Adlertag - Knowledge

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short by 150 pilots by 31 August 1940. Only 150 pilots could be replaced up to 21 September. Bomber pilots were converted to cope. Overall trend was up from July 1940. Murray focuses on German crew losses. Bf 109 units were running at 67 percent, Bf 110 units 46 percent, and bombers were at 59 percent establishment by 14 September. One week later it was 64, 52 and 52 percent respectively. It seemed that the Germans were "running out of aircraft". Wood and Dempster assert that RAF operational strength hardly declined, from 64.8 percent on 24 August to 64.7 percent on 31 August, and finally 64.25 percent on 7 September 1940.

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layout from the main headquarters at Bentley Priory. The main map on the plotting table represented the group command area and its associated airfields. Extensive radio and telephone equipment transmitted and received a constant flow of information from the various sector airfields as well as the Observer Corps, AA Command and the navy. The "Duty fighter controller" was the Group GOC's personal representative and was tasked with controlling how and when each raid would be intercepted. If the telephone system failed engineers would be on site within minutes to repair the broken links.

118: 1731: 2510:. However, as with the campaign against the RAF, the types of targets differed radically and no sustained pressure was put under any one type of British target. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it had even begun. The end result of the air campaign against Britain in 1940 and 1941 was a decisive failure to end the war. As Hitler committed Germany to ever increasing military adventures, the 4352: 104: 2341:. Despite the group being a specialist night strike unit which had high expertise in night navigation, only four of the crews found their targets. The eleven 551 lb (250 kg) bombs dropped were not sufficient to disrupt fighter production. Around five of the 11 fell inside the compound. Casualties were small as workers had gone to shelter. Serious damage was done only to offices and a tool room, while a gas main was fractured. Another group, led by 1251:(the true figure was 496) and that figure would decrease, indicating that the RAF could not sustain a long battle of attrition. Schmid also claimed the command at all levels was rigid and inflexible, with fighters being tied to home bases. In his list of omissions, Schmid failed to mention the RAF maintenance and organisation operations, which put back damaged aircraft with rapid effect. He anticipated a short battle. Crucially, Schmid failed to mention 1803:. As the plots of the raiding aircraft moved, the counters were pushed across the map by magnetic "rakes". This system enabled the main "Fighter Controller" and Dowding to see where each formation was heading, at what height, and in what strength. This allowed an estimate to be made of possible targets. The age of the information was denoted from the colour of the counter. The simplicity of the system meant that decisions could be made quickly. 4364: 2423:

and Eastchurch was a failure, as both were Coastal Command stations and bore no relation to Fighter Command. The Germans may have reasoned that if bases such as Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne were neutralised through the attacks on 12 August, then Fighter Command may have had to move onto these airfields. In fact, the bombing of 12 August had failed to knock out these strips, and

938:. The date of the assault was postponed several times because of bad weather. Eventually, it was carried out on 13 August 1940. The German attacks on 13 August inflicted significant damage and casualties on the ground, but, marred by poor intelligence and communication, they did not make a significant impression on Fighter Command's ability to defend British air space. 2449:), both sides claimed to have shot down and destroyed more enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air than they had in reality. RAF Fighter Command claimed 78 German aircraft shot down on 13 August 1940. Another source states that official RAF claims amounted to 64. Actual German losses amounted to 47–48 aircraft destroyed and 39 severely damaged. Conversely, the 1768:(ROC), combined with an organisation system to process the information was crucial to the RAF's ability to efficiently intercept incoming enemy aircraft. The technology was named RDF with misleading intent – the vague description would disguise the full nature of the system to the enemy if its existence ever became known. 2088:

to the target of Portland. They ran into No. 601 Squadron RAF Hurricanes and lost six Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged. Only one Hurricane was shot down and another damaged. A second source states only four Bf 110s were destroyed, whilst a third gives the loss of five destroyed and five damaged. The

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failed to develop any focused strategy for defeating RAF Fighter Command. At first, it attempted to destroy RAF bases, then switched to strategic bombing by day and night. It tried to achieve the destruction of several British industries at the same time, switching from bombing aircraft factories, to

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and underestimated the RAF. The most serious mistakes were made concerning radar, airfield identification, and production sites. Schmid asserted that the number of operational airfields in southern England were severely limited; estimated that the British could produce only 180–330 fighters per month

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The Germans had not achieved a degree of success commensurate with their exertions. Nevertheless, in the belief they were having considerable effect on Fighter Command, they prepared to launch their all-out assault on the RAF the following day. By 12 August, German air strength had reached acceptable

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was badly damaged and others targeted were also damaged, but not destroyed. All were in working order by the following morning. The attacks against the harbour and RAF stations had failed to destroy them. All were not in fully working order by the end of the day, but were back in action the following

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had issued orders for bombers to abandon missions if their escorts did not show up, but Fink did not want to be accused of failing to obey orders and continued onward even though the Bf 110s turned back. The return leg would take KG 2 across No. 11 Group's territory, which could have been disastrous

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Bungay notes that by between 27 August to 4 September 1940 that German bomber unit strength had shrunk to an average of 20 out of 35–40. Bf 109 units had declined to 18 out of 35–40 and Bf 110 units had shrunk even lower. Bungay also notes that the RAF pilot losses were 125 a week and the force was

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claimed to have destroyed 70 Hawker Hurricanes and Spitfires in the air and a further 18 Blenheim bombers in the air alone. This was an exaggeration of about 300 percent. Another 84 RAF fighters were claimed on the ground. Actual RAF losses in the air amounted to 13 fighters and 11 bombers, with 47

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instead. No. 238 Squadron had been detailed to intercept, but the fighter escort was too strong and the bombers were not diverted from their course. Several warehouses were destroyed and a cold storage plant was also knocked out. All fires were under control by dusk. One III./LG 1 dropped its bombs

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was to be bombed as well, with the support of 52 Ju 87s from StG 1 and StG 2 who were to strike at RAF Warmwell and Yeovil. I./JG 53 flew a fighter sweep ahead of the bombers from Poole to Lyme Regis in order to tempt the RAF into battle. I./JG 53 made landfall at 16:00. The sweep failed to attract

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At 11:10, V./LG 1 Bf 110s took off in advance of a raid by KG 54, possibly to tempt RAF fighters into battle before the main assault, so the RAF would be out of position. The bombers' mission was cancelled. The order did not reach V./LG 1 who continued to their target area. The 23 Bf 110s continued

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The Germans had maintained the attacks on airfields in south-eastern England which they had started the previous day. On 12 August, most of the Kentish airfields had been attacked; and on 13 August, the Germans concentrated on the second line airfields south of London. The concentration on Detling

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For an hour after dawn on 13 August, there were few German tracks upon the plot tables in operations rooms, and none at all in the central and eastern Channel. The first signs of concentration, however, came earlier than usual, for between 05:30 and 05:40 two formations of 30 or more aircraft were

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This information was simultaneously sent to the headquarters of each group, where it was cross-checked through a filter room before being sent through to another operations room, housed in an underground bunker. Because Group had tactical control of the battle, the operations room was different in

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before the Battle of Britain. Over 1400 aircraft had been lost in the Battle of France on top of about 500 lost in conquering Poland and Norway in 1939. The service was forced to wait until it had reached acceptable levels before a main assault against the RAF could be made. Therefore, the first

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intelligence had not identified the Southampton Spitