231:(1969) coined an extension of the Coase theorem: aside from transaction costs, all institutional forms are capable of achieving the same efficient allocation. Contracts, extended markets, and corrective taxation are equally capable of internalizing an externality. To be logically correct, some restrictive assumptions are needed. First, spillover effects must be bilateral. This applies to the cases that Coase investigated. Cattle trample a farmer's fields; a building blocks sunlight to a neighbor's swimming pool; a confectioner disturbs a dentist's patients etc. In each case the source of the externality is matched with a particular victim. It does not apply to pollution generally, since there are typically multiple victims. Equivalence also requires that each institution has equivalent property rights. Victim rights in contract law correspond to victim entitlements in extended markets and to the polluter pays principle in taxation.
610:
well as who is actually affected by it. In the case of a polluted river that reduces the fish population as described by Coase, how can the involved parties determine which factories may have contributed the pollution that specifically harmed the fish, or whether there were any natural factors that interfered in the process. And even if one can determine who exactly is responsible and who is harmed, it is cumbersome to accurately quantify these effects. People cannot easily translate their experiences to monetary values, and they are likely to overstate the harm they have suffered. At the same time, the polluters would likely underestimate the proportion of the externality that they are responsible for.
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on the
Buchanan – Stubblebine – Turvey Theorem. By relaxing this assumption, they are able to conclude that even with a Pigouvian tax levied, efficiency improvements can exist. By creating a more realistic environment with how property rights are allocated, MacKenzie and Ohndorf observed that gains from Coasean exchange are reduced by a Pigouvian tax. Furthermore, their research also shows that it is possible that a pre-existing tax can be efficiency enhancing in the case of environmental litigation and liability. This is because it softens the controversy and therefore, reduces overall spending in litigation.
172:(1) In the case of zero transaction costs, no matter how the rights are initially allocated, negotiations between the parties will lead to the Pareto optimal allocation of resources; (2) In the case of non-zero transaction costs, different rights allocation definitions will lead to different resource allocations; (3) Because of the existence of transaction costs, different rights definitions and allocations will bring about resource allocation with different benefits. Therefore, the establishment of the property rights system is the basis for optimizing resource allocation (to Pareto optimal).
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transaction costs are never zero, it cannot be assumed that any institutional arrangement will necessarily be efficient. Others have argued that because transaction costs are never zero it is always appropriate for a government to intervene and regulate, though Coase believed that economists and politicians "tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation." What Coase actually argued is, that it is important to always compare alternative institutional arrangements to see which would come closest to "the unattainable ideal of the world of zero transaction costs."
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pillars for the New
Institutional Economics. First, the Coasean maximum-value solution becomes a benchmark by which institutions can be compared. And the institutional equivalence result establishes the motive for comparative institutional analysis and suggests the means by which institutions can be compared (according to their respective abilities to economize on transaction costs). The equivalency result also underlies Coase's (1937) proposition that the boundaries of the firm are chosen to minimize transaction costs. Aside from the "marketing costs" of using outside suppliers and the
681:)), are not due to transaction costs (although these are also quite prevalent), and are not due to absorbing states and inability to pay. Rather, they are due to fundamental theoretical requirements of Coase's theorem (necessary conditions) that are typically grossly misunderstood, and that when not present systematically eliminate the ability of Coaseian approaches to obtain efficient outcomes—locking in inefficient ones. Hahnel and Sheeran conclude that it is highly unlikely that conditions required for an efficient Coaseian solution will exist in any real-world economic situations.
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necessarily involved more than a single party engaged in conflicting activities and must be treated as a reciprocal problem. His work explored the relationship between the parties and their conflicting activities and the role of assigned rights/liabilities. While the exact definition of the Coase theorem remains unsettled, there are two issues or claims within the theorem: the results will be efficient and the results in terms of resource allocation will be the same regardless of initial assignments of rights/liabilities.
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abstract sense. This suggests that in practice, people would not be willing to accept the efficient outcomes prescribed by the
Coasean bargaining if they deem them to be unfair. So, while the Coase theorem suggests that parties who lose out on property rights should then pursue the property according to how much they value it, this does not often happen in reality. For example, Professor Ward Farnsworth has described how in the aftermath of twenty observed legal
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imposed on the Smiths, the optimal quantity of pear trees produced a year will increase to 4 (Jones’ MB + Smiths’ MB = MC). By internalizing the externality, both the Smith family and the Jones family increase their overall utility by increasing production from 3 pear trees a year to 4. $ 5 is the maximum price the Smiths are willing to pay for an additional, fourth, pear tree, which implies their marginal benefit to plant a fifth pear tree is 0.
