–09.
11611:Kevin J. Mitchell
11603:, pp. 51–70.
11404:978-605-63198-1-5
10159:978-0-262-51257-2
10130:978-0-12-374472-2
10093:978-0-19-538426-0
10017:978-0-19-518963-6
9853:978-0-262-23222-7
9614:10.1002/ana.21173
9569:10.1002/hbm.20771
9260:978-0-262-56077-1
9235:978-0-7618-5862-1
9187:978-0-262-51257-2
9158:978-0-12-374226-1
8646:Swami Vivekananda
8627:978-0-13-092385-1
8602:978-0-521-60401-7
8557:978-0-19-973339-2
8423:freedom of action
8397:978-0-415-02960-5
8292:978-0-262-51257-2
8263:978-0-8122-1023-1
8230:978-0-19-928552-5
8144:978-0-19-512656-3
8112:James, W. (1907)
8071:978-0-521-25028-3
8030:Steiner, Rudolf.
7971:Hume, D. (1765).
7958:978-1-4209-3114-3
7789:978-0-7637-5083-1
7588:978-0-19-825018-0
7558:978-0-19-530998-0
7522:978-0-19-530998-0
7471:Hume, D. (1740).
7288:978-0-14-023012-3
7258:978-0-495-60149-4
7191:978-0-415-17486-2
7158:978-1-58811-475-4
7137:See for example:
7114:978-0-19-510763-0
7086:Mere Christianity
7021:978-0-02-865705-9
6985:978-0-415-17995-9
6949:978-0-7487-8078-5
6874:10.1117/12.140132
6569:978-1-4129-4164-8
6520:978-3-16-151672-6
6376:978-1-4077-2950-3
6342:978-0-19-875160-1
6308:978-0-8204-0122-5
6213:978-0-8014-2557-8
6177:978-0-19-517854-8
6143:978-0-7102-1168-2
6082:978-0-415-29593-2
6040:978-1-4051-3486-6
6015:978-0-688-17369-2
5977:978-0-19-510550-6
5943:978-0-262-69282-3
5909:978-0-7100-7392-1
5875:978-0-19-824924-5
5841:978-0-7156-1549-2
5807:978-0-674-66479-1
5695:978-0-262-54037-7
5661:978-0-19-530504-3
5627:978-0-8133-9093-2
5593:978-0-8014-8583-1
5557:978-0-7546-6058-3
5438:978-0-19-514970-8
5338:978-0-415-93927-0
5232:978-1-4411-3867-5
5169:978-0-415-00323-0
5042:978-0-444-89972-9
4960:978-0-415-34317-6
4933:978-1-4051-3486-6
4904:978-0-19-924750-9
4681:Kane, R. (1996).
4667:978-0-262-54042-1
4610:978-0-521-79198-4
4484:978-1-4051-3486-6
4395:978-0-231-12008-1
4307:978-0-19-162091-1
4249:on 26 August 2012
4223:978-0-415-42515-5
4196:978-0-19-518963-6
4164:978-0-19-515290-6
4135:978-0-19-518963-6
3985:TW Clark (1999).
3971:978-0-19-518963-6
3902:978-0-7391-7136-3
3872:978-0-231-51055-4
3839:978-0-19-505644-0
3780:978-0-19-924226-9
3726:978-0-415-21243-4
3692:978-0-521-88239-2
3663:978-0-470-52278-3
3622:978-0-19-823794-5
3490:Free will theorem
3458:Philosophy portal
3421:William of Ockham
3405:Søren Kierkegaard
3289:bechirah chofshit
3286:
3124:put forth in the
2906:Cognitive science
2824:Tourette syndrome
2665:Like physicists,
2637:Quantum mechanics
2578:Swami Vivekananda
2576:A quotation from
2493:Pubbekatahetuvada
2472:karma in Buddhism
2463:pratītyasamutpāda
2250:freedom of action
2084:mind–body dualism
2082:physics, such as
1966:The physical mind
1960:Newcomb's paradox
1914:The first group,
1812:political liberty
1657:Cartesian dualism
1649:are divided into
1631:mind–body problem
1593:Mind–body problem
1587:Mind–body problem
1164:Quantum mechanics
935:quantum mechanics
647:domino's movement
588:
587:
445:Peter van Inwagen
391:Peter van Inwagen
282:freedom of choice
202:the Enlightenment
198:liberum arbitrium
18:Liberum arbitrium
16:(Redirected from
16556:
16549:Religious ethics
16462:van Stockum dust
16374:Butterfly effect
16219:
16212:
16205:
16196:
16195:
16174:Superdeterminism
16169:Necessitarianism
16149:Hard determinism
16129:Non-essentialism
16098:Cause (medicine)
15984:
15977:
15970:
15961:
15960:
15947:
15946:
15937:
15936:
15779:Unconscious mind
15407:Reflexive monism
15402:Property dualism
15377:New mysterianism
15337:Epiphenomenalism
15317:Computationalism
15312:Anomalous monism
15300:
15299:
15192:Michael Graziano
15162:Francisco Varela
15066:Carl Gustav Jung
15030:Thomas Metzinger
15000:Martin Heidegger
14980:Kenneth M. Sayre
14840:Bertrand Russell
14815:
14814:
14797:
14790:
14783:
14774:
14773:
14760:
14759:
14707:Moral psychology
14652:
14644:
14636:
14632:Practical Ethics
14628:
14620:
14616:Principia Ethica
14612:
14604:
14596:
14588:
14580:
14572:
14564:
14556:
14548:
14540:
14532:
14524:
14520:Ethics (Spinoza)
14516:
14155:Moral imperative
13613:Consequentialism
13590:
13583:
13576:
13567:
13566:
13553:
13552:
13551:
13541:
13540:
13450:
13440:
13430:
13420:
13410:
13400:
13390:
13380:
13370:
13360:
13350:
13340:
13330:
13320:
13310:
13300:
13290:
13280:
13270:
12946:Substantial form
12758:Cogito, ergo sum
12701:Substance theory
12555:
12548:
12541:
12532:
12531:
12212:Positive liberty
12207:Negative liberty
12164:
12157:
12150:
12141:
12140:
12131:
12119:
12110:
12095:
12080:
12071:Zalta, Edward N.
12020:. Indianapolis:
12013:
12011:
12010:
12004:
11998:. Archived from
11987:
11918:
11912:
11904:
11853:
11727:
11702:
11682:
11672:
11551:
11514:The Grand Design
11500:
11490:
11484:
11481:Norman Kretzmann
11477:
11471:
11464:
11458:
11451:
11445:
11444:
11436:
11430:
11429:
11423:
11415:
11413:
11396:
11385:
11379:
11378:
11376:
11375:
11364:
11358:
11357:
11346:
11340:
11339:
11332:Watt, Montgomery
11328:
11322:
11319:
11313:
11310:
11304:
11303:
11288:
11282:
11281:
11279:
11277:
11261:
11255:
11254:
11225:
11219:
11218:
11208:
11176:
11170:
11169:
11131:
11125:
11124:
11114:
11104:
11080:
11074:
11073:
11063:
11037:
11028:
11011:
11010:
11000:
10975:
10969:
10968:
10928:
10922:
10921:
10911:
10901:
10877:
10871:
10870:
10860:
10850:
10826:
10820:
10819:
10791:
10785:
10784:
10748:
10739:
10738:
10702:
10696:
10682:
10676:
10675:
10674:. November 2021.
10668:
10662:
10661:
10658:10.1037/h0032060
10651:
10631:
10625:
10622:
10616:
10612:
10606:
10599:
10593:
10592:
10564:
10553:
10552:
10508:
10502:
10501:
10491:
10481:
10464:(52): 22469–74.
10449:
10443:
10442:
10402:
10396:
10395:
10385:
10365:
10359:
10358:
10330:
10324:
10323:
10305:
10285:
10279:
10278:
10250:
10244:
10243:
10223:
10217:
10216:
10182:
10173:
10167:
10166:
10141:
10135:
10134:
10108:
10102:
10101:
10096:. Archived from
10077:
10071:
10070:
10068:
10062:. Archived from
10037:
10028:
10022:
10021:
10001:
9995:
9994:
9966:
9960:
9959:
9923:
9917:
9916:
9898:
9878:
9872:
9871:
9869:
9868:
9862:
9856:. Archived from
9845:
9834:
9825:
9824:
9788:
9782:
9781:
9773:
9767:
9766:
9756:
9724:
9718:
9717:
9689:
9683:
9682:
9672:
9640:
9634:
9633:
9597:
9591:
9590:
9580:
9548:
9542:
9541:
9505:
9499:
9492:
9483:
9482:
9472:
9462:
9438:
9432:
9431:
9421:
9389:
9383:
9382:
9372:
9362:
9345:(42): 16776–77.
9330:
9324:
9323:
9313:
9303:
9279:
9273:
9272:
9244:
9238:
9216:
9210:
9209:
9198:
9192:
9191:
9169:
9163:
9162:
9141:
9135:
9134:
9132:
9126:. Archived from
9093:
9084:
9078:
9077:
9075:
9069:. Archived from
9044:
9035:
9029:
9028:
9000:
8994:
8993:
8965:
8954:
8944:
8938:
8937:
8919:
8913:
8912:
8894:
8888:
8887:
8874:The Selfish Gene
8869:
8863:
8862:
8844:
8838:
8837:
8829:
8823:
8822:
8804:
8798:
8797:
8795:
8794:
8783:
8777:
8776:
8763:
8757:
8756:
8754:
8753:
8741:
8735:
8734:
8711:
8705:
8704:
8702:
8701:
8686:
8680:
8679:
8661:
8655:
8654:
8643:
8632:
8631:
8613:
8607:
8606:
8586:
8580:
8573:
8562:
8561:
8539:
8533:
8494:
8488:
8485:Summa Theologiae
8483:Thomas Aquinas,
8481:
8475:
8474:
8472:
8471:
8460:
8454:
8453:
8451:
8450:
8439:
8433:
8432:
8408:
8402:
8401:
8371:
8365:
8364:
8362:
8361:
8347:
8341:
8340:
8338:
8337:
8331:
8316:
8307:
8301:
8300:
8274:
8268:
8267:
8241:
8235:
8234:
8212:
8206:
8191:
8185:
8174:
8168:
8167:
8155:
8149:
8148:
8126:
8120:
8110:
8101:
8094:
8088:
8082:
8076:
8075:
8053:
8047:
8046:
8044:
8043:
8027:
8021:
8002:
7996:
7989:
7983:
7969:
7963:
7962:
7940:
7934:
7933:
7925:
7919:
7918:
7910:
7904:
7903:
7875:
7869:
7868:
7840:
7834:
7833:
7831:
7829:
7813:
7807:
7806:CSP, 2014, Ch. 7
7800:
7794:
7793:
7767:
7761:
7760:
7747:
7741:
7740:
7723:
7717:
7702:
7696:
7688:. Viking Books.
7682:
7673:
7672:
7664:
7658:
7657:
7649:
7643:
7642:
7606:
7600:
7599:
7597:
7595:
7572:
7566:
7565:
7536:
7530:
7529:
7500:
7491:
7475:Section VIII.: "
7469:
7463:
7453:
7447:
7446:
7418:
7409:
7408:
7396:
7387:
7380:Bobzien, Susanne
7377:
7371:
7370:
7364:
7356:
7345:
7339:
7338:
7336:
7334:
7299:
7293:
7292:
7269:
7263:
7262:
7242:
7236:
7235:
7219:
7206:
7200:
7199:
7169:
7163:
7162:
7135:
7126:
7125:
7123:
7121:
7096:
7090:
7089:
7081:
7075:
7073:Summa Theologica
7070:
7067:Summa Theologica
7058:
7052:
7051:
7039:
7033:
7032:
7030:
7028:
7003:
6997:
6996:
6994:
6992:
6967:
6961:
6960:
6958:
6956:
6933:
6927:
6926:
6895:
6889:
6888:
6849:
6843:10.1037/h0065249
6823:See for example
6822:
6820:
6818:
6807:"Predeterminism"
6803:
6797:
6796:
6791:
6789:
6775:
6769:
6768:
6745:
6739:
6738:
6706:
6700:
6695:
6693:
6685:
6671:
6660:See for example
6658:
6652:
6651:
6646:
6644:
6629:
6623:
6622:
6620:
6618:
6607:"Predeterminism"
6603:
6601:
6599:
6584:"Predeterminism"
6580:
6574:
6573:
6543:
6532:
6531:
6529:
6527:
6504:
6498:
6497:
6455:
6446:(7138): 871–75.
