312:
1144:. If either firm chooses low advertising while the other chooses high, then the low-advertising firm will suffer a great loss in market share while the other experiences a boost. If they both choose high advertising, then neither firms' market share will increase but their advertising costs will increase, thus lowering their profits. If they both choose to stay at the normal level of advertising, then sales will remain constant without the added advertising expense. Thus, both firms will experience a greater payoff if they both choose normal advertising (this set of actions is unstable, as both are tempted to defect to higher advertising to increase payoffs). A
2590:
1024:"A few years ago, two companies were selling a textbook called The Making of a Fly. One of those sellers used an algorithm which essentially matched its rival’s price. That rival had an algorithm which always set a price 27% higher than the first. The result was that prices kept spiralling upwards, until finally someone noticed what was going on, and adjusted the price manually. By that time, the book was selling – or rather, not selling – for 23 million dollars a copy."
38:
1063:
944:, the most reliable firm emerges as the best barometer of market conditions, or the firm could be the one with the lowest costs of production, leading other firms to follow suit. Although this firm might not be dominating the industry, its prices are believed to reflect market conditions which are the most satisfactory, as the firm would most likely be a good forecaster of economic changes.
1203:) (this threat is credible since symmetric use of aggressive advertising is a Nash equilibrium of each stage of the game). Each firm must then weigh the short term gain of $ 30 from 'cheating' against the long term loss of $ 35 in all future periods that comes as part of its punishment. Provided that firms care enough about the future, collusion is an equilibrium of this repeated game.
956:, bidders might participate in a tacit collusion to keep bids low. A profitable collusion is possible, if the number of bidders is finite and the identity of the winner is publicly observable. It can be very difficult or even impossible for the seller to detect such collusion from the distribution of bids only. In case of
1198:
In general, if the payoffs for colluding (normal, normal) are greater than the payoffs for cheating (aggressive, aggressive), then the two firms will want to collude (tacitly). Although this collusive arrangement is not an equilibrium in the one-shot game above, repeating the game allows the firms to
1199:
sustain collusion over long time periods. This can be achieved, for example if each firm's strategy is to undertake normal advertising so long as its rival does likewise, and to pursue aggressive advertising forever as soon as its rival has used an aggressive advertising campaign at least once (see:
1139:
game over an indefinite number of periods (effectively saying 'infinitely many'). Both of the firms' payoffs are contingent upon their own action, but more importantly the action of their competitor. They can choose to stay at the current level of advertising or choose a more aggressive advertising
870:
This practice can be harmful to consumers who, if the market power of the firm is used, can be forced to pay monopoly prices for goods that should be selling for only a little more than the cost of production. Nevertheless, it is very hard to prosecute because it may occur without any collusion
906:. Price leadership is the form of a tacit collusion, whereby firms orient at the price set by a leader. A price leader will then emerge and set the general industry price, with other firms following suit. For example, see the case of British Salt Limited and New Cheshire Salt Works Limited.
866:
that occurs without an actual agreement or at least without any evidence of an actual agreement between the players. In result, one competitor will take the lead in raising or lowering prices. The others will then follow suit, raising or lowering their prices by the same amount, with the
806:. In a concerted action also known as concerted activity, competitors exchange some information without reaching any explicit agreement, while conscious parallelism implies no communication. In both types of tacit collusion, competitors agree to play a certain strategy
987:
bidding information by embedding it into digits of the bids. Economic theory predicts a higher difficulty for tacit collusions due to those precautions. In general, transparency in auctions always increases the risk of a tacit collusion.
1375:
965:"It requires that all the bidders reach an implicit agreement about who should get what. With thirty diverse bidders unable to communicate about strategy except through their bids, forming such unanimous agreement is difficult at best."
2297:
1305:
849:
the tacit collusion between these retailers. BP emerged as a price leader and influenced the behavior of the competitors. As result, the timing of price jumps became coordinated and the margins started to grow in 2010.
1048:
algorithms with more general goals. Self-learning AI algorithms might form a tacit collusion without the knowledge of their human programmers as result of the task to determine optimal prices in any market situation.
1596:
982:
used by governmental agencies in spectrum auctions restricts the number of valid bids and offers them as a list to a bidder to choose from. Click-box bidding was invented in 1997 by FCC to prevent bidders from
2305:
1191:
Notice that Nash's equilibrium is set at both firms choosing an aggressive advertising strategy. This is to protect themselves against lost sales. This game is an example of a
1041:
Competition
Committee Roundtable "Algorithms and Collusion" took place in June 2017 in order to address the risk of possible anti-competitive behaviour by algorithms.