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parties has the incentive to free-ride, to withhold their payments and withdraw from the negotiations because they can still receive the benefits regardless of whether or not they contribute financially. In 2016, Ellingsen and
Paltseva modelled contract negotiation games and showed that the only way to avoid the free-rider problem in situations with multiple parties is to enforce mandatory participation such as through the use of court orders.
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parties themselves would care who was granted the rights initially because this allocation would impact their wealth, but the result of who broadcasts would not change because the parties would trade to the outcome that was overall most efficient. This counterintuitive insight—that the initial imposition of legal entitlement is irrelevant because the parties will eventually reach the same result—is Coase's invariance thesis.
639:(specifically a "divide the pie" game under incomplete information). This typically yields a broad range of potential negotiated solutions, making it unlikely that the efficient outcome will be the one selected. Rather it is more likely to be determined by a host of factors including the structure of the negotiations, discount rates and other factors of relative bargaining strength (cf.
73:. The theorem is significant because, if true, the conclusion is that it is possible for private individuals to make choices that can solve the problem of market externalities. The theorem states that if the provision of a good or service results in an externality and trade in that good or service is possible, then bargaining will lead to a
725:(as told by the researchers) holding the tokens, as would be predicted by the Coase Theorem. However, when the students were trading property (mugs in this case) that were not directly equivalent to cash, proper Coasean bargaining did not occur as depicted in the adjacent diagram. This is because people generally exhibit an
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problem in question. The research conducted shows that in the presence of a pre-existing
Pigouvian tax, Coasean bargaining may be superior. The implications of this policy are regulation at both the federal and state level and environmental litigation and liability. This is because dual regulatory environments exist.
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So what is the right economic answer to the liability question in a world where transaction costs exist? The answer to that question (and this is the last of Coase's insights) is to make your best estimate of who the "least cost avoider" is – that is the person who will incur the least cost to avoid
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In 2009, in their seminal JEI article, Hahnel and
Sheeran highlight several major misinterpretations and common assumptions, which when accounted for substantially reduce the applicability of Coase's theorem to real world policy and economic problems. First, they recognize that the solution between a
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described in 2016, there are strong social norms that often prevent people from bargaining in most day-to-day situations. Whether it is the awkwardness of the exchange or the fear of greatly under-valuing someone else's property rights, transaction costs can still be quite high even in the most basic
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The Coase theorem considers all four of these outcomes logical because the economic incentives will be stronger than legal incentives. Pure or traditional legal analysis will expect that the wall will exist in both scenarios where B has a cause of action and that the wall will never exist if B has no
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fallacies that motivated Coase. Pigouvian taxation is revealed as not the only way to internalize an externality. Market and contractual institutions should also be considered, as well as corrective subsidies. The equivalence theorem also is a springboard for Coase's primary achievement—providing the
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In order to examine whether the hypothesis that
Coasean bargaining in the presence of a Pigouvian tax is superior to a scenario without taxation, MacKenzie and Ohndorf had to make certain assumptions. Firstly, they relaxing the assumption of property right allocations, and in doing so had a new take
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Second, in situations where multiple parties hold the property rights, Coasean bargaining often fails because of the holdout problem. Once all the property owners except for one have accepted the
Coasean solution, the last party is able to demand more compensation from the opposing party in order to
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The Jones family plants pear trees on their property which is adjacent to the Smith family. The Smith family gets an external benefit from the Jones family's pear trees because they pick up whatever pears fall to the ground on their side of the property line. This is an externality because the Smith
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Ian A. MacKenzie and Markus
Ohndorf have conducted research on Coasean bargaining in the presence of a Pigouvian tax. This research stems from the common belief within Coasean perspectives that Pigouvian taxation creates distortions and therefore inefficiencies, instead of effectively resolving the
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Thaler has also provided experimental evidence for the argument that initial allocations matter, put forth by Duncan
Kennedy (as previously noted), among others. When students were trading cash-equivalent tokens, the negotiations resulted in the students who would receive the most cash from a token
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Gruber described three additional issues with attempting to apply the Coase Theorem to real-world situations. The first is known as the assignment problem, and stems from the fact that for most situations with externalities, it is difficult to determine who may be responsible for the externality as
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However, transaction costs are not only a barrier for situations with large numbers of involved parties. Even in the simplest of situations, with only two individuals, social costs can increase transaction costs to be unreasonably high so as to invalidate the applicability of Coasean bargaining. As
