312:
972:, in the real estate industry, may occur when the bank "tentatively" auctions a foreclosed home and gives bidders an option to give "preliminary bids" for homes that are not yet authorized for auction. If the reserve bids are not met, the home is updated as "never was available for auction" even though bids were received. Some houses are auctioned at fire-sale prices, and the auctions are closed before the auction was formally announced. Investors rush to get in their preliminary bids before the house is technically up for auction. Bidders fear losing options so it results in more bids, and naturally, higher prices. If bidders fail to reach the target bids, the item was never available for auction. Banks do that because if they unloaded all of their
990:
behaviors, such as bid rigging, create market inefficiencies as contracts are fulfilled at elevated values. Furthermore, bid prices increase with more repeated collusion. Ultimately, the cost is typically borne by the taxpayer as government-sponsored contracts are artificially above market value. Additionally, it can be thought of as raising prices for the taxpayer (or consumer) as firms rent seek. One study found that bid rigging significantly raised prices over market value in the seafood industry in
Philadelphia in a bidding scheme involving Defense Personnel Support Center, a purchaser for the Department of Defense. The high price of entry and fewer entrants in many industries results in lessened incentives for firms to behave competitively.
814:, for example in the case of government construction contracts. The typical objective of bid rigging is to enable the "winning" party to obtain contracts at uncompetitive prices (i.e., at higher prices if they are sellers, or lower prices if they are buyers). The other parties are compensated in various ways, for example, by cash payments, or by being designated to be the "winning" bidder on other contracts, or by an arrangement where some parts of the successful bidder's contract will be subcontracted to them. In this way, they "share the spoils" among themselves. Bid rigging almost always results in economic harm to the agency which is seeking the bids, and to the public, who ultimately bear the costs as taxpayers or consumers.
1178:
unit quotes. The fines from this bid rigging scheme amounted to €45 million following an initial court decision, an over-ruling, and a reinstatement of the initial verdict. In 2007, a
Slovakian government ministry participated in bidder exclusion by posting a request for proposals regarding consulting on a bulletin board in an official building, though not open to the public. This resulted in a consulting firm winning a €120 million contract. The word for receiving kickbacks after participating in bid rigging is known as "tunelovanie" in Slovak.
1051:, or if there is reason to believe that officials and bidders are in contact, an open auction is preferred to sidestep potential bribery. When officials are engaged in more competitive procurement processes with regard to price but are suspected of kickbacks, a potential solution is the open auction to prevent clandestine arrangements such as change order abuse. If a closed or sealed auction process is preferred, the use of electronic bidding and investment in tamper-resistant systems is suggested.
38:
920:, occurs when some of the bidders agree to submit bids that are intended to be unsuccessful so that another conspirator can win the contract. For example, the cover bids might contain prices that are uncompetitive in relation to the prices submitted by the conspirator, who is designated to win the contract, or the cover bids might contain conditions that the conspirators know to be unacceptable to the agency calling for the bids.
1217:"Indeed, the OFT uncovered evidence of cover pricing in over 4000 tenders involving over 1000 companies but had to focus its investigation on a limited number of companies and instances where the available evidence was strongest, in order to make best use of its resources and conclude its investigation within a reasonable timeframe. The OFT could not, therefore, pursue every firm suspected of involvement in cover pricing."
1165:(TFEU). The annual cost to the EU in economic waste as a direct result of bid rigging among cartels was estimated to be between €13 billion and €37 billion in 2008. Bid rigging seems to be on the rise across Europe, raising concerns particularly over excessive expenditures and single-bid tenders. These single-bid tenders represented 17% of tenders in 2006, but 30% nine years later.
1294:
meaning that they were more likely to continue to win additional contracts in areas they were already developing. This was discovered to be a result of complementary bidding. Some legal action has been undertaken against these bid rigging schemes with nine contracting companies and several officials being charged and fined $ 5 billion in 1999.
1077:. Petrobras is suspected of having overcharged bids as much as 3% of the total cost on contracts with an alleged $ 2.1 billion being misappropriated in kickbacks. Operation Car Wash is part of a larger investigation into Brazil's government as well and has contributed to the conviction and imprisonment of former president
884:
simultaneously skimming profits from the artificially high bid price. Additionally, bidders may give low quotes for non-necessary items (knowledge gained through collusion or experience) to disadvantage other firms as their bid amount is more competitive. This also serves to increase the cost of entry for new firms.