6435:
6429:
6412:
6403:
6394:
6388:
6387:
6385:
6383:
6360:
6354:
6353:
6351:
6349:
6326:
6320:
6319:
6317:
6315:
6292:
6286:
6285:
6283:
6281:
6266:
6256:
6250:
6249:
6247:
6245:
6231:
6225:
6224:
6222:
6220:
6205:
6195:
6189:
6188:
6186:
6184:
6161:
6155:
6154:
6152:
6150:
6127:
6121:
6120:
6100:
6094:
6093:
6091:
6089:
6066:
6060:
6059:
6026:
6020:
6019:
5995:
5989:
5988:
5986:
5984:
5961:
5955:
5954:
5952:
5950:
5927:
5921:
5920:
5918:
5916:
5893:
5887:
5886:
5884:
5882:
5859:
5853:
5852:
5850:
5848:
5825:
5819:
5818:
5816:
5814:
5799:
5789:
5783:
5782:
5754:
5748:
5747:
5737:
5713:
5707:
5706:
5704:
5702:
5679:
5673:
5672:
5670:
5668:
5645:
5639:
5638:
5636:
5634:
5611:
5605:
5604:
5602:
5600:
5585:
5575:
5569:
5568:
5566:
5564:
5541:
5535:
5534:
5489:
5469:
5463:
5456:
5450:
5449:
5447:
5445:
5422:
5413:
5412:
5400:
5387:
5386:
5378:
5372:
5371:
5356:. Stanford, CA:
5349:
5343:
5342:
5307:
5301:
5300:
5272:
5266:
5265:
5253:
5244:
5243:
5241:
5239:
5216:
5205:
5204:
5192:
5181:
5180:
5178:
5176:
5151:
5145:
5144:
5142:
5119:
5099:
5090:
5084:
5078:
5072:
5068:
5066:
5058:
5033:10.1038/131457a0
5010:
5001:
5000:
4995:
4994:
4974:
4965:
4964:
4944:
4938:
4937:
4915:
4909:
4908:
4892:
4882:
4871:
4870:
4842:
4836:
4835:
4821:
4815:
4814:
4806:
4797:
4796:
4788:
4782:
4781:
4766:Bok, H. (1998).
4763:
4757:
4756:
4748:
4742:
4736:
4728:
4722:
4721:
4703:
4697:
4696:
4678:
4672:
4671:
4651:
4642:
4641:
4621:
4615:
4614:
4594:
4583:
4582:
4560:
4551:
4550:
4538:
4526:
4513:
4512:
4500:
4489:
4488:
4470:
4455:
4454:
4452:
4432:
4426:
4425:
4413:
4404:
4403:
4379:
4373:
4372:
4370:
4323:
4314:
4293:
4287:
4286:
4284:
4283:
4268:
4259:
4258:
4256:
4254:
4234:
4228:
4227:
4207:
4201:
4200:
4178:
4172:
4171:
4146:
4140:
4139:
4113:
4104:
4103:
4097:
4091:. Archived from
4090:
4081:
4075:
4074:
4058:
4052:
4051:
4035:
4026:
4009:
3982:
3976:
3975:
3953:
3938:
3937:
3917:
3911:
3910:
3886:
3880:
3879:
3854:
3848:
3847:
3821:
3815:
3812:
3806:
3805:
3797:
3791:
3790:
3788:
3787:
3754:
3748:
3747:
3737:
3731:
3730:
3703:
3697:
3696:
3674:
3668:
3667:
3642:
3636:
3635:
3630:
3629:
3606:
3597:
3596:
3570:
3564:
3563:
3547:
3510:Superdeterminism
3495:Locus of control
3460:
3455:
3454:
3453:
3440:lack free will.
3416:are consistent.
3403:The philosopher
3393:Day of Judgement
3303:
3297:
3296:
3291:
3281:
3279:
3206:Paul the Apostle
3192:prevenient grace
3183:Council of Trent
3149:Jacobus Arminius
3127:Summa Theologica
3062:
3001:responsibility.
2866:will of its own,
2705:Neurostimulation
2547:Hindu philosophy
2531:Hindu philosophy
2001:cognitive robots
1741:property dualism
1729:, mental events
1727:anomalous monism
1688:epiphenomenalism
1484:hard determinism
1412:to happen, by a
1245:B-theory of time
1197:Destiny and fate
1091:existence of God
1069:hard determinism
1065:soft determinism
908:Centred accounts
879:centred accounts
690:Hard determinism
684:Hard determinism
599:hard determinism
595:soft determinism
485:
481:
294:incompatibilists
123:hard determinism
43:
36:
21:
16564:
16563:
16559:
16558:
16557:
16555:
16554:
16553:
16499:
16498:
16476:
16471:
16457:Tipler cylinder
16416:
16403:
16360:
16324:
16301:
16264:
16228:
16223:
16193:
16188:
16059:
15993:
15988:
15958:
15953:
15925:
15808:
15784:Unconsciousness
15595:Explanatory gap
15545:Binding problem
15492:
15426:
15287:
15273:Susan Blackmore
15226:
15217:Stuart Hameroff
15137:Antonio Damasio
15120:
15116:Wolfgang Köhler
15054:
15015:Paul Churchland
14920:George Berkeley
14890:Donald Davidson
14806:
14801:
14771:
14766:
14748:
14655:
14650:
14642:
14634:
14626:
14618:
14610:
14602:
14594:
14586:
14578:
14570:
14562:
14554:
14546:
14538:
14530:
14522:
14514:
14500:
14273:
14266:
14190:Self-discipline
14150:Moral hierarchy
14098:Problem of evil
14043:Double standard
14033:Culture of life
13991:
13920:
13867:Non-cognitivism
13782:
13657:
13599:
13594:
13564:
13559:
13549:
13547:
13529:
13453:
13448:
13438:
13428:
13418:
13408:
13398:
13388:
13378:
13368:
13358:
13348:
13338:
13328:
13318:
13308:
13298:
13295:De rerum natura
13288:
13278:
13268:
13252:
12992:
12896:Physical object
12732:Abstract object
12720:
12706:Theory of forms
12641:Meaning of life
12564:
12559:
12529:
12524:
12458:
12444:To be forgotten
12359:Internet access
12282:
12236:
12173:
12168:
12061:
12056:
12008:
12006:
12002:
11996:
11985:
11906:
11905:
11893:
11879:Stapp, Henry P.
11850:
11568:Freedom Evolves
11558:
11556:Further reading
11509:
11504:
11503:
11491:
11487:
11478:
11474:
11465:
11461:
11452:
11448:
11437:
11433:
11417:
11416:
11411:
11405:
11394:
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11366:
11365:
11361:
11347:
11343:
11329:
11325:
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11316:
11311:
11307:
11296:Shoals, Indiana
11290:
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11275:
11273:
11263:
11262:
11258:
11226:
11222:
11177:
11173:
11132:
11128:
11081:
11077:
11035:
11029:
11014:
10976:
10972:
10929:
10925:
10878:
10874:
10827:
10823:
10792:
10788:
10749:
10742:
10703:
10699:
10693:Wayback Machine
10683:
10679:
10670:
10669:
10665:
10649:10.1.1.211.9085
10632:
10628:
10623:
10619:
10613:
10609:
10600:
10596:
10565:
10556:
10509:
10505:
10450:
10446:
10403:
10399:
10383:10.1.1.175.1091
10366:
10362:
10331:
10327:
10303:10.1.1.364.1083
10286:
10282:
10267:10.2307/2089386
10251:
10247:
10224:
10220:
10180:
10174:
10170:
10160:
10142:
10138:
10131:
10109:
10105:
10094:
10078:
10074:
10066:
10035:
10029:
10025:
10018:
10002:
9998:
9967:
9963:
9924:
9920:
9896:10.1.1.188.8271
9879:
9875:
9866:
9864:
9860:
9854:
9843:
9835:
9828:
9799:(2–3): 357–63.
9789:
9785:
9774:
9770:
9725:
9721:
9690:
9686:
9641:
9637:
9598:
9594:
9563:(11): 3475–94.
9549:
9545:
9506:
9502:
9493:
9486:
9439:
9435:
9390:
9386:
9331:
9327:
9280:
9276:
9261:
9245:
9241:
9217:
9213:
9199:
9195:
9188:
9170:
9166:
9159:
9142:
9138:
9130:
9091:
9085:
9081:
9073:
9042:
9036:
9032:
9001:
8997:
8966:
8957:
8945:
8941:
8934:
8920:
8916:
8909:
8895:
8891:
8884:
8870:
8866:
8859:
8845:
8841:
8830:
8826:
8819:
8805:
8801:
8792:
8790:
8785:
8784:
8780:
8765:
8764:
8760:
8751:
8749:
8742:
8738:
8722:(2578): 52–55.
8712:
8708:
8699:
8697:
8687:
8683:
8676:
8662:
8658:
8649:
8644:
8635:
8628:
8614:
8610:
8603:
8587:
8583:
8574:
8565:
8558:
8540:
8536:
8509:Wayback Machine
8495:
8491:
8482:
8478:
8469:
8467:
8466:. Newadvent.org
8462:
8461:
8457:
8448:
8446:
8441:
8440:
8436:
8427:freedom of will
8409:
8405:
8398:
8372:
8368:
8359:
8357:
8348:
8344:
8335:
8333:
8329:
8314:
8308:
8304:
8293:
8275:
8271:
8264:
8242:
8238:
8231:
8213:
8209:
8200:cerebral cortex
8192:
8188:
8175:
8171:
8156:
8152:
8145:
8127:
8123:
8111:
8104:
8095:
8091:
8083:
8079:
8072:
8054:
8050:
8041:
8039:
8028:
8024:
8003:
7999:
7990:
7986:
7970:
7966:
7959:
7941:
7937:
7926:
7922:
7911:
7907:
7876:
7872:
7841:
7837:
7827:
7825:
7814:
7810:
7802:Claudio Costa.
7801:
7797:
7790:
7768:
7764:
7748:
7744:
7724:
7720:
7703:
7699:
7686:Freedom Evolves
7683:
7676:
7665:
7661:
7650:
7646:
7607:
7603:
7593:
7591:
7589:
7573:
7569:
7559:
7537:
7533:
7523:
7501:
7494:
7470:
7466:
7454:
7450:
7435:10.2307/2024717
7419:
7412:
7401:"Compatibilism"
7397:
7390:
7378:
7374:
7358:
7357:
7346:
7342:
7332:
7330:
7300:
7296:
7289:
7270:
7266:
7259:
7243:
7239:
7224:"Consciousness"
7210:Josh Weisberg.
7207:
7203:
7192:
7170:
7166:
7159:
7136:
7129:
7119:
7117:
7115:
7097:
7093:
7082:
7078:
7059:
7055:
7040:
7036:
7026:
7024:
7022:
7004:
7000:
6990:
6988:
6986:
6968:
6964:
6954:
6952:
6950:
6934:
6930:
6896:
6892:
6816:
6814:
6805:
6804:
6800:
6787:
6785:
6776:
6772:
6746:
6742:
6717:(1–2): 181–83.
6698:
6696:
6687:
6686:
6659:
6655:
6642:
6640:
6631:
6630:
6626:
6616:
6614:
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6427:Wayback Machine
6413:
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6240:. Prentice-Hall
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5152:
5148:
5140:
5117:10.1.1.361.7065
5097:
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4611:
4595:
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4579:
4569:Clarendon Press
4561:
4554:
4543:"Compatibilism"
4527:
4516:
4501:
4492:
4485:
4471:
4458:
4433:
4429:
4418:"Compatibilism"
4414:
4407:
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4380:
4376:
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4321:
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4281:
4279:
4269:
4262:
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4197:
4179:
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4147:
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4101:
4099:
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4082:
4078:
4059:
4055:
4036:
4029:
4023:Wayback Machine
4001:(8–9): 279–93.