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If a cause of action exists (i.e. B could sue A for damages and win) and the property damage equals $ 100 while the cost of building a wall to stop the runoff equals $ 50, the wall will probably exist. Owner A will spend $ 50 and build the wall in order to prevent a court case where B could claim $
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If the polluter has the ownership rights, it is incentivized to overstate its benefits from polluting, if the victim has the ownership rights, (s)he has the incentive to also misrepresent her/his damages. As a result, under incomplete information (probably the only state of knowledge for most real
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Ronald Coase's work itself emphasized a problem in applying the Coase theorem: transactions are "often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost." This isn't a criticism of the
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After realizing that the Smith family gets utility from the Jones family's pear trees, the Jones family thinks it is unfair that the Smiths get utility from picking up the pears that fall from their pear trees. The first option to eliminate the externality could be to put up a net fence that will
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In practice, numerous complications, including imperfect information and poorly defined property rights, can prevent this optimal Coasean bargaining solution. In his 1960 paper, Coase specified the ideal conditions under which the theorem could hold and then also argued that real-world transaction
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cases, none of the parties ever attempted to engage in Coasean bargaining (as would be expected to reach the most efficient outcome) because of anger at the unfairness of having to bargain. It is possible that Coase and his defenders would simply view this as a non-pecuniary transaction cost, but
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In his later writings, Coase himself expressed frustration that his theorem was often misunderstood. Some mistakenly understood the theorem to mean that markets would always achieve efficient results when transaction costs were low, when in reality his point was almost the exact opposite: because
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Whilst the Coase Theorem remains largely theoretical, a real life example of Coasean bargaining in the negotiations between waterworks and farmers in Denmark was published in 2012. Danish waterworks attempted to establish "voluntary cultivation agreements with Danish farmers". Some main takeaways
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The second option for the Jones could be to impose a cost on the Smith family if they want to continue to get utility from their pear trees. Say, if the Jones family has a MC of $ 25 for each pear tree produced, it allows them to plant 3 pear trees a year (Jones’ MB = MC). However, if the cost is
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in explaining the inability to effectively use the Coase Theorem in practice. Thaler modified his experiments with the Ultimatum game and showed that people were more likely to be concerned with ensuring fairness in negotiations when negotiating over their own tangible property rather than in an
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Lastly, if the side with only one party holds the property rights (so as to avoid the holdout problem), Coasean bargaining still fails, because of the free-rider problem. When the multiple parties on the other side all benefit fairly equally from the results of the negotiations, then each of the
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In the absence of transaction costs, both stations would strike a mutually advantageous deal. It would not matter which station had the initial right to broadcast; eventually, the right to broadcast would end up with the party that was able to put it to the most highly valued use. Of course, the
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who thinks that private property rights are institutions that arise to reduce transaction costs. The existence of private property rights implies that transaction costs are non-zero. If transaction costs are really zero, any property rights system will result in identical and efficient resource
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In resultant scholarship using economic models of analysis, prominently including the Coase theorem, theoretical models demonstrated that, when transaction costs are minimized or nonexistent, the legal appropriation of liability diminishes in importance or disappears completely. In other words,
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So, a key criticism is that the theorem is almost always inapplicable in economic reality, because real-world transaction costs are rarely low enough to allow for efficient bargaining. (That was the conclusion of Coase's original paper, making him the first 'critic' of using the theorem as a
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Because Ronald Coase did not originally intend to set forth any one particular theorem, it has largely been the effort of others who have developed the loose formulation of the Coase theorem. What Coase initially provided was fuel in the form of “counterintuitive insight” that externalities
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This version fits the legal cases cited by Coase. If it is more efficient to prevent cattle trampling a farmer's fields by fencing in the farm, rather than fencing in the cattle, the outcome of bargaining will be the fence around the farmer's fields, regardless of whether victim rights or
128:. Competing radio stations could use the same frequencies and would therefore interfere with each other's broadcasts. The problem faced by regulators was how to eliminate interference and allocate frequencies to radio stations efficiently. What Coase proposed in 1959 was that as long as
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In many cases of externalities, the parties might be a single large factory versus a thousand landowners nearby. In such situations, say the critics, the transaction costs rise extraordinarily high due to the fundamental difficulties in bargaining with a large number of individuals.