1177:
Bid rigging is illegal in
Slovakia under the Act on the Protection of Competition and by EU membership, also Article 101 of TFEU. The first charges to be brought to court in Slovakia in 2006 by the Antimonopoly Office involved six construction companies who submitted bids with suspiciously consistent
980:
Those forms of bid rigging can occur together, and two or more of the practices could occur at the same time. For example, if one member of the bidding ring is designated to win a particular contract, that bidder's conspirators could avoid winning by not bidding ("bid suppression") or by submitting a
1017:
At a very basic level, there would likely be more competitive bidding if there were more firms present in a market, outside of a cartel, as evidence shows that bids lessen in value as the number of firms rises. Furthermore, collusion becomes less frequent with better market competitiveness, a result
989:
Many of the issues presented by bid rigging are the result of cartel involvement. Inefficient firms are not pushed out, as they would have been in a competitive market, and firms experience more profit, despite an inefficient allocation of resources. Cartels behave more like monopolies and so their
883:
involves high bid prices for commencing phases of development and low prices for later stages. That effectively increases the flow of funds for the bidding firm. This occurs when bidders cite high prices for items, intending to raise the number of units and purchase them at a competitive rate while
1293:
In a three-and-a-half-year period from 1995 to 1998 there was an estimated $ 4.13 billion surcharge attributed to bid rigging in Korea's construction industry, representing 15.5% of the total spent. It was also found that firms already present in an area enjoyed a significant degree of incumbency,
1265:
is often supported though as allowing small firms to continue to compete, though detractors are quick to point to the economic inefficiencies presented by a non-competitive market. The US Government, specifically the United States Trade
Representative Office and Department of Commerce, made fierce
1249:
Although both a violation of
Japanese criminal law and the Japan Anti-Monopoly Law, bid rigging is still a habitual practice of the Japanese construction industry. It has been shown by a number of academic studies both in Japan and in the US to be a system which considerably inflates the cost of
950:
are false bids to trick a legitimate bidder into bidding more than would have otherwise been the case. The seller or auctioneer hires confederates to call out the phantom bids. If the phantom bid is the winner, the lot is hidden and comes back around for a second auction, or the second-highest
926:
occurs when bidders take turns being the designated successful bidder. For example, each conspirator is designated to be the successful bidder on a certain contract, with conspirators designated to win other contracts. That is a form of market allocation in which the conspirators allocate or
1270:
as a de facto non-tariff barrier to foreign firms in the
Japanese construction market. Despite years of negotiations, including promises by the Japanese government in the Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) trade talks, the practice was never fully stamped out and continued to flourish.
1115:
From 2002 until 2013, the
Colombian government opened 121 investigations into bid rigging, which lead to sixty-nine entities paying fines amounting to nearly $ 23.5 million, with an additional nine entities receiving sanctions. Colombia was found to generally comply with the
857:
to reduce the minimum bid amount. That functions as contracts are split up to reduce the actual procurement amount and keep it under a threshold value. That reduces competitive bidding and enables less oversight at the project level as bid prices drop and kickbacks can be
1097:. This would not be the first instance of bid rigging by construction firms in recent Brazilian history as Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia SA, the nation's second largest construction firm, admitted to bid rigging during contract procurement for stadiums to host the
1260:
can be understood as a mutually beneficial system of bureaucracy and government and the private construction industry wherein bid rigging is incredibly common, benefiting colluding firms and officials alike in the form of kickbacks. The system of
870:
is another method for officials to choose the bidder of their choice but occurs after receipt of bids. The methods for this would include either changing bid parameters, evaluation processes, or other activity to effectively select the bidder of
927:
apportion markets, products, customers or geographic territories among themselves. This is then divided up such that each will get a "fair share" of the total business, without truly having to compete with the others for that business.
1224:
Many of the businesses involved cooperated fully with the OFT investigation and it was acknowledged that they had changed their bidding practices and provided staff training on competition law once the OFT had raised the issue.
1213:(OFT) on 103 construction companies found to have engaged in illegal bid-rigging schemes. The OFT commented that cover pricing, the form of bid rigging involved in these cases, was widespread in the UK construction industry.
1186:
Bid rigging occurs frequently in the construction industry in
Switzerland. In 2007, seventeen different firms were involved in a bid rigging scheme but there was no prosecution as the ring had disbanded before
1092:
The
Petrobras scandal extends beyond bid rigging in the oil sector as the investigation has also implicated Brazilian construction firms as bid rigging was discovered to be rampant in the preparations for the
831:
occurs when a contractor colludes with project officials, wins a low bid, and asks to change the contract afterwards. That is approved by officials, resulting in a much higher bid being retroactively approved.
1046:
Suggestions for ameliorating procurement auctions have also been put forth. Lengstein and
Wolfstetter suggest that when a particular bidder is preferred, disregarding cost, possible reforms include a sealed
961:
is the strategy in which the auctioneer or seller bids on a lot and buys it back to protect it from being sold to the highest bidder for an insufficient price. That is fraud if the auction is advertised as
1870:
2282:
in the cases of Quarmby Construction Company Limited and St James Securities Holdings Limited v Office of Fair Trading, unofficial summary published 15 April 2011, accessed 19 January 2024
840:
Instituting unreasonable qualification parameters, excluding non-preferred firms, or effectuating the same by shortening the time of acceptance periods for new bids following a request.
2004:
1162:
1014:
Bid rigging is an illegal practice under the criminal or competition laws of most developed countries. Depending on the jurisdiction, it is punishable by fines, imprisonment or both.
933:
can be a factor fostering the presence of bid rigging; for instance, it is the case of marketing agencies that bid for the same ad space on behalf of different and competing agents.).
1236:
figures for the wrong year when calculating fines, and treated the bid-rigging as more serious than it should have done, although in some other respects the OFT's ruling was upheld.
1194:, in 2011, a bid rigging scheme was discovered wherein seventeen firms were fined eight million Swiss francs though the appeals are ongoing. Multiple other cases are still ongoing.
951:
legitimate bidder is informed that the first bidder was unable to make payment. In online auctions, the latter ruse is pulled via a (secretly illegitimate) "second-chance offer."
2266:
1979:
100:
2097:
877:
allow more bidder exclusion by officials by either tailoring requests to individual bidders or creating a vague criterion to reasonably choose a preferred bidder.
771:
1022:
1221:
Cover pricing involves high price bidding, intended "to give the appearance of genuine competition", by businesses who, "in reality, ... are not competing".
2122:
1832:
2241:
Information note to procuring entities in the public and private sectors regarding the OFT’s decision on bid rigging in the construction industry
1188:
864:, which requires a relationship of some degree between the project and a bidder as the bidder is handed information to gain an unfair advantage.