3983:
3979:
3972:
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3914:
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3887:
3883:
3873:
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3664:
3644:An argument by
3643:
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3623:
3607:
3600:
3593:
3571:
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3539:
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3456:
3451:
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3401:
3360:
3252:
3246:
3105:
3100:
3094:
3064:
3057:
3040:
3034:
3026:
3017:
2991:
2982:
2916:
2902:
2870:corpus callosum
2856:sense of agency
2793:Freedom Evolves
2707:
2701:
2695:Neurophilosophy
2693:Main articles:
2691:
2663:
2646:interpretations
2621:
2619:Quantum physics
2608:
2539:
2533:
2447:
2442:
2433:
2398:
2313:
2307:
2286:
2235:
2199:thing-in-itself
2115:
2097:
2076:
2069:
1997:neural networks
1974:
1968:
1956:decision theory
1935:Freedom Evolves
1924:
1901:sense of agency
1892:
1852:
1840:Harry Frankfurt
1823:incompatibilist
1793:
1787:
1763:laws of physics
1751:Incompatibilism
1662:incompatibilist
1613:
1595:
1589:
1581:incompatibilism
1399:
1393:
1322:
1316:
1310:
1296:, known as the
1270:
1264:
1247:
1241:
1233:incompatibilist
1205:
1199:
1191:indeterministic
1149:within a given
1143:
1137:
1045:Derk Pereboom,
1002:
982:George Berkeley
977:
957:incompatibilist
949:Indeterministic
870:
850:
804:
798:
738:Laplace's demon
692:
686:
591:Incompatibilism
374:
372:Incompatibilism
368:
366:Incompatibilism
310:non-materialist
217:
211:
187:Susanne Bobzien
171:
114:incompatibilism
51:
44:
37:
30:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
16562:
16552:
16551:
16546:
16541:
16536:
16531:
16526:
16521:
16516:
16511:
16473:
16472:
16470:
16469:
16464:
16459:
16454:
16449:
16447:Krasnikov tube
16444:
16439:
16434:
16432:BTZ black hole
16429:
16423:
16421:
16405:
16404:
16402:
16401:
16399:Predestination
16396:
16391:
16386:
16381:
16376:
16370:
16368:
16362:
16361:
16359:
16358:
16353:
16348:
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16214:
16207:
16199:
16190:
16189:
16187:
16186:
16181:
16176:
16171:
16166:
16161:
16159:Predeterminism
16156:
16151:
16146:
16141:
16136:
16131:
16122:
16117:
16112:
16107:
16102:
16101:
16100:
16090:
16085:
16084:
16083:
16078:
16067:
16065:
16064:Related topics
16061:
16060:
16058:
16057:
16052:
16047:
16042:
16037:
16032:
16027:
16022:
16017:
16012:
16007:
16001:
15999:
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15994:
15987:
15986:
15979:
15972:
15964:
15955:
15954:
15952:
15951:
15941:
15930:
15927:
15926:
15924:
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15916:
15909:
15902:
15897:
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15883:
15876:
15869:
15864:
15857:
15850:
15843:
15836:
15829:
15824:
15816:
15814:
15810:
15809:
15807:
15806:
15801:
15796:
15794:Visual masking
15791:
15786:
15781:
15776:
15771:
15766:
15761:
15756:
15751:
15746:
15744:Sentiocentrism
15741:
15736:
15731:
15730:
15729:
15717:
15712:
15707:
15702:
15697:
15692:
15687:
15682:
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15662:
15657:
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15607:
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15597:
15592:
15587:
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15572:
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15537:
15536:
15535:
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15520:
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15455:
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15440:
15434:
15432:
15428:
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15425:
15424:
15419:
15414:
15409:
15404:
15399:
15394:
15389:
15384:
15379:
15374:
15372:Neutral monism
15369:
15364:
15359:
15354:
15352:Interactionism
15349:
15344:
15339:
15334:
15329:
15324:
15319:
15314:
15308:
15306:
15297:
15293:
15292:
15289:
15288:
15286:
15285:
15283:Wolfgang Pauli
15280:
15275:
15270:
15265:
15260:
15255:
15250:
15245:
15240:
15234:
15232:
15228:
15227:
15225:
15224:
15219:
15214:
15212:Steven Laureys
15209:
15204:
15199:
15197:Patrick Wilken
15194:
15189:
15184:
15179:
15174:
15169:
15167:Gerald Edelman
15164:
15159:
15154:
15149:
15144:
15142:Benjamin Libet
15139:
15134:
15128:
15126:
15122:
15121:
15119:
15118:
15113:
15108:
15103:
15098:
15096:Max Wertheimer
15093:
15088:
15083:
15081:Gustav Fechner
15078:
15076:Franz Brentano
15073:
15068:
15062:
15060:
15056:
15055:
15053:
15052:
15050:William Seager
15047:
15042:
15037:
15032:
15027:
15025:René Descartes
15022:
15017:
15012:
15007:
15002:
14997:
14992:
14987:
14982:
14977:
14975:Keith Frankish
14972:
14967:
14962:
14957:
14952:
14947:
14942:
14937:
14932:
14927:
14922:
14917:
14915:Galen Strawson
14912:
14907:
14902:
14900:Edmund Husserl
14897:
14892:
14887:
14882:
14880:David Papineau
14877:
14872:
14870:David Chalmers
14867:
14865:Daniel Dennett
14862:
14857:
14852:
14847:
14842:
14837:
14835:Baruch Spinoza
14832:
14827:
14821:
14819:
14812:
14808:
14807:
14800:
14799:
14792:
14785:
14777:
14768:
14767:
14765:
14764:
14753:
14750:
14749:
14747:
14746:
14739:
14734:
14732:Secular ethics
14729:
14727:Rehabilitation
14724:
14719:
14714:
14709:
14704:
14699:
14694:
14689:
14684:
14679:
14674:
14669:
14663:
14661:
14657:
14656:
14654:
14653:
14645:
14637:
14629:
14621:
14613:
14605:
14597:
14592:Utilitarianism
14589:
14581:
14573:
14565:
14557:
14549:
14541:
14533:
14525:
14517:
14508:
14506:
14502:
14501:
14499:
14498:
14493:
14488:
14483:
14478:
14473:
14468:
14463:
14458:
14453:
14448:
14443:
14438:
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14428:
14423:
14418:
14413:
14408:
14403:
14398:
14393:
14388:
14383:
14378:
14373:
14368:
14363:
14358:
14353:
14348:
14343:
14338:
14333:
14328:
14323:
14318:
14313:
14308:
14303:
14298:
14293:
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14283:
14277:
14275:
14268:
14267:
14265:
14264:
14259:
14254:
14249:
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14243:
14242:
14237:
14232:
14222:
14217:
14212:
14207:
14202:
14197:
14192:
14187:
14182:
14177:
14172:
14167:
14162:
14157:
14152:
14147:
14142:
14137:
14132:
14127:
14122:
14117:
14112:
14107:
14102:
14101:
14100:
14095:
14090:
14080:
14075:
14070:
14065:
14060:
14055:
14050:
14045:
14040:
14035:
14030:
14025:
14020:
14015:
14010:
14005:
13999:
13997:
13993:
13992:
13990:
13989:
13984:
13979:
13974:
13969:
13964:
13959:
13954:
13952:Existentialist
13949:
13944:
13939:
13934:
13928:
13926:
13922:
13921:
13919:
13918:
13917:
13916:
13906:
13901:
13896:
13891:
13890:
13889:
13884:
13879:
13874:
13864:
13859:
13854:
13849:
13847:Constructivism
13844:
13843:
13842:
13841:
13840:
13835:
13825:
13824:
13823:
13821:Non-naturalism
13818:
13803:
13798:
13792:
13790:
13784:
13783:
13781:
13780:
13775:
13770:
13765:
13760:
13755:
13750:
13745:
13740:
13735:
13730:
13725:
13720:
13715:
13714:
13713:
13703:
13698:
13693:
13688:
13683:
13678:
13673:
13667:
13665:
13659:
13658:
13656:
13655:
13650:
13648:Utilitarianism
13645:
13640:
13635:
13630:
13625:
13620:
13615:
13609:
13607:
13601:
13600:
13593:
13592:
13585:
13578:
13570:
13561:
13560:
13558:
13557:
13545:
13534:
13531:
13530:
13528:
13527:
13522:
13517:
13512:
13507:
13502:
13497:
13492:
13487:
13482:
13477:
13472:
13467:
13461:
13459:
13458:Related topics
13455:
13454:
13452:
13451:
13441:
13431:
13425:Being and Time
13421:
13411:
13401:
13391:
13381:
13371:
13361:
13351:
13341:
13331:
13321:
13311:
13301:
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13260:
13258:
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13233:
13228:
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13218:
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13148:
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13098:
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13073:
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13048:
13043:
13038:
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13028:
13023:
13018:
13013:
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13002:
13000:
12998:Metaphysicians
12994:
12993:
12991:
12990:
12983:
12978:
12973:
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12958:
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12868:
12863:
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12843:
12838:
12833:
12828:
12823:
12818:
12817:
12816:
12806:
12801:
12796:
12791:
12786:
12781:
12776:
12771:
12766:
12761:
12754:
12752:Causal closure
12749:
12744:
12739:
12734:
12728:
12726:
12722:
12721:
12719:
12718:
12713:
12708:
12703:
12698:
12693:
12688:
12683:
12678:
12673:
12668:
12663:
12658:
12653:
12648:
12643:
12638:
12633:
12628:
12626:Libertarianism
12623:
12618:
12613:
12611:Existentialism
12608:
12603:
12598:
12593:
12588:
12583:
12578:
12572:
12570:
12566:
12565:
12558:
12557:
12550:
12543:
12535:
12526:
12525:
12523:
12522:
12517:
12515:Libertarianism
12512:
12507:
12502:
12497:
12492:
12487:
12482:
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12472:
12466:
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12460:
12459:
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12441:
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12391:
12386:
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12346:
12341:
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12296:
12290:
12288:
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12265:
12260:
12255:
12250:
12244:
12242:
12238:
12237:
12235:
12234:
12229:
12227:Social liberty
12224:
12222:Self-ownership
12219:
12214:
12209:
12204:
12203:
12202:
12192:
12187:
12181:
12179:
12175:
12174:
12167:
12166:
12159:
12152:
12144:
12138:
12137:
12125:
12112:
12111:
12096:
12081:
12060:
12059:External links
12057:
12055:
12054:
12038:
12024:
12014:
11994:
11976:
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11933:
11919:
11891:
11875:
11854:
11848:
11826:
11816:
11806:
11799:
11784:
11770:
11753:
11745:. Free Press.
11736:
11728:
11703:
11687:Harnad, Stevan
11683:
11640:
11604:
11589:
11579:
11559:
11557:
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11485:
11472:
11459:
11446:
11431:
11403:
11380:
11370:. Al-islam.org
11359:
11350:Wolfson, Harry
11341:
11323:
11314:
11305:
11283:
11256:
11220:
11191:(2): 168–192.
11171:
11126:
11075:
11012:
10991:(3): 429–438.
10970:
10923:
10872:
10841:(5): 612–619.
10821:
10802:(2): 191–199.
10786:
10740:
10697:
10677:
10663:
10626:
10617:
10607:
10594:
10554:
10503:
10444:
10397:
10360:
10325:
10280:
10261:(3): 375–384.
10245:
10218:
10168:
10158:
10136:
10129:
10103:
10100:on 2011-11-13.
10092:
10072:
10069:on 2011-08-13.
10023:
10016:
9996:
9961:
9918:
9873:
9852:
9826:
9783:
9768:
9719:
9684:
9635:
9592:
9543:
9516:(11): 372–83.
9500:
9484:
9433:
9384:
9325:
9274:
9259:
9239:
9211:
9193:
9186:
9164:
9157:
9136:
9133:on 2014-12-17.
9079:
9076:on 2013-05-26.
9030:
8995:
8955:
8939:
8932:
8914:
8907:
8889:
8882:
8864:
8857:
8839:
8824:
8817:
8799:
8778:
8758:
8744:Honderich, E.
8736:
8706:
8681:
8674:
8656:
8633:
8626:
8608:
8601:
8581:
8563:
8556:
8534:
8489:
8476:
8455:
8434:
8403:
8396:
8366:
8342:
8302:
8291:
8269:
8262:
8236:
8229:
8207:
8186:
8169:
8150:
8143:
8121:
8102:
8089:
8077:
8070:
8048:
8022:
7997:
7984:
7964:
7957:
7935:
7920:
7905:
7870:
7851:(4): 468–482.
7845:Metaphilosophy
7835:
7808:
7795:
7788:
7762:
7742:
7718:
7697:
7674:
7659:
7644:
7601:
7587:
7567:
7557:
7531:
7521:
7492:
7464:
7448:
7410:
7388:
7372:
7340:
7314:(3): 223–251.