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By applying the Coase Theorem two possible solutions arise for internalizing this externality. These solutions can occur because the positive external benefits are clearly identified and we assume that 1) transaction costs are low; 2) property rights are clearly defined.
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has argued that the fact that an "economist as distinguished as Meade assumed an externality problem was insoluble save for government intervention suggests...the range of problems to which the Coasean solution is relevant may be greater than many would at first guess."
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If a cause of action does not exist, and the damage equals $ 100 while the cost of the wall equals $ 50, the wall will exist. Even though B cannot win the lawsuit, he or she will pay A $ 50 to build the wall because the wall is less costly than the damages from the
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family does not pay the Jones family for utility received from gathering the fallen pears and, therefore, does not participate in the market transaction of pear production. It results in the pears being underproduced, which means too few pear trees are planted.
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If a cause of action exists and the damage equals $ 50 while the cost of a wall is $ 100, the wall will not exist. Owner B may sue, win the case and the court will order Owner A to pay B $ 50. This is cheaper than actually building the wall. Courts
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interfered with each other by broadcasting in the same frequency band. Furthermore, it did not matter to whom the property rights were granted. His reasoning was that the station able to reap the higher economic gain from broadcasting would have an
532:. Essentially, a person who already has an entitlement is likely to request more to give it up than would a person who started off without the entitlement. The validity of this theoretical critique in practice is addressed in a later section.
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conclusion sometimes drawn from the Coase theorem is that liability should initially be assigned to the actors for whom avoiding the costs associated with the externality problem are the lowest. The problem in real life is that nobody knows
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from this application of the Coase Theorem were that, the farmers tried to receive over compensation by exploiting their information advantage, which in turn may have resulted in waterworks terminating negotiations. Additionally, as
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unrestricted grazing-rights prevail. Subsequent authors have shown that this version of the theorem is not generally true, however. Changing liability placement changes wealth distribution, which in turn affects demand and prices.
729:, in which they value something more once they actually have possession of it. Thus, the Coase Theorem would not always work in practice because initial allocations of property rights would affect the result of the negotiations.
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The zero transaction cost condition is taken to mean that there are no impediments to bargaining. Since any inefficient allocation leaves unexploited contractual opportunities, the allocation cannot be a contractual equilibrium.
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is included in transaction costs, by exploiting their information advantage, the farmers prolonged negotiations, thus demonstrating that the Coase theorem is very sensitive to its assumption of low transaction costs.
116:, and for the first time called it a "theorem." Since the 1960s, a voluminous amount of literature on the Coase theorem and its various interpretations, proofs, and criticism has developed and continues to grow.
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If a cause of action does not exist, and the damage equals $ 50 while the wall will cost $ 100, the wall will not exist. B cannot win the lawsuit and the economic realities of trying to get the wall built are
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Two property owners own land on a mountainside. Property Owner A's land is upstream from Owner B and there is significant, damaging runoff from Owner A's land to Owner B's land. Four scenarios are considered:
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ex ante. Thus, even though it is often claimed that Coasean bargaining is an alternative to Pigouvian taxation, it has been argued that in a hold-up situation Coasean bargaining may actually justify a
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argued that even in a simple case of a beekeeper's bees pollinating a nearby farmer's crops, Coasean bargaining is inefficient (though beekeepers and farmers do make contracts and have for some time).
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costs are rarely low enough to allow for efficient bargaining. Hence, the theorem is almost always inapplicable to economic reality but is a useful tool in predicting possible economic outcomes.
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the most valued use of a resource, and also that there exist costs involving the reallocation of resources by government. Another, more refined, normative conclusion also often discussed in
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Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2007). "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?". Economica. 74 (296): 573–585. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00556.x. ISSN 1468-0335.
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270:, the Coase theorem is often used as a method to evaluate the relative power of the parties during the negotiation and acceptance of a traditional or classical bargained-for contract.
