1260:. Thus it includes sales losses due to outpricing by competitor 1, a more attractive deal by competitor 2, or to customers saving their money instead of spending it on any of those competitors' products. Mathematically speaking, what is important is the own-price elasticity of the good in question, not its cross-price elasticity relative to any other product. Cross-price elasticities can help determine what products are substitutes (high, positive cross-price elasticities) in succeeding iterations of the SSNIP test, but the attractiveness of controlling a market can only be evaluated with an own-price elasticity.
31:
412:"). If sufficient numbers of buyers are likely to switch to alternative products and the lost sales would make such price increase unprofitable, then the hypothetical market should not be considered a relevant market for the basis of litigation or regulation. Therefore, another, larger, basket of products is proposed for a hypothetical monopolist to control and the SSNIP test is performed on that
423:. In the case of linear demand, information on firms' price-cost margins is sufficient for the calculation. If the pre-merger elasticity of demand exceeds the critical elasticity, then the decline in sales arising from the price increase will be sufficiently large to render the price increase unprofitable and the products concerned do not constitute the relevant market.
939:
the relevant market and the product of the firm does not constitute by itself a separate relevant market. The "market" formed by this only product is not "worth monopolising" as an increase in prices would not be profitable. The investigation should continue by including new products which we may guess are substitutes of the one under investigation.
387:. Scherer also proposed the basic concept underlying SSNIP along with limitations posed by what has come to be known as "the cellophane fallacy" in the second (1980) edition of his industrial organization textbook. Historical retrospectives suggest that early proponents were unaware of other individuals' conceptual proposals.
1315:
producer) argued that cellophane was not a separate relevant market since it competed with flexible packaging materials such as aluminum foil, wax paper and polyethylene. The problem was that DuPont, being the sole producer of cellophane, had set prices at the monopoly level, and it was at this level
1228:
If we had found that such an increase would not have been profitable, we should further include new products which we may imagine are substitutes in a third phase until we arrive at a situation in which such an increase in price would have been profitable, indicating that those products do constitute
947:
We already know that the previous product is not by itself a relevant market because there do exist other substitute products. Let’s suppose that the previous firm (A) tells us that it considers as competitors the products of B and C. In this case, in the second phase we should include these products
938:
In our example, the increase in price produces too much consumer substitution which is not compensated by the increase in price nor the reduction in costs. Overall, the firm would make less profits (4800 compared to 5000). In other words, there are other substitute products that should be included in
435:
The test consists of observing whether a small increase in price (in the range of 5 to 10 percent) would provoke a significant number of consumers to switch to another product (in fact, substitute product). In other words, it is designed to analyse whether that increase in price would be profitable
1224:
As can be seen, the monopolist controlling A, B and C would profitably increase the price of A by 10 percent, in other words, these three products do constitute a market "worth monopolising" and therefore constitutes a relevant market. This result is because X controls all three products which are
754:
As can be seen, such an increase in prices would induce a certain substitution for our hypothetical firm, in fact, 200 units less will be sold. This may be so because some consumers have started to buy a substitute product, the same consumers have bought a smaller quantity of the product given its
426:
An alternative method for applying the SSNIP test where demand elasticities cannot be estimated, involves estimating the "critical loss." The critical loss is defined as the maximum sales loss that could be sustained as a result of the price increase without making the price increase unprofitable.
1263:
In succeeding iterations of larger market control, the hypothetical price increase still only applies to the first product. The gains to the hypothetical owner of substitute products come from increasing the price of one base product and thus getting higher revenue from it and spillover from its
1295:
sets its prices at a monopoly level it may happen that two products appear to be close substitutes whereas at competitive prices they are not. In other words, it may happen that using the SSNIP test one defines the relevant market too broadly, including products which are not substitutes.
934:
1225:
the only substitutes of A. Thus, X knows that even if its increase in price of A will generate some substitution, a significant share of these consumers will end up buying other products which he controls, therefore overall, his profits will not be reduced but rather increased.