7294:
7287:
7264:
7257:
7237:
7201:
7190:
7164:
7157:
7127:
7113:
7091:
7076:
7053:
7034:
7020:
6998:
6984:
6962:
6948:
6928:
6890:
6798:
6770:
6740:
6699:|journal=
6669:hep-th/0104219
6653:
6624:
6575:
6568:
6548:Predeterminism
6533:
6519:
6499:
6430:
6404:
6389:
6375:
6355:
6341:
6321:
6307:
6287:
6273:
6251:
6226:
6212:
6190:
6176:
6156:
6142:
6122:
6095:
6081:
6061:
6039:
6021:
6014:
5990:
5976:
5956:
5942:
5922:
5908:
5888:
5874:
5854:
5840:
5820:
5806:
5784:
5765:(2): 189–211.
5749:
5708:
5694:
5674:
5660:
5640:
5626:
5606:
5592:
5570:
5556:
5536:
5464:
5451:
5437:
5414:
5388:
5373:
5366:
5344:
5337:
5302:
5267:
5245:
5231:
5206:
5182:
5168:
5146:
5085:
5081:us.archive.org
5071:|journal=
5041:
5016:Light and Life
5002:
4966:
4959:
4939:
4932:
4910:
4903:
4872:
4837:
4816:
4798:
4783:
4776:
4758:
4743:
4723:
4716:
4698:
4691:
4673:
4666:
4643:
4616:
4609:
4584:
4577:
4552:
4514:
4490:
4483:
4456:
4427:
4405:
4394:
4374:
4306:
4288:
4260:
4229:
4222:
4202:
4195:
4173:
4163:
4141:
4134:
4114:Also found in
4076:
4053:
4027:
3977:
3970:
3939:
3932:
3912:
3901:
3881:
3871:
3849:
3838:
3816:
3807:
3792:
3779:
3749:
3732:
3725:
3698:
3691:
3669:
3662:
3648:described by:
3637:
3621:
3598:
3591:
3565:
3541:
3540:
3538:
3535:
3533:
3530:
3528:
3527:
3522:
3517:
3512:
3507:
3502:
3497:
3492:
3487:
3479:
3474:
3469:
3463:
3462:
3461:
3445:
3442:
3400:
3397:
3388:predestination
3359:
3356:
3355:
3354:
3335:
3270:Jewish thought
3248:Main article:
3245:
3242:
3137:Luis de Molina
3122:Thomas Aquinas
3104:
3101:
3096:Main article:
3093:
3090:
3060:Richard Holton
3049:
3033:
3030:
3025:
3022:
3016:
3013:
3005:Roy Baumeister
2990:
2987:
2981:
2978:
2943:
2942:
2939:
2901:
2898:
2894:hallucinations
2890:proprioception
2798:Daniel Dennett
2788:
2787:
2784:
2781:
2778:
2722:(after German
2715:Benjamin Libet
2690:
2687:
2662:
2659:
2620:
2617:
2607:
2604:
2532:
2529:
2446:
2443:
2441:
2438:
2432:
2429:
2402:Thomas Aquinas
2397:
2394:
2369:
2368:
2359:'s proof from
2354:
2306:
2303:
2285:
2282:
2238:Rudolf Steiner
2234:
2231:
2138:
2137:
2131:Baruch Spinoza
2122:Baruch Spinoza
2114:
2111:
2096:
2093:
2068:
2067:Non-naturalism
2065:
2030:, and various
1967:
1964:
1923:
1920:
1916:wanton addicts
1905:theory of mind
1891:
1888:
1851:
1848:
1844:Daniel Dennett
1789:Main article:
1786:
1783:
1643:nervous system
1620:René Descartes
1591:Main article:
1588:
1585:
1573:
1572:
1565:
1558:Thomas Aquinas
1550:
1538:
1537:
1534:
1531:
1525:
1515:
1514:
1491:
1444:predestination
1440:
1439:
1432:
1395:Main article:
1392:
1389:
1366:Predestination
1325:Predeterminism
1320:Predestination
1314:Predeterminism
1312:Main article:
1309:
1308:Predeterminism
1306:
1286:predestination
1278:predeterminism
1266:Main article:
1263:
1260:
1240:
1237:
1201:Main article:
1198:
1195:
1179:causal closure
1139:Main article:
1136:
1133:
1102:Galen Strawson
1061:
1060:
1059:
1058:
1057:
1056:
1055:
1054:
1053:
1052:
1051:
1050:
1034:
1033:
1030:
1027:
1024:
1021:
1018:
1015:
1001:
998:
976:
973:
937:(and physical
898:Daniel Dennett
869:
866:
849:
846:
800:Main article:
797:
794:
771:
770:
758:
753:
746:
741:
726:
688:Main article:
685:
682:
658:Alex Rosenberg
603:libertarianism
586:
585:
582:
579:
576:
573:
570:
567:
564:
561:
558:
551:
550:
547:
544:
541:
538:
535:
532:
529:
526:
523:
516:
515:
512:
509:
506:
503:
500:
497:
494:
491:
488:
414:Daniel Dennett
410:intuition pump
370:Main article:
367:
364:
273:compatibilists
266:responsibility
239:causal closure
223:(for example,
210:
207:
170:
167:
138:compatibilists
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
16561:
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16460:
16458:
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16410:
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16261:
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16253:
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16248:
16246:
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16241:
16238:
16237:
16235:
16231:
16227:
16220:
16215:
16213:
16208:
16206:
16201:
16200:
16197:
16185:
16182:
16180:
16177:
16175:
16172:
16170:
16167:
16165:
16162:
16160:
16157:
16155:
16154:Indeterminism
16152:
16150:
16147:
16145:
16144:Compatibilism
16142:
16140:
16137:
16135:
16132:
16130:
16126:
16123:
16121:
16118:
16116:
16113:
16111:
16108:
16106:
16103:
16099:
16096:
16095:
16094:
16091:
16089:
16086:
16082:
16079:
16077:
16074:
16073:
16072:
16069:
16068:
16066:
16062:
16056:
16053:
16051:
16050:Technological
16048:
16046:
16043:
16041:
16040:Psychological
16038:
16036:
16033:
16031:
16028:
16026:
16023:
16021:
16020:Environmental
16018:
16016:
16013:
16011:
16008:
16006:
16003:
16002:
16000:
15996:
15992:
15985:
15980:
15978:
15973:
15971:
15966:
15965:
15962:
15950:
15942:
15940:
15932:
15931:
15928:
15922:
15921:
15917:
15914:
15910:
15908:
15907:
15903:
15901:
15898:
15896:
15895:
15891:
15889:
15888:
15884:
15882:
15881:
15877:
15875:
15874:
15870:
15868:
15865:
15863:
15862:
15858:
15856:
15855:
15851:
15849:
15848:
15844:
15842:
15841:
15837:
15835:
15834:
15830:
15828:
15825:
15823:
15822:
15818:
15817:
15815:
15811:
15805:
15802:
15800:
15797:
15795:
15792:
15790:
15787:
15785:
15782:
15780:
15777:
15775:
15772:
15770:
15767:
15765:
15762:
15760:
15757:
15755:
15752:
15750:
15747:
15745:
15742:
15740:
15737:
15735:
15732:
15728:
15727:
15723:
15722:
15721:
15718:
15716:
15713:
15711:
15708:
15706:
15703:
15701:
15698:
15696:
15693:
15691:
15688:
15686:
15683:
15681:
15680:Phenomenology
15678:
15676:
15673:
15671:
15668:
15666:
15663:
15661:
15658:
15656:
15653:
15651:
15648:
15646:
15643:
15641:
15638:
15636:
15633:
15631:
15628:
15626:
15623:
15621:
15618:
15616:
15613:
15611:
15610:Hallucination
15608:
15606:
15603:
15601:
15598:
15596:
15593:
15591:
15588:
15586:
15583:
15581:
15578:
15576:
15573:
15571:
15568:
15566:
15563:
15561:
15558:
15556:
15553:
15551:
15548:
15546:
15543:
15541:
15538:
15534:
15531:
15530:
15529:
15526:
15524:
15521:
15519:
15516:
15514:
15511:
15509:
15506:
15505:
15503:
15499:
15489:
15486:
15484:
15481:
15479:
15476:
15474:
15471:
15469:
15466:
15464:
15461:
15459:
15456:
15454:
15451:
15449:
15446:
15444:
15441:
15439:
15436:
15435:
15433:
15429:
15423:
15420:
15418:
15415:
15413:
15410:
15408:
15405:
15403:
15400:
15398:
15395:
15393:
15390:
15388:
15385:
15383:
15380:
15378:
15375:
15373:
15370:
15368:
15365:
15363:
15360:
15358:
15355:
15353:
15350:
15348:
15345:
15343:
15342:Functionalism
15340:
15338:
15335:
15333:
15330:
15328:
15325:
15323:
15320:
15318:
15315:
15313:
15310:
15309:
15307:
15305:
15301:
15298:
15294:
15284:
15281:
15279:
15276:
15274:
15271:
15269:
15268:Roger Penrose
15266:
15264:
15261:
15259:
15258:Marvin Minsky
15256:
15254:
15251:
15249:
15248:Eugene Wigner
15246:
15244:
15241:
15239:
15238:Annaka Harris
15236:
15235:
15233:
15229:
15223:
15220:
15218:
15215:
15213:
15210:
15208:
15205:
15203:
15200:
15198:
15195:
15193:
15190:
15188:
15185:
15183:
15180:
15178:
15175:
15173:
15172:Giulio Tononi
15170:
15168:
15165:
15163:
15160:
15158:
15157:Francis Crick
15155:
15153:
15152:Christof Koch
15150:
15148:
15147:Bernard Baars
15145:
15143:
15140:
15138:
15135:
15133:
15130:
15129:
15127:
15123:
15117:
15114:
15112:
15111:William James
15109:
15107:
15106:Wilhelm Wundt
15104:
15102:
15101:Sigmund Freud
15099:
15097:
15094:
15092:
15089:
15087:
15086:Julian Jaynes
15084:
15082:
15079:
15077:
15074:
15072:
15069:
15067:
15064:
15063:
15061:
15057:
15051:
15048:
15046:
15045:William Lycan
15043:
15041:
15038:
15036:
15033:
15031:
15028:
15026:
15023:
15021:
15018:
15016:
15013:
15011:
15008:
15006:
15003:
15001:
14998:
14996:
14993:
14991:
14988:
14986:
14983:
14981:
14978:
14976:
14973:
14971:
14968:
14966:
14965:Joseph Levine
14963:
14961:
14958:
14956:
14953:
14951:
14948:
14946:
14943:
14941:
14940:Immanuel Kant
14938:
14936:
14933:
14931:
14928:
14926:
14923:
14921:
14918:
14916:
14913:
14911:
14908:
14906:
14905:Frank Jackson
14903:
14901:
14898:
14896:
14893:
14891:
14888:
14886:
14883:
14881:
14878:
14876:
14873:
14871:
14868:
14866:
14863:
14861:
14858:
14856:
14853:
14851:
14848:
14846:
14843:
14841:
14838:
14836:
14833:
14831:
14828:
14826:
14823:
14822:
14820:
14816:
14813:
14809:
14805:
14804:Consciousness
14798:
14793:
14791:
14786:
14784:
14779:
14778:
14775:
14763:
14755:
14754:
14751:
14745:
14744:
14740:
14738:
14735:
14733:
14730:
14728:
14725:
14723:
14720:
14718:
14715:
14713:
14710:
14708:
14705:
14703:
14700:
14698:
14695:
14693:
14690:
14688:
14685:
14683:
14680:
14678:
14675:
14673:
14670:
14668:
14665:
14664:
14662:
14658:
14649:
14646:
14641:
14638:
14633:
14630:
14625:
14622:
14617:
14614:
14609:
14606:
14601:
14598:
14593:
14590:
14585:
14582:
14577:
14574:
14569:
14566:
14561:
14558:
14553:
14550:
14545:
14542:
14537:
14534:
14529:
14526:
14521:
14518:
14513:
14510:
14509:
14507:
14503:
14497:
14494:
14492:
14489:
14487:
14484:
14482:
14479:
14477:
14474:
14472:
14469:
14467:
14464:
14462:
14459:
14457:
14454:
14452:
14449:
14447:
14444:
14442:
14439:
14437:
14434:
14432:
14429:
14427:
14424:
14422:
14419:
14417:
14414:
14412:
14409:
14407:
14404:
14402:
14399:
14397:
14394:
14392:
14389:
14387:
14384:
14382:
14379:
14377:
14374:
14372:
14369:
14367:
14364:
14362:
14359:
14357:
14354:
14352:
14349:
14347:
14344:
14342:
14339:
14337:
14334:
14332:
14329:
14327:
14324:
14322:
14319:
14317:
14314:
14312:
14309:
14307:
14304:
14302:
14299:
14297:
14294:
14292:
14289:
14287:
14284:
14282:
14279:
14278:
14276:
14274:
14269:
14263:
14260:
14258:
14255:
14253:
14250:
14248:
14245:
14241:
14238:
14236:
14233:
14231:
14228:
14227:
14226:
14223:
14221:
14218:
14216:
14213:
14211:
14208:
14206:
14203:
14201:
14198:
14196:
14193:
14191:
14188:
14186:
14183:
14181:
14178:
14176:
14173:
14171:
14168:
14166:
14163:
14161:
14158:
14156:
14153:
14151:
14148:
14146:
14145:Moral courage
14143:
14141:
14138:
14136:
14133:
14131:
14128:
14126:
14123:
14121:
14118:
14116:
14113:
14111:
14108:
14106:
14103:
14099:
14096:
14094:
14091:
14089:
14086:
14085:
14084:
14083:Good and evil
14081:
14079:
14076:
14074:
14071:
14069:
14068:Family values
14066:
14064:
14061:
14059:
14056:
14054:
14051:
14049:
14046:
14044:
14041:
14039:
14036:
14034:
14031:
14029:
14026:
14024:
14021:
14019:
14016:
14014:
14011:
14009:
14006:
14004:
14001:
14000:
13998:
13994:
13988:
13985:
13983:
13980:
13978:
13975:
13973:
13970:
13968:
13965:
13963:
13960:
13958:
13955:
13953:
13950:
13948:
13945:
13943:
13940:
13938:
13935:
13933:
13930:
13929:
13927:
13923:
13915:
13912:
13911:
13910:
13907:
13905:
13902:
13900:
13897:
13895:
13892:
13888:
13885:
13883:
13882:Quasi-realism
13880:
13878:
13875:
13873:
13870:
13869:
13868:
13865:
13863:
13860:
13858:
13855:
13853:
13850:
13848:
13845:
13839:
13836:
13834:
13831:
13830:
13829:
13826:
13822:
13819:
13817:
13814:
13813:
13812:
13809:
13808:
13807:
13804:
13802:
13799:
13797:
13794:
13793:
13791:
13789:
13785:
13779:
13776:
13774:
13771:
13769:
13766:
13764:
13761:
13759:
13756:
13754:
13751:
13749:
13746:
13744:
13741:
13739:
13736:
13734:
13731:
13729:
13726:
13724:
13721:
13719:
13716:
13712:
13709:
13708:
13707:
13706:Environmental
13704:
13702:
13699:
13697:
13694:
13692:
13689:
13687:
13684:
13682:
13679:
13677:
13674:
13672:
13669:
13668:
13666:
13664:
13660:
13654:
13651:
13649:
13646:
13644:
13641:
13639:
13636:
13634:
13631:
13629:
13628:Particularism
13626:
13624:
13621:
13619:
13616:
13614:
13611:
13610:
13608:
13606:
13602:
13598:
13591:
13586:
13584:
13579:
13577:
13572:
13571:
13568:
13556:
13546:
13544:
13536:
13535:
13532:
13526:
13523:
13521:
13518:
13516:
13513:
13511:
13508:
13506:
13503:
13501:
13500:Phenomenology
13498:
13496:
13493:
13491:
13488:
13486:
13483:
13481:
13478:
13476:
13473:
13471:
13468:
13466:
13463:
13462:
13460:
13456:
13447:
13446:
13442:
13437:
13436:
13432:
13427:
13426:
13422:
13417:
13416:
13412:
13407:
13406:
13402:
13397:
13396:
13392:
13387:
13386:
13382:
13377:
13376:
13372:
13367:
13366:
13362:
13357:
13356:
13352:
13347:
13346:
13342:
13337:
13336:
13332:
13327:
13326:
13322:
13317:
13316:
13312:
13307:
13306:
13302:
13297:
13296:
13292:
13287:
13286:
13282:
13277:
13276:
13272:
13267:
13266:
13262:
13261:
13259:
13257:Notable works
13255:
13249:
13248:
13244:
13242:
13239:
13237:
13234:
13232:
13229:
13227:
13224:
13222:
13219:
13217:
13214:
13212:
13209:
13207:
13204:
13202:
13199:
13197:
13194:
13192:
13189:
13187:
13184:
13182:
13179:
13177:
13174:
13172:
13169:
13167:
13164:
13162:
13159:
13157:
13154:
13152:
13149:
13147:
13144:
13142:
13139:
13137:
13134:
13132:
13129:
13127:
13124:
13122:
13119:
13117:
13114:
13112:
13109:
13107:
13104:
13102:
13099:
13097:
13094:
13092:
13089:
13087:
13084:
13082:
13079:
13077:
13074:
13072:
13069:
13067:
13064:
13062:
13059:
13057:
13054:
13052:
13049:
13047:
13044:
13042:
13039:
13037:
13034:
13032:
13029:
13027:
13024:
13022:
13019:
13017:
13014:
13012:
13009:
13007:
13004:
13003:
13001:
12999:
12995:
12989:
12988:
12984:
12982:
12979:
12977:
12974:
12972:
12969:
12967:
12964:
12962:
12959:
12957:
12954:
12952:
12949:
12947:
12944:
12942:
12939:
12937:
12934:
12932:
12929:
12927:
12924:
12922:
12919:
12917:
12914:
12912:
12909:
12907:
12904:
12902:
12899:
12897:
12894:
12892:
12889:
12887:
12884:
12882:
12879:
12877:
12874:
12872:
12869:
12867:
12864:
12862:
12859:
12857:
12854:
12852:
12849:
12847:
12844:
12842:
12839:
12837:
12834:
12832:
12829:
12827:
12824:
12822:
12819:
12815:
12812:
12811:
12810:
12807:
12805:
12802:
12800:
12797:
12795:
12792:
12790:
12787:
12785:
12782:
12780:
12777:
12775:
12772:
12770:
12767:
12765:
12762:
12760:
12759:
12755:
12753:
12750:
12748:
12745:
12743:
12740:
12738:
12735:
12733:
12730:
12729:
12727:
12723:
12717:
12714:
12712:
12709:
12707:
12704:
12702:
12699:
12697:
12694:
12692:
12689:
12687:
12684:
12682:
12679:
12677:
12674:
12672:
12669:
12667:
12664:
12662:
12661:Phenomenalism
12659:
12657:
12654:
12652:
12649:
12647:
12644:
12642:
12639:
12637:
12634:
12632:
12629:
12627:
12624:
12622:
12619:
12617:
12614:
12612:
12609:
12607:
12604:
12602:
12599:
12597:
12594:
12592:
12589:
12587:
12584:
12582:
12581:Action theory
12579:
12577:
12574:
12573:
12571:
12567:
12563:
12556:
12551:
12549:
12544:
12542:
12537:
12536:
12533:
12521:
12518:
12516:
12513:
12511:
12508:
12506:
12503:
12501:
12498:
12496:
12493:
12491:
12488:
12486:
12483:
12481:
12478:
12476:
12473:
12471:
12468:
12467:
12465:
12461:
12455:
12452:
12450:
12447:
12445:
12442:
12440:
12437:
12435:
12432:
12430:
12427:
12425:
12422:
12420:
12417:
12415:
12412:
12410:
12407:
12405:
12402:
12400:
12397:
12395:
12392:
12390:
12387:
12385:
12382:
12380:
12377:
12375:
12374:Morphological
12372:
12370:
12367:
12365:
12362:
12360:
12357:
12355:
12352:
12350:
12347:
12345:
12342:
12340:
12337:
12335:
12332:
12330:
12327:
12325:
12322:
12320:
12317:
12315:
12312:
12310:
12307:
12305:
12302:
12300:
12297:
12295:
12292:
12291:
12289:
12285:
12279:
12276:
12274:
12273:Morphological
12271:
12269:
12266:
12264:
12261:
12259:
12256:
12254:
12251:
12249:
12246:
12245:
12243:
12239:
12233:
12230:
12228:
12225:
12223:
12220:
12218:
12215:
12213:
12210:
12208:
12205:
12201:
12198:
12197:
12196:
12193:
12191:
12188:
12186:
12183:
12182:
12180:
12176:
12172:
12165:
12160:
12158:
12153:
12151:
12146:
12145:
12142:
12135:
12130:
12126:
12123:
12118:
12114:
12113:
12108:
12107:
12102:
12097:
12093:
12092:
12087:
12084:Kevin Timpe.
12082:
12078:
12077:
12072:
12068:
12063:
12062:
12052:
12051:
12046:
12042:
12041:George Musser
12039:
12037:
12036:0-19-518963-9
12033:
12029:
12025:
12023:
12019:
12015:
12005:on 2018-12-12
12001:
11997:
11991:
11988:. MIT Press.
11984:
11983:
11977:
11975:
11971:
11967:
11964:
11961:
11960:0-907845-39-8
11957:
11953:
11949:
11946:
11945:0-19-824924-1
11942:
11938:
11934:
11932:
11928:
11924:
11920:
11916:
11910:
11902:
11898:
11894:
11888:
11884:
11880:
11876:
11873:
11872:0-631-14552-4
11869:
11865:
11863:
11858:
11855:
11851:
11845:
11841:
11840:Penguin Press
11837:
11836:
11831:
11827:
11824:
11820:
11817:
11815:
11814:larchivio.org
11811:
11807:
11804:
11800:
11797:
11796:0-07-296355-7
11793:
11789:
11785:
11783:
11782:0-19-512656-4
11779:
11775:
11771:
11769:
11765:
11762:Basic Books.
11761:
11757:
11754:
11752:
11748:
11744:
11740:
11737:
11735:
11734:
11729:
11725:
11721:
11717:
11713:
11709:
11704:
11700:
11696:
11692:
11688:
11684:
11680:
11676:
11671:
11666:
11662:
11658:
11654:
11650:
11646:
11641:
11638:
11634:
11630:
11626:
11622:
11621:
11616:
11612:
11608:
11607:Gleick, James
11605:
11602:
11601:1-932594-04-3
11598:
11594:
11590:
11587:
11583:
11580:
11578:
11577:0-670-03186-0
11574:
11570:
11569:
11564:
11561:
11560:
11549:
11545:
11540:
11537:
11534:
11532:
11531:0-262-01525-0
11528:
11524:
11523:
11518:
11515:
11511:
11510:
11498:
11494:
11489:
11482:
11476:
11469:
11463:
11456:
11450:
11442:
11435:
11427:
11421:
11410:
11406:
11400:
11393:
11392:
11384:
11369:
11363:
11355:
11351:
11345:
11337:
11333:
11327:
11318:
11309:
11301:
11297:
11293:
11287:
11272:
11271:
11266:
11260:
11252:
11248:
11244:
11240:
11236:
11232:
11224:
11216:
11212:
11207:
11202:
11198:
11194:
11190:
11186:
11182:
11175:
11167:
11163:
11159:
11155:
11151:
11147:
11144:(1): 214–42.
11143:
11139:
11130:
11122:
11118:
11113:
11108:
11103:
11098:
11095:(2): 205–18.
11094:
11090:
11086:
11079:
11071:
11067:
11062:
11057:
11053:
11049:
11045:
11041:
11034:
11027:
11025:
11023:
11021:
11019:
11017:
11008:
11004:
10999:
10994:
10990:
10986:
10982:
10974:
10966:
10962:
10958:
10954:
10950:
10946:
10942:
10938:
10934:
10927:
10919:
10915:
10910:
10905:
10900:
10895:
10891:
10887:
10883:
10876:
10868:
10864:
10859:
10854:
10849:
10844:
10840:
10836:
10832:
10825:
10817:
10813:
10809:
10805:
10801:
10797:
10790:
10782:
10778:
10774:
10770:
10766:
10762:
10759:(2): 260–68.
10758:
10754:
10747:
10745:
10736:
10732:
10728:
10724:
10720:
10716:
10712:
10708:
10701:
10694:
10690:
10687:
10681:
10673:
10667:
10659:
10655:
10650:
10645:
10641:
10637:
10630:
10621:
10611:
10604:
10598:
10590:
10586:
10582:
10578:
10574:
10570:
10563:
10561:
10559:
10550:
10546:
10542:
10538:
10534:
10530:
10526:
10522:
10519:(1): 342–50.
10518:
10514:
10507:
10499:
10495:
10490:
10485:
10480:
10475:
10471:
10467:
10463:
10459:
10455:
10448:
10440:
10436:
10432:
10428:
10424:
10420:
10417:(3): 346–58.
10416:
10412:
10408:
10401:
10393:
10389:
10384:
10379:
10376:(4): 663–85.