1042:
Reducing potential for communication between bidders and procurement officials and adhering to a strict criterion and process of evaluation.
798:
action which enables companies to submit non-competitive bids. It can be performed by corrupt officials, by firms in an orchestrated act of
1250:
construction projects, and in the Japanese public sector, considerably wasteful of annual tax money amounting to billions of Japanese yen.
890:
are bids chosen on criteria unrelated to their competitiveness. That can be performed blatantly, by falsifying bids, or by price splitting.
1103:
1285:
As of 2008, thirteen lawsuits were still pending over 1990s' bid rigging for local government contracts to supply incinerator plants.
278:
2027:
1006:
in 2016 aiming to promote good practice among procurement and supply staff, and detailing indications they should watch out for.
2240:
1874:
526:
2253:
1346:
Choi, Jin-Wook (2007). "Governance Structure and Administrative Corruption in Japan: An Organizational Network Approach".
1190:
In 2009, a ring of seven electricity firms from Bern were charged with bid rigging and fined two million Swiss francs. In
2453:
1887:
837:
allows project officials to essentially choose their bid. There are multiple methods to achieve that like the following:
2404:
Lee, In Kwon; Hahn, Kyungdong (2002). "Bid-Rigging in Auctions for Korean Public-Works Contracts and Potential Damage".
1137:. Even so, bid rigging is still rampant in the construction industry, auto sale auctions, and foreclosed home auctions.
1853:
311:
2463:
2338:
1797:
Froeb, Luke M.; Koyak, Robert A.; Werden, Gregory J. (January 1993). "What is the effect of bid-rigging on prices?".
999:
778:
516:
247:
849:
Coercion and intimidation can also be used, as well as the simple rejection of individual bids over trivial matters.
976:
at once, the housing market would collapse, which causes foreclosed homes to be dribbled out with phantom auctions.
441:
802:, or by officials and firms acting together. This form of collusion is illegal in most countries. It is a form of
1256:
refers to collusion in Japanese, or more precisely, "conference", and is an extremely prevalent system in Japan.
436:
2157:
1282:, resigned over a series of bid rigging allegations and was subsequently sentenced to over three years in jail.
906:
occurs when some of the conspirators agree not to submit bids to allow another conspirator to win the contract.
491:
486:
85:
2458:
2313:
386:
271:
190:
2279:
2269:
in the cases of G F Tomlinson Building and others, CAT 7, published 24 March 2011, accessed 16 January 2024
1754:
Gupta, Srabana (2001). "The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry".
711:
406:
1078:
1229:
843:
Advertising projects to select bidders or bidding markets, thereby reducing publicity of bid procurement.
566:
401:
1081:. In early January 2018, Petrobras settled a United States class action case for $ 2.95 billion, though
955:
is a legitimate bidder's best chance to foil a shill bidder who aims to drive up the price artificially.
1500:
119:
54:
1548:
2468:
1425:
Woodall, Brian (1993). "The Logic of Collusive Action: The Political Roots of Japan's Dango System".
746:
1101:. This revelation implicates an additional five domestic construction firms and was revealed by the
661:
264:
2178:
1708:
Black, William K. (October 2004). "The Dango Tango: Why Corruption Blocks Real Reform in Japan".
1596:
1036:
Maximizing the number of bids and potential contractors for enhanced competition among proposals.
646:
456:
2292:
1210:
164:
2051:
Maci, Marsela (April 2012). "Private Enforcement in Bid-Rigging Cases in the European Union".
1620:
1476:
1169:
estimated that the overall annual cost posed to the EU by bid cost increases was $ 5 billion.
1133:
In the United States, bid rigging is a federal felony criminal offense under Section 1 of the
1404:
Porter, Robert; Zona, J. Douglas (1992). "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions".
706:
651:
611:
506:
501:
391:
366:
252:
1572:
2383:
2362:
1524:
1094:
496:
396:
207:
202:
90:
8:
1644:
1279:
1203:
1098:
716:
641:
356:
339:
2429:
2149:
2076:
1936:
1779:
1733:
1687:
1450:
1392:
1323:
1070:
963:
671:
511:
466:
226:
148:
1033:
Developing expertise and awareness of the market for which a tender is being designed.
2433:
2421:
2219:
2153:
2141:
2080:
2068:
1954:
1940:
1928:
1814:
1810:
1783:
1771:
1737:
1725:
1442:
1384:
1363:
1359:
721:
676:
531:
461:
371:
351:
295:
212:
197:
80:
68:
17:
1691:
1266:
efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to urge the Japanese government to reform
2413:
2211:
2133:
2060:
1920:
1806:
1763:
1717:
1677:
1434:
1413:
1355:
1191:
1166:
764:
751:
666:
561:
481:
451:
446:
376:
221:
175:
171:
73:
1375:
LaCasse, Chantale (1995). "Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution".
1328:
1146:
1145:
In Canada, bid rigging is an indictable criminal offence under Section 47 of the
1048:
952:
626:
591:
586:
581:
521:
476:
426:
421:
334:
329:
180:
159:
105:
29:
2064:
1233:
1158:
1082:
731:
696:
636:
536:
431:
411:
381:
344:
128:
110:
2417:
1767:
361:
2447:
2425:
2384:"Builders settle damages suit over bid-rigging | The Japan Times Online"
2223:
2145:
2072:
1932:
1818:
1775:
1729:
1446:
1388:
1367:
1275:
811:
631:
416:
217:
185:
2215:
1232:
revised the values of the fines. The tribunal decided that the OFT had used
1333:
973:
803:
686:
681:
656:
616:
571:
471:
231:
144:
95:
2202:
Huschelrath, K. (2012-12-17). "Economic Approaches to Fight Bid Rigging".