1316:
that consumers viewed those other products as substitutes. Instead, at the competitive level, consumers viewed cellophane as a unique relevant market (a small but significant increase in prices would not have them switching to goods like wax or the others). In the case, the
407:
The application of the SSNIP test involves interviewing consumers regarding buying decisions and determining whether a hypothetical monopolist or cartel could profit from a price increase of 5% for at least one year (assuming that "the terms of sale of all other products
403:
by the customer. Such a catalogue is considered "worth monopolizing" if, should only one single supplier provide it, that supplier could profitably increase its price without its customers turning away and choosing other goods and services from other suppliers.
749:
605:
1083:
1220:
1128:
This means that the price increase of A would provoke that 200 units less of A be sold and instead, 100 more units of B and C will be sold respectively. Given that our hypothetical monopolist controls all three products, its profits will
991:
Given that we want to know if products A, B and C constitute a relevant market, the exercise would consist in supposing that an hypothetical monopolist X would control all three products. In that case, the monopolist would make profits
1594:
374:
in three antitrust cases: in a 1972 Justice
Department attempt to enjoin the merger of Associated Brewing Co. and G. W. Heileman Co., in 1975 during hearings on the U.S. government's monopolization case against
762:
1087:
Now suppose that monopolist X decides to increase the price of product A, maintaining the price of B and C constant. Suppose that a 10 percent increase in the price of A provokes the following situation:
610:
Now suppose the firm decides to increase its price by a 10 percent, which would imply that the new price would be 11 (10 percent increase). Suppose that the new situation facing the firm is therefore:
399:
within which a hypothetical monopolist or cartel could impose a profitable significant increase in price. The relevant market consists of a "catalogue" of goods and/or services which are considered
427:
Where the likely loss of sales to the hypothetical monopolist (cartel) is less than the
Critical Loss, then a 5% price increase would be profitable and the market is defined.
636:
492:
1605:
1249:). So, a competition authority investigating A should only consider competitive pressure (or lack thereof) that B puts on A - reverse pressure from A to B is irrelevant.
996:
1133:
1354:
1678:
370:. Several other individuals formulated, apparently independently, similar conceptual approaches during the 1970s. The SSNIP approach was implemented by
1271:
The SSNIP test only measures competition based on price and thus cannot be considered a catch-all or fully sufficient tool for defining markets.
1715:
929:{\displaystyle \mathrm {Profits} =\mathrm {Price} \times \mathrm {Sales} -\mathrm {Variable\ cost\ per\ unit} \times \mathrm {Sales} =4800.}
1498:
1243:
performing the SSNIP test on A's products will not necessarily yield the same relevant market as applying the SSNIP test on B's products
1379:
271:
1671:
1291:
predicts that any profit-maximizing firm will set its prices at a level where demand for its product is elastic. Therefore, when a
351:
Merger
Guidelines introduced the SSNIP test as a new method for defining markets and for measuring market power directly. In the
1664:
1480:
1317:
1774:
1544:
240:
1800:
1320:
failed to recognise that a high own-price elasticity may mean that a firm is already exercising monopoly power.