658:—in other words that both sides lack private information, that their true costs are completely known, not only to themselves but to each other, and that this knowledge state is also
528:, who argues that the initial allocation always matters in reality. This is because psychological studies indicate that asking prices often exceed offer prices, due to the so-called
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The Coase Theorem shows that the essence of the market is not price, but property rights. As long as there are property rights, people will naturally "negotiate" a reasonable price.
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Therefore, in summary, MacKenzie and Ohndorf's research provides an economic argument in support of Pigouvian taxation in the case where there is the potential for negotiation.
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While most critics find fault with the applicability of the Coase Theorem, a critique of the theorem itself can be found in the 1981 work of the critical legal scholar
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If the negotiation is not a single shot game, then reputation effects may also occur, which can dramatically distort outcomes and may lead to failed negotiation (cf.
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allocation, and the assumption of private property rights is not necessary. Therefore, zero transaction costs and private property rights cannot logically coexist.
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part with the property right. Knowing this, the other property owners have the incentive to also demand more, leading to the unraveling of the bargaining process.
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is that government should create institutions that minimize transaction costs, so as to allow misallocations of resources to be corrected as cheaply as possible.
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Schweizer, Urs (1988). "Externalities and the Coase Theorem: Hypothesis or Result?". Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). 144 (2): 245–266.
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in 1991, was that transaction costs, however, could not be neglected, and therefore, the initial allocation of property rights often mattered. As a result, one
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When faced with an externality, the same efficient outcome can be reached without any government intervention as long as the following assumptions hold:
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prevent pears from falling to the ground of the Smith's side property line, which will automatically decrease the Smith family's marginal benefit to 0.
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Lastly, using a game-theoretic model, it has been argued that sometimes it is easier to reach an agreement if the initial property rights are unclear.
692:. Alternatively, it may be efficient to forbid renegotiation. Yet, there are situations in which a ban on contract renegotiation is not desirable.
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Robson, Alexander; Skaperdas, Stergios (2005). "Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem". The Australian National University.
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of central direction inside the firm, whether to put Fisher Body inside or outside of General Motors would have been a matter of indifference.
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theorem itself, since the theorem considers only those situations in which there are no transaction costs. Instead, it is an objection to
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Hahnel and Sheeran emphasize that these failures are not due to behavioral issues or irrationality (although these are quite prevalent (
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Lee, Timothy. "The Coase Theorem is widely cited in economics. Ronald Coase hated it". The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 October 2020.
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104:, especially in the case of externalities, and it has been used by jurists and legal scholars to analyze and resolve legal disputes.
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outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property. A key condition for this outcome is that there are sufficiently low
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There must be no wealth effects. The efficient solution will be the same, regardless of who gets the initial property rights.
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909:"Does the Coase theorem hold in real markets? An application to the negotiations between waterworks and farmers in Denmark"
185:(Following 2.) There must be few affected parties (or else the transactions costs of organizing them gets to be too great).
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Ellingsen, Tore; Paltseva, Elena (1 April 2016). "Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding".
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Schmitz, Patrick W. (2001). "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights".
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Ellingsen, Tore; Paltseva, Elena (2016-04-01). "Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding".
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Farnsworth, Ward (1999-01-01). "Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment? A Glimpse inside the Cathedral".
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654:). Second, the information assumptions required to apply Coase's theorem correctly to yield an efficient result are
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Akee, R. (2009). "Checkerboards and Coase: The Effect of Property Institutions on Efficiency in Housing Markets".
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single polluter and single victim is a negotiation—not a market. As such, it is subject to the extensive work on
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summarized the resolution of the externality problem in the absence of transaction costs in a 1966 economics
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is the gravity of the resulting injury (loss). This decision flung open the doors of economic analysis in
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Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2007). "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?".
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Schmitz, Patrick W. (2005). "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?".
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parties will arrive at an economically efficient solution that may ignore the legal framework in place.
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662:. When this is not the case, Coasean solutions predictably yield highly inefficient results because of
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The Coase theorem is considered an important basis for most modern economic analyses of government
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Roumasset, James (1979). "Sharecropping, Production Externalities, and the Theory of Contracts".
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Notwithstanding these restrictive assumptions, the equivalence version helps to underscore the
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is the burden (economic or otherwise) of adequate protection against foreseeable damages,
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Efficiency version: aside from transaction costs, the prevailing outcome will be efficient
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Gjerdingen, Donald (1983). "The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought".
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Invariance version: aside from transaction costs, the same efficient outcome will prevail
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Andrew Halpin, "Disproving the Coase Theorem?", 23 Econ. & Phil. 321, 325–27 (2007).
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Game-theoretic critique: hold-out, free-rider problems, complete information assumption
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1454:"Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment? A Glimpse inside the Cathedral"
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Apples, Bees and Contracts: A Coase-Cheung Theorem for Positive Spillover Effects.
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in these frequencies were well defined, it ultimately did not matter if adjacent
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in the bargaining and exchange process. This 'theorem' is commonly attributed to
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Hahnel, Robin; Sheeran, Kristen A. (2009). "Misinterpreting the Coase Theorem".
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Hahnel, Robin; Sheeran, Kristen A. (2009). "Misinterpreting the Coase Theorem".
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world negotiations), Coasean bargaining yields predictably inefficient results.
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cases, thanks in no small part to Judge Hand's popularity among legal scholars.
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Wright, Richard W. (2003). "Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the 'Hand Formula'".
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a Court of Law compensates Owner B the losses it makes from bearing the runoff.
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1664:"Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements"
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and legal scholars in the analysis and resolution of disputes involving both
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that may be an unreasonable extension of the concept of transaction costs.
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1974:. University Casebook Series (3rd ed.). St. Paul: Foundation Press.
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1954:
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159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947). Judge Hand's holding resolved simply that
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1939:"Coase's Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements"
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1726:——— (1959). "The Federal Communications Commission".
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a Court of Law pays Owner A the gains it makes from causing the runoff.
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A statement and proof of a simple mathematical version of the theorem.
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An overview of the theorem as well as criticism and further discussion
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Brown, John Prather (1973). "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability".
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2220:'The Coase theorem fails in the presence of asymmetric information.'
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Tirole, Jean (1999). "Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?".
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Owner A pays Owner B the losses it makes from bearing the runoff.
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Owner B pays Owner A the gains it makes from causing the runoff.
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Coase developed his theorem when considering the regulation of
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Abildtrup, Jens; Frank Jensen; Alex Dubgaard (January 2012).
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1755:——— (1960). "The Problem of Social Cost".
684:
Unconstrained Coasean bargaining ex post may also lead to a
1082:
Johnson, David B. (1973). "Meade, Bees and Externalities".
987:"Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique"
385:
50:
1585:"Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation"
1539:"Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation"
1493:"Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation"
966:
1836:
Gilles, Stephen G. (1994). "The Invisible Hand Formula".
2214:, including discussion of wealth effects and the theorem
1908:
Halpin, Andrew (2007). "Disproving the Coase Theorem?".
733:
Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation
601:
interactions that could make use of the Coase Theorem.
152:,' published in 1960 and cited when he was awarded the
436:
a Court of Law orders owner A to limit its operations.
2159:." Journal of Economic Literature, 58 (4): 1045–1128.
370:
364:
is the probability of damage (or loss) occurring and
350:
330:
301:
53:
47:
439:
a Court of Law orders owner A to compensate Owner B.
1063:
801:
799:
474:Possible solutions to internalize the externality:
44:
2224:Coase, Demsetz and the Unending Externality Debate
1989:Posner, Richard (1972). "A Theory of Negligence".
954:
376:
356:
336:
316:
247:Application in United States contract and tort law
1589:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
1543:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
1497:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
1244:
1166:
1081:
535:An additional critique of the theorem comes from
227:In his UCLA dissertation and in subsequent work,
89:(quotations noting that Coase's theorem is not a
2240:
1583:MacKenzie, Ian; Ohndorf, Markus (January 2016).
1537:MacKenzie, Ian; Ohndorf, Markus (January 2016).
1491:MacKenzie, Ian; Ohndorf, Markus (January 2016).
811:
796:
984:
295:could be determined by applying the formula of
551:Criticisms of the applicability of the theorem
148:Coase's main point, clarified in his article '
1878:
1300:"Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements"
1297:
1201:
897:, 4th edition. London: Macmillan and Co. 1932
496:
182:There must be little to no transactions costs
2050:. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
1970:Merrill, Thomas W.; Smith, Henry E. (2017).
1969:
1431:. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
972:
515:
417:rarely order persons to do or not do actions
195:
2203:Libertarian criticism against Coase theorem
1384:Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
400:
141:to pay the other station not to interfere.
2193:A simple illustration of the Coase Theorem
2132:(May 1995). "What is the Coase Theorem?".
2020:American Journal of Agricultural Economics
1822:
1451:
832:"Cybersecurity and the Least Cost Avoider"
829:
703:Behavioral criticisms of the Coase theorem
2017:
1403:
1350:
1266:
884:World Economic Forum, Shanghai: Dec. 2002
760:Fundamental theorems of welfare economics
707:Unlike Hahnel and Sheeran, the economist
1121:. Princeton Paperbacks. pp. 41–42.
1116:
1110:
978:
2128:
1381:
1298:Antràs, Pol; Staiger, Robert W (2012).
1075:
1026:
179:Property rights must be clearly defined
14:
2241:
2066:
1988:
1936:
1907:
1835:
1661:
1426:
1336:
1141:
1135:
565:that neglect this crucial assumption.
455:
222:
2212:An overview of the different insights
2198:Overview and discussion of efficiency
1754:
1725:
1701:
1632:
1069:
1029:European Journal of Law and Economics
960:
817:
805:
604:
2097:
1805:The University of Chicago Law Review
1458:The University of Chicago Law Review
830:Rosenzweig, Paul (5 November 2013).
555:
2061:United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
1943:Washington University Law Quarterly
1452:Farnsworth, Ward (1 January 1999).
913:Journal of Environmental Management
288:United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
251:The Coase Theorem has been used by
93:in the strict mathematical sense).
24:
2233:The Wolfram Demonstrations Project
2091:
1719:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
1705:(1937). "The Nature of the Firm".
694:
25:
2280:
2172:
1972:Property: Principles and Policies
1866:Public Finance and Public Policy.
1728:The Journal of Law and Economics
1259:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00556.x
1144:Public Finance and Public Policy
1084:The Journal of Law and Economics
880:Johansson, P. and J. Roumasset,
489:
467:
40:
1576:
1530:
1484:
1445:
1420:
1375:
1330:
1291:
1238:
1195:
1160:
1020:
666:—not "mere" transaction costs.
283:Second Circuit Court of Appeals
1825:Southern California Law Review
1791:The Review of Economic Studies
1786:, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
1668:Journal of Law & Economics
1169:The Review of Economic Studies
1146:. New York: Worth Publishers.
900:
887:
874:
862:
853:
823:
419:: they prefer monetary awards.
119:
69:or outcome in the presence of
13:
1:
2218:Dilbert and the Coase Theorem
1625:
933:10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.09.004
848:the harm under consideration.
711:highlights the importance of
2146:10.1016/0922-1425(94)00038-U
2101:Journal of Law and Economics
2070:Theoretical Inquiries in Law
1868:New York: Worth Publishers.
1757:Journal of Law and Economics
790:
510:
464:Let's assume the following:
7:
2269:New institutional economics
2134:Japan and the World Economy
1662:Cheung, Steven N S (1969).
1117:Friedman, David D. (2000).
870:Intermediate Microeconomics
748:
563:applications of the theorem
395:
10:
2285:
2157:The Coase Theorem at Sixty
1910:Economics & Philosophy
1893:10.2753/JEI0021-3624430110
1881:Journal of Economic Issues
1609:10.1016/j.jeem.2015.09.003
1563:10.1016/j.jeem.2015.09.003
1517:10.1016/j.jeem.2015.09.003
1216:10.2753/JEI0021-3624430110
1204:Journal of Economic Issues
973:Merrill & Smith (2017)
497:Waterworks Denmark example
150:The Problem of Social Cost
2155:Medema, Steven G. 2020. "
1922:10.1017/S0266267107001514
1864:Gruber, Jonathan (2016).
1142:Gruber, Jonathan (2016).
516:Criticisms of the theorem
196:Efficiency and invariance
2046:Thaler, Richard (2015).
1991:Journal of Legal Studies
1937:Harris, Seth D. (2002).
1635:Journal of Legal Studies
1427:Thaler, Richard (2015).
1304:American Economic Review
985:Kennedy, Duncan (1981).