100:
1227:
1780:
1317:
1044:
It is important to distinguish between simple algorithms intentionally programmed to raise price according to the competitors and more sophisticated self-learning
2137:
771:
2168:
FCC Record: A Comprehensive
Compilation of Decisions, Reports, Public Notices, and Other Documents of the Federal Communications Commission of the United States
798:
between competitors who do not explicitly exchange information but achieve an agreement about coordination of conduct. There are two types of tacit collusion:
2932:
1235:
875:
have held that no violation of the antitrust laws occurs where firms independently raise or lower prices, but that a violation can be shown when
1961:
British Salt
Limited and New Cheshire Salt Works Limited: A Report on the Acquisition by British Salt Limited of New Cheshire Salt Works Limited
2190:
Bichler, Martin; Gretschko, Vitali; Janssen, Maarten (1 June 2017). "Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015".
1019:
mentioned an early example of algorithmic tacit collusion in her speech on "Algorithms and
Collusion" on March 16, 2017, described as follows:
2358:
921:
are able to extract optimum revenue by offering fewer units at a higher cost. An oligopoly where each firm acts independently tends toward
862:, some sources use conscious parallelism as a synonym to tacit collusion in order to describe pricing strategies among competitors in an
898:
usually try not to engage in price cutting, excessive advertising or other forms of competition. Thus, there may be unwritten rules of
1812:
278:
1630:
1565:
1835:
1519:
2621:
2801:
883:
and taking actions against their own economic self-interests. This procedure of the courts is sometimes called as setting of a
2388:"Tacit Collusion on Steroids: The Potential Risks for Competition Resulting from the Use of Algorithm Technology by Companies"
2540:
1969:
1935:
526:
1787:
2963:
2550:
2437:
311:
2743:
1110:
971:
778:
516:
247:
1661:
1092:
1084:
441:
1959:
2640:
1879:
436:
2988:
1088:
884:
491:
486:
85:
2983:
1388:
271:
190:
2511:
2462:
830:
711:
406:
20:
2758:
2711:
566:
401:
2238:
Ezrachi, A.; Stucke, M. E. (13 March 2020). "Sustainable and unchallenged algorithmic tacit collusion".
2467:
119:
54:
2973:
2645:
2616:
2516:
2454:
746:
2024:
1907:
1766:
1504:
2968:
2796:
2386:
Hutchinson, Christophe Samuel; Ruchkina, Gulnara
Fliurovna; Pavlikov, Sergei Guerasimovich (2021).
1403:
1073:
661:
264:
2877:
2662:
2269:"Horizontal Restraint Regulations in the EU and the US in the Era of Algorithmic Tacit Collusion"
1473:
1077:
646:
456:
2897:
2557:
2430:
1030:
984:
164:
1738:
1730:
1370:{\displaystyle 30<{\frac {\delta }{1-\delta }}35\Leftrightarrow \delta >{\frac {6}{13}}}
2706:
2611:
2011:
1894:
1753:
1491:
1212:
1192:
1013:
706:
651:
611:
506:
501:
391:
366:
252:
2978:
2917:
2882:
2720:
2667:
2574:
1418:
922:
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496:
396:
207:
202:
90:
8:
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2902:
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1398:
1207:
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716:
641:
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339:
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1016:
671:
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466:
226:
148:
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2059:
1965:
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914:
721:
676:
531:
461:
371:
351:
295:
212:
197:
80:
68:
975:
917:
is attained at a price equal to the incremental cost of producing additional units.
2958:
2953:
2753:
2701:
2684:
2606:
2598:
2399:
2336:
2276:
2207:
2199:
2111:
2051:
1531:
1438:
1408:
1229:. The discounted value of the cost to cheating and being punished indefinitely are
1132:
1034:
957:
764:
751:
666:
561:
481:
451:
446:
376:
221:
175:
171:
73:
1000:
to determine prices, a tacit collusion between them imposes a much higher danger.
2569:
2446:
2203:
2166:
1925:
1393:
1311:
The firms therefore prefer not to cheat (so that collusion is an equilibrium) if
1300:{\displaystyle \sum _{t=1}^{\infty }\delta ^{t}35={\frac {\delta }{1-\delta }}35}
910:
859:
626:
586:
581:
521:
476:
426:
421:
334:
329:
180:
105:
29:
2912:
2846:
2823:
2657:
2652:
2635:
2628:
2521:
2281:
2268:
929:
as price leadership tends toward higher profitability for all, though it is an
838:
731:
696:
636:
536:
431:
411:
381:
344:
128:
110:
2589:
361:
2947:
2786:
2528:
2499:
2477:
2251:
2221:
2123:
2063:
1700:
1448:
1145:
631:
416:
217:
185:
1993:
2867:
2841:
2831:
2808:
2689:
1200:
686:
681:
656:
616:
571:
471:
231:
144:
95:
1566:"Matsushita and the Role of Economists with Regard to Proof of Conspiracy"
601:
2887:
2836:
2677:
2533:
1136:
1128:
930:
834:
621:
576:
556:
154:
2212:
2096:
1813:"Emerging Antitrust Threats and Enforcement Actions in the Online World"
2694:
2672:
2404:
2387:
2071:
2039:
1708:
1684:
1543:
1001:
319:
2922:
2562:
1443:
1428:
997:
926:
899:
895:
880:
863:
795:
133:
63:
37:
2055:
1535:
1062:
2851:
2813:
2545:
2487:
2040:"Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring"
1423:
1141:
918:
741:
59:
1033:, written in 1992, briefly achieved a price of $ 23,698,655.93 on
2472:
2359:"Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age"
2332:"How A Book About Flies Came To Be Priced $ 24 Million On Amazon"
1124:
953:
546:
303:
1135:). Let's take an example of two firms A and B, who both play an
2506:
1520:"Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary"
978:, limiting the number of bids and anonymous bidding. So called
974:(FCC) experimented with precautions for spectrum auctions like
826:
139:
2240:
Northwestern
Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property
2165:
Commission, United States
Federal Communications (June 2008).