1753:
1741:
78:
1455:
366:
The original concept is believed to have been proposed first in 1959 by economist David Morris
Adelman of the
264:
183:
1507:
758:
If we want to know whether such price increase has been profitable, we should solve the following equation:
1699:
744:{\displaystyle \mathrm {Price} \times \mathrm {Sales} -\mathrm {Variable\ cost} \times \mathrm {Sales} }
600:{\displaystyle \mathrm {Price} \times \mathrm {Sales} -\mathrm {Variable\ cost} \times \mathrm {Sales} }
348:
112:
47:
1720:
1795:
1725:
1334:
1078:{\displaystyle 10\times 1000-5\times 1000+13\times 800-4\times 800+9\times 1100-4\times 1100=17700}
257:
1758:
1215:{\displaystyle 11\times 800-5\times 800+13\times 900-4\times 900+9\times 1200-4\times 1200=18900}
1580:
1569:
157:
1746:
1463:
1339:
384:
245:
319:. Competition regulating authorities and other actuators of antitrust law intend to prevent
1388:
1276:
451:
420:
380:
200:
195:
83:
439:
In general, one uses databases from the firms which may include data on variables such as
8:
1528:
1494:
1419:
1349:
371:
360:
1436:
1300:
312:
219:
141:
1628:
Decided by the
Supreme Court and reported at 351 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed.1264
1550:
1540:
1403:
205:
190:
73:
61:
1237:
Despite its widespread usage, the SSNIP test is not without problems. Specifically:
1456:"The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm"
1428:
367:
336:
214:
168:
164:
66:
447:
or sales and over a sufficiently long period (generally over at least two years).
1359:
1329:
1288:
1284:
413:
409:
400:
396:
308:
297:
285:
173:
152:
98:
22:
1268:
from increasing the price of the base product and the price for its competitors.
363:
in its "Commission's Notice for the
Definition of the Relevant Market" in 1997.
1246:
755:
price increase or maybe because they have stopped buying that type of product.
352:
320:
121:
103:
1789:
1656:
626:
482:
210:
178:
304:
determination of the relevant market by arguments about product similarity.
1554:
1536:
1280:
1275:
Furthermore, many economists have noted an important pitfall in the use of
436:
or if, instead, it would just induce substitution, making it unprofitable.
289:
224:
137:
88:
1417:
Adelman, M. A. (June 1959). "Economic
Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion".
454:
of the firm. That is, how a change in prices by the firm affects its own
147:
1440:
1312:
1638:
419:
The SSNIP test can be applied by estimating empirically the critical
328:
126:
56:
30:
1432:
1344:
1292:
332:
52:
466:
As an example, let's suppose the following situation for a firm:
444:
450:
In economic terms, what the SSNIP test does is to calculate the
1304:
455:
324:
316:
301:
132:
620:
614:
476:
470:
1639:"Market Definition and Market Power in Competition Analysis"
1258:
not just substitutions to a particular competitor's product
440:
1387:(Technical report). Lexecon Ltd. June 1997. Archived from
294:
small but significant and non-transitory increase in price
633:
In this case, the firm would make profits equal to 4800:
489:
In this case, the firm would make profits equal to 5000:
376:
292:
which would justify government intervention, the test of
1570:"Lecture 4. Market Definition Part II – The SSNIP Test"
1381:
359:
case in 1992 and has been officially recognized by the
1355:
United States
Department of Justice Antitrust Division
1136:
999:
765:
639:
495:
288:, before deciding whether companies have significant
1533:
Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance
1214:
1077:
928:
743:
599:
1500:On the Paternity of a Market Delineation Approach
1787:
1299:This problem is known in the literature as the
1686:
1604:, Oxera Consulting, March 2005, archived from
395:The SSNIP test seeks to identify the smallest
1672:
300:in a consistent way. It is an alternative to
265:
1595:"The SSNIP test: some common misconceptions"
951:The situation can be described as follows:
379:, and in a 1981 proceeding precipitated by
1679:
1665:
272:
258:
948:to our analysis and repeat the exercise.
233:Enforcement authorities and organizations
1287:. The problem arises from the fact that
1527:
1493:
1416:
1788:
1453:
1247:2002 Bayer/Aventis Crop Science merger
355:it was used for the first time in the
1660:
1245:(this presented a legal issue in the
1481:United States Department of Justice
1241:In evaluating a merger of A and B,
13:
1567:
1318:Supreme Court of the United States
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497:
29:
14:
1812:
241:International Competition Network
1454:Werden, Gregory J. (June 2002).
