357:
enforceable, the incentives to comply with collusive agreements are the same with and without communication. It is against competition law for companies to have explicit conversations in private. If evidence of conversations is accidentally left behind, it will become the most critical and conclusive evidence in antitrust litigation. Even without communication, businesses can coordinate prices by observation, but from a legal standpoint, this tacit handling leaves no evidence. Most companies cooperate through invisible collusion, so whether companies communicate is at the core of antitrust policy.
1297:) were fined $ 34.5 million by the Federal Court for engaging in criminal cartel conduct. The court found that K-Line participated in a cartel with other shipping companies to fix prices on the transportation of cars, trucks, and buses to Australia between 2009 and 2012. K-Line pleaded guilty in April 2018 and the fine is the largest ever imposed under the Competition and Consumer Act. The court noted that the penalty should serve as a strong warning to businesses that cartel conduct will not be tolerated and will result in serious consequences.
1040:
45:
1152:
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owners have a bigger advantage over the working class. Nevertheless, according to Adam Smith, the public rarely hears about coordination and collaborations that occur between business owners as it takes place in informal settings. Some forms of explicit collusion are not considered impactful enough on an individual basis to be considered illegal, such as that which occurred by the social media group
427:, hidden taxes and fees in the wireless industry, negotiable pricing), this can cause competition based on price to be meaningless (because it would be too complicated to explain to the customer in a short advertisement). This causes industries to have essentially the same prices and compete on advertising and image, something theoretically as damaging to consumers as normal price fixing.
309:; for example, by defrauding or gaining an unfair market advantage. It is an agreement among firms or individuals to divide a market, set prices, limit production or limit opportunities. It can involve "unions, wage fixing, kickbacks, or misrepresenting the independence of the relationship between the colluding parties". In legal terms, all acts effected by collusion are considered
1016:. Firms face a kinked demand curve if, when one firm decreases its price, other firms are expected to follow suit to maintain sales. When one firm increases its price, its rivals are unlikely to follow, as they would lose the sales gains they would otherwise receive by holding prices at the previous level. Kinked demand potentially fosters
353:
etc. On the other hand, tacit collusion is where companies coordinate and monitor their behavior without direct communication. This type of collusion is generally not considered illegal, so companies guilty of tacit conspiracy should face no penalties even though their actions would have a similar economic impact as explicit conspiracy.
1048:
of credibility. Firms that deviate from cooperative pricing will use MMC in each market. MMC increases the loss of deviation, and incremental loss is more important than incremental gain when the firm's objective function is concave. Therefore, the purpose of MMC is to strengthen corporate compliance or inhibit deviant collusion.
1047:
Actions that generate sufficient returns in the future are important to every company, and the probability of continued interaction and the company discount factor must be high enough. The sustainability of cooperation between companies also depends on the threat of punishment, which is also a matter
1003:
and decreasing the price-determining ability of each firm. However if all firms collude to increase prices, loss of sales will be minimized, as consumers lack choices at lower prices and must decide between what is available. This benefits the colluding firms, as they generate more sales at the cost
352:
Under competition law, there is an important distinction between direct and covert collusion. Direct collusion generally refers to a group of companies communicating directly with each other to coordinate and monitor their actions, such as cooperating through pricing, market allocation, sales quotas,
1406:
Stable demand and capacity implies predictability and therefore demand and capacity does not fluctuate significantly, which makes it easier for firms to coordinate their actions and maintain a collusive agreement. This can also refer to a situation where firms have more production capacity than is
1334:
Colluding firms may not have all the correct information about all other firms, from a quantitative perspective (firms may not know all other firms' cost and demand conditions) or a qualitative perspective (moral hazard). In either situation, firms may not know each others' preferences or actions,
1268:
Google has been hit with a series of antitrust lawsuits. In
October 2020, the US Department of Justice filed a landmark lawsuit alleging that Google unlawfully boxed out competitors by reaching deals with phone makers, including Apple and Samsung, to be the default search engine on their devices.
1164:
When companies discriminate, price collusion is less likely, so the discount factor needed to ensure stability must be increased. In such price competition, competitors use delivered pricing to discriminate in space, but this does not mean that firms using delivered pricing to discriminate cannot
1367:
Many countries with anti-collusion laws outlaw side-payments, which are an indication of collusion as firms pay each other to incentivize the continuation of the collusive relationship, may see less collusion as firms will likely prefer situations where profits are distributed towards themselves
1327:
If costs vary significantly between firms, it may be impossible to establish a price at which to fix output. Firms generally prefer to produce at a level where marginal cost meets marginal revenue, if one firm can produce at a lower cost, it will prefer to produce more units, and would receive a
356:
Collusion results from less competition through mutual understanding, where competitors can independently set prices and market share. A core principle of antitrust policy is that companies must not communicate with each other. Even if conversations between multiple companies are illegal but not
1374:
Leniency programs are policies that reduce sanctions against collusion if a participant voluntarily confesses their behavior or cooperates with the public authority’s investigation. One example of a leniency program is offering immunity to the first firm who comes clean and gives the government
406:
explains that since the masters (business owners) are fewer in number, it is easier to collude to serve common interests among those involved, such as maintaining low wages, whilst it is difficult for the labour to coordinate to protect their interests due to their vast numbers. Hence, business
337:
usually involves an agreement between two or more sellers to take action to suppress competition between sellers in the market. Because competition among sellers can provide consumers with low prices, conspiracy agreements increase the price consumers pay for the goods. Because of this harm to
1008:
to society. However, depending on the assumptions made in the theoretical model on the information available to all firms, there are some outcomes, based on
Cooperative Game Theory, where collusion may have higher efficiency than if firms did not collude.
627:
419:
The practice of stock analyst conference calls and meetings of industry participants almost necessarily results in tremendous amounts of strategic and price transparency. This allows each firm to see how and why every other firm is pricing their
1300:
Between 2004 and 2013, Dr Esra Ogru, the former CEO of an
Australian biotech company called Phosphagenics, colluded with two colleagues by using false invoicing and credit card reimbursements to defraud her employer of more than $ 6.1
1160:
In the example in the picture, the dots in Pc and Q represent competitive industry prices. If firms collude, they can limit production to Q2 and raise the price to P2. Collusion usually involves some form of agreement to seek a higher
1525:(1992), "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations", Advances in Economic Theory: Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, ed by J.-J. Laffont. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol.2:151-206.
1065:
Scholars in economics and management have tried to identify factors explaining why some firms are more or less likely to be involved in collusion. Some have noted the role of the regulatory environment and the existence of
2198:
938:
1269:
Another lawsuit filed by nearly 40 attorneys general on Dec. 17, 2020 alleges that Google’s search results favored its own services over those of more-specialized rivals, a tactic that harmed competitors.
1265:
Google and Apple against employee poaching, a collusion case in 2015 wherein it was revealed that both companies agreed not to hire employees from one another in order to halt the rise in wages.
4147:
1351:
New firms may enter the industry, establishing a new baseline price and eliminating collusion (though anti-dumping laws and tariffs can prevent foreign companies from entering the market).
982:
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512:
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because any one firm would receive a reduced benefit from cutting price, as opposed to the benefits accruing under neoclassical theory and certain game-theoretic models such as
669:
741:
705:
1998:
Heywood, Li, D., & Ye, G. (2020). Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? a delivered pricing model. Journal of
Economics (Vienna, Austria), 131(1), 39–60.
1357:
An increase in average total cost or a decrease in revenue provides the incentive to compete with rival firms in order to secure a larger market share and increased demand.
1397:
Homogeneous products refer to products that are similar in nature, which makes it easier for firms to agree on prices and reduces the incentive for firms to compete on
984:
is the case, i.e. the firm has no incentive to deviate unilaterally. So as the number of firms increases, the more difficult it is for The Cartel to maintain stability.
