541:; and assimilate CIDG leaders into the ARVN ranks. The conversion process proceeded successfully, partly because the Vietnamese Special Forces camp commanders stayed in place and automatically became Ranger battalion commanders. Their familiarity with the troops, the camp area, and the tactical area of operations was invaluable. The MACV advisers did not arrive for duty until some 17 camps had been converted. The fact that many of the advisers were former Special Forces men familiar with the camps minimized problems. As a result of the close co-ordination between U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces, the
68:
77:
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52:
92:
28:
741:
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expressed by their willingness to join the ARVN units, the government provided legal birth and marriage certificates as well as medical benefits and disability pay for injuries received in military action. This was the first time that the minority groups, and particularly the
Montagnards, were given full status as citizens of South Vietnam.
380:
and bury themselves... with concrete." After visiting some of their more exposed
Highland camps, he expressed "horror" that an organization that prided itself on being a "highly mobile, disdainful of fixed installations, innovative, not requiring organized logistical support" should find itself "in
549:
battalions. Of the possible 17,057 troop spaces scheduled for conversion 14,534 CIDG troops actually became members of the Ranger command. A significant benefit that accrued to the minority ethnic groups involved was the better treatment by the government of South
Vietnam. For their allegiance, as
523:
camps, with a target date of 31 December 1970. Progressive, concurrent conversion cycles were initiated, with the major criteria being the state of security around each camp and seasonal weather. Camps in relatively secure areas that could be supplied easily during the rainy season were converted
385:
in concrete emplacements with fixed range cards printed on the concrete, and literally... locked in by their own actions." In his estimation the CIDG program drained manpower from Saigon and was too expensive; the indigenous soldiers spent too much time protecting their own dependents who lived
390:
from responsibility" who "tended to be nonconformist, couldn't quite get along in a straight military system, and found a haven where their actions were not scrutinized too carefully, and where they came under only sporadic or intermittent observation from the regular chain of command."
480:. Since then, CIDG forces were regarded as an economy of force element, which could be used to release conventional units for deployment in response to new enemy buildups. They also were used for conventional operations, along with the U.S. and other
536:
staff developed jointly a program designed to continue operational missions in CIDG camps; process CIDG members administratively and medically; prepare MACV advisers for camp missions; transfer logistical support; reorganize CIDG units into Ranger
440:
Great emphasis was given to assistance of the CIDG soldier and his family; with the intention of increasing
Vietnamese participation, thereby preparing the South Vietnamese for a total take-over and improving their motivation to keep
527:
During the stand-down period, every effort was made to raise the combat readiness of the 37 remaining CIDG camps to the highest efficiency. Concurrently, a concerted effort was made to assimilate the
Montagnard and other minority
524:
first. Camps in less secure areas were scheduled for later conversion so that more time and resources could be applied to increase the combat readiness of these camps. The final number of CIDG camps converted to
Rangers was 37.
330:
felt that the program was a great success, but only that the CIDG units and
Special Forces units were not being employed properly, and ordered Operation Switchback, which transferred control of the CIDG program from the
323:
and South
Vietnamese and therefore quickly took to the American advisers. The program was widely successful, as once one village was pacified, it served as a training camp for other local villages.
488:
In response to the increasing enemy firepower, also in recognition to the CIDG, the US MACV approved a weapons modernization program in April 1968, under which CIDG troops were equipped with
386:
nearby. Furthermore, he felt that United States Army
Special Forces members "viewed themselves as something separate and distinct from the rest of the military effort," describing them as "
307:
and civic action, the
Special Forces teams did the majority of the training. Villagers were trained and armed for village defense for two weeks, while localized strike forces (
235:
after two years since its inception and changed its focus from village defense to more conventional operations. From June 1967 onwards the CIDG members were made part of the
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754:
1067:
978:
434:
605:
1443:
1404:
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attacks. The vast majority of the CIDG camps were initially manned by inhabitants of ethnic minority regions in the country (especially
80:
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239:(ARVN) or other government agencies to increase Vietnamese participation. By late 1970, the remaining CIDG camps were converted to
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135:
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351:, and the CIDG units stopped focusing on village defense and instead took part in more conventional operations, most notably
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irregulars and their American allies. Six CIDG troops died and 39 were wounded; four members of the Special Forces died.
300:
95:
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1423:
1310:
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957:
732:
638:
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By 1 June 1970, the number of CIDG camps in South Vietnam had been reduced to thirty-eight, either by conversion to
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camps. The indigenous ethnic-minority people that formed the CIDG reaped significant benefits by the government of
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433:(ARVN) or other government agencies. This involved closure, conversion and/or turnover of the CIDG camps to full
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area, which took place from 29 October to 4 November 1967. The camp strike force, together with elements of the
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448:, launched in January 1968, in which CIDG troops successfully defended a number of urban centers, such as
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populations. The main purpose of setting up the CIDG program was to counter the growing influence of
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and Dalat. This was considered an excellent performance considering their training mainly involved
340:
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by training and arming the villagers for village defense. The program rapidly expanded after the
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311:) would receive better training and weapons and served as a quick reaction force to react to
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Many CIDG camps were assaulted or attacked. An example of this is the assault on Camp
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The U.S. feared that the VC would be able to recruit large numbers of minority troops.