10375:
10371:
10364:
10356:
10352:
10348:
10344:
10340:
10336:
10329:
10321:
10317:
10313:
10309:
10304:
10299:
10295:
10291:
10284:
10276:
10272:
10268:
10264:
10260:
10256:
10249:
10241:
10237:
10233:
10229:
10222:
10214:
10210:
10206:
10202:
10198:
10194:
10191:(3): 965–71.
10190:
10186:
10179:
10172:
10165:
10161:
10155:
10151:
10147:
10140:
10132:
10126:
10122:
10118:
10114:
10107:
10099:
10095:
10089:
10085:
10084:
10076:
10065:
10061:
10057:
10053:
10049:
10046:(4): 527–41.
10045:
10041:
10034:
10027:
10019:
10013:
10009:
10008:
10000:
9992:
9988:
9984:
9980:
9977:(5): 666–67.
9976:
9972:
9965:
9957:
9953:
9949:
9945:
9941:
9937:
9934:(3): 439–58.
9933:
9929:
9922:
9914:
9910:
9906:
9902:
9897:
9892:
9889:(7): 480–91.
9888:
9884:
9877:
9863:on 2018-12-12
9859:
9855:
9849:
9846:. MIT Press.
9842:
9841:
9833:
9831:
9822:
9818:
9814:
9810:
9806:
9802:
9798:
9794:
9787:
9779:
9772:
9764:
9760:
9755:
9750:
9746:
9742:
9738:
9734:
9730:
9723:
9715:
9711:
9707:
9703:
9700:(4): 261–77.
9699:
9695:
9688:
9680:
9676:
9671:
9666:
9662:
9658:
9655:(9): 806–10.
9654:
9650:
9646:
9639:
9631:
9627:
9623:
9619:
9615:
9611:
9608:(3): 301–06.
9607:
9603:
9596:
9588:
9584:
9579:
9574:
9570:
9566:
9562:
9558:
9554:
9547:
9539:
9535:
9531:
9527:
9523:
9519:
9515:
9511:
9504:
9497:
9491:
9489:
9480:
9476:
9471:
9466:
9461:
9456:
9452:
9448:
9444:
9437:
9429:
9425:
9420:
9415:
9411:
9407:
9404:(3): 548–62.
9403:
9399:
9395:
9388:
9380:
9376:
9371:
9366:
9361:
9356:
9352:
9348:
9344:
9340:
9336:
9329:
9321:
9317:
9312:
9307:
9302:
9297:
9293:
9289:
9285:
9278:
9270:
9266:
9262:
9256:
9252:
9251:
9243:
9236:
9232:
9228:
9224:
9220:
9215:
9207:
9203:
9197:
9189:
9183:
9179:
9175:
9168:
9160:
9154:
9150:
9149:
9140:
9129:
9125:
9121:
9117:
9113:
9109:
9105:
9102:(4): 535–39.
9101:
9097:
9096:Exp Brain Res
9090:
9083:
9072:
9068:
9064:
9060:
9056:
9053:(3): 623–42.
9052:
9048:
9041:
9034:
9026:
9022:
9018:
9014:
9011:(4): 529–66.
9010:
9006:
8999:
8991:
8987:
8983:
8979:
8976:(3): 623–42.
8975:
8971:
8964:
8962:
8960:
8952:
8948:
8943:
8935:
8933:88-420-6418-1
8929:
8925:
8918:
8910:
8908:0-14-200334-4
8904:
8900:
8893:
8885:
8883:88-04-39318-1
8879:
8875:
8868:
8860:
8858:0-385-33430-3
8854:
8850:
8849:The Naked Ape
8843:
8835:
8828:
8820:
8818:88-15-07174-1
8814:
8810:
8809:Biopsychology
8803:
8788:
8782:
8774:
8773:
8768:
8762:
8747:
8740:
8733:
8729:
8725:
8721:
8717:
8716:New Scientist
8710:
8696:
8692:
8685:
8677:
8675:88-424-9359-7
8671:
8667:
8660:
8652:
8647:
8642:
8640:
8638:
8629:
8623:
8619:
8612:
8604:
8598:
8594:
8593:
8585:
8578:
8572:
8570:
8568:
8559:
8553:
8549:
8545:
8538:
8531:
8527:
8523:
8519:
8514:
8510:
8506:
8503:
8499:
8493:
8486:
8480:
8465:
8459:
8444:
8438:
8431:
8428:
8424:
8418:
8414:
8407:
8399:
8393:
8389:
8385:
8382:
8378:
8370:
8355:
8354:
8346:
8332:on 2015-12-21
8328:
8324:
8320:
8313:
8306:
8299:
8294:
8288:
8284:
8280:
8273:
8265:
8259:
8255:
8251:
8249:
8240:
8232:
8226:
8222:
8218:
8211:
8205:
8201:
8197:
8190:
8184:
8180:
8173:
8165:
8161:
8154:
8146:
8140:
8136:
8132:
8125:
8119:
8115:
8109:
8107:
8099:
8093:
8087:
8081:
8073:
8067:
8063:
8059:
8052:
8038:on 2018-10-06
8037:
8033:
8026:
8020:
8019:0-631-14552-4
8016:
8012:
8011:
8006:
8001:
7994:
7988:
7982:
7981:0-87220-230-5
7978:
7974:
7968:
7960:
7954:
7950:
7946:
7939:
7931:
7924:
7916:
7909:
7901:
7897:
7893:
7889:
7885:
7881:
7874:
7866:
7862:
7858:
7854:
7850:
7846:
7839:
7823:
7819:
7812:
7805:
7799:
7791:
7785:
7781:
7777:
7773:
7766:
7758:
7754:
7746:
7738:
7734:
7728:
7722:
7715:
7714:0-19-513336-6
7711:
7707:
7701:
7695:
7694:0-670-03186-0
7691:
7687:
7681:
7679:
7670:
7663:
7655:
7648:
7640:
7636:
7632:
7628:
7624:
7620:
7616:
7612:
7605:
7590:
7584:
7580:
7579:
7571:
7564:
7560:
7554:
7550:
7546:
7542:
7535:
7528:
7524:
7518:
7514:
7510:
7506:
7499:
7497:
7490:
7489:0-87220-230-5
7486:
7482:
7478:
7474:
7468:
7461:
7458:
7452:
7444:
7440:
7436:
7432:
7428:
7424:
7417:
7415:
7406:
7402:
7395:
7393:
7385:
7381:
7376:
7368:
7362:
7354:
7350:
7344:
7329:
7325:
7321:
7317:
7313:
7309:
7305:
7298:
7290:
7284:
7280:
7276:
7268:
7260:
7254:
7250:
7249:
7241:
7233:
7229:
7225:
7217:
7213:
7205:
7198:
7193:
7187:
7183:
7179:
7175:
7168:
7160:
7154:
7150:
7146:
7142:
7134:
7132:
7116:
7110:
7106:
7102:
7095:
7087:
7080:
7074:
7068:
7064:
7057:
7049:
7045:
7038:
7023:
7017:
7013:
7009:
7002:
6987:
6981:
6977:
6973:
6972:"determinism"
6966:
6951:
6945:
6941:
6940:
6932:
6925:
6921:
6917:
6913:
6909:
6905:
6901:
6894:
6887:
6883:
6879:
6875:
6871:
6867:
6863:
6859:
6855:
6848:
6844:
6840:
6837:(3): 217–29.
6836:
6832:
6828:
6812:
6808:
6802:
6795:
6783:
6782:
6774:
6767:
6763:
6759:
6755:
6751:
6744:
6737:
6732:
6728:
6724:
6720:
6716:
6712:
6704:
6691:
6684:
6679:
6675:
6670:
6665:
6657:
6650:
6638:
6634:
6628:
6612:
6608:
6593:
6589:
6585:
6579:
6571:
6565:
6561:
6557:
6553:
6549:
6542:
6540:
6538:
6522:
6516:
6512:
6511:
6503:
6495:
6491:
6487:
6483:
6479:
6475:
6471:
6467:
6463:
6459:
6454:
6449:
6445:
6441:
6434:
6428:
6424:
6421:
6417:
6411:
6409:
6401:
6400:
6393:
6378:
6372:
6369:. HardPress.
6368:
6367:
6359:
6344:
6338:
6334:
6333:
6325:
6310:
6304:
6300:
6299:
6291:
6276:
6274:9780710005656
6270:
6265:
6264:
6255:
6239:
6238:
6230:
6215:
6209:
6204:
6203:
6194:
6179:
6173:
6169:
6168:
6160:
6145:
6139:
6135:
6134:
6126:
6118:
6114:
6110:
6106:
6099:
6084:
6078:
6074:
6073:
6065:
6058:
6056:
6052:
6048:
6047:spontaneously
6042:
6036:
6032:
6025:
6017:
6011:
6007:
6003:
6002:
5994:
5979:
5973:
5969:
5968:
5960:
5945:
5939:
5936:. MIT Press.
5935:
5934:
5926:
5911:
5905:
5901:
5900:
5892:
5877:
5871:
5867:
5866:
5858:
5843:
5837:
5834:. Duckworth.
5833:
5832:
5824:
5809:
5803:
5798:
5797:
5788:
5780:
5776:
5772:
5768:
5764:
5760:
5753:
5745:
5741:
5736:
5731:
5727:
5723:
5719:
5712:
5697:
5691:
5688:. MIT Press.
5687:
5686:
5678:
5663:
5657:
5653:
5652:
5644:
5629:
5623:
5619:
5618:
5610:
5595:
5589:
5584:
5583:
5574:
5559:
5553:
5549:
5548:
5540:
5533:
5529:
5525:
5521:
5517:
5513:
5509:
5505:
5501:
5497:
5493:
5488:
5483:
5479:
5475:
5468:
5461:
5455:
5440:
5434:
5430:
5429:
5421:
5419:
5410:
5406:
5399:
5397:
5395:
5393:
5384:
5377:
5369:
5367:1-55786-857-3
5363:
5359:
5355:
5348:
5340:
5334:
5330:
5326:
5322:
5321:"Determinism"
5316:
5313:goes back to
5312:
5306:
5298:
5294:
5290:
5286:
5282:
5278:
5271:
5263:
5259:
5252:
5250:
5234:
5228:
5224:
5223:
5215:
5213:
5211:
5202:
5198:
5191:
5189:
5187:
5171:
5165:
5161:
5157:
5156:"determinism"
5150:
5139:
5135:
5131:
5127:
5123:
5118:
5113:
5110:(2): 223–47.
5109:
5105:
5104:
5096:
5089:
5082:
5076:
5064:
5057:
5052:
5048:
5044:
5038:
5034:
5030:
5026:
5022:
5018:
5017:
5009:
5007:
4999:
4988:
4984:
4982:
4973:
4971:
4962:
4956:
4952:
4951:
4943:
4935:
4929:
4925:
4921:
4914:
4906:
4900:
4896:
4891:
4890:
4881:
4879:
4877:
4868:
4864:
4860:
4856:
4853:(3): 113–21.
4852:
4848:
4841:
4834:on 2008-09-11
4833:
4829:
4828:
4824:Inwagen, P.,
4820:
4812:
4805:
4803:
4794:
4787:
4779:
4777:0-691-01566-X
4773:
4769:
4762:
4754:
4747:
4740:
4734:
4727:
4719:
4717:0-415-29624-2
4713:
4709:
4702:
4694:
4692:0-19-512656-4
4688:
4684:
4677:
4669:
4663:
4659:
4658:
4650:
4648:
4639:
4635:
4631:
4627:
4620:
4612:
4606:
4602:
4601:
4593:
4591:
4589:
4580:
4578:0-19-824924-1
4574:
4570:
4566:
4559:
4557:
4548:
4544:
4536:
4532:
4525:
4523:
4521:
4519:
4510:
4506:
4499:
4497:
4495:
4486:
4480:
4476:
4469:
4467:
4465:
4463:
4461:
4451:
4450:10.1.1.5.2852
4446:
4443:(12): 24–28.