2748:
2097:"Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions"
872:
842:
1666:
Northwestern
Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
960:, some sources claim that a tacit collusion is easily upset:
19:"Conscious parallelism" redirects here. For other uses, see
2494:
2415:
2138:"Bundesnetzagentur stärkt Deutschland als Leitmarkt für 5G"
1958:
Commission, Great
Britain: Competition (30 November 2005).
1866:
The
Economics of Antitrust Injury and Firm-specific Damages
1038:
2385:
1662:"Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion"
2189:
1880:"Summary Judgements in Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation"
1123:
Tacit collusion is best understood in the context of a
1045:
845:
gathered in the years 2001 to 2015 was used to show by
822:
1320:
1238:
1215:
1781:"Oligopolies, Conscious Parallelism and Concertatio"
1731:"Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline"
1836:"Can Conspiracy Theory Solve the Oligopoly Problem"
2933:Task allocation and partitioning of social insects
1991:
1729:Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas (23 July 2018).
1369:
1299:
1221:
2309:(Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition)
1685:"The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership"
1012:are essential for the development of e-commerce.
2945:
386:
1206:To be more precise, suppose that firms have a
936:There exist two types of price leadership. In
2431:
2237:
2095:Bajari, Patrick; Yeo, Jungwon (1 June 2009).
1810:
1659:
772:
272:
1992:Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Hopenhayn, Hugo (2001).
1728:
1563:
2090:
2088:
1811:Ezrachi, Ariel; Stucke, Maurice E. (2017).
1660:Fzrachi, Ariel; Stucke, Maurice E. (2019).
1091:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
940:, the price leader is the biggest firm. In
867:understanding that greater profits result.
2438:
2424:
2164:
1957:
1877:
1594:
1471:
779:
765:
279:
265:
2403:
2280:
2211:
2094:
1919:
1917:
1111:Learn how and when to remove this message
240:Enforcement authorities and organizations
2295:
2085:
1864:Kevin Scott Marshall, Stephen H. Kalos,
879:occur, such as firms being motivated to
853:
2263:
2261:
2233:
2231:
1682:
2946:
2037:
1994:"Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions"
1923:
1914:
2541:Patterns of self-organization in ants
2419:
2329:
1951:
1833:
1635:Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
1570:Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
1517:
996:Once the competitors are able to use
2258:
2228:
1631:"Communication and Concerted Action"
1628:
1467:
1465:
1089:adding citations to reliable sources
1056:
2171:. Federal Communications Commission
1733:. Social Science Research Network.
890:
13:
2551:symmetry breaking of escaping ants
1255:
1052:
1029:The book "The Making of a Fly" by
36:
14:
3000:
1930:. Financial Times Prentice Hall.
1557:
1462:
1148:is presented with numbers given:
1004:is one of the major premises for
972:Federal Communications Commission
248:International Competition Network
2588:
2330:Solon, Olivia (April 27, 2011).
2273:Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
2116:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.04.001
2104:Information Economics and Policy
1564:Shulman, Daniel R. (2006–2007).
1524:University of Chicago Law Review
1061:
942:barometric firm price leadership
821:A dataset of gasoline prices of
812:oligopolistic price coordination
310:
2379:
2351:
2323:
2289:
2183:
2158:
2130:
2031:
1985:
1871:
1858:
1827:
1804:
1604:Handbook of Antitrust Economics
1773:
1722:
1676:
1653:
1622:
1588:
1511:
1472:Harrington, Joseph E. (2012).
1348:
1177:Firm A aggressive advertising
1159:Firm B aggressive advertising
976:restricting visibility of bids
938:dominant firm price leadership
925:at the ideal, but such covert
253:List of competition regulators
1:
1834:Marks, Randall David (1986).
1817:Competition Law International
1474:"A theory of tacit collusion"
1455:
1389:Accumulation by dispossession
991:
16:Collusion between competitors
2512:Mixed-species foraging flock
2463:Agent-based model in biology
2445:
2298:"Algorithms and competition"
2296:Vestager, Margrethe (2017).
2204:10.1016/j.telpol.2017.01.005
1689:The American Economic Review
808:without explicitly saying so
7:
2759:Particle swarm optimization
1381:
1006:algorithmic tacit collusion
947:
10:
3005:
2964:Anti-competitive practices
2468:Collective animal behavior
2282:10.14324/111.2052-1871.098
1878:Rogers III, C. P. (1978).