942:
383:'s effort to avert takeover by
1631:
1622:
1587:
1561:
1521:
1487:
1447:
1410:
1372:
1232:
461:
390:
296:(SSNIP) is used to define the
246:List of competition regulators
1:
1365:
1122:Variable cost per unit C = 4
1111:Variable cost per unit B = 4
1100:Variable cost per unit A = 5
985:Variable cost per unit C = 4
974:Variable cost per unit B = 4
963:Variable cost per unit A = 5
452:residual elasticity of demand
315:and in approving or blocking
307:The SSNIP test is crucial in
1508:American Antitrust Institute
7:
1323:
1311:). In this case, DuPont (a
1256:after a 5% price increase,
10:
1817:
1687:Competition law by country
430:
349:U.S. Department of Justice
342:
113:Anti-competitive practices
79:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
48:History of competition law
16:Concept in competition law
1767:
1734:
1708:
1692:
1535:(2nd ed.). Chicago:
1252:The SSNIP test relies on
1335:Federal Trade Commission
1279:when inferring both the
1801:Elasticity (economics)
1581:Trinity College Dublin
1216:
1079:
930:
745:
601:
158:Occupational licensing
34:
1611:on September 27, 2007
1464:Antitrust Law Journal
1394:on September 28, 2007
1340:Local Loop Unbundling
1309:U.S. v. E. I. du Pont
1303:after the celebrated
1254:total losses in sales
1217:
1080:
931:
746:
602:
385:Mobil Oil Corporation
33:
1506:(Technical report).
1134:
997:
763:
637:
493:
421:elasticity of demand
381:Marathon Oil Company
335:, or other forms of
201:Occupational closure
196:Dividing territories
184:Essential facilities
84:Market concentration
1420:Virginia Law Review
1350:European Commission
1277:demand elasticities
1229:a relevant market.
361:European Commission
1301:cellophane paradox
1212:
1075:
926:
741:
597:
313:abuse of dominance
220:Regulatory capture
35:
1783:
1782:
1404:CRA International
1126:
1125:
989:
988:
886:
874:
859:
707:
563:
410:are held constant
282:
281:
211:Misuse of patents
206:Predatory pricing
191:Exclusive dealing
74:Barriers to entry
62:Coercive monopoly
1808:
1681:
1674:
1667:
1658:
1657:
1651:
1650:
1648:
1646:
1641:. CompEcon. 2002
1635:
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1626:
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1618:
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1578:
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1559:
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1519:
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1516:
1514:
1505:
1497:(January 2009).
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1484:
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1401:
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604:
603:
598:
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576:
561:
532:
512:
368:Aston University
337:market dominance
274:
267:
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165:Product bundling
67:Natural monopoly
19:
18:
1816:
1815:
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1807:
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1805:
1796:Competition law
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1785:
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1704:
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1655:
1654:
1644:
1642:
1637:
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1627:
1623:
1614:
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1608:
1602:Competing Ideas
1597:
1593:
1592:
1588:
1574:
1572:
1566:
1562:
1547:
1539:. p. 517.
1526:
1522:
1512:
1510:
1503:
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1474:
1472:
1458:
1452:
1448:
1433:10.2307/1070847
1415:
1411:
1397:
1395:
1391:
1384:
1378:
1377:
1373:
1368:
1360:Relevant market
1330:Competition law
1326:
1289:economic theory
1285:relevant market
1235:
1135:
1132:
1131:
1130:
1119:Sales C = 1200;
998:
995:
994:
993:
982:Sales C = 1100;
960:Sales A = 1000;
945:
903:
832:
812:
792:
766:
764:
761:
760:
759:
724:
680:
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516:
496:
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491:
490:
464:
433:
414:relevant market
397:relevant market
393:
345:
311:cases accusing
309:competition law
298:relevant market
286:competition law
278:
174:Refusal to deal
153:Tacit collusion
99:Relevant market
23:Competition law
17:
12:
11:
5:
1814:
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1803:
1798:
1781:
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1754:United Kingdom
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1742:European Union
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1586:
1560:
1545:
1529:Scherer, F. M.