1650:
Garrod, & Olczak, M. (2018). Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries. International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 56, 1–25.
107:
500:
Collusion is illegal, contracts between cartels establishing collusion are not protected by law, cannot be enforced by courts, and must have other forms of punishment
1058:
Collusion is easier to sustain when the choice deviates from the maximum profit to be gained is lower (i.e. the penalty profit is lower) and the penalty is greater.
4269:
338:
consumers, it is against antitrust laws to fix prices by agreement between producers, so participants must keep it a secret. Collusion often takes place within an
305:
by deceiving, misleading or defrauding others of their legal right. Collusion is not always considered illegal. It can be used to attain objectives forbidden by
806:
4208:
2012:
4066:
4025:
4007:
1784:
Compte et al., 2002. Olivier Compte, Frederic Jenny, Patrick Rey
Capacity, constraints, mergers and collusion European Economic Review, 46 (2002), pp. 1-29
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1375:
information about collusion. These programs are designed to destabilize collusion and increase deterrence by encouraging firms to report illegal behavior.
2386:
1067:
1283:
in 2019, to hinder technological progress in improving the quality of vehicle emissions in order to reduce the cost of production and maximize profits.
1384:
There are several industry traits that are thought to be conducive to collusion or empirically associated with collusion. These traits include:
4043:
2041:
4176:
1262:
collusion of products in 2013: Ben and Jerry's makes chunkier flavors with more treats in them, while Häagen-Dazs sticks to smoother flavors.
2098:
1424:. Therefore, natural market forces alone may be insufficient to prevent or deter collusion, and government intervention is often necessary.
4279:
4259:
2125:
2086:
1427:
Fortunately, various forms of government intervention can be taken to reduce collusion among firms and promote natural market competition.
1391:
High market concentration refers to a market with few firms, which makes it easier for these firms to collude and coordinate their actions.
2174:
1607:
4317:
4152:
3996:
859:
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firms. At the collusive price, the firms are symmetric, so they divide the profits equally between the whole industry, represented as
285:
4094:
1061:
Future collusive profits − future punishment profits ≥ current deviation profits − current collusive profits-collusion can sustain.
345:, where there are few firms and agreements that have significant impacts on the entire market or industry. To differentiate from a
1749:
4136:
4001:
497:
Two factors influence this choice: (1) deviations must be detectable (2) penalties for deviations must have a significant effect.
4224:
4141:
2438:
1051:
The principle of collusion: firms give up deviation gains in the short term in exchange for continued collusion in the future.
988:
As the number of firms in the market increases, so does the factor of the minimum discount required for collusion to succeed.
4088:
4030:
3959:
2470:
2416:
1863:
1818:
349:, collusive agreements between parties may not be explicit; however, the implications of cartels and collusion are the same.
1437:
Provide immunity (leniency) to the first company to confess and provide the government with information about the collusion.
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1345:, in the short term the defecting firm may gain considerably. This phenomenon is frequently referred to as "chiseling".
423:
If the practice of the industry causes more complicated pricing, which is hard for the consumer to understand (such as
1772:
Levenstein, & Suslow, V. Y. (2006). What
Determines Cartel Success? Journal of Economic Literature, 44(1), 43–95.
4130:
4054:
3005:
2824:
2022:
1734:
1563:
1100:
254:
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4312:
4219:
2626:
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1908:
Sorenson. (2007). Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly. Managerial and
Decision Economics, 28(2), 115–128.
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747:
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2222:
1712:
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4106:
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2636:
92:
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811:
622:{\displaystyle {\frac {\pi (P_{c})}{n(1-\delta )}}\geq \pi (P_{c})\rightarrow {\frac {1}{n(1-\delta )}}\geq 1}
4214:
4112:
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3146:
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1519:(1986), "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, vol. 2, pp. 181–214.
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197:
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2601:
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2696:
2199:"14-296MR Former CEO and two Melbourne men jailed following theft of millions from Phosphagenics Limited"
1341:
There is considerable incentive to cheat on collusion agreements; although lowering prices might trigger
1279:
The illegal collusion between the giant German automakers BMW, Daimler and
Volkswagen, discovered by the
2087:
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/138544/sullivcj_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
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27:
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1961:
1922:
853:. If and only if the profit of choosing to deviate is greater than that of sticking to collude, i.e.
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2038:
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3537:
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1398:
19:
For a secret agreement by people to commit something criminally or civilly wrong or illegal, see
1879:
Conley, Timothy; Decarolis, Francesco (2016). "Detecting
Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions".
1604:
1431:
Fines and imprisonment to companies that collude and their executives who are personally liable.
3739:
3511:
3491:
3471:
3420:
3090:
2995:
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2799:
2731:
2701:
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2037:
Hunter-Gault, Charlayne (October 15, 1996). "ADM: Who's Next?". MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (PBS).
1555:
1239:
992:
412:
171:
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Harrington, J. (2015). Some Thoughts on Why Certain Markets are More Susceptible to Collusion.
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3744:
3707:
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1447:
1434:
Detect collusion by screening markets for suspicious pricing activity and high profitability.
1194:
402:
259:
1547:
1027:
Collusion may also occur in auction markets, where independent firms coordinate their bids (
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3171:
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1318:
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1021:
330:
214:
209:
97:
1797:
Kalai, Ehud; Satterthwaite, Mark A. (1994), Gilles, Robert P.; Ruys, Pieter H. M. (eds.),
1310:
There can be significant barriers to collusion. In any given industry, these may include:
8:
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3080:
3030:
2867:
2794:
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1005:
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is a deceitful agreement or secret cooperation between two or more parties to limit open
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424:
233:
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European Commission finds German automakers illegally colluded on emissions technology
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2018:
1981:
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219:
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1977:
1973:
1934:
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1855:
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1676:
1665:"Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments"
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1110:
1106:
381:
342:
228:
182:
178:
80:
2279:"The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion"
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increases, it is more difficult to successfully organize, collude and communicate.
1133:
Restricting the distribution or supply of products along the supply chain through
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2524:
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2107:
2045:
1799:"The Kinked Demand Curve, Facilitating Practices, and Oligopolistic Coordination"
1651:
1611:
1513:, MIT Press, Cambridge MA (An organized introduction to industrial organization)
1457:
1452:
1175:
1116:
393:
187:
166:
112:
36:
3269:
1810:
1805:, Theory and Decision Library, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 15–38,
1208:
free agents in an effort to help a targeted franchise circumvent the salary cap.
16:
Agreement between two or more parties, sometimes illegal and therefore secretive
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3822:
3344:
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3249:
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2877:
2686:
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1421:
408:
373:
135:
117:
1938:
1798:
1592:
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3869:
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3329:
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3040:
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2859:
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2641:
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1999:
1985:
1946:
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1698:
1126:
Selling products below cost in order to drive out competitors (also known as
1013:
443:
on the conspiracy agreement (bargaining, explicit or implicit communication).
361:
224:
192:
1226:
Market division and output determination of livestock feed additive, called
3910:
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3354:
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or setting prices that are either too high or too low without justification
1083:
1039:
999:, the independence of suppliers forces prices to their minimum, increasing
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102:
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2814:
2749:
2739:
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2504:
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1892:
1750:"The telecom price wars continue to rage in the global wireless industry"
1522:
1516:
1506:
1235:
1183:
1139:
1028:
996:
475:
Collusion on high prices means that members have an incentive to deviate.
326:
302:
161:
2448:
2407:
2303:
1554:. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458: Pearson Prentice Hall. pp.
4327:
4148:
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Slovenia
3842:
3797:
3754:
3553:
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2759:
2362:
2330:
1689:
1342:
397:
334:
310:
20:
2175:"K-Line convicted of criminal cartel conduct and fined $ 34.5 million"
489:
Insist on collusion agreements (now) and promote cooperation (future).