1683:Markham, Jesse W. (1951).
1595:Buccirossi, Paolo (2008).
1518:Vaska, Michael K. (1985).
1164:Firm A normal advertising
120:Anti-competitive practices
86:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
55:History of competition law
18:
2860:
2822:
2777:
2729:
2597:
2586:
2453:
2192:Telecommunications Policy
1964:. The Stationery Office.
1629:Page, William H. (2007).
1156:Firm B normal advertising
871:between the competitors.
747:Private electronic market
2797:Self-propelled particles
2038:Compte, Olivier (1998).
1597:"Facilitating practices"
1404:Laissez-faire Capitalism
442:Generalized second-price
2878:Collective intelligence
2744:Ant colony optimization
1222:{\displaystyle \delta }
1185:Each earns $ 15 profit
437:Generalized first-price
2898:Microbial intelligence
2558:Shoaling and schooling
2019:Cite journal requires
1902:Cite journal requires
1761:Cite journal requires
1499:Cite journal requires
1371:
1301:
1259:
1223:
1167:Each earns $ 50 profit
1031:Peter Anthony Lawrence
1027:
968:
492:Simultaneous ascending
165:Occupational licensing
41:
2989:Pricing controversies
1924:Sloman, John (2006).
1372:
1302:
1239:
1224:
1021:
1014:European Commissioner
962:
854:Conscious parallelism
804:conscious parallelism
527:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
40:
2984:Cheating in business
2918:Spatial organization
2883:Decentralised system
2721:Sea turtle migration
2575:Swarming (honey bee)
1419:Malicious compliance
1318:
1236:
1213:
1180:Firm A: $ 80 profit
1172:Firm B: $ 80 profit
1085:improve this section
847:statistical analysis
810:. It is also called
407:Discriminatory price
208:Occupational closure
203:Dividing territories
191:Essential facilities
91:Market concentration
2893:Group size measures
2455:Biological swarming
2302:European Commission
1840:Maryland Law Review
1399:Cournot competition
1170:Firm A: $ 0 profit
1127:and the concept of
717:Revenue equivalence
402:Deferred-acceptance
2908:Predator satiation
2769:Swarm (simulation)
2764:Swarm intelligence
2739:Agent-based models
2570:Swarming behaviour
2405:10.3390/su13020951
1414:Price fixing cases
1367:
1297:
1219:
1193:prisoner's dilemma
1182:Firm B: $ 0 profit
1017:Margrethe Vestager
1010:pricing algorithms
487:Sealed first-price
227:Regulatory capture
42:
2941:
2940:
2928:Military swarming
2873:Animal navigation
2792:Collective motion
2779:Collective motion
2646:reverse migration
2580:Swarming motility
2145:Bundesnetzagentur
1971:978-0-11-703625-3
1937:978-0-273-70512-3
1434:Predatory pricing
1365:
1343:
1292:
1189:
1188:
1121:
1120:
1113:
980:click-box bidding
958:spectrum auctions
915:Pareto efficiency
902:behavior such as
885:conspiracy theory
816:tacit parallelism
789:
788:
567:Cancellation hunt
517:Value of revenues
387:Click-box bidding
289:
288:
218:Misuse of patents
213:Predatory pricing
198:Exclusive dealing
81:Barriers to entry
69:Coercive monopoly
2996:
2974:Bidding strategy
2754:Crowd simulation
2731:Swarm algorithms
2702:Insect migration
2607:Animal migration
2599:Animal migration
2592:
2517:Mobbing behavior
2440:
2433:
2426:
2417:
2416:
2410:
2409:
2407:
2383:
2377:
2376:
2374:
2372:
2363:
2355:
2349:
2348:
2346:
2344:
2327:
2321:
2320:
2318:
2316:
2310:
2304:. Archived from
2293:
2287:
2286:
2284:
2275:. 13 June 2018.
2265:
2256:
2255:
2235:
2226:
2225:
2215:
2198:(5–6): 325–340.