1202:
In the United Kingdom, individuals can be prosecuted criminally under the
601:
2137:
2123:"The First Bid Rigging Case in Slovakia after Years of Judicial Disputes"
1912:
1721:
1134:
1086:
1073:
is an ongoing investigation into the Brazilian semi-public multinational
1003:
795:
621:
556:
1924:
1396:
1318:
1026:
319:
2028:"Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Colombia - 2014 - OECD"
1454:
1669:
1313:
1074:
799:
133:
63:
37:
1955:"Petrobras scandal | Summary, Explanation, & Operation Car Wash"
2005:"Brazil builder admits to World Cup stadium cartel in deal with..."
1980:"Petrobras to pay $ 2.95 billion to settle U.S. corruption lawsuit"
1682:
1438:
807:
741:
59:
1888:"Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement - OECD"
1417:
1163:
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
1303:
546:
303:
1670:"Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions"
1412:. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research: 518–538.
1668:
Decarolis, Francesco; Goldmanis, Maris; Penta, Antonio (2017).
1308:
896:
139:
1228:
The fines were subsequently deemed to be "excessive" and the
1117:
964:
an absolute auction, meaning that there are no reserve bids
1833:"Checklist to design tender methods to reduce bid rigging"
1027:
its work on bid-rigging and cartels in public procurement
1089:
had expected a settlement between $ 5 and $ 10 billion.
1667:
1120:'s recommendations regarding competitive procurement.
1029:, makes the following suggestions for better tenders:
1023:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
937:
1749:
1747:
1910:
2243:, published 22 September 2009, accessed 27 May 2024
2204:Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
1744:
1645:"Potential Scheme: Unjustified Sole Source Awards"
1854:CMA publishes guidance to help detect bid-rigging
1039:Striving for clarity in requirements and details.
2445:
1796:
1674:National Bureau of Economic Research, No. W23962
1911:Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. (2006).
1501:"Potential Scheme: Excluding Qualified Bidders"
2120:
1549:"Potential Scheme: Leaking of Bid Information"
2278:Registry of the Competition Appeal Tribunal,
1054:
806:and market allocation, often practiced where
772:
272:
2256:, published March 2024, accessed 27 May 2024
2201:
1104:Conselho Administrativo de Defesa EconĂ´mica
1403:
779:
765:
279:
265:
2121:Blaao, Ondrej; Sramelova, Silvia (2015).
1877:on 24 June 2016, accessed 18 January 2024
1681:
1597:"Potential Scheme: Rigged Specifications"
846:Bundling of contracts to exclude bidders.
240:Enforcement authorities and organizations
1573:"Potential Scheme: Manipulation of Bids"
822:
2403:
1424:
1374:
2446:
2235:
2233:
2176:
1873:, published 20 June 2016, archived by
1621:"Potential Scheme: Unbalanced Bidding"
1477:"Potential Scheme: Change Order Abuse"
16:For the New Jersey investigation, see
2386:. Search.japantimes.co.jp. 2009-04-04
2365:. Search.japantimes.co.jp. 2009-03-28
2172:
2170:
2092:
2090:
1753:
1707:
1703:
1701:
2050:
1913:"Corruption in Procurement Auctions"
1345:
2280:Judgment (Non-confidential version)
2230:
2179:"E.U. Cash Tunnel Ends in Slovakia"
2177:Castle, Stephen (9 November 2010).
1977:
1871:Detecting and deterring bid-rigging
1869:Competition and Markets Authority,
1525:"Potential Scheme: Split Purchases"
938:As a seller, auctioneer or official
13:
2167:
2087:
1698:
1339:
1209:In 2011, fines were levied by the
1018:of reduced ability to compromise.
894:
36:
14:
2480:
2406:Review of Industrial Organization
2314:"New York Times report from 1995"
2293:"US Department of Justice report"
1756:Review of Industrial Organization
1197:
1000:Competition and Markets Authority
984:
248:International Competition Network
2002:
1360:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00779.x
1128:
1123:
1059:
310:
2397:
2376:
2355:
2331:
2306:
2285:
2272:
2259:
2246:
2195:
2114:
2044:
2020:
1996:
1971:
1947:
1904:
1880:
1863:
1846:
1825:
1790:
1661:
1637:
1613:
1589:
1565:
1541:
1517:
1493:
1469:
1181:
1157:Bid rigging is illegal in the
1009:
888:Unjustified sole source awards
253:List of competition regulators
1:
2265:Competition Appeal Tribunal,
1462:
1377:The RAND Journal of Economics
2053:European Competition Journal
1811:10.1016/0165-1765(93)90095-t
1406:Journal of Political Economy
1348:Public Administration Review
993:
981:high bid ("cover bidding").
794:is a fraudulent scheme in a
7:
1297:
1230:Competition Appeal Tribunal
1172:
1110:
10:
2485:
2454:Anti-competitive practices
2065:10.5235/174410512800369973
1860:, accessed 18 January 2024
1055:Notable examples by region
862:Leaking of bid information
120:Anti-competitive practices
86:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
55:History of competition law
15:
2254:Cartels and Cover Pricing
2130:SSRN Working Paper Series
1917:SSRN Working Paper Series
1710:Business Ethics Quarterly
1152:
1140:
1079:Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
1064:
904:Bid suppression collusion
747:Private electronic market
23:Form of procurement fraud
2464:Organized crime activity
2239:Office of Fair Trading,
1676:. Working Paper Series.
1288:
1244:
817:
442:Generalized second-price
2418:10.1023/a:1016018505021
2295:. Usdoj.gov. 1994-09-16
1959:Encyclopedia Britannica
1768:10.1023/a:1012568509136
1278:, the then governor of
1239:
437:Generalized first-price
1219:
1211:Office of Fair Trading
492:Simultaneous ascending
165:Occupational licensing
41:
2216:10.1093/jeclap/lps071
1875:The National Archives
1433:(3). JSTOR: 297–312.
1383:(3). Wiley: 398–417.
1354:(5). Wiley: 930–942.
1215:
910:Complementary bidding
875:Rigged Specifications
823:As acts of corruption
527:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
40:
2459:Conflict of interest
2363:"Japan Times report"
2138:10.2139/ssrn.2741673
1722:10.5840/beq200414442
1427:Comparative Politics
1095:2016 Summer Olympics
810:are determined by a
407:Discriminatory price
208:Occupational closure
203:Dividing territories
191:Essential facilities
91:Market concentration
2339:"Britanica Article"
1925:10.2139/ssrn.874705
1280:Miyazaki Prefecture
1204:Enterprise Act 2002
1099:2014 FIFA World Cup
717:Revenue equivalence
402:Deferred-acceptance
2318:The New York Times
2183:The New York Times
2098:"Rigging the bids"
1978:Pierson, Brendan.
1324:Operation Car Wash
1071:Operation Car Wash
881:Unbalanced bidding
855:Purchase splitting
829:Change order abuse
487:Sealed first-price
227:Regulatory capture
42:
1799:Economics Letters
789:
788:
567:Cancellation hunt
517:Value of revenues
387:Click-box bidding
289:
288:
218:Misuse of patents
213:Predatory pricing
198:Exclusive dealing
81:Barriers to entry
69:Coercive monopoly
18:Operation Bid Rig
2476:
2469:Bidding strategy
2438:
2437:
2401:
2395:
2394:
2392:
2391:
2380:
2374:
2373:
2371:
2370:
2359:
2353:
2352:
2350:
2349:
2335:
2329:
2328:
2326:
2325:
2310:
2304:
2303:
2301:
2300:
2289:
2283:
2276:
2270:
2263:
2257:
2250:
2244:
2237:
2228:
2227:
2199:
2193:
2192:
2190:
2189:
2174:
2165:
2164:
2162:
2156:. Archived from
2127:
2118:
2112:
2111:
2109:
2108:
2094:
2085:
2084:
2048:
2042:
2041:
2039:
2038:
2024:
2018:
2017:
2015:
2014:
2000:
1994:
1993:
1991:
1990:
1975:
1969:
1968:
1966:
1965:
1951:
1945:
1944:
1908:
1902:
1901:
1899:
1898:
1884:
1878:
1867:
1861:
1850:
1844:
1843:
1837:
1829:
1823:
1822:
1794:
1788:
1787:
1751:
1742:
1741:
1705:
1696:
1695:
1685:
1665:
1659:
1658:
1656:
1655:
1641:
1635:
1634:
1632:
1631:
1617:
1611:
1610:
1608:
1607:
1593:
1587:
1586:
1584:
1583:
1569:
1563:
1562:
1560:
1559:
1545:
1539:
1538:
1536:
1535:
1521:
1515:
1514:
1512:
1511:
1497:
1491:
1490:
1488:
1487:
1473:
1458:
1421:
1400:
1371:
970:Phantom auctions
918:courtesy bidding
912:, also known as
868:Bid manipulation
835:Bidder exclusion
781:
774:
767:
712:Price of anarchy
562:Calor licitantis
314:
291:
290:
281:
274:
267:
172:Product bundling
74:Natural monopoly
26:
25:
2484:
2483:
2479:
2478:
2477:
2475:
2474:
2473:
2444:
2443:
2442:
2441:
2402:
2398:
2389:
2387:
2382:
2381:
2377:
2368:
2366:
2361:
2360:
2356:
2347:
2345:
2337:
2336:
2332:
2323:
2321:
2312:
2311:
2307:
2298:
2296:
2291:
2290:
2286:
2277:
2273:
2264:
2260:
2251:
2247:
2238:
2231:
2200:
2196:
2187:
2185:
2175:
2168:
2160:
2125:
2119:
2115:
2106:
2104:
2096:
2095:
2088:
2049:
2045:
2036:
2034:
2026:
2025:
2021:
2012:
2010:
2001:
1997:
1988:
1986:
1976:
1972:
1963:
1961:
1953:
1952:
1948:
1909:
1905:
1896:
1894:
1886:
1885:
1881:
1868:
1864:
1851:
1847:
1835:
1831:
1830:
1826:
1795:
1791:
1752:
1745:
1706:
1699:
1666:
1662:
1653:
1651:
1649:guide.iacrc.org
1643:
1642:
1638:
1629:
1627:
1625:guide.iacrc.org
1619:
1618:
1614:
1605:
1603:
1601:guide.iacrc.org
1595:
1594:
1590:
1581:
1579:
1577:guide.iacrc.org
1571:
1570:
1566:
1557:
1555:
1553:guide.iacrc.org
1547:
1546:
1542:
1533:
1531:
1529:guide.iacrc.org
1523:
1522:
1518:
1509:
1507:
1505:guide.iacrc.org
1499:
1498:
1494:
1485:
1483:
1481:guide.iacrc.org
1475:
1474:
1470:
1465:
1342:
1340:Further reading
1329:Organized crime
1300:
1291:
1247:
1242:
1200:
1184:
1175:
1155:
1147:Competition Act
1143:
1131:
1126:
1113:
1067:
1062:
1057:
1049:Vickrey auction
1012:
998:In the UK, the
996:
987:
940:
900:
825:
820:
785:
756:
726:
691:
596:
592:Tacit collusion
541:
457:Multi-attribute
285:
181:Refusal to deal
160:Tacit collusion
106:Relevant market
30:Competition law
24:
21:
12:
11:
5:
2482:
2472:
2471:
2466:
2461:
2456:
2440:
2439:
2396:
2375:
2354:
2343:Britannica.com
2330:
2305:
2284:
2271:
2258:
2252:Wedlake Bell,
2245:
2229:
2210:(2): 185–191.
2194:
2166:
2163:on 2020-01-01.
2113:
2086:
2059:(1): 211–227.
2043:
2019:
1995:
1970:
1946:
1903:
1879:
1862:
1845:
1824:
1805:(4): 419–423.
1789:
1762:(4): 451–465.
1743:
1716:(4): 603–623.
1697:
1683:10.3386/w23962
1660:
1636:
1612:
1588:
1564:
1540:
1516:
1492:
1467:
1466:
1464:
1461:
1460:
1459:
1439:10.2307/422247
1422:
1401:
1372:
1341:
1338:
1337:
1336:
1331:
1326:
1321:
1316:
1311:
1306:
1299:
1296:
1290:
1287:
1246:
1243:
1241:
1238:
1199:
1198:United Kingdom
1196:
1183:
1180:
1174:
1171:
1159:European Union
1154:
1151:
1142:
1139:
1130:
1127:
1125:
1122:
1112:
1109:
1066:
1063:
1061:
1058:
1056:
1053:
1044:
1043:
1040:
1037:
1034:
1011:
1008:
995:
992:
986:
985:Economic costs
983:
978:
977:
967:
956:
939:
936:
935:
934:
931:Bid delegation
928:
921:
907:
899:
893:
892:
891:
885:
878:
872:
865:
859:
852:
851:
850:
847:
844:
841:
832:
824:
821:
819:
816:
787:
786:
784:
783:
776:
769:
761:
758:
757:
755:
754:
749:
744:
738:
735:
734:
728:
727:
725:
724:
722:Winner's curse
719:
714:
709:
703:
700:
699:
693:
692:
690:
689:
684:
679:
674:
669:
664:
659:
654:
649:
644:
639:
634:
629:
624:
619:
614:
608:
605:
604:
598:
597:
595:
594:
589:
584:
579:
574:
569:
564:
559:
553:
550:
549:
543:
542:
540:
539:
534:
529:
524:
519:
514:
509:
504:
499:
494:
489:
484:
479:
474:
469:
464:
459:
454:
449:
444:
439:
434:
429:
424:
419:
414:
409:
404:
399:
394:
389:
384:
379:
374:
369:
364:
359:
354:
349:
348:
347:
342:
337:
326:
323:
322:
316:
315:
307:
306:
300:
299:
287:
286:
284:
283:
276:
269:
261:
258:
257:
256:
255:
250:
242:
241:
237:
236:
235:
234:
229:
224:
215:
210:
205:
200:
195:
194:
193:
188:
178:
169:
168:
167:
162:
157:
152:
142:
131:
129:Monopolization
123:
122:
116:
115:
114:
113:
111:Merger control
108:
103:
98:
93:
88:
83:
78:
77:
76:
71:
57:
49:
48:
47:Basic concepts
44:
43:
33:
32:
22:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2481:
2470:
2467:
2465:
2462:
2460:
2457:
2455:
2452:
2451:
2449:
2435:
2431:
2427:
2423:
2419:
2415:
2411:
2407:
2400:
2385:
2379:
2364:
2358:
2344:
2340:
2334:
2319:
2315:
2309:
2294:
2288:
2281:
2275:
2268:
2262:
2255:
2249:
2242:
2236:
2234:
2225:
2221:
2217:
2213:
2209:
2205:
2198:
2184:
2180:
2173:
2171:
2159:
2155:
2151:
2147:
2143:
2139:
2135:
2131:
2124:
2117:
2103:
2102:The Economist
2099:
2093:
2091:
2082:
2078:
2074:
2070:
2066:
2062:
2058:
2054:
2047:
2033:
2029:
2023:
2009:
2006:
1999:
1985:
1981:
1974:
1960:
1956:
1950:
1942:
1938:
1934:
1930:
1926:
1922:
1918:
1914:
1907:
1893:
1889:
1883:
1876:
1872:
1866:
1859:
1855:
1849:
1841:
1834:
1828:
1820:
1816:
1812:
1808:
1804:
1800:
1793:
1785:
1781:
1777:
1773:
1769:
1765:
1761:
1757:
1750:
1748:
1739:
1735:
1731:
1727:
1723:
1719:
1715:
1711:
1704:
1702:
1693:
1689:
1684:
1679:
1675:
1671:
1664:
1650:
1646:
1640:
1626:
1622:
1616:
1602:
1598:
1592:
1578:
1574:
1568:
1554:
1550:
1544:
1530:
1526:
1520:
1506:
1502:
1496:
1482:
1478:
1472:
1468:
1456:
1452:
1448:
1444:
1440:
1436:
1432:
1428:
1423:
1419:
1418:10.3386/w4013
1415:
1411:
1407:
1402:
1398:
1394:
1390:
1386:
1382:
1378:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1361:
1357:
1353:
1349:
1344:
1343:
1335:
1332:
1330:
1327:
1325:
1322:
1320:
1317:
1315:
1312:
1310:
1307:
1305:
1302:
1301:
1295:
1286:
1283:
1281:
1277:
1276:Tadahiro Ando
1272:
1269:
1264:
1259:
1255:
1251:
1237:
1235:
1231:
1226:
1222:
1218:
1214:
1212:
1207:
1205:
1195:
1193:
1189:
1179:
1170:
1168:
1164:
1160:
1150:
1148:
1138:
1136:
1129:United States
1124:North America
1121:
1119:
1108:
1107:
1105:
1100:
1096:
1090:
1088:
1084:
1080:
1076:
1072:
1060:South America
1052:
1050:
1041:
1038:
1035:
1032:
1031:
1030:
1028:
1024:
1019:
1015:
1007:
1005:
1002:published an
1001:
991:
982:
975:
971:
968:
965:
960:
957:
954:
949:
945:
942:
941:
932:
929:
925:
922:
919:
915:
914:cover bidding
911:
908:
905:
902:
901:
898:
889:
886:
882:
879:
876:
873:
869:
866:
863:
860:
856:
853:
848:
845:
842:
839:
838:
836:
833:
830:
827:
826:
815:
813:
812:call for bids
809:
805:
801:
797:
793:
782:
777:
775:
770:
768:
763:
762:
760:
759:
753:
750:
748:
745:
743:
740:
739:
737:
736:
733:
730:
729:
723:
720:
718:
715:
713:
710:
708:
707:Digital goods
705:
704:
702:
701:
698:
695:
694:
688:
685:
683:
680:
678:
675:
673:
670:
668:
665:
663:
660:
658:
655:
653:
650:
648:
645:
643:
640:
638:
635:
633:
630:
628:
625:
623:
620:
618:
615:
613:
610:
609:
607:
606:
603:
600:
599:
593:
590:
588:
585:
583:
580:
578:
575:
573:
570:
568:
565:
563:
560:
558:
555:
554:
552:
551:
548:
545:
544:
538:
535:
533:
530:
528:
525:
523:
520:
518:
515:
513:
510:
508:
507:Uniform price
505:
503:
502:Traffic light
500:
498:
495:
493:
490:
488:
485:
483:
480:
478:
475:
473:
470:
468:
465:
463:
460:
458:
455:
453:
450:
448:
445:
443:
440:
438:
435:
433:
430:
428:
425:
423:
420:
418:
415:
413:
410:
408:
405:
403:
400:
398:
395:
393:
392:Combinatorial
390:
388:
385:
383:
380:
378:
375:
373:
370:
368:
367:Best/not best
365:
363:
362:Barter double
360:
358:
355:
353:
350:
346:
343:
341:
338:
336:
333:
332:
331:
328:
327:
325:
324:
321:
318:
317:
313:
309:
308:
305:
302:
301:
297:
293:
292:
282:
277:
275:
270:
268:
263:
262:
260:
259:
254:
251:
249:
246:
245:
244:
243:
239:
238:
233:
230:
228:
225:
223:
219:
216:
214:
211:
209:
206:
204:
201:
199:
196:
192:
189:
187:
186:Group boycott
184:
183:
182:
179:
177:
173:
170:
166:
163:
161:
158:
156:
153:
150:
146:
143:
141:
138:Formation of
137:
136:
135:
132:
130:
127:
126:
125:
124:
121:
118:
117:
112:
109:
107:
104:
102:
99:
97:
94:
92:
89:
87:
84:
82:
79:
75:
72:
70:
67:
66:
65:
61:
58:
56:
53:
52:
51:
50:
46:
45:
39:
35:
34:
31:
28:
27:
19:
2412:(1): 73–88.
2409:
2405:
2399:
2388:. Retrieved
2378:
2367:. Retrieved
2357:
2346:. Retrieved
2342:
2333:
2322:. Retrieved
2320:. 1995-03-09
2317:
2308:
2297:. Retrieved
2287:
2274:
2261:
2248:
2207:
2203:
2197:
2186:. Retrieved
2182:
2158:the original
2129:
2116:
2105:. Retrieved
2101:
2056:
2052:
2046:
2035:. Retrieved
2032:www.oecd.org
2031:
2022:
2011:. Retrieved
2007:
1998:
1987:. Retrieved
1983:
1973:
1962:. Retrieved
1958:
1949:
1916:
1906:
1895:. Retrieved
1892:www.oecd.org
1891:
1882:
1865:
1857:
1848:
1839:
1827:
1802:
1798:
1792:
1759:
1755:
1713:
1709:
1673:
1663:
1652:. Retrieved
1648:
1639:
1628:. Retrieved
1624:
1615:
1604:. Retrieved
1600:
1591:
1580:. Retrieved
1576:
1567:
1556:. Retrieved
1552:
1543:
1532:. Retrieved
1528:
1519:
1508:. Retrieved
1504:
1495:
1484:. Retrieved
1480:
1471:
1430:
1426:
1409:
1405:
1380:
1376:
1351:
1347:
1334:Price fixing
1292:
1284:
1273:
1267:
1262:
1257:
1253:
1252:
1248:
1227:
1223:
1220:
1216:
1208:
1201:
1185:
1176:
1156:
1144:
1132:
1114:
1102:
1091:
1068:
1045:
1020:
1016:
1013:
997:
988:
979:
974:toxic assets
969:
958:
947:
944:Phantom bids
943:
930:
924:Bid rotation
923:
917:
913:
909:
903:
887:
880:
874:
867:
861:
854:
834:
828:
804:price fixing
791:
790:
642:Domain names
576:
497:Single-price
397:Common value
232:Rent-seeking
154:
145:Price fixing
96:Market power
2003:Mano, Ana.