4442:
4438:
4431:
4423:
4419:
4412:
4410:
4402:
4397:
4391:
4387:
4386:
4378:
4367:
4363:
4359:
4355:
4351:
4347:
4343:
4339:
4335:
4331:
4327:
4320:
4313:
4309:
4303:
4299:
4292:
4278:
4274:
4267:
4265:
4248:
4244:
4240:
4233:
4225:
4219:
4215:
4214:
4206:
4198:
4192:
4188:
4184:
4177:
4170:
4166:
4160:
4156:
4152:
4145:
4137:
4131:
4127:
4123:
4119:
4112:
4110:
4098:on 2012-09-03
4094:
4087:
4080:
4072:
4068:
4064:
4057:
4049:
4045:
4041:
4034:
4032:
4024:
4020:
4017:
4013:
4008:
4006:
4000:
3996:
3992:
3990:
3981:
3973:
3967:
3963:
3959:
3952:
3950:
3948:
3946:
3944:
3935:
3933:9780826404763
3929:
3925:
3924:
3916:
3909:
3904:
3898:
3894:
3893:
3885:
3878:
3874:
3868:
3864:
3860:
3853:
3846:
3841:
3835:
3831:
3827:
3820:
3811:
3803:
3796:
3782:
3776:
3772:
3768:
3764:
3760:
3753:
3745:
3744:
3736:
3728:
3722:
3718:
3714:
3710:
3702:
3694:
3688:
3684:
3680:
3673:
3665:
3659:
3655:
3654:
3647:
3646:Rudolf Carnap
3641:
3634:
3624:
3618:
3614:
3613:
3605:
3603:
3594:
3592:9780128002841
3588:
3584:
3580:
3576:
3569:
3562:
3558:
3557:
3552:
3546:
3542:
3526:
3525:Will to power
3523:
3521:
3518:
3516:
3513:
3511:
3508:
3506:
3503:
3501:
3498:
3496:
3493:
3491:
3488:
3485:
3484:
3480:
3478:
3477:Buridan's ass
3475:
3473:
3470:
3468:
3465:
3464:
3459:
3448:
3441:
3439:
3435:
3431:
3427:
3422:
3417:
3415:
3411:
3406:
3396:
3394:
3389:
3385:
3382:position. In
3381:
3377:
3373:
3369:
3365:
3352:
3348:
3344:
3340:
3336:
3333:
3329:
3328:
3323:
3319:
3315:
3314:
3313:
3311:
3307:
3302:
3290:
3284:
3275:
3271:
3264:
3260:
3256:
3251:
3241:
3238:
3235:
3232:
3230:
3226:
3221:
3219:
3215:
3209:
3207:
3203:
3201:
3197:
3193:
3189:
3184:
3180:
3178:
3173:
3172:Martin Luther
3170:
3166:
3162:
3158:
3154:
3150:
3146:
3142:
3138:
3134:
3130:
3128:
3123:
3119:
3109:
3099:
3089:
3086:
3084:
3079:
3077:
3073:
3069:
3063:
3061:
3054:
3048:
3045:
3039:
3038:Self-efficacy
3029:
3021:
3012:
3008:
3006:
3002:
2998:
2995:
2986:
2977:
2973:
2970:
2968:
2964:
2960:
2958:
2953:
2947:
2940:
2937:
2936:
2935:
2932:
2928:
2924:
2923:Daniel Wegner
2920:
2915:
2911:
2907:
2897:
2895:
2891:
2886:
2885:schizophrenia
2881:
2879:
2875:
2871:
2867:
2862:
2857:
2853:
2848:
2845:
2841:
2837:
2833:
2829:
2828:tic disorders
2825:
2820:
2816:
2813:
2809:
2806:
2802:
2799:
2795:
2794:
2785:
2782:
2779:
2776:
2775:
2774:
2771:
2769:
2763:
2761:
2757:
2752:
2748:
2743:
2741:
2736:
2733:
2729:
2725:
2721:
2716:
2712:
2706:
2700:
2696:
2686:
2684:
2680:
2676:
2675:Steven Pinker
2672:
2668:
2658:
2655:
2649:
2647:
2643:
2638:
2634:
2630:
2626:
2616:
2612:
2603:
2601:
2597:
2590:
2585:
2583:
2579:
2574:
2572:
2568:
2564:
2561:school, only
2560:
2556:
2552:
2548:
2544:
2538:
2528:
2526:
2525:
2520:
2516:
2515:
2514:idappaccayatā
2510:
2506:
2502:
2498:
2494:
2488:
2486:
2482:
2477:
2473:
2469:
2465:
2464:
2459:
2455:
2451:
2437:
2428:
2424:
2422:
2418:
2414:
2409:
2407:
2403:
2393:
2391:
2387:
2381:
2379:
2374:
2373:Immanuel Kant
2371:In the 1780s
2366:
2362:
2358:
2355:
2352:
2348:
2345:
2344:
2343:
2341:
2336:
2333:
2329:
2324:
2323:
2318:
2312:
2302:
2300:
2296:
2295:
2290:
2289:William James
2281:
2279:
2273:
2271:
2267:
2263:
2259:
2255:
2251:
2247:
2243:
2239:
2230:
2228:
2224:
2222:
2215:
2212:
2208:
2204:
2200:
2194:
2192:
2191:
2185:
2181:
2177:
2173:
2169:
2166:According to
2161:
2157:
2153:
2149:
2147:
2142:
2136:
2132:
2128:
2127:
2123:
2119:
2110:
2107:
2102:
2101:Ted Honderich
2092:
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14640:After Virtue
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277:
270:
257:
253:
251:
235:physical law
232:
229:
218:
197:
195:
172:
161:
157:
149:
145:
141:
135:
112:
102:
89:deliberation
66:
53:
52:
16481:Citizendium
16442:Kerr metric
16379:Determinism
16320:Causal loop
16226:Time travel
16110:Illusionism
16055:Theological
15991:Determinism
15397:Physicalism
15392:Parallelism
15387:Panpsychism
15357:Materialism
15332:Emergentism
15222:Wolf Singer
15091:Kurt Koffka
15020:Philip Goff
14995:Michael Tye
14990:Max Velmans
14970:Karl Popper
14960:John Searle
14945:John Eccles
14930:Georges Rey
14515:(c. 322 BC)
14381:Kierkegaard
14200:Stewardship
13977:Rousseauian
13894:Rationalism
13806:Cognitivism
13753:Programming
13728:Meat eating
13701:Engineering
13305:Metaphysics
13289:(c. 200 BC)
13279:(c. 350 BC)
13269:(c. 350 BC)
13156:Collingwood
13061:Malebranche
12809:Information
12737:Anima mundi
12716:Type theory
12671:Physicalism
12636:Materialism
12591:Determinism
12562:Metaphysics
12364:Information
12329:Family life
12299:Association
12086:"Free Will"
12067:"Free Will"
11812:19.08.2004
11739:Harris, Sam
11040:Neuroethics
10569:Neuroethics
10341:(1): 1–23.
8748:. Ucl.ac.uk
8413:"Free Will"
7886:(1): 3–10.
7429:(1): 5–20.
7271:Quote from
7120:22 December
7027:22 December
6991:22 December
6955:22 December
6817:20 December
6788:20 December
6643:19 December
6617:20 December
6604:. See also
6598:20 December
6382:27 December
6348:27 December
6314:27 December
6301:. P. Lang.
6280:27 December
6244:27 December
6219:27 December
6183:27 December
6149:27 December
6088:27 December
5983:27 December
5949:27 December
5915:27 December
5881:27 December
5847:27 December
5813:27 December
5701:27 December
5667:27 December
5633:27 December
5599:27 December
5563:27 December
5444:27 December
5238:22 December
5175:26 December
4273:"Free Will"
4253:12 December
4050:(11): 2–29.
3765:: 287–338.
3551:Carus, Paul
3505:Prospection
3343:omniscience
3278:בחירה חפשית
3188:John Wesley
3161:John Calvin
3141:Arminianism
3092:In theology
3044:determinism
2840:involuntary
2836:unvoluntary
2740:unconscious
2683:exculpation
2679:explanation
2571:Vaisheshika
2095:Other views
1985:physicalist
1699:physicalism
1639:human brain
1611:Physicalism
1523:omniscience
1495:omniscience
1421:omniscience
1410:predestined
1406:determinism
1354:determinism
1302:omnipotence
1273:Omniscience
1268:Omniscience
1262:Omniscience
1251:determinism
1219:determinism
1160:self-caused
1141:Determinism
986:Thomas Reid
924:Robert Kane
858:panpsychism
841:physicalism
831:, will, or
709:determinism
458:David Lewis
399:determinism
395:Robert Kane
387:Thomas Reid
385:", such as
322:Origination
306:determinism
105:Determinism
93:prohibition
77:culpability
48:Self-agency
16503:Categories
16409:Spacetimes
16384:Eternalism
16351:Multiverse
16105:Falliblism
16035:Linguistic
16030:Historical
16005:Biological
15789:Upanishads
15590:Experience
15555:Blindsight
15382:Nondualism
15263:Max Planck
15243:David Bohm
15059:Psychology
14950:John Locke
14875:David Hume
14818:Philosophy
14411:Bonhoeffer
14120:Immorality
14063:Eudaimonia
14023:Conscience
14018:Compassion
13904:Skepticism
13899:Relativism
13816:Naturalism
13796:Absolutism
13768:Technology
13618:Deontology
13365:Monadology
13299:(c. 80 BC)
13006:Parmenides
12891:Perception
12789:Experience
12676:Relativism
12651:Naturalism
12601:Enactivism
12324:Fair trial
12009:2018-12-12
11966:Dick Swaab
11810:L'Espresso
11733:PhilPapers
11374:2010-11-21
10943:: 104342.
10234:: 239–45.
9867:2018-12-12
9269:lc92010057
9202:Wegner, D.
8793:2010-11-21
8752:2010-11-21
8700:2008-11-01
8518:contingent
8470:2012-08-13
8449:2012-08-13
8360:2015-12-09
8336:2015-12-09
8179:in subject
8114:Pragmatism
8086:((online))
8042:2007-08-02
8007:, Arthur,
7949:The Ethics
7594:6 February
7483:, Oxford.
7333:4 December
7042:Boethius.
6860:: 714–24.
6526:8 December
6420:((online))
5728:: 119–25.
5487:2107.06572
5480:: 104474.
5474:Biosystems
5283:: 242–57.
4993:2012-09-14
4632:: 121–37.
4567:. Oxford:
4282:2013-01-15
4102:2012-08-21
3786:2015-12-09
3628:2015-12-09
3556:The Monist
3532:References
3372:al-Ash'ari
3306:Maimonides
3259:Bas relief
3214:glorified.
3036:See also:
2904:See also:
2703:See also:
2667:biologists
2635:theories.
2633:stochastic
2625:Democritus
2535:See also:
2505:Samkhyists
2458:the Buddha
2388:and their
2317:David Hume
2309:See also:
2294:Pragmatism
2270:antecedent
2266:Chrysippus
2203:phenomenon
2141:David Hume
2080:naturalist
2054:Recently,
2028:depression
2005:behavioral
1981:naturalism
1970:See also:
1929:Elbow Room
1897:psychology
1874:David Hume
1597:See also:
1562:C.S. Lewis
1528:Infallible
1370:Calvinists
1329:philosophy
1318:See also:
1243:See also:
1083:John Locke
969:Niels Bohr
651:determined
554:Free will
431:Carl Ginet
349:biological
225:Chrysippus
213:See also:
85:persuasion
16519:Causality
16509:Free will
16485:Free will
16483:article "
16394:Free will
16290:Time loop
16139:Free will
16071:Causality
15804:Yogachara
15739:Sentience
15600:Free will
15540:Awareness
15528:Attention
15417:Solipsism
15132:Anil Seth
15005:Ned Block
14672:Casuistry
14584:Either/Or
14491:Korsgaard
14486:Azurmendi
14451:MacIntyre
14391:Nietzsche
14321:Augustine
14316:Confucius
14296:Aristotle
14272:Ethicists
14230:Intrinsic
14195:Suffering
14105:Happiness
14078:Free will
14058:Etiquette
14003:Authority
13947:Epicurean
13942:Confucian
13937:Christian
13872:Emotivism
13696:Discourse
13633:Pragmatic
13605:Normative
13525:Teleology
13490:Mereology
13470:Cosmology
13329:(c. 1000)
13226:Plantinga
13216:Armstrong
13166:Heidegger
13141:Whitehead
13126:Nietzsche
13046:Descartes
13016:Aristotle
12971:Universal
12901:Principle
12871:Necessity
12831:Intention
12784:Existence
12747:Causality
12686:Solipsism
12616:Free will
12490:Anarchism
12424:Sexuality
12319:Education
12278:Political
12232:Free will
12134:Free will
12122:Free will
11909:cite book
11901:991595874
11758:. (2007)
11743:Free Will
11420:cite book
11158:1475-4975
11070:143687015
11046:: 13–16.
11007:227095775
10965:220057834
10937:Cognition
10816:152011660
10644:CiteSeerX
10642:: 65–72.