2187:
2181:
2180:
2178:
2176:
2162:
2156:
2155:
2153:
2151:
2142:
2134:
2128:
2127:
2101:
2092:
2083:
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2080:
2078:
2035:
2029:
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2022:
2017:
2015:
2007:
2005:
2003:
1998:
1989:
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1853:
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1831:
1825:
1824:
1808:
1802:
1801:
1799:
1798:
1792:
1786:. Archived from
1785:
1777:
1771:
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1764:
1759:
1757:
1749:
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1745:
1726:
1720:
1719:
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1515:
1509:
1508:
1502:
1497:
1495:
1487:
1485:
1483:
1478:
1469:
1439:Price leadership
1409:Nash equilibrium
1376:
1374:
1373:
1368:
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1358:
1344:
1342:
1328:
1306:
1304:
1303:
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1277:
1269:
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1253:
1228:
1226:
1225:
1220:
1151:
1150:
1133:Nash equilibrium
1116:
1109:
1105:
1102:
1096:
1065:
1057:
904:price leadership
891:Price leadership
800:concerted action
781:
774:
767:
712:Price of anarchy
562:Calor licitantis
314:
291:
290:
281:
274:
267:
172:Product bundling
74:Natural monopoly
26:
25:
3004:
3003:
2999:
2998:
2997:
2995:
2994:
2993:
2969:Competition law
2944:
2943:
2942:
2937:
2856:
2818:
2773:
2725:
2593:
2584:
2449:
2444:
2414:
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2314:
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2308:
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2259:
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2229:
2188:
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2174:
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2159:
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2147:
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2136:
2135:
2131:
2099:
2093:
2086:
2076:
2074:
2056:10.2307/2998576
2036:
2032:
2020:
2018:
2009:
2008:
2001:
1999:
1996:
1990:
1986:
1976:
1974:
1972:
1956:
1952:
1942:
1940:
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1922:
1915:
1903:
1901:
1892:
1891:
1884:
1882:
1876:
1872:
1868:(2008), p. 228.
1863:
1859:
1849:
1847:
1832:
1828:
1809:
1805:
1796:
1794:
1790:
1783:
1779:
1778:
1774:
1762:
1760:
1751:
1750:
1743:
1741:
1727:
1723:
1713:
1711:
1681:
1677:
1658:
1654:
1644:
1642:
1627:
1623:
1613:
1611:
1599:
1593:
1589:
1579:
1577:
1562:
1558:
1548:
1546:
1536:10.2307/1599667
1516:
1512:
1500:
1498:
1489:
1488:
1481:
1479:
1476:
1470:
1463:
1458:
1453:
1394:Competition law
1384:
1357:
1332:
1327:
1319:
1316:
1315:
1281:
1276:
1264:
1260:
1254:
1243:
1237:
1234:
1233:
1214:
1211:
1210:
1208:discount factor
1181:
1171:
1117:
1106:
1100:
1097:
1082:
1066:
1055:
1053:Duopoly example
994:
950:
911:economic theory
893:
860:competition law
856:
792:Tacit collusion
785:
756:
726:
691:
596:
592:Tacit collusion
541:
457:Multi-attribute
285:
181:Refusal to deal
160:Tacit collusion
106:Relevant market
30:Competition law
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3002:
2992:
2991:
2986:
2981:
2976:
2971:
2966:
2961:
2956:
2939:
2938:
2936:
2935:
2930:
2925:
2920:
2915:
2913:Quorum sensing
2910:
2905:
2900:
2895:
2890:
2885:
2880:
2875:
2870:
2864:
2862:
2861:Related topics
2858:
2857:
2855:
2854:
2849:
2847:Swarm robotics
2844:
2839:
2834:
2828:
2826:
2824:Swarm robotics
2820:
2819:
2817:
2816:
2811:
2806:
2805:
2804:
2794:
2789:
2783:
2781:
2775:
2774:
2772:
2771:
2766:
2761:
2756:
2751:
2746:
2741:
2735:
2733:
2727:
2726:
2724:
2723:
2718:
2717:
2716:
2715:
2714:
2699:
2698:
2697:
2692:
2682:
2681:
2680:
2675:
2670:
2665:
2658:Fish migration
2655:
2653:Cell migration
2650:
2649:
2648:
2643:
2636:Bird migration
2633:
2632:
2631:
2629:coded wire tag
2626:
2625:
2624:
2614:
2603:
2601:
2595:
2594:
2587:
2585:
2583:
2582:
2577:
2572:
2567:
2566:
2565:
2555:
2554:
2553:
2548:
2538:
2537:
2536:
2526:
2525:
2524:
2522:feeding frenzy
2514:
2509:
2504:
2503:
2502:
2492:
2491:
2490:
2485:
2475:
2470:
2465:
2459:
2457:
2451:
2450:
2443:
2442:
2435:
2428:
2420:
2412:
2411:
2392:Sustainability
2378:
2350:
2322:
2288:
2257:
2227:
2182:
2157:
2129:
2084:
2050:(3): 597–626.
2030:
2021:|journal=
1984:
1970:
1950:
1936:
1913:
1904:|journal=
1870:
1857:
1826:
1803:
1772:
1763:|journal=
1721:
1695:(5): 891–905.
1675:
1652:
1621:
1587:
1556:
1530:(2): 508–535.