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728:
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Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
410:. It is estimated that 1,000 enemies were killed, of which 184 were credited to the
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1014:
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began to prepare for disengagement and prepared CIDG members to become part of the
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Three major changes took place in the CIDG effort between June 1967 and June 1968:
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519:(JGS) and the MACV staff then decided to convert the remaining camps to
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The U.S. Army in Vietnam Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973
532:
from remote areas into the ARVN. The Vietnamese Special Forces and the
501:
481:
376:," he observed, "and what they did was build fortifications out of the
308:
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was confused and unhappy with the activities of the Special Forces in
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moved into villages and set up Area Development Centers. Focusing on
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27:
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91:
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This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the
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This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the
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508:. The weapons transfer program was completed in January 1969.
175:
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339:(MACV). The CIDG Program was rapidly expanded, as the entire
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believed that the South Vietnamese effort to create similar
166:
251:
were given full status as citizens of South Vietnam.
185:
163:
630:
Vietnam Studies U.S. Army Special Forces 1961 - 1971
247:
for their allegiance and it was the first time that
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1415:
500:. Up to that point, CIDG troops had used mainly
1439:Military units and formations of the Cold War
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606:United States Army Center of Military History
545:was strengthened by the addition of 37 light
299:of Buon Enao, small A Teams from the US Army
259:The CIDG program was formed for two reasons:
1405:South Vietnamese military ranks and insignia
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763:
200:) was a military program developed by the
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81:U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
933:Civilian Irregular Defense Group program
727:. U.S. Army Center of Military History.
678:. University of Chicago Press. p.
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620:
618:
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633:. US Army Center of Military History.
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444:The third change was a result of the
372:. They were "supposed to be training
613:
517:South Vietnamese Joint General Staff
337:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
283:The CIDG program was devised by the
231:transferred its control from CIA to
1444:Indigenous counterinsurgency forces
657:
287:in early 1961 to counter expanding
96:Republic of Vietnam Military Forces
13:
604:from websites or documents of the
14:
1455:
345:United States Army Special Forces
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739:
645:
600: This article incorporates
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208:, which was intended to develop
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148:Civilian Irregular Defense Group
90:
75:
66:
50:
26:
21:Civilian Irregular Defense Group
431:Army of the Republic of Vietnam
237:Army of the Republic of Vietnam
1434:Government paramilitary forces
696:
301:Special Forces (Green Berets)
1:
590:
398:, A-311, situated in the III
381:fortified installations with
271:units needed to be bolstered.
7:
553:
333:Central Intelligence Agency
293:Central Highlands (Vietnam)
202:Central Intelligence Agency
72:Central Intelligence Agency
10:
1460:
515:status or by closure. The
404:U.S. 1st Infantry Division
278:
254:
217:indigenous ethnic-minority
198:Lực lượng Dân sự chiến đấu
1429:Military of South Vietnam
1424:CIA activities in Vietnam
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1053:
992:
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793:Military of South Vietnam
319:), who disliked both the
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101:
86:
62:
45:
37:
25:
20:
718:Clarke, Jeffrey (1998).
534:5th Special Forces Group
341:5th Special Forces Group
963:Combined Action Program
627:Kelly, Francis (1973).