10589:143223154
10533:1053-8100
10431:1468-0017
10378:CiteSeerX
10355:1468-0017
10320:1933-1592
10298:CiteSeerX
9991:144699878
9891:CiteSeerX
9821:206021496
9219:Kornhuber
8947:Kornhuber
8522:necessary
8487:, Q83 A1.
8381:Aquinas,
7900:155641763
7865:1467-9973
7704:Kane, R.
7654:Free Will
7457:Leviathan
7361:cite book
7355:. Oxford.
7320:0048-3915
6613:. Collins
6478:0028-0836
6453:0704.2529
6051:undermine
5779:169483672
5744:0739-7046
5528:235785726
5512:0303-2647
5428:Free Will
5112:CiteSeerX
5073:ignored (
5063:cite book
4867:170811962
4739:bad faith
4539:See also
4445:CiteSeerX
3908:flowing..
3845:proposed.
3826:"Freedom"
3537:Citations
3515:True Will
3283:romanized
3229:Ephesians
3200:synergism
3153:Calvinism
2844:voluntary
2728:Kornhuber
2629:Cārvākans
2582:Vedantist
2519:Nagarjuna
2509:Cārvākans
2413:intellect
2340:apriority
2315:In 1739,
2299:meliorism
2201:, but is
2182:, as the
2172:phenomena
2089:Darwinism
2061:Jim Jones
1989:cognition
1880:, in his
1835:implement
1737:emergence
1732:supervene
1627:free will
1501:), or as
1155:causality
1124:ex nihilo
1049:, p. xvi.
837:causality
423:causa sui
379:d'Holbach
183:Epictetus
179:Aristotle
146:necessary
54:Free will
16389:Fatalism
16134:Fatalism
16093:Etiology
16015:Economic
16010:Cultural
15939:Category
15675:Ontology
15630:Illusion
15347:Idealism
15296:Theories
14762:Category
14702:Ideology
14667:Axiology
14496:Nussbaum
14446:Frankena
14441:Anscombe
14431:Williams
14386:Sidgwick
14306:Valluvar
14301:Diogenes
14286:Socrates
14210:Theodicy
14205:Sympathy
14170:Pacifism
14160:Morality
14073:Fidelity
14053:Equality
14008:Autonomy
13996:Concepts
13957:Feminist
13932:Buddhist
13862:Nihilism
13801:Axiology
13758:Research
13691:Computer
13686:Business
13543:Category
13465:Axiology
13319:(c. 270)
13247:more ...
13201:Anscombe
13196:Strawson
13191:Davidson
13086:Berkeley
13026:Plotinus
12987:more ...
12926:Relation
12906:Property
12881:Ontology
12804:Identity
12725:Concepts
12656:Nihilism
12621:Idealism
12569:Theories
12495:Autonomy
12463:See also
12404:Religion
12394:Property
12379:Movement
12294:Assembly
12287:By right
12268:Internet
12258:Economic
12248:Academic
12200:Libertas
12178:Concepts
12045:Einstein
11881:(2017).
11859:(1839).
11832:(2023).
11819:Nowak A.
11741:. 2012.
11701:: 29–47.
11689:(1982).
11679:15590621
11584:(1999).
11565:(2003).
11409:Archived
11352:(1976).
11334:(1948).
11276:6 August
11215:18453477
11166:15648622
11121:22074173
10957:32593841
10918:28144228
10867:31249653
10781:16010829
10773:19141628
10727:18181791
10689:Archived
10575:: 1–11.
10549:16953908
10541:18805023
10498:21149703
10439:18837686
10213:19502601
10205:21367624
10060:16949962
9956:13991023
9948:16091264
9913:10424155
9813:10719163
9763:10601408
9714:15006289
9630:14180577
9622:17638304
9587:19387980
9530:11077021
9479:31642807
9428:21315264
9379:22869750
9320:23966921
9225:, 2012.
9204:(2002).
9124:43567513
9116:19641911
8505:Archived
8248:a priori
7631:10637618
7351:(2012).
6882:62639035
6762:40694201
6486:17443179
6423:Archived
6001:Miracles
5520:34242745
5297:14586058
5138:Archived
5134:16783870
4366:Archived
4362:46156580
4354:14625354
4019:Archived
3444:See also
3301:bechirah
3220:8:29–30
3133:Molinism
3076:fatalism
2874:epilepsy
2661:Genetics
2555:kaivalya
2501:Nyayists
2468:Sanskrit
2450:Buddhism
2421:passions
2390:synapses
2378:a priori
2262:Stoicism
2207:a priori
2184:noumenon
2160:noumenon
2146:velleity
2106:abstract
2045:dopamine
2036:volition
1878:Voltaire
1651:physical
1554:Boethius
1460:taxonomy
1385:fatalism
1151:paradigm
1095:postpone
961:volition
920:volition
700:taxonomy
617:implies
609:implies
353:cultural
298:illusion
40:FreeWill
16295:in film
16115:Destiny
16025:Genetic
15949:Commons
15726:Purusha
15715:Reentry
15508:Agnosia
15431:Science
14811:Figures
14660:Related
14406:Tillich
14371:Bentham
14346:Spinoza
14341:Aquinas
14326:Mencius
14240:Western
14215:Torture
14180:Precept
14135:Loyalty
14130:Liberty
14125:Justice
14038:Dignity
14028:Consent
13972:Kantian
13962:Islamic
13925:Schools
13811:Realism
13743:Nursing
13738:Medical
13723:Machine
13663:Applied
13315:Enneads
13309:(c. 50)
13275:Timaeus
13265:Sophist
13211:Dummett
13206:Deleuze
13146:Russell
13136:Bergson
13131:Meinong
13111:Bolzano
13071:Leibniz
13051:Spinoza
13036:Aquinas
13021:Proclus
12951:Thought
12941:Subject
12921:Reality
12916:Quality
12886:Pattern
12846:Meaning
12821:Insight
12779:Essence
12764:Concept
12666:Realism
12631:Liberty
12596:Dualism
12439:Thought
12429:Silence
12399:Protest
12389:Privacy
12354:Housing
12241:By type
12171:Liberty
12073:(ed.).
11670:1693460
11633:purpose
11251:3023336
11206:2408534
11112:3757306
10979:2020).
10909:5239816
10858:6542011
10735:2643260
10489:3012523
10466:Bibcode
10275:2089386
9754:1760620
9679:1402972
9670:1015106
9578:2767459
9538:7774922
9470:6809608
9419:3052770
9370:3479453
9347:Bibcode
9311:3746176
9294:: 385.
9067:6640273
9025:6965339
8990:6640273
8648:(1907)
8530:chaotic
7443:2024717
7328:2265349
6920:4224996
6862:Bibcode
6736:nature.
6719:Bibcode
6674:Bibcode
6494:4412358
6458:Bibcode
6055:enhance
5492:Bibcode
5315:Laplace
5051:4080545
5021:Bibcode
4847:Theoria
4401:brains.
4334:Bibcode
3438:animals
3380:Ash'ari
3327:Mitzvot
3285::
3244:Judaism
3118:Thomism
2952:priming
2627:or the
2563:Ishvara
2551:Samkhya
2521:in the
2481:destiny
2386:neurons
2319:in his
1333:history
1229:Destiny
1203:Destiny
766:knowing
341:destiny
314:dualism
287:ability
16045:Social
15873:Psyche
15720:Sakshi
15705:Qualia
15501:Topics
15367:Monism
15231:Others
14651:(1984)
14643:(1981)
14635:(1979)
14627:(1971)
14619:(1903)
14611:(1887)
14603:(1874)
14595:(1861)
14587:(1843)
14579:(1820)
14571:(1788)
14563:(1785)
14555:(1780)
14547:(1759)
14539:(1740)
14531:(1726)
14523:(1677)
14481:Taylor
14466:Parfit
14461:Singer
14436:Mackie
14311:Cicero
14252:Virtue
14185:Rights
14110:Honour
13967:Jewish
13763:Sexual
13671:Animal
13653:Virtue
13597:Ethics
13449:(1981)
13439:(1943)
13429:(1927)
13419:(1846)
13409:(1818)
13399:(1807)
13389:(1783)
13379:(1781)
13369:(1714)
13359:(1710)
13349:(1677)
13345:Ethics
13339:(1641)
13241:Parfit
13231:Kripke
13221:Putnam
13181:Sartre
13171:Carnap
13121:Peirce
13066:Newton
13041:Suárez
13031:Scotus
12911:Qualia
12876:Object
12866:Nature
12861:Motion
12841:Matter
12774:Entity
12646:Monism
12434:Speech
12414:Resist
12409:Repair
12349:Health
12309:Choice
12304:Asylum
12217:Rights
12034:
11992:
11972:
11958:
11943:
11929:
11899:
11889:
11870:
11846:
11794:
11780:
11766:
11749:
11677:
11667:
11629:reason
11625:Agency
11599:
11575:
11529:
11401:
11249:
11213:
11203:
11164:
11156:
11119:
11109:
11068:
11005:
10963:
10955:
10916:
10906:
10892:: 20.
10865:
10855:
10814:
10779:
10771:
10733:
10725:
10646:
10587:
10547:
10539:
10531:
10496:
10486:
10437:
10429:
10380:
10353:
10318:
10300:
10273:
10211:
10203:
10156:
10127:
10090:
10058:
10014:
9989:
9954:
9946:
9911:
9893:
9850:
9819:
9811:
9761:
9751:
9712:
9677:
9667:
9628:
9620:
9585:
9575:
9536:
9528:
9477:
9467:
9426:
9416:
9398:Neuron
9377:
9367:
9318:
9308:
9267:
9257:
9233:
9223:Deecke
9221:&
9184:
9155:
9122:
9114:
9065:
9023:
8988:
8951:Deecke
8949:&
8930:
8905:
8880:
8855:
8815:
8672:
8624:
8599:
8554:
8513:direct
8394:
8289:
8260:
8227:
8141:
8068:
8017:
7979:
7955:
7898:
7863:
7828:3 June
7786:
7729:. See
7712:
7692:
7639:451912
7637:
7629:
7585:
7555:
7519:
7487:
7441:
7326:
7318:
7285:
7255:
7188:
7155:
7111:
7018:
6982:
6946:
6918:
6880:
6850:, and
6760:
6707:, and
6566:
6517:
6492:
6484:
6476:
6440:Nature
6373:
6339:
6305:
6271:
6210:
6174:
6140:
6079:
6037:
6012:
5974:
5940:
5906:
5872:
5838:
5804:
5777:
5742:
5692:
5658:
5624:
5590:
5554:
5526:
5518:
5510:
5435:
5364:
5335:
5295:
5229:
5166:
5132:
5114:
5049:
5039:
4957:
4930:
4901:
4865:
4774:
4714:
4689:
4664:
4607:
4575:
4481:
4447:
4392:
4360:
4352:
4304:
4220:
4193:
4161:
4132:
4005:per se
3968:
3930:
3899:
3869:
3836:
3777:
3723:
3689:
3660:
3619:
3589:
3399:Others
3274:Hebrew
3218:Romans
2912:, and
2878:stroke
2819:will.
2751:before
2732:Deecke
2730:&
2543:astika
2454:agency
2419:, and
2365:qualia
2332:result
2258:action
2135:Ethics
2040:addict
1745:monism
1723:qualia
1707:exists
1676:Popper
1609:, and
1607:Monism
1560:, and
1147:events
881:, and
467:Using
393:, and
347:, and
278:action
221:stoics
97:willed
91:, and
81:advice
73:praise
62:action
58:choose
15998:Types
15813:Works
15560:Brain
14743:Index
14505:Works
14476:Adams
14471:Nagel
14426:Dewey
14421:Rawls
14401:Barth
14396:Moore
14361:Hegel
14336:Xunzi
14291:Plato
14281:Laozi
14262:Wrong
14235:Japan
14225:Value
14220:Trust
14115:Ideal
13982:Stoic
13733:Media
13718:Legal
13495:Meta-
13236:Lewis
13186:Quine
13151:Moore
13116:Lotze
13101:Hegel
13076:Wolff
13056:Locke
13011:Plato
12981:Value
12961:Truth
12449:Truth
12384:Press
12314:Death
12253:Civil
12069:. In
12003:(PDF)
11986:(PDF)
11538:(PDF)
11497:Philo
11412:(PDF)
11395:(PDF)
11247:S2CID
11162:S2CID
11066:S2CID
11036:(PDF)
11003:S2CID
10961:S2CID
10812:S2CID
10777:S2CID
10731:S2CID
10585:S2CID
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