1510:
1501:|journal=
1460:
1459:
1457:
1454:
1452:
1451:
1446:
1441:
1436:
1431:
1426:
1421:
1416:
1411:
1406:
1401:
1396:
1391:
1385:
1383:
1380:
1379:
1378:
1364:
1361:
1356:
1353:
1350:
1347:
1341:
1338:
1335:
1331:
1326:
1323:
1309:
1308:
1296:
1290:
1287:
1284:
1280:
1275:
1272:
1267:
1263:
1257:
1252:
1249:
1246:
1242:
1218:
1187:
1186:
1183:
1178:
1174:
1173:
1168:
1165:
1161:
1160:
1157:
1154:
1119:
1118:
1069:
1067:
1060:
1054:
1051:
993:
990:
970:Nevertheless,
949:
946:
892:
889:
855:
852:
787:
786:
784:
783:
776:
769:
761:
758:
757:
755:
754:
749:
744:
738:
735:
734:
728:
727:
725:
724:
722:Winner's curse
719:
714:
709:
703:
700:
699:
693:
692:
690:
689:
684:
679:
674:
669:
664:
659:
654:
649:
644:
639:
634:
629:
624:
619:
614:
608:
605:
604:
598:
597:
595:
594:
589:
584:
579:
574:
569:
564:
559:
553:
550:
549:
543:
542:
540:
539:
534:
529:
524:
519:
514:
509:
504:
499:
494:
489:
484:
479:
474:
469:
464:
459:
454:
449:
444:
439:
434:
429:
424:
419:
414:
409:
404:
399:
394:
389:
384:
379:
374:
369:
364:
359:
354:
349:
348:
347:
342:
337:
326:
323:
322:
316:
315:
307:
306:
300:
299:
287:
286:
284:
283:
276:
269:
261:
258:
257:
256:
255:
250:
242:
241:
237:
236:
235:
234:
229:
224:
215:
210:
205:
200:
195:
194:
193:
188:
178:
169:
168:
167:
162:
157:
152:
142:
131:
129:Monopolization
123:
122:
116:
115:
114:
113:
111:Merger control
108:
103:
98:
93:
88:
83:
78:
77:
76:
71:
57:
49:
48:
47:Basic concepts
44:
43:
33:
32:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3001:
2990:
2987:
2985:
2982:
2980:
2977:
2975:
2972:
2970:
2967:
2965:
2962:
2960:
2957:
2955:
2952:
2951:
2949:
2934:
2931:
2929:
2926:
2924:
2921:
2919:
2916:
2914:
2911:
2909:
2906:
2904:
2901:
2899:
2896:
2894:
2891:
2889:
2886:
2884:
2881:
2879:
2876:
2874:
2871:
2869:
2866:
2865:
2863:
2859:
2853:
2850:
2848:
2845:
2843:
2840:
2838:
2835:
2833:
2830:
2829:
2827:
2825:
2821:
2815:
2812:
2810:
2807:
2803:
2800:
2799:
2798:
2795:
2793:
2790:
2788:
2787:Active matter
2785:
2784:
2782:
2780:
2776:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2760:
2757:
2755:
2752:
2750:
2747:
2745:
2742:
2740:
2737:
2736:
2734:
2732:
2728:
2722:
2719:
2713:
2710:
2709:
2708:
2705:
2704:
2703:
2700:
2696:
2693:
2691:
2688:
2687:
2686:
2683:
2679:
2676:
2674:
2671:
2669:
2666:
2664:
2663:diel vertical
2661:
2660:
2659:
2656:
2654:
2651:
2647:
2644:
2642:
2639:
2638:
2637:
2634:
2630:
2627:
2623:
2620:
2619:
2618:
2615:
2613:
2610:
2609:
2608:
2605:
2604:
2602:
2600:
2596:
2591:
2581:
2578:
2576:
2573:
2571:
2568:
2564:
2561:
2560:
2559:
2556:
2552:
2549:
2547:
2544:
2543:
2542:
2539:
2535:
2532:
2531:
2530:
2527:
2523:
2520:
2519:
2518:
2515:
2513:
2510:
2508:
2505:
2501:
2500:herd behavior
2498:
2497:
2496:
2493:
2489:
2486:
2484:
2481:
2480:
2479:
2476:
2474:
2471:
2469:
2466:
2464:
2461:
2460:
2458:
2456:
2452:
2448:
2441:
2436:
2434:
2429:
2427:
2422:
2421:
2418:
2406:
2401:
2397:
2393:
2389:
2382:
2367:
2360:
2354:
2339:
2338:
2333:
2326:
2311:on 2019-11-29
2307:
2303:
2299:
2292:
2283:
2278:
2274:
2270:
2264:
2262:
2253:
2249:
2245:
2241:
2234:
2232:
2223:
2219:
2214:
2209:
2205:
2201:
2197:
2193:
2186:
2170:
2169:
2161:
2146:
2139:
2133:
2125:
2121:
2117:
2113:
2110:(2): 90–100.