3764:
3692:
3633:
3010:
2930:
2324:
2322:
1500:
1417:
1055:
Collusion occurs when companies place more emphasis on future profits
377:
369:
339:
322:
70:
44:
2346:
1151:
3837:
3807:
3577:
3445:
2945:
1909:
1220:
933:{\displaystyle {\frac {\pi (P_{c})}{n(1-\delta )}}\geq \pi (P_{c})}
66:
2319:
3749:
3647:
3166:
3156:
2834:
2039:
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/october96/adm_10-15.html
1335:
and any discrepancy would incentive at least one actor to renege.
2126:"Google's three antitrust battles: Here's what you need to know"
1503:, Cambridge MA (readable; suitable for advanced undergraduates.)
1078:
Some actions that may indicate collusion among competitors are:
415:. There are many ways that implicit collusion tends to develop:
4077:
2059:"Collusion Strategy and Analysis for Texas Hold'em by T. Hayes"
1962:"An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program"
1294:
1227:
1216:
492:
Turn away from the alliance (now) and face punishment (future).
365:
346:
146:
2173:
Commission, Australian Competition and Consumer (2019-08-02).
4037:
3697:
3522:
2935:
1923:"Controlling cartels – Implications of the EU policy reforms"
1249:
1231:
3682:
2393:, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 151–172,
1628:"OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms - Collusion Definition"
1212:
1142:
by fixing bids or agreeing not to bid for certain contracts
4073:
Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania
1328:
larger share of profits than its partner in the agreement.
1012:
One variation of this traditional theory is the theory of
2248:"The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion"
1205:
333:
when rival companies cooperate for their mutual benefit.
306:
4270:
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities
478:
In a one-off situation, high prices are not sustainable.
2223:"Combating collusion - Cartels, Monopolies - Australia"
1792:
1790:
1113:(although, not all product bundling is anticompetitive)
1542:
4067:
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
4026:
Independent Commission Against Corruption (Hong Kong)
1663:
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo (2012-11-01).
1293:
Japanese shipping company Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (
949:
940:(Companies have no incentive to deviate unilaterally)
862:
814:
794:
750:
714:
678:
636:
515:
4008:
Anti-corruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory
1803:
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations
1787:
1379:
481:
Requires long-term vision and repeated interactions.
467:
inspection by customers and competition authorities.
4209:
Citizen's Charter and Grievance Redressal Bill 2011
943:Therefore, the cartel alliance will be stable when
2014:Encyclopedia of white-collar & corporate crime
1796:
1747:
1093:and agreeing to refer customers only to each other
976:
932:
845:
800:
777:
735:
699:
663:
621:
431:
4354:
2391:Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
2283:International Journal of Industrial Organization
1966:International Journal of Industrial Organization
1622:
1620:
484:Companies need to choose between two approaches：
1878:
4177:Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption
4044:Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption
3975:UNCAC Coalition of Civil Society Organisations
1662:
1652:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.10.006
3538:
2464:
1617:
279:
4280:United Nations Convention against Corruption
4260:Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
977:{\displaystyle \delta \geq {\frac {n-1}{n}}}
778:{\displaystyle \delta \geq {\frac {n-1}{n}}}
436:For a cartel to work successfully, it must:
384:and tacit understandings still takes place.
380:laws, but implicit collusion in the form of
4318:Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity
4153:Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
3997:Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
2120:
2118:
1204:The sharing of potential contract terms by
4165:National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
4061:Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau
3545:
3531:
2471:
2457:
2328:
2172:
2000:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00699-4
1904:
1902:
1774:https://doi.org/10.1257/002205106776162681
1411:
1325:Cost and demand differences between firms:
1215:manufacturers providing cafeteria food to
286:
272:
2478:
2439:"Government policies to reduce collusion"
2436:
2406:
2302:
1881:American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
1688:
1469:Chassang, Sylvain; Ortner, Juan (2023). "
247:Enforcement authorities and organizations
4095:Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
2115:
2010:
1848:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
1252:or any other card game played for money.
1150:
1119:with certain customers or suppliers and
1038:
846:{\displaystyle {\frac {\pi (P_{c})}{n}}}
4137:Sierra Leone Anti-corruption Commission
4002:Anti-Corruption Commission (Bangladesh)
2329:Asch, Peter; Seneca, Joseph J. (1975).
1959:
1899:
1845:
993:neoclassical price-determination theory
471:Regarding stability within the cartel:
4355:
4225:Freedom of information laws by country
4142:Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
2384:
2085:. Diss. University of Michigan, 2016.
1920:
1735:"Ethics of the GameStop Short Squeeze"
4089:Anti-Corruption Commission of Myanmar
4031:Commission Against Corruption (Macau)
3960:International Anti-Corruption Academy
3526:
2452:
2276:
1841:
1839:
1837:
1835:
1732:
1511:The Theory of Industrial Organization
1489:
1420:market structure, which is a type of
1404:Stable demand and/or excess capacity:
4308:2012 Indian anti-corruption movement
4303:2011 Indian anti-corruption movement
4084:Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
4014:National Anti-Corruption Observatory
2331:"Characteristics of Collusive Firms"
2245:
1846:Roberts, Kevin (1987). "Collusion".
1593:Collusion Law & Legal Definition
4230:The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
4125:National Anticorruption Directorate
4119:Anti-Corruption General Directorate
2335:The Journal of Industrial Economics
1529:
1361:Anti-collusion legal framework and
1123:with certain customers or suppliers
461:the expansion of non-cartel supply.
13:
3955:Group of States Against Corruption
2520:First-player and second-player win
2142:
2091:
1832:
1705:
1463:
1186:equipment in the 1960s, including
664:{\displaystyle 1\geq n(1-\delta )}
387:
329:, collusion takes place within an
43:
14:
4384:
4131:Investigative Committee of Russia
2083:Three Essays on Product Collusion
1416:Collusion often occurs within an
1380:Conditions Conducive to Collusion
1368:rather than the combined venture.
1101:horizontal territorial allocation
255:International Competition Network
4323:Russian anti-corruption campaign
4313:Anti-austerity movement in Spain
4220:Foreign Extortion Prevention Act
2627:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
1910:https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1314
1681:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.002
1242:being the most notable of these.
1169:
736:{\displaystyle n\delta \geq n-1}
700:{\displaystyle 1\geq n-n\delta }
4159:Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera
4020:National Supervisory Commission
2437:Pettinger, Tejvan (July 2020).
2430:
2387:"Excess capacity and collusion"
2378:
2369:
2270:
2239:
2215:
2191:
2166:
2101:A Critique of Political Economy
2075:
2051:
2031:
2004:
1992:
1953:
1914:
1872:
1778:
1766:
1715:A Critique of Political Economy
1550:Economics: Principles in Action
432:Base model of (Price) Collusion
4107:Investigation Task Force Sweep
4101:National Accountability Bureau
3573:Corruption in local government
3561:Corruption in different fields
3552:
2637:Evolutionarily stable strategy
2295:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102619
2011:Salinger, Lawrence M. (2005).
1978:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.007
1856:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_22-1
1741:
1726:
1656:
1644:
1597:
1586:
1546:; Sheffrin, Steven M. (2003).
1536:
927:
914:
902:
890:
882:
869:
834:
821:
658:
646:
607:
595:
583:
580:
567:
555:
543:
535:
522:
260:List of competition regulators
1:
4215:Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
4113:Central Anticorruption Bureau
2565:Simultaneous action selection
2264:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.014
1484:
1317:As the number of firms in an
1182:among manufacturers of heavy
1073:
504:
392:Covert collusion is known as
316:
4275:OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
4265:International asset recovery
4049:Central Vigilance Commission
3604:Corruption Perceptions Index
3497:List of games in game theory
2677:Quantal response equilibrium
2667:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
2602:Bayes correlated equilibrium
2399:10.1017/CBO9780511522055.010
2277:Emons, Winand (2020-05-01).