602:public domain material
197:
136:Unconventional warfare
1276:Nguyễn Phước Vĩnh Lộc
498:M79 grenade launchers
565:Battle of Dong Xoai
435:ARVN Special Forces
353:Border surveillance
295:. Beginning in the
1400:Ranks and insignia
958:Presidential Guard
580:Battle of Nam Dong
575:Battle of Kham Duc
570:Battle of Hiep Hoa
521:Vietnamese Rangers
427:5th Special Forces
421:In the context of
241:Vietnamese Rangers
213:irregular military
116:Counter-insurgency
32:CIDG unit training
1411:
1410:
1321:Nguyễn Viết Thanh
1281:Nguyễn Trọng Luật
972:ARVN Sub-branches
478:jungle operations
366:Harold K. Johnson
291:influence in the
225:Central Highlands
204:(CIA) during the
141:
140:
1451:
1371:Trần Thiện Khiêm
1366:Trần Thanh Phong
1351:Phan Trọng Chinh
1326:Nguyễn Vĩnh Nghi
1306:Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
1286:Nguyễn Văn Chuân
1246:Nguyễn Đức Thắng
1241:Nguyễn Chánh Thi
1231:Ngô Quang Trưởng
791:
790:
779:
772:
765:
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743:
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704:"Special Forces"
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694:
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677:
664:
655:
649:
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624:
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585:Siege of Plei Me
560:Battle of A Shau
494:M60 machine guns
210:South Vietnamese
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1386:Trần Quang Khôi
1356:Phan Xuân Nhuận
1341:Phạm Quốc Thuần
1311:Nguyễn Văn Toàn
1301:Nguyễn Văn Minh
1296:Nguyễn Văn Mạnh
1291:Nguyễn Văn Hiếu
1271:Nguyễn Khoa Nam
1261:Nguyễn Hữu Hạnh
1251:Nguyễn Hợp Đoàn
1191:Lê Nguyên Khang
1108:
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948:Regional Forces
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513:Regional Forces
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249:minority groups
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1161:Hoàng Xuân Lãm
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1151:Dương Văn Minh
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1126:Đặng Văn Quang
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1121:Chung Tấn Cang
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1083:September 1964
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979:Special Forces
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640:978-1519258953
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543:Ranger Command
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423:Vietnamization
360:Chief of Staff
358:In 1966, Army
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132:Reconnaissance
124:Jungle warfare
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1361:Tôn Thất Đính
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1336:Phạm Phú Quốc
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1256:Nguyễn Hữu Có
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1236:Nguyễn Cao Kỳ
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1176:Lâm Quang Thơ
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1171:Lâm Quang Thi
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1166:Huỳnh Văn Cao
1164:
1162:
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1156:Hoàng Cơ Minh
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1146:Dương Văn Đức
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1088:December 1964
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746:public domain
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689:9780226567709
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530:ethnic groups
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446:Tet Offensive
443:
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370:South Vietnam
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347:, moved into
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326:By 1963, the
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305:local defense
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143:Military unit
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120:Direct Action
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57:South Vietnam
53:
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40:
36:
29:
24:
19:
16:
1381:Trần Văn Hai
1376:Trần Văn Đôn
1346:Phạm Văn Phú
1266:Nguyễn Khánh
1221:Mai Hữu Xuân
1196:Lê Nguyên Vỹ
1181:Lâm Văn Phát
1141:Dư Quốc Đống
1116:Cao Văn Viên
1078:January 1964
1056:and mutinies
1040:Tan Son Nhut
932:
720:
713:
698:
673:
629:
594:
526:
510:
487:
470:Ban Me Thuot
416:
393:
357:
325:
282:
269:paramilitary
258:
223:(VC) in the
151:
147:
145:
15:
1391:Vũ Văn Giai
1211:Lữ Mộng Lan
1201:Lê Văn Hưng
1186:Lê Minh Đảo
502:M1 Carbines
408:air strikes
378:Middle Ages
328:US military
229:US military
215:units from
206:Vietnam War
1418:Categories
1216:Lý Tòng Bá
1206:Lê Văn Kim
1131:Đỗ Cao Trí
953:Junk Force
591:References
539:battalions
506:M14 rifles
490:M16 rifles
482:Free World
474:Phan Thiet
374:guerrillas
317:Montagnard
309:MIKE Force
194:Vietnamese
63:Allegiance
1025:Phan Rang
1020:Nha Trang
1005:Binh Thuy
993:Air bases
923:Air Force
839:Divisions
668:John Nagl
450:Nha Trang
441:fighting.
388:fugitives
289:Viet Cong
221:Viet Cong
41:1961–1970
1109:officers
1010:Cam Ranh
1000:Bien Hoa
916:Branches
907:Airborne
670:(2005).
554:See also
547:infantry
466:Chau Doc
454:Qui Nhon
437:control.
412:civilian
396:Loc Ninh
335:over to
1107:Notable
1045:Tuy Hoa
1030:Phù Cát
1015:Da Nang
984:Rangers
484:forces.
458:Kon Tum
383:mortars
363:General
349:Vietnam
297:village
279:History
255:Purpose
128:Raiding
106:Militia
46:Country
1226:Ngô Du
1136:Đỗ Mậu
1035:Pleiku
902:Marine
731:
686:
637:
496:, and
462:Pleiku
425:, the
265:Saigon
87:Branch
38:Active
800:Corps
725:(PDF)
400:Corps
321:North
1098:1966
1093:1965
1073:1963
1068:1962
1063:1960
938:Navy
928:Army
729:ISBN
684:ISBN
635:ISBN
504:and
233:MACV
189:-jee
152:CIDG
146:The
112:Role
102:Type
822:CMD
817:III
680:128
285:CIA
187:SID
1420::
897:25
892:23
887:22
882:21
877:18
829:IV
812:II
682:.
659:^
615:^
608:.
492:,
472:,
468:,
464:,
460:,
456:,
452:,
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343:,
313:VC
196::
192:;
183:,
176:iː
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708:.
706:.
692:.
654:.
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173:ʒ
170:d
167:ɪ
164:s
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158:/
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