2109:
2105:
2098:
2091:
2089:
2073:
2069:
2065:
2061:
2057:
2053:
2049:
2045:
2041:
2034:
2026:
2013:
1995:
1988:
1973:
1967:
1963:
1962:
1954:
1939:
1933:
1929:
1928:
1920:
1918:
1909:
1896:
1881:
1874:
1867:
1861:
1845:
1841:
1837:
1830:
1822:
1818:
1814:
1807:
1793:on 2007-07-08
1789:
1782:
1776:
1768:
1755:
1740:
1736:
1732:
1725:
1710:
1706:
1702:
1698:
1694:
1690:
1686:
1679:
1671:
1667:
1663:
1656:
1640:
1636:
1632:
1625:
1609:
1605:
1598:
1591:
1575:
1571:
1567:
1560:
1545:
1541:
1537:
1533:
1529:
1525:
1521:
1514:
1506:
1493:
1475:
1468:
1466:
1461:
1450:
1449:Whistleblower
1447:
1445:
1442:
1440:
1437:
1435:
1432:
1430:
1427:
1425:
1422:
1420:
1417:
1415:
1412:
1410:
1407:
1405:
1402:
1400:
1397:
1395:
1392:
1390:
1387:
1386:
1362:
1359:
1354:
1351:
1345:
1339:
1336:
1333:
1329:
1324:
1321:
1314:
1313:
1312:
1294:
1288:
1285:
1282:
1278:
1273:
1270:
1265:
1261:
1250:
1247:
1244:
1240:
1232:
1231:
1230:
1216:
1209:
1204:
1202:
1196:
1194:
1184:
1179:
1176:
1175:
1169:
1166:
1163:
1162:
1158:
1155:
1153:
1152:
1149:
1147:
1146:payoff matrix
1143:
1138:
1134:
1130:
1126:
1115:
1112:
1104:
1094:
1090:
1086:
1080:
1079:
1075:
1070:This section
1068:
1064:
1059:
1058:
1050:
1047:
1042:
1040:
1036:
1032:
1026:
1025:
1020:
1018:
1015:
1011:
1007:
1003:
999:
989:
986:
981:
977:
973:
967:
966:
961:
959:
955:
945:
943:
939:
934:
933:arrangement.
932:
928:
924:
920:
916:
912:
907:
905:
901:
897:
888:
886:
882:
878:
874:
868:
865:
861:
851:
848:
844:
840:
836:
832:
828:
824:
819:
817:
813:
809:
805:
801:
797:
793:
782:
777:
775:
770:
768:
763:
762:
760:
759:
753:
750:
748:
745:
743:
740:
739:
737:
736:
733:
730:
729:
723:
720:
718:
715:
713:
710:
708:
707:Digital goods
705:
704:
702:
701:
698:
695:
694:
688:
685:
683:
680:
678:
675:
673:
670:
668:
665:
663:
660:
658:
655:
653:
650:
648:
645:
643:
640:
638:
635:
633:
630:
628:
625:
623:
620:
618:
615:
613:
610:
609:
607:
606:
603:
600:
599:
593:
590:
588:
585:
583:
580:
578:
575:
573:
570:
568:
565:
563:
560:
558:
555:
554:
552:
551:
548:
545:
544:
538:
535:
533:
530:
528:
525:
523:
520:
518:
515:
513:
510:
508:
507:Uniform price
505:
503:
502:Traffic light
500:
498:
495:
493:
490:
488:
485:
483:
480:
478:
475:
473:
470:
468:
465:
463:
460:
458:
455:
453:
450:
448:
445:
443:
440:
438:
435:
433:
430:
428:
425:
423:
420:
418:
415:
413:
410:
408:
405:
403:
400:
398:
395:
393:
392:Combinatorial
390:
388:
385:
383:
380:
378:
375:
373:
370:
368:
367:Best/not best
365:
363:
362:Barter double
360:
358:
355:
353:
350:
346:
343:
341:
338:
336:
333:
332:
331:
328:
327:
325:
324:
321:
318:
317:
313:
309:
308:
305:
302:
301:
297:
293:
292:
282:
277:
275:
270:
268:
263:
262:
260:
259:
254:
251:
249:
246:
245:
244:
243:
239:
238:
233:
230:
228:
225:
223:
219:
216:
214:
211:
209:
206:
204:
201:
199:
196:
192:
189:
187:
186:Group boycott
184:
183:
182:
179:
177:
173:
170:
166:
163:
161:
158:
156:
153:
150:
146:
143:
141:
138:Formation of
137:
136:
135:
132:
130:
127:
126:
125:
124:
121:
118:
117:
112:
109:
107:
104:
102:
99:
97:
94:
92:
89:
87:
84:
82:
79:
75:
72:
70:
67:
66:
65:
61:
58:
56:
53:
52:
51:
50:
46:
45:
39:
35:
34:
31:
28:
27:
22:
2868:Allee effect
2842:Nanorobotics
2832:Ant robotics
2809:Vicsek model
2395:
2391:
2381:
2369:. Retrieved
2365:
2353:
2341:. Retrieved
2335:
2325:
2313:. Retrieved
2306:the original
2291:
2272:
2243:
2239:
2213:10419/145809
2195:
2191:
2185:
2173:. Retrieved
2167:
2160:
2148:. Retrieved
2144:
2132:
2107:
2103:
2075:. Retrieved
2047:
2044:Econometrica
2043:
2033:
2012:cite journal
2000:. Retrieved
1987:
1975:. Retrieved
1960:
1953:
1941:. Retrieved
1926:
1895:cite journal
1883:. Retrieved
1873:
1865:
1860:
1848:. Retrieved
1843:
1839:
1829:
1820:
1816:
1806:
1795:. Retrieved
1788:the original
1775:
1754:cite journal
1742:. Retrieved
1724:
1712:. Retrieved
1692:
1688:
1678:
1669:
1665:
1655:
1643:. Retrieved
1638:
1634:
1624:
1612:. Retrieved
1607:
1603:
1590:
1578:. Retrieved
1573:
1569:
1559:
1547:. Retrieved
1527:
1523:
1513:
1492:cite journal
1480:. Retrieved
1310:
1205:
1201:grim trigger
1197:
1190:
1122:
1107:
1098:
1083:Please help
1071:
1043:
1037:in 2011. An
1028:
1023:
1022:
1005:
995:
979:
969:
964:
963:
952:In repeated
951:
941:
937:
935:
908:
903:
896:Oligopolists
894:
877:plus factors
876:
869:
857:
820:
815:
811:
807:
803:
799:
791:
790:
642:Domain names
591:
497:Single-price
397:Common value
232:Rent-seeking
159:
145:Price fixing
96:Market power
2979:Game theory
2888:Eusociality
2837:Microbotics
2707:butterflies
2678:sardine run
2612:altitudinal
2534:pack hunter
1137:advertising
1129:game theory
927:cooperation
923:equilibrium
913:holds that
357:Anglo-Dutch
340:Bidding fee
155:Bid rigging
21:Parallelism
2948:Categories
2802:clustering
2695:philopatry
2673:salmon run
2668:Lessepsian
2398:(2): 951.
1797:2012-02-26
1456:References
1101:April 2021
1008:. Complex
1002:E-commerce
998:algorithms
992:Algorithms
985:signalling
919:Monopolies
909:Classical
831:Woolworths
612:Algorithms
512:Unique bid
467:No-reserve
222:copyrights
101:SSNIP test
2923:Stigmergy
2903:Mutualism
2563:bait ball
2252:1549-8271
2222:0308-5961
2124:0167-6245
2064:0012-9682
1927:Economics
1701:0002-8282
1610:: 305–351
1444:Oligopoly
1429:Monopsony
1352:δ
1349:⇔
1340:δ
1337:−
1330:δ
1289:δ
1286:−
1279:δ
1262:δ
1256:∞
1241:∑
1217:δ
1131:(namely,
1072:does not
900:collusive
864:oligopoly
796:collusion
677:Virginity
532:Walrasian
462:Multiunit
372:Brazilian
352:Amsterdam
134:Collusion
64:oligopoly
2852:Symbrion
2814:BIO-LGCA
2617:tracking
2546:ant mill
2488:sort sol
2483:flocking
2447:Swarming
2175:17 April
2150:17 April
2077:16 April
2002:16 April
1885:16 March
1850:16 March
1744:25 March
1714:25 April
1645:24 March
1614:27 March
1580:27 March
1549:27 March
1482:24 March
1424:Monopoly
1382:See also
1142:strategy
954:auctions
948:Auctions
931:unstable
752:Software
742:Ebidding
667:Spectrum
632:Children
602:Contexts
482:Scottish
452:Knapsack
447:Japanese
377:Calcutta
304:Auctions
296:a series
294:Part of
60:Monopoly
2959:Pricing
2954:Cartels
2712:monarch
2641:flyways
2622:history
2473:Droving
2072:2998576
1739:2570637
1709:1809090
1544:1599667
1125:duopoly
1093:removed
1078:sources
881:collude
647:Flowers
637:Players
627:Charity
587:Suicide
582:Sniping
577:Rigging
557:Shading
547:Bidding
522:Vickrey
477:Reverse
427:Forward
422:English
335:Chinese
330:All-pay
140:cartels
2685:Homing
2507:Locust
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2070:
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1035:Amazon
873:Courts
837:, and
827:Caltex
732:Online
697:Theory
672:Stamps
662:Slaves
537:Yankee
432:French
412:Double
382:Candle
345:Dollar
2749:Boids
2690:natal
2478:Flock
2371:1 May
2362:(PDF)
2343:1 May
2337:Wired
2315:1 May
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1600:(PDF)
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1540:JSTOR
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843:Perth
841:from
835:Coles
794:is a
687:Wives
652:Loans
617:Autos
417:Dutch
320:Types
176:tying
149:cases
2529:Pack
2495:Herd
2373:2021
2366:OECD
2345:2021
2317:2021
2248:ISSN
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2177:2021
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2079:2021
2060:ISSN
2025:help
2004:2021
1979:2021
1966:ISBN
1945:2021
1932:ISBN
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1887:2021
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1767:help
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1735:SSRN
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1697:ISSN
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1616:2021
1582:2021
1551:2021
1505:help
1484:2021
1355:>
1325:<
1076:any
1074:cite
1039:OECD
839:Gull
802:and
682:Wine
657:Scam
572:Jump
472:Rank
220:and
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2400:doi
2277:doi
2208:hdl
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