2081:Sullivan, Christopher John.
1287:
1034:
360:Collusion is illegal in the
7:
4333:2017–2019 Romanian protests
2966:Optional prisoner's dilemma
2697:Self-confirming equilibrium
2385:Phlips, Louis, ed. (1995),
1927:European Management Journal
1921:Morgan, Eleanor J. (2009).
1811:10.1007/978-94-011-1370-0_2
1441:
1305:
1146:
1103:of markets among themselves
10:
4389:
4363:Anti-competitive practices
4338:2017–2018 Russian protests
3970:Transparency International
3945:Global Financial Integrity
3431:Principal variation search
3147:Aumann's agreement theorem
2810:Strategy-stealing argument
2722:Trembling hand equilibrium
2652:Markov perfect equilibrium
2647:Mertens-stable equilibrium
2048:. Retrieved on 2007-10-17.
1475:Annual Review of Economics
1389:High market concentration:
1230:, by companies in the US,
1199:restrict players' salaries
127:Anti-competitive practices
93:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
62:History of competition law
28:Collusion (disambiguation)
25:
18:
4298:2011 Azerbaijani protests
4288:
4248:
4199:
4190:
3983:
3937:
3928:
3883:
3785:
3775:Offshore financial centre
3626:
3617:
3596:
3578:Interest group corruption
3560:
3467:Combinatorial game theory
3454:
3413:
3195:
3139:
3126:Princess and monster game
2921:
2823:
2730:
2682:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
2607:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
2588:
2487:
1960:Brenner, Steffen (2009).
1939:10.1016/j.emj.2008.04.006
1332:Asymmetry of information:
1273:
396:and is considered legal.
4240:Whistleblower protection
3728:Cryptocurrency and crime
3482:Evolutionary game theory
3215:Antoine Augustin Cournot
3101:Guess 2/3 of the average
2898:Strictly determined game
2692:Satisfaction equilibrium
2510:Escalation of commitment
1748:PricewaterhouseCoopers.
1669:European Economic Review
1578:: CS1 maint: location (
1043:Future collusive profits
1018:supra-competitive prices
788:Suppose this market has
3609:Economics of corruption
3487:Glossary of game theory
3086:Stackelberg competition
2712:Strong Nash equilibrium
1737:. University of Oxford.
1412:Government Intervention
1399:product differentiation
4235:UK Bribery Act of 2010
3991:Oficina Anticorrupción
3740:Noble cause corruption
3597:Measures of corruption
3512:Tragedy of the commons
3492:List of game theorists
3472:Confrontation analysis
3182:Sprague–Grundy theorem
2702:Sequential equilibrium
2622:Correlated equilibrium
2246:Park, Sangwon (2014).
1407:needed to meet demand.
1240:Archer Daniels Midland
1156:
1044:
978:
934:
847:
802:
779:
737:
701:
665:
623:
413:GameStop short squeeze
172:Occupational licensing
48:
3965:Mo Ibrahim Foundation
3745:Professional courtesy
3708:Honest services fraud
3285:Jean-François Mertens
1448:Conscious parallelism
1395:Homogeneous products:
1195:Major League Baseball
1154:
1042:
979:
935:
848:
803:
780:
738:
702:
666:
624:
403:The Wealth of Nations
47:
3929:Institutions dealing
3663:Conflict of interest
3588:Political corruption
3414:Search optimizations
3290:Jennifer Tour Chayes
3177:Revelation principle
3172:Purification theorem
3111:Nash bargaining game
3076:Bertrand competition
3061:El Farol Bar problem
3026:Electronic mail game
2991:Lewis signaling game
2535:Hierarchy of beliefs
1893:10.1257/mic.20130254
1471:Regulating Collusion
1315:The number of firms:
1211:Price fixing within
1109:and anticompetitive
1097:Dividing territories
1089:Paying or receiving
1022:Bertrand competition
947:
860:
812:
792:
748:
712:
676:
634:
513:
215:Occupational closure
210:Dividing territories
198:Essential facilities
98:Market concentration
26:For other uses, see
3770:Offshore investment
3462:Bounded rationality
3081:Cournot competition
3031:Rock paper scissors
3006:Battle of the sexes
2996:Volunteer's dilemma
2868:Perfect information
2795:Dominant strategies
2632:Epsilon-equilibrium
2515:Extensive-form game
1355:Economic recession:
1281:European Commission
1135:vertical restraints
4171:Warioba Commission
4109:(Papua New Guinea)
3853:Regulatory capture
3658:Commercial bribery
3441:Paranoid algorithm
3421:Alpha–beta pruning
3300:John Maynard Smith
3131:Rendezvous problem
2971:Traveler's dilemma
2961:Gift-exchange game
2956:Prisoner's dilemma
2873:Large Poisson game
2840:Bargaining problem
2745:Backward induction
2717:Subgame perfection
2672:Proper equilibrium
2044:2007-09-30 at the
1610:2008-01-09 at the
1544:O'Sullivan, Arthur
1490:General references
1372:Leniency Programs:
1157:
1045:
974:
930:
843:
798:
775:
733:
697:
661:
619:
425:risk-based pricing
234:Regulatory capture
49:
4350:
4349:
4346:
4345:
4186:
4185:
3924:
3923:
3901:Election security
3848:Political scandal
3583:Police corruption
3520:
3519:
3426:Aspiration window
3395:Suzanne Scotchmer
3350:Oskar Morgenstern
3245:Donald B. Gillies
3187:Zermelo's theorem
3116:Induction puzzles
3071:Fair cake-cutting
3046:Public goods game
2976:Coordination game
2850:Intransitive game
2780:Forward induction
2662:Pareto efficiency
2642:Gibbs equilibrium
2612:Berge equilibrium
2560:Simultaneous game
2418:978-0-521-49871-5
2252:Economics Letters
1865:978-1-349-95121-5
1820:978-94-011-1370-0
1733:McConnell, Doug.
1497:Oligopoly pricing
1495:Vives, X. (1999)
1363:collusive lawsuit
1201:in the mid-1980s.
1155:Set higher prices
1121:exclusive dealing
1068:leniency programs
972:
906:
841:
801:{\displaystyle n}
773:
611:
559:
296:
295:
225:Misuse of patents
220:Predatory pricing
205:Exclusive dealing
88:Barriers to entry
76:Coercive monopoly
4380:
4373:Bidding strategy
4197:
4196:
3935:
3934:
3916:Vote suppression
3803:Crony capitalism
3733:Hawala and crime
3723:Money laundering
3703:Graft (politics)
3683:Confidence trick
3624:
3623:
3618:Forms or aspects
3547:
3540:
3533:
3524:
3523:
3507:Topological game
3502:No-win situation
3400:Thomas Schelling
3380:Robert B. Wilson
3340:Merrill M. Flood
3310:John von Neumann
3220:Ariel Rubinstein
3205:Albert W. Tucker
3056:War of attrition
3016:Matching pennies
2657:Nash equilibrium
2580:Mechanism design
2545:Normal-form game
2500:Cooperative game
2473:
2466:
2459:
2450:
2449:
2443:
2442:
2434:
2428:
2427:
2426:
2425:
2410:
2382:
2376:
2373:
2367:
2366:
2326:
2317:
2316:
2306:
2274:
2268:
2267:
2243:
2237:
2236:
2234:
2233:
2219:
2213:
2212:
2210:
2209:
2195:
2189:
2188:
2186:
2185:
2170:
2164:
2163:
2146:
2140:
2139:
2137:
2136:
2122:
2113:
2112:
2111:. 24 April 2014.