895:The Economics of Welfare
401:Damage from water runoff
112:in terms of private and
1582:
1536:
1490:
1361:10.1111/1468-0262.00052
1041:10.1023/A:1008709628107
906:
785:Environmental economics
317:{\displaystyle B<PL}
1316:10.1257/aer.102.7.3140
699:
504:asymmetric information
378:
358:
338:
318:
2231:by Seth J. Chandler,
1799:10.1093/restud/rdw001
1181:10.1093/restud/rdw001
698:
569:practical solution.)
379:
359:
339:
319:
2264:Public choice theory
713:behavioral economics
656:complete information
368:
348:
328:
299:
27:Theorem in economics
2083:10.2139/ssrn.362800
1955:10.2139/ssrn.372800
1838:Virginia Law Review
1793:. 83 (2): 547–586.
1601:2016JEEM...75....1M
1555:2016JEEM...75....1M
1509:2016JEEM...75....1M
1396:10.1093/jleo/ewi019
994:Stanford Law Review
925:2012JEnvM..93..169A
770:Economic efficiency
664:perverse incentives
541:Steven N. S. Cheung
456:Planting pear trees
229:Steven N. S. Cheung
223:Equivalence version
63:economic efficiency
2254:Economics theorems
2207:Hans-Hermann Hoppe
893:Pigou, Arthur C.,
700:
652:chainstore paradox
605:Assignment problem
374:
354:
334:
314:
2249:Law and economics
2229:The Coase Theorem
2183:David D. Friedman
1981:978-1-62810-102-7
1784:Conway v. O'Brien
585:David D. Friedman
556:Transaction costs
537:new institutional
432:cause of action.
377:{\displaystyle L}
357:{\displaystyle P}
337:{\displaystyle B}
285:in his decision,
167:law and economics
126:radio frequencies
79:transaction costs
32:law and economics
16:(Redirected from
2276:
2149:
2125:
2086:
2043:
2014:
1985:
1966:
1933:
1904:
1861:
1844:(5): 1015–1054.
1832:
1780:
1751:
1722:
1703:Coase, Ronald H.
1698:
1696:
1694:
1658:
1620:
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1407:
1379:
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1354:
1334:
1328:
1327:
1310:(7): 3140–3183.
1295:
1289:
1288:
1270:
1253:(296): 573–585.
1242:
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1199:
1193:
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844:
842:
827:
821:
815:
809:
803:
727:endowment effect
679:cognitive biases
660:common knowledge
641:Ariel Rubenstein
629:bargaining games
530:endowment effect
493:
471:
383:
381:
380:
375:
363:
361:
360:
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75:Pareto efficient
61:) describes the
60:
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52:
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46:
21:
2284:
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2279:
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2238:
2175:
2130:Hurwicz, Leonid
2094:
2092:Further reading
2089:
2063:, 159 F.2d 169.
2032:10.2307/1239911
1982:
1850:10.2307/1073624
1817:10.2307/1600470
1713:(16): 386–405.
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1470:10.2307/1600470
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1352:10.1.1.465.9450
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1006:10.2307/1228354
989:
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868:Varian, H 1987
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838:
828:
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797:
793:
751:
735:
705:
686:hold-up problem
616:
607:
598:Jonathan Gruber
558:
553:
518:
513:
499:
458:
411:100 in damages.
403:
398:
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130:property rights
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65:of an economic
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23:
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15:
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2259:Market failure
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2114:10.1086/592718
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2015:
2003:10.1086/467478
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71:externalities
68:
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58:
37:
36:Coase theorem
33:
19:
2140:(1): 49–74.
2137:
2133:
2105:
2099:
2074:
2068:
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2047:
2023:
2019:
1997:(1): 29–96.
1994:
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1942:
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1706:
1691:. Retrieved
1674:(1): 23–42.
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1612:. Retrieved
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1119:Law's Order
841:12 November
650:, also the
637:game theory
633:negotiation
575:James Meade
154:Nobel Prize
120:The theorem
114:social cost
83:Nobel Prize
2243:Categories
1626:References
946:10 October
596:economist
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573:economist
539:economist
273:In modern
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2011:154627597
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1707:Economica
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1324:0002-8282
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1247:Economica
1224:0021-3624
1189:0034-6527
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791:Footnotes
765:Economics
511:Criticism
293:liability
236:Pigouvian
158:normative
139:incentive
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718:nuisance
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324:, where
275:tort law
261:tort law
110:textbook
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1963:8521787
1858:1073624
1693:14 June
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