1182:Switzerland
1161:(EU) under
1135:Sherman Act
1087:BTG Pactual
1025:(OECD), in
1010:Remediation
1004:open letter
796:procurement
792:Bid rigging
357:Anglo-Dutch
340:Bidding fee
155:Bid rigging
2448:Categories
2390:2011-12-17
2369:2011-12-17
2348:2011-12-17
2324:2011-12-17
2299:2011-12-17
2188:2018-09-11
2107:2018-09-11
2037:2018-09-11
2013:2018-09-11
1989:2018-09-11
1964:2018-09-11
1897:2018-09-11
1852:Cave, B.,
1654:2018-09-11
1630:2018-09-11
1606:2018-09-11
1582:2018-09-11
1558:2018-09-11
1534:2018-09-11
1510:2018-09-11
1486:2018-09-11
1463:References
1319:Corruption
1187:colluding.
948:shill bids
612:Algorithms
512:Unique bid
467:No-reserve
222:copyrights
101:SSNIP test
2434:153429133
2426:0889-938X
2224:2041-7764
2154:159767037
2146:1556-5068
2081:154382209
2073:1744-1056
1941:167452901
1933:1556-5068
1819:0165-1765
1784:153988096
1776:0889-938X
1738:146369439
1730:1052-150X
1447:0010-4159
1389:0741-6261
1368:0033-3352
1314:Collusion
1274:In 2006,
1083:JP Morgan
1075:Petrobras
1069:Brazil's
994:Detection
895:Within a
858:allotted.
808:contracts
800:collusion
677:Virginity
532:Walrasian
462:Multiunit
372:Brazilian
352:Amsterdam
134:Collusion
64:oligopoly
2267:Judgment
1858:Lexology
1692:44056837
1298:See also
1234:turnover
1173:Slovakia
1111:Colombia
959:Buy-back
752:Software
742:Ebidding
667:Spectrum
632:Children
602:Contexts
482:Scottish
452:Knapsack
447:Japanese
377:Calcutta
304:Auctions
296:a series
294:Part of
60:Monopoly
1842:. 2009.
1397:2555995
1304:Bribery
1106:(CADE).
953:Sniping
871:choice.
647:Flowers
637:Players
627:Charity
587:Suicide
582:Sniping
577:Rigging
557:Shading
547:Bidding
522:Vickrey
477:Reverse
427:Forward
422:English
335:Chinese
330:All-pay
140:cartels
2432:
2424:
2222:
2152:
2144:
2079:
2071:
1939:
1931:
1817:
1782:
1774:
1736:
1728:
1690:
1455:422247
1453:
1445:
1395:
1387:
1366:
1309:Cartel
1192:Aargau
1153:Europe
1141:Canada
1065:Brazil
897:cartel
732:Online
697:Theory
672:Stamps
662:Slaves
537:Yankee
432:French
412:Double
382:Candle
345:Dollar
2430:S2CID
2161:(PDF)
2150:S2CID
2126:(PDF)
2077:S2CID
1937:S2CID
1836:(PDF)
1780:S2CID
1734:S2CID
1688:S2CID
1451:JSTOR
1393:JSTOR
1289:Korea
1268:dango
1263:dango
1258:Dango
1254:Dango
1245:Japan
818:Forms
687:Wives
652:Loans
617:Autos
417:Dutch
320:Types
176:tying
149:cases
2422:ISSN
2220:ISSN
2142:ISSN
2069:ISSN
1929:ISSN
1840:OECD
1815:ISSN
1772:ISSN
1726:ISSN
1443:ISSN
1385:ISSN
1364:ISSN
1240:Asia
1167:RAND
1118:OECD
1085:and
1021:The
682:Wine
657:Scam
572:Jump
472:Rank
220:and
174:and
62:and
2414:doi
2212:doi
2134:doi
2061:doi
2008:U.S
1984:U.S
1921:doi
1807:doi
1764:doi
1718:doi
1678:doi
1435:doi
1414:doi
1410:101
1356:doi
946:or
916:or
622:Art
2450::
2428:.
2420:.
2410:21
2408:.
2341:.
2316:.
2232:^
2218:.
2206:.
2181:.
2169:^
2148:.
2140:.
2132:.
2128:.
2100:.
2089:^
2075:.
2067:.
2055:.
2030:.
1982:.
1957:.
1935:.
1927:.
1919:.
1915:.
1890:.
1856:,
1838:.
1813:.
1803:42
1801:.
1778:.
1770:.
1760:19
1758:.
1746:^
1732:.
1724:.
1714:14
1712:.
1700:^
1686:.
1672:.
1647:.
1623:.
1599:.
1575:.
1551:.
1527:.
1503:.
1479:.
1449:.
1441:.
1431:25
1429:.
1408:.
1391:.
1381:26
1379:.
1362:.
1352:67
1350:.
1206:.
1149:.
298:on
2436:.
2416::
2393:.
2372:.
2351:.
2327:.
2302:.
2226:.
2214::
2208:4
2191:.
2136::
2110:.
2083:.
2063::
2057:8
2040:.
2016:.
1992:.
1967:.
1943:.
1923::
1900:.
1821:.
1809::
1786:.
1766::
1740:.
1720::
1694:.
1680::
1657:.
1633:.
1609:.
1585:.
1561:.
1537:.
1513:.
1489:.
1457:.
1437::
1420:.
1416::
1399:.
1370:.
1358::
966:.
780:e
773:t
766:v
280:e
273:t
266:v
151:)
147:(
20:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