1520:
1495:Scherer, F. M.
1486:
1446:
1427:(5): 684–696.
1409:
1370:
1369:
1367:
1364:
1363:
1362:
1357:
1352:
1347:
1342:
1337:
1332:
1325:
1322:
1273:
1272:
1269:
1264:competitors –
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1250:
1234:
1231:
1211:
1208:
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1199:
1196:
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1148:
1145:
1142:
1139:
1124:
1123:
1120:
1117:
1113:
1112:
1109:
1108:Sales B = 900;
1106:
1102:
1101:
1098:
1097:Sales A = 800;
1095:
1074:
1071:
1068:
1065:
1062:
1059:
1056:
1053:
1050:
1047:
1044:
1041:
1038:
1035:
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1029:
1026:
1023:
1020:
1017:
1014:
1011:
1008:
1005:
1002:
987:
986:
983:
980:
976:
975:
972:
971:Sales B = 800;
969:
965:
964:
961:
958:
944:
941:
925:
922:
918:
915:
912:
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906:
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772:
769:
739:
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583:
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531:
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508:
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502:
499:
487:
486:
480:
474:
463:
460:
432:
429:
392:
389:
357:Nestlé/Perrier
344:
341:
321:market failure
280:
279:
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122:Monopolization
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109:
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104:Merger control
101:
96:
91:
86:
81:
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71:
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69:
64:
50:
42:
41:
40:Basic concepts
37:
36:
26:
25:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
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1701:
1700:United States
1698:
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1682:
1677:
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1668:
1663:
1662:
1659:
1640:
1634:
1625:
1607:
1603:
1596:
1590:
1582:
1571:
1568:Massey, Pat.
1564:
1556:
1552:
1548:
1546:9780528671029
1542:
1538:
1534:
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1509:
1502:
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1390:
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1371:
1361:
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1149:
1146:
1143:
1140:
1137:
1121:
1118:
1115:
1114:
1110:
1107:
1105:Price B = 13;
1104:
1103:
1099:
1096:
1094:Price A = 11;
1093:
1092:
1089:
1085:
1072:
1069:
1066:
1063:
1060:
1057:
1054:
1051:
1048:
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1030:
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1024:
1021:
1018:
1015:
1012:
1009:
1006:
1003:
1000:
984:
981:
978:
977:
973:
970:
968:Price B = 13;
967:
966:
962:
959:
957:Price A = 10;
956:
955:
952:
949:
940:
936:
923:
920:
900:
829:
809:
789:
756:
752:
721:
677:
657:
628:
627:Variable cost
625:
622:
619:
616:
613:
612:
611:
608:
577:
533:
513:
484:
483:Variable cost
481:
478:
475:
472:
469:
468:
467:
459:
457:
453:
448:
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437:
428:
424:
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398:
388:
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382:
378:
373:
372:F. M. Scherer
369:
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179:Group boycott
177:
176:
175:
172:
170:
166:
163:
159:
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154:
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146:
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139:
136:
134:
131:Formation of
130:
129:
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119:
118:
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111:
110:
105:
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100:
97:
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68:
65:
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51:
49:
46:
45:
44:
43:
39:
38:
32:
28:
27:
24:
21:
20:
1643:. Retrieved
1633:
1624:
1613:, retrieved
1606:the original
1601:
1589:
1579:– via
1573:. Retrieved
1563:
1537:Rand McNally
1532:
1523:
1511:. Retrieved
1499:
1489:
1479:– via
1473:. Retrieved
1468:
1462:
1449:
1424:
1418:
1412:
1402:– via
1396:. Retrieved
1389:the original
1380:
1374:
1308:
1298:
1281:market power
1274:
1265:
1257:
1253:
1242:
1236:
1227:
1223:
1127:
1116:Price C = 9;
1086:
990:
979:Price C = 9;
950:
946:
943:Second phase
937:
757:
753:
632:
629:per unit = 5
609:
488:
485:per unit = 5
465:
449:
438:
434:
425:
418:
406:
394:
365:
356:
347:In 1982 the
346:
306:
293:
290:market power
283:
225:Rent-seeking
138:Price fixing
93:
89:Market power
1645:January 24,
1615:January 24,
1575:January 24,
1513:January 24,
1475:January 24,
1398:January 24,
1233:Limitations
462:First phase
401:substitutes
391:Measurement
148:Bid rigging
1790:Categories
1366:References
1313:cellophane
1293:monopolist
443:, prices,
323:caused by
215:copyrights
94:SSNIP test
1775:Australia
1471:: 253–269
1201:×
1195:−
1189:×
1177:×
1171:−
1165:×
1153:×
1147:−
1141:×
1064:×
1058:−
1052:×
1040:×
1034:−
1028:×
1016:×
1010:−
1004:×
901:×
830:−
810:×
722:×
678:−
658:×
578:×
534:−
514:×
329:oligopoly
127:Collusion
57:oligopoly
1693:Americas
1531:(1980).
1345:Monopoly
1324:See also
1283:and the
333:monopoly
53:Monopoly
1768:Oceania
1747:Ireland
1555:5803494
1441:1070847
445:revenue
431:Example
343:History
317:mergers
133:cartels
1759:Russia
1735:Europe
1553:
1543:
1439:
1307:case (
1305:DuPont
885:
873:
858:
706:
562:
479:= 1000
456:demand
325:cartel
302:ad hoc
1726:Japan
1721:India
1716:China
1609:(PDF)
1598:(PDF)
1504:(PDF)
1459:(PDF)
1437:JSTOR
1392:(PDF)
1385:(PDF)
1210:18900
1073:17700
924:4800.
623:= 800
621:Sales
615:Price
477:Sales
471:Price
441:costs
169:tying
142:cases
1709:Asia
1647:2023
1617:2023
1577:2023
1551:OCLC
1541:ISBN
1515:2023
1477:2023
1400:2023
1204:1200
1192:1200
1067:1100
1055:1100
1019:1000
1007:1000
617:= 11
473:= 10
213:and
167:and
55:and
1429:doi
1266:not
1180:900
1168:900
1156:800
1144:800
1129:be:
1043:800
1031:800
992:of:
377:IBM
284:In
1792::
1600:,
1549:.
1469:71
1467:.
1461:.
1435:.
1425:45
1423:.
1162:13
1138:11
1025:13
1001:10
751:.
607:.
458:.
416:.
353:EU
339:.
331:,
327:,
1680:e
1673:t
1666:v
1649:.
1583:.
1557:.
1517:.
1483:.
1443:.
1431::
1406:.
1207:=
1198:4
1186:9
1183:+
1174:4
1159:+
1150:5
1070:=
1061:4
1049:9
1046:+
1037:4
1022:+
1013:5
921:=
917:s
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908:a
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894:i
891:n
888:u
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846:a
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806:e
803:c
800:i
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794:P
790:=
786:s
783:t
780:i
777:f
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771:r
768:P
738:s
735:e
732:l
729:a
726:S
718:t
715:s
712:o
709:c
703:e
700:l
697:b
694:a
691:i
688:r
685:a
682:V
674:s
671:e
668:l
665:a
662:S
654:e
651:c
648:i
645:r
642:P
594:s
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588:l
585:a
582:S
574:t
571:s
568:o
565:c
559:e
556:l
553:b
550:a
547:i
544:r
541:a
538:V
530:s
527:e
524:l
521:a
518:S
510:e
507:c
504:i
501:r
498:P
273:e
266:t
259:v
144:)
140:(
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