2095:
2089:
2079:
2073:
2072:
2070:
2069:
2055:
2049:
2035:
2029:
2028:
2008:
2002:
1996:
1990:
1989:
1957:
1951:
1950:
1918:
1912:
1906:
1897:
1896:
1876:
1870:
1869:
1850:. pp. 1–5.
1843:
1830:
1829:
1828:
1827:
1794:
1785:
1782:
1776:
1770:
1764:
1763:
1761:
1760:
1745:
1739:
1738:
1730:
1724:
1723:
1721:
1709:
1703:
1702:
1692:
1675:(8): 1759–1772.
1660:
1654:
1648:
1642:
1641:
1639:
1638:
1624:
1615:
1601:
1595:
1590:
1584:
1583:
1577:
1569:
1553:
1540:
1530:Inline citations
1349:Potential entry:
1188:General Electric
1111:Product bundling
1107:Tying agreements
983:
981:
980:
975:
973:
968:
957:
939:
937:
936:
931:
926:
925:
907:
905:
885:
881:
880:
864:
852:
850:
849:
844:
842:
837:
833:
832:
816:
807:
805:
804:
799:
784:
782:
781:
776:
774:
769:
758:
742:
740:
739:
734:
706:
704:
703:
698:
670:
668:
667:
662:
628:
626:
625:
620:
612:
610:
587:
579:
578:
560:
558:
538:
534:
533:
517:
382:price leadership
372:and most of the
343:market structure
321:In the study of
288:
281:
274:
179:Product bundling
81:Natural monopoly
33:
32:
4388:
4387:
4383:
4382:
4381:
4379:
4378:
4377:
4353:
4352:
4351:
4342:
4290:
4284:
4252:
4250:
4244:
4201:
4192:Anti-corruption
4182:
3979:
3931:with corruption
3930:
3920:
3896:Electoral fraud
3891:Ballot stuffing
3879:
3781:
3619:
3613:
3592:
3568:Corporate crime
3556:
3551:
3521:
3516:
3450:
3436:max^n algorithm
3409:
3405:William Vickrey
3365:Reinhard Selten
3320:Kenneth Binmore
3235:David K. Levine
3230:Daniel Kahneman
3197:
3191:
3167:Negamax theorem
3157:Minimax theorem
3135:
3096:Diner's dilemma
2951:All-pay auction
2917:
2903:Stochastic game
2855:Mean-field game
2826:
2819:
2790:Markov strategy
2726:
2592:
2584:
2555:Sequential game
2540:Information set
2525:Game complexity
2495:Congestion game
2483:
2477:
2447:
2446:
2435:
2431:
2423:
2421:
2419:
2383:
2379:
2374:
2370:
2347:10.2307/2097944
2327:
2320:
2275:
2271:
2244:
2240:
2231:
2229:
2221:
2220:
2216:
2207:
2205:
2197:
2196:
2192:
2183:
2181:
2179:www.accc.gov.au
2171:
2167:
2148:
2147:
2143:
2134:
2132:
2124:
2123:
2116:
2108:TheGuardian.com
2097:
2096:
2092:
2080:
2076:
2067:
2065:
2057:
2056:
2052:
2046:Wayback Machine
2036:
2032:
2025:
2009:
2005:
1997:
1993:
1958:
1954:
1919:
1915:
1907:
1900:
1877:
1873:
1866:
1844:
1833:
1825:
1823:
1821:
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1783:
1779:
1771:
1767:
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1711:
1710:
1706:
1661:
1657:
1649:
1645:
1636:
1634:
1626:
1625:
1618:
1612:Wayback Machine
1602:
1598:
1591:
1587:
1571:
1570:
1566:
1541:
1537:
1532:
1492:
1487:
1466:
1464:Further reading
1458:Competition law
1453:Corporate crime
1444:
1414:
1382:
1308:
1290:
1276:
1256:Ben and Jerry's
1176:Market division
1172:
1149:
1117:Refusal to deal
1076:
1037:
958:
956:
948:
945:
944:
921:
917:
886:
876:
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865:
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631:
591:
586:
574:
570:
539:
529:
525:
518:
516:
514:
511:
510:
507:
455:non-compliance.
434:
394:tacit collusion
390:
388:Tacit Collusion
319:
292:
188:Refusal to deal
167:Tacit collusion
113:Relevant market
37:Competition law
31:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
4386:
4376:
4375:
4370:
4365:
4348:
4347:
4344:
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4341:
4340:
4335:
4330:
4325:
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4162:
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4134:
4128:
4122:
4116:
4110:
4104:
4098:
4092:
4086:
4081:
4075:
4070:
4064:
4058:
4052:
4046:
4041:
4035:
4034:
4033:
4028:
4017:
4011:
4005:
3999:
3994:
3987:
3985:
3981:
3980:
3978:
3977:
3972:
3967:
3962:
3957:
3952:
3950:Global Witness
3947:
3941:
3939:
3932:
3926:
3925:
3922:
3921:
3919:
3918:
3913:
3908:
3906:Gerrymandering
3903:
3898:
3893:
3887:
3885:
3881:
3880:
3878:
3877:
3872:
3867:
3866:
3865:
3855:
3850:
3845:
3840:
3835:
3830:
3825:
3823:Ghost soldiers
3820:
3815:
3810:
3805:
3800:
3795:
3789:
3787:
3783:
3782:
3780:
3779:
3778:
3777:
3772:
3762:
3757:
3752:
3747:
3742:
3737:
3736:
3735:
3730:
3720:
3715:
3710:
3705:
3700:
3695:
3690:
3685:
3680:
3679:
3678:
3673:
3665:
3660:
3655:
3650:
3645:
3636:
3630:
3628:
3621:
3615:
3614:
3612:
3611:
3606:
3600:
3598:
3594:
3593:
3591:
3590:
3585:
3580:
3575:
3570:
3564:
3562:
3558:
3557:
3550:
3549:
3542:
3535:
3527:
3518:
3517:
3515:
3514:
3509:
3504:
3499:
3494:
3489:
3484:
3479:
3474:
3469:
3464:
3458:
3456:
3452:
3451:
3449:
3448:
3443:
3438:
3433:
3428:
3423:
3417:
3415:
3411:
3410:
3408:
3407:
3402:
3397:
3392:
3387:
3382:
3377:
3372:
3370:Robert Axelrod
3367:
3362:
3357:
3352:
3347:
3345:Olga Bondareva
3342:
3337:
3335:Melvin Dresher
3332:
3327:
3325:Leonid Hurwicz
3322:
3317:
3312:
3307:
3302:
3297:
3292:
3287:
3282:
3277:
3272:
3267:
3262:
3260:Harold W. Kuhn
3257:
3252:
3250:Drew Fudenberg
3247:
3242:
3240:David M. Kreps
3237:
3232:
3227:
3225:Claude Shannon
3222:
3217:
3212:
3207:
3201:
3199:
3193:
3192:
3190:
3189:
3184:
3179:
3174:
3169:
3164:
3162:Nash's theorem
3159:
3154:
3149:
3143:
3141:
3137:
3136:
3134:
3133:
3128:
3123:
3118:
3113:
3108:
3103:
3098:
3093:
3088:
3083:
3078:
3073:
3068:
3063:
3058:
3053:
3048:
3043:
3038:
3033:
3028:
3023:
3021:Ultimatum game
3018:
3013:
3008:
3003:
3001:Dollar auction
2998:
2993:
2988:
2986:Centipede game
2983:
2978:
2973:
2968:
2963:
2958:
2953:
2948:
2943:
2941:Infinite chess
2938:
2933:
2927:
2925:
2919:
2918:
2916:
2915:
2910:
2908:Symmetric game
2905:
2900:
2895:
2893:Signaling game
2890:
2888:Screening game
2885:
2880:
2878:Potential game
2875:
2870:
2865:
2857:
2852:
2847:
2842:
2837:
2831:
2829:
2821:
2820:
2818:
2817:
2812:
2807:
2805:Mixed strategy
2802:
2797:
2792:
2787:
2782:
2777:
2772:
2767:
2762:
2757:
2752:
2747:
2742:
2736:
2734:
2728:
2727:
2725:
2724:
2719:
2714:
2709:
2704:
2699:
2694:
2689:
2687:Risk dominance
2684:
2679:
2674:
2669:
2664:
2659:
2654:
2649:
2644:
2639:
2634:
2629:
2624:
2619:
2614:
2609:
2604:
2598:
2596:
2586:
2585:
2583:
2582:
2577:
2572:
2567:
2562:
2557:
2552:
2547:
2542:
2537:
2532:
2530:Graphical game
2527:
2522:
2517:
2512:
2507:
2502:
2497:
2491:
2489:
2485:
2484:
2476:
2475:
2468:
2461:
2453:
2445:
2444:
2429:
2417:
2377:
2368:
2341:(3): 223–237.
2318:
2269:
2258:(2): 326–330.
2238:
2227:www.mondaq.com
2214:
2190:
2165:
2159:Deutsche Welle
2141:
2114:
2090:
2074:
2050:
2030:
2023:
2003:
1991:
1972:(6): 639–645.
1952:
1913:
1898:
1871:
1864:
1831:
1819:
1786:
1777:
1765:
1740:
1725:
1704:
1655:
1643:
1632:stats.oecd.org
1616:
1596:
1585:
1564:
1534:
1533:
1531:
1528:
1527:
1526:
1520:
1514:
1504:
1491:
1488:
1486:
1483:
1482:
1481:
1465:
1462:
1461:
1460:
1455:
1450:
1443:
1440:
1439:
1438:
1435:
1432:
1422:market failure
1413:
1410:
1409:
1408:
1401:
1392:
1381:
1378:
1377:
1376:
1369:
1358:
1352:
1346:
1336:
1329:
1322:
1307:
1304:
1303:
1302:
1298:
1289:
1286:
1285:
1284:
1275:
1272:
1271:
1270:
1266:
1263:
1253:
1243:
1224:
1209:
1202:
1193:An attempt by
1191:
1171:
1168:
1167:
1166:
1162:
1148:
1145:
1144:
1143:
1137:
1131:
1124:
1114:
1104:
1094:
1087:
1084:uniform prices
1075:
1072:
1063:
1062:
1059:
1056:
1036:
1033:
986:
985:
971:
967:
964:
961:
955:
952:
941:
929:
924:
920:
916:
913:
910:
904:
901:
898:
895:
892:
889:
884:
879:
875:
871:
868:
840:
836:
831:
827:
823:
820:
797:
786:
785:
772:
768:
765:
762:
756:
753:
743:
732:
729:
726:
723:
720:
717:
707:
696:
693:
690:
687:
684:
681:
671:
660:
657:
654:
651:
648:
645:
642:
639:
629:
618:
615:
609:
606:
603:
600:
597:
594:
590:
585:
582:
577:
573:
569:
566:
563:
557:
554:
551:
548:
545:
542:
537:
532:
528:
524:
521:
506:
503:
502:
501:
498:
494:
493:
490:
486:
485:
482:
479:
476:
469:
468:
462:
456:
450:
444:
433:
430:
429:
428:
421:
409:WallStreetBets
389:
386:
318:
315:
294:
293:
291:
290:
283:
276:
268:
265:
264:
263:
262:
257:
249:
248:
244:
243:
242:
241:
236:
231:
222:
217:
212:
207:
202:
201:
200:
195:
185:
176:
175:
174:
169:
164:
159:
149:
138:
136:Monopolization
130:
129:
123:
122:
121:
120:
118:Merger control
115:
110:
105:
100:
95:
90:
85:
84:
83:
78:
64:
56:
55:
54:Basic concepts
51:
50:
40:
39:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4385:
4374:
4371:
4369:
4366:
4364:
4361:
4360:
4358:
4339:
4336:
4334:
4331:
4329:
4326:
4324:
4321:
4319:
4316:
4314:
4311:
4309:
4306:
4304:
4301:
4299:
4296:
4295:
4293:
4287:
4281:
4278:
4276:
4273:
4271:
4268:
4266:
4263:
4261:
4258:
4257:
4255:
4249:International
4247:
4241:
4238:
4236:
4233:
4231:
4228:
4226:
4223:
4221:
4218:
4216:
4213:
4210:
4207:
4206:
4204:
4198:
4195:
4193:
4189:
4178:
4175:
4172:
4169:
4166:
4163:
4160:
4157:
4155:(South Korea)
4154:
4151:
4149:
4146:
4143:
4140:
4138:
4135:
4132:
4129:
4126:
4123:
4120:
4117:
4114:
4111:
4108:
4105:
4102:
4099:
4096:
4093:
4090:
4087:
4085:
4082:
4079:
4076:
4074:
4071:
4068:
4065:
4062:
4059:
4056:
4053:
4050:
4047:
4045:
4042:
4039:
4036:
4032:
4029:
4027:
4024:
4023:
4021:
4018:
4015:
4012:
4009:
4006:
4003:
4000:
3998:
3995:
3992:
3989:
3988:
3986:
3982:
3976:
3973:
3971:
3968:
3966:
3963:
3961:
3958:
3956:
3953:
3951:
3948:
3946:
3943:
3942:
3940:
3938:International
3936:
3933:
3927:
3917:
3914:
3912:
3909:
3907:
3904:
3902:
3899:
3897:
3894:
3892:
3889:
3888:
3886:
3882:
3876:
3873:
3871:
3870:State capture
3868:
3864:
3861:
3860:
3859:
3856:
3854:
3851:
3849:
3846:
3844:
3841:
3839:
3836:
3834:
3831:
3829:
3826:
3824:
3821:
3819:
3816:
3814:
3813:Elite capture
3811:
3809:
3806:
3804:
3801:
3799:
3796:
3794:
3791:
3790:
3788:
3784:
3776:
3773:
3771:
3768:
3767:
3766:
3763:
3761:
3758:
3756:
3753:
3751:
3748:
3746:
3743:
3741:
3738:
3734:
3731:
3729:
3726:
3725:
3724:
3721:
3719:
3716:
3714:
3711:
3709:
3706:
3704:
3701:
3699:
3696:
3694:
3691:
3689:
3686:
3684:
3681:
3677:
3674:
3672:
3669:
3668:
3666:
3664:
3661:
3659:
3656:
3654:
3651:
3649:
3646:
3644:
3640:
3637:
3635:
3632:
3631:
3629:
3625:
3622:
3620:of corruption
3616:
3610:
3607:
3605:
3602:
3601:
3599:
3595:
3589:
3586:
3584:
3581:
3579:
3576:
3574:
3571:
3569:
3566:
3565:
3563:
3559:
3555:
3548:
3543:
3541:
3536:
3534:
3529:
3528:
3525:
3513:
3510:
3508:
3505:
3503:
3500:
3498:
3495:
3493:
3490:
3488:
3485:
3483:
3480:
3478:
3475:
3473:
3470:
3468:
3465:
3463:
3460:
3459:
3457:
3455:Miscellaneous
3453:
3447:
3444:
3442:
3439:
3437:
3434:
3432:
3429:
3427:
3424:
3422:
3419:
3418:
3416:
3412:
3406:
3403:
3401:
3398:
3396:
3393:
3391:
3390:Samuel Bowles
3388:
3386:
3385:Roger Myerson
3383:
3381:
3378:
3376:
3375:Robert Aumann
3373:
3371:
3368:
3366:
3363:
3361:
3358:
3356:
3353:
3351:
3348:
3346:
3343:
3341:
3338:
3336:
3333:
3331:
3330:Lloyd Shapley
3328:
3326:
3323:
3321:
3318:
3316:
3315:Kenneth Arrow
3313:
3311:
3308:
3306:
3303:
3301:
3298:
3296:
3295:John Harsanyi
3293:
3291:
3288:
3286:
3283:
3281:
3278:
3276:
3273:
3271:
3268:
3266:
3265:Herbert Simon
3263:
3261:
3258:
3256:
3253:
3251:
3248:
3246:
3243:
3241:
3238:
3236:
3233:
3231:
3228:
3226:
3223:
3221:
3218:
3216:
3213:
3211:
3208:
3206:
3203:
3202:
3200:
3194:
3188:
3185:
3183:
3180:
3178:
3175:
3173:
3170:
3168:
3165:
3163:
3160:
3158:
3155:
3153:
3150:
3148:
3145:
3144:
3142:
3138:
3132:
3129:
3127:
3124:
3122:
3119:
3117:
3114:
3112:
3109:
3107:
3104:
3102:
3099:
3097:
3094:
3092:
3089:
3087:
3084:
3082:
3079:
3077:
3074:
3072:
3069:
3067:
3066:Fair division
3064:
3062:
3059:
3057:
3054:
3052:
3049:
3047:
3044:
3042:
3041:Dictator game
3039:
3037:
3034:
3032:
3029:
3027:
3024:
3022:
3019:
3017:
3014:
3012:
3009:
3007:
3004:
3002:
2999:
2997:
2994:
2992:
2989:
2987:
2984:
2982:
2979:
2977:
2974:
2972:
2969:
2967:
2964:
2962:
2959:
2957:
2954:
2952:
2949:
2947:
2944:
2942:
2939:
2937:
2934:
2932:
2929:
2928:
2926:
2924:
2920:
2914:
2913:Zero-sum game
2911:
2909:
2906:
2904:
2901:
2899:
2896:
2894:
2891:
2889:
2886:
2884:
2883:Repeated game
2881:
2879:
2876:
2874:
2871:
2869:
2866:
2864:
2862:
2858:
2856:
2853:
2851:
2848:
2846:
2843:
2841:
2838:
2836:
2833:
2832:
2830:
2828:
2822:
2816:
2813:
2811:
2808:
2806:
2803:
2801:
2800:Pure strategy
2798:
2796:
2793:
2791:
2788:
2786:
2783:
2781:
2778:
2776:
2773:
2771:
2768:
2766:
2765:De-escalation
2763:
2761:
2758:
2756:
2753:
2751:
2748:
2746:
2743:
2741:
2738:
2737:
2735:
2733:
2729:
2723:
2720:
2718:
2715:
2713:
2710:
2708:
2707:Shapley value
2705:
2703:
2700:
2698:
2695:
2693:
2690:
2688:
2685:
2683:
2680:
2678:
2675:
2673:
2670:
2668:
2665:
2663:
2660:
2658:
2655:
2653:
2650:
2648:
2645:
2643:
2640:
2638:
2635:
2633:
2630:
2628:
2625:
2623:
2620:
2618:
2615:
2613:
2610:
2608:
2605:
2603:
2600:
2599:
2597:
2595:
2591:
2587:
2581:
2578:
2576:
2575:Succinct game
2573:
2571:
2568:
2566:
2563:
2561:
2558:
2556:
2553:
2551:
2548:
2546:
2543:
2541:
2538:
2536:
2533:
2531:
2528:
2526:
2523:
2521:
2518:
2516:
2513:
2511:
2508:
2506:
2503:
2501:
2498:
2496:
2493:
2492:
2490:
2486:
2482:
2474:
2469:
2467:
2462:
2460:
2455:
2454:
2451:
2440:
2433:
2420:
2414:
2409:
2404:
2400:
2396:
2392:
2388:
2381:
2372:
2364:
2360:
2356:
2352:
2348:
2344:
2340:
2336:
2332:
2325:
2323:
2314:
2310:
2305:
2300:
2296:
2292:
2288:
2284:
2280:
2273:
2265:
2261:
2257:
2253:
2249:
2242:
2228:
2224:
2218:
2204:
2200:
2194:
2180:
2176:
2169:
2161:
2160:
2155:
2153:
2145:
2131:
2127:
2121:
2119:
2110:
2109:
2104:
2102:
2094:
2088:
2084:
2078:
2064:
2060:
2054:
2047:
2043:
2040:
2034:
2026:
2024:9780761930044
2020:
2016:
2015:
2007:
2001:
1995:
1987:
1983:
1979:
1975:
1971:
1967:
1963:
1956:
1948:
1944:
1940:
1936:
1932:
1928:
1924:
1917:
1911:
1905:
1903:
1894:
1890:
1886:
1882:
1875:
1867:
1861:
1857:
1853:
1849:
1842:
1840:
1838:
1836:
1822:
1816:
1812:
1808:
1804:
1800:
1793:
1791:
1781:
1775:
1769:
1755:
1751:
1744:
1736:
1729:
1718:
1716:
1708:
1700:
1696:
1691:
1686:
1682:
1678:
1674:
1670:
1666:
1659:
1653:
1647:
1633:
1629:
1623:
1621:
1613:
1609:
1605:
1600:
1594:
1589:
1581:
1575:
1567:
1565:0-13-063085-3
1561:
1557:
1552:
1551:
1545:
1539:
1535:
1524:
1521:
1518:
1515:
1512:
1508:
1505:
1502:
1498:
1494:
1493:
1479:
1476:
1472:
1468:
1467:
1459:
1456:
1454:
1451:
1449:
1446:
1445:
1436:
1433:
1430:
1429:
1428:
1425:
1423:
1419:
1405:
1402:
1400:
1396:
1393:
1390:
1387:
1386:
1385:
1373:
1370:
1366:
1364:
1359:
1356:
1353:
1350:
1347:
1344:
1340:
1337:
1333:
1330:
1326:
1323:
1320:
1316:
1313:
1312:
1311:
1299:
1296:
1292:
1291:
1282:
1278:
1277:
1267:
1264:
1261:
1257:
1254:
1251:
1247:
1244:
1241:
1237:
1233:
1229:
1225:
1222:
1218:
1214:
1210:
1207:
1203:
1200:
1196:
1192:
1189:
1185:
1181:
1177:
1174:
1173:
1170:United States
1163:
1159:
1158:
1153:
1141:
1138:
1136:
1132:
1129:
1125:
1122:
1118:
1115:
1112:
1108:
1105:
1102:
1098:
1095:
1092:
1088:
1085:
1081:
1080:
1079:
1071:
1069:
1060:
1057:
1054:
1053:
1052:
1049:
1041:
1032:
1030:
1025:
1023:
1019:
1015:
1014:kinked demand
1010:
1007:
1002:
998:
994:
991:According to
989:
969:
965:
962:
959:
953:
950:
942:
922:
918:
911:
908:
899:
896:
893:
887:
877:
873:
866:
856:
855:
854:
838:
829:
825:
818:
795:
770:
766:
763:
760:
754:
751:
744:
730:
727:
724:
721:
718:
715:
708:
694:
691:
688:
685:
682:
679:
672:
655:
652:
649:
643:
640:
637:
630:
616:
613:
604:
601:
598:
592:
588:
575:
571:
564:
561:
552:
549:
546:
540:
530:
526:
519:
509:
508:
499:
496:
495:
491:
488:
487:
483:
480:
477:
474:
473:
472:
466:
463:
460:
457:
454:
451:
448:
445:
442:
439:
438:
437:
426:
422:
418:
417:
416:
414:
410:
405:
404:
399:
395:
385:
383:
379:
375:
371:
367:
363:
362:United States
358:
354:
350:
348:
344:
341:
336:
332:
328:
324:
314:
312:
308:
304:
300:
289:
284:
282:
277:
275:
270:
269:
267:
266:
261:
258:
256:
253:
252:
251:
250:
246:
245:
240:
237:
235:
232:
230:
226:
223:
221:
218:
216:
213:
211:
208:
206:
203:
199:
196:
194:
193:Group boycott
191:
190:
189:
186:
184:
180:
177:
173:
170:
168:
165:
163:
160:
157:
153:
150:
148:
145:Formation of
144:
143:
142:
139:
137:
134:
133:
132:
131:
128:
125:
124:
119:
116:
114:
111:
109:
106:
104:
101:
99:
96:
94:
91:
89:
86:
82:
79:
77:
74:
73:
72:
68:
65:
63:
60:
59:
58:
57:
53:
52:
46:
42:
41:
38:
35:
34:
29:
22:
4080:(Madagascar)
4004:(Bangladesh)
3911:Vote pairing
3863:Rent-setting
3858:Rent-seeking
3818:Failed state
3718:Match fixing
3688:Embezzlement
3667:Corporation
3652:
3639:Black market
3360:Peyton Young
3355:Paul Milgrom
3270:Hervé Moulin
3210:Amos Tversky
3152:Folk theorem
2863:-player game
2860:
2785:Grim trigger
2754:
2432:
2422:, retrieved
2408:10419/221034
2390:
2380:
2371:
2338:
2334:
2304:10419/204916
2286:
2282:
2272:
2255:
2251:
2241:
2230:. Retrieved
2226:
2217:
2206:. Retrieved
2202:
2193:
2182:. Retrieved
2178:
2168:
2157:
2151:
2144:
2133:. Retrieved
2129:
2106:
2100:
2093:
2082:
2077:
2066:. Retrieved
2062:
2053:
2033:
2013:
2006:
1994:
1969:
1965:
1955:
1930:
1926:
1916:
1884:
1880:
1874:
1847:
1824:, retrieved
1802:
1780:
1768:
1757:. Retrieved
1753:
1743:
1728:
1714:
1707:
1672:
1668:
1658:
1646:
1635:. Retrieved
1631:
1599:
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1510:
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1477:
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1415:
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1394:
1388:
1383:
1371:
1360:
1354:
1348:
1338:
1331:
1324:
1314:
1309:
1246:Chip dumping
1180:price-fixing
1077:
1064:
1050:
1046:
1026:
1011:
990:
987:
787:
470:
464:
458:
452:
446:
440:
435:
401:
391:
359:
355:
351:
320:
298:
297:
239:Rent-seeking
152:Price fixing
140:
103:Market power
4368:Game theory
4253:and efforts
4251:instruments
4202:enforcement
4144:(Singapore)
4057:(Indonesia)
3993:(Argentina)
3875:State crime
3833:Mafia state
3828:Kleptocracy
3793:Clientelism
3760:Tax evasion
3643:Grey market
3477:Coopetition
3280:Jean Tirole
3275:John Conway
3255:Eric Maskin
3051:Blotto game
3036:Pirate game
2845:Global game
2815:Tit for tat
2750:Bid shading
2740:Appeasement
2590:Equilibrium
2570:Solved game
2505:Determinacy
2488:Definitions
2481:game theory
2203:asic.gov.au
2063:Lybrary.com
1933:(1): 1–12.
1887:(2): 1–38.
1690:10871/14991
1260:Häagen-Dazs
1236:South Korea
1140:Bid rigging
1029:bid rigging
997:game theory
449:compliance.
441:Co-ordinate
327:competition
325:and market
303:competition
162:Bid rigging
4357:Categories
4328:Yo Soy 132
4173:(Tanzania)
4103:(Pakistan)
4016:(Cameroon)
3843:Plutocracy
3798:Coronelism
3755:Slush fund
3554:Corruption
3121:Trust game
3106:Kuhn poker
2775:Escalation
2770:Deterrence
2760:Cheap talk
2732:Strategies
2550:Preference
2479:Topics of
2424:2023-04-04
2289:: 102619.
2232:2023-04-19
2208:2023-04-19
2184:2023-04-19
2135:2023-04-04
2068:2022-12-27
1826:2020-11-01
1759:2023-04-19
1637:2020-11-01
1603:Collusion
1523:Tirole, J.
1517:Tirole, J.
1507:Tirole, J.
1485:References
1343:price wars
1197:owners to
1184:electrical
1074:Indicators
1006:efficiency
1001:efficiency
505:Variations
398:Adam Smith
335:Conspiracy
317:Definition
229:copyrights
108:SSNIP test
21:Conspiracy
4291:movements
4211:(pending)
4179:(Vietnam)
4167:(Ukraine)
4127:(Romania)
4121:(Romania)
4097:(Nigeria)
4091:(Myanmar)
4069:(Liberia)
4040:(Croatia)
4010:(Burundi)
3884:Elections
3765:Tax haven
3693:Extortion
3653:Collusion
3634:Baksheesh
3305:John Nash
3011:Stag hunt
2755:Collusion
2355:0022-1821
2313:0167-7187
1986:0167-7187
1947:0263-2373
1699:0014-2921
1574:cite book
1501:MIT Press
1418:oligopoly
1339:Cheating:
1288:Australia
1238:in 1996,
1091:kickbacks
1082:Charging
1035:Deviation
963:−
954:≥
951:δ
912:π
909:≥
900:δ
897:−
867:π
819:π
764:−
755:≥
752:δ
728:−
722:≥
719:δ
695:δ
689:−
683:≥
656:δ
653:−
641:≥
614:≥
605:δ
602:−
584:→
565:π
562:≥
553:δ
550:−
520:π
420:products.
378:antitrust
370:Australia
340:oligopoly
323:economics
299:Collusion
141:Collusion
71:oligopoly
4200:Laws and
4133:(Russia)
4115:(Poland)
4063:(Latvia)
4022:(China)
3984:National
3838:Nepotism
3808:Cronyism
3713:Kickback
3446:Lazy SMP
3140:Theorems
3091:Deadlock
2946:Checkers
2827:of games
2594:concepts
2042:Archived
1608:Archived
1442:See also
1319:industry
1306:Barriers
1301:million.
1223:in 1993.
1221:military
1219:and the
1165:collude.
1147:Examples
331:industry
67:Monopoly
4289:Protest
4161:(Spain)
4051:(India)
3750:Scandal
3648:Bribery
3627:General
3198:figures
2981:Chicken
2835:Auction
2825:Classes
2363:2097944
1509:(1988)
1217:schools
1128:dumping
459:Control
447:Monitor
411:in the
376:due to
147:cartels
4078:BIANCO
2415:
2361:
2353:
2311:
2021:
1984:
1945:
1862:
1817:
1697:
1562:
1295:K-Line
1274:Europe
1228:lysine
1161:price.
453:Punish
366:Canada
347:cartel
4038:USKOK
3786:State
3698:Fraud
3676:Shell
3671:Dummy
2936:Chess
2923:Games
2359:JSTOR
1720:(PDF)
1250:poker
1232:Japan
465:Avoid
183:tying
156:cases
2617:Core
2413:ISBN
2351:ISSN
2309:ISSN
2130:CNET
2019:ISBN
1982:ISSN
1943:ISSN
1860:ISBN
1815:ISBN
1695:ISSN
1580:link
1560:ISBN
1258:and
1234:and
1213:food
1178:and
1099:and
995:and
311:void
227:and
181:and
69:and
4055:KPK
3196:Key
2403:hdl
2395:doi
2343:doi
2299:hdl
2291:doi
2260:doi
2256:122
1974:doi
1935:doi
1889:doi
1852:doi
1807:doi
1754:PwC
1685:hdl
1677:doi
1556:171
1480:(1)
1473:".
1248:in
1206:NBA
1031:).
1004:of
400:in
307:law
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2931:Go
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1980:.
1970:27
1968:.
1964:.
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1929:.
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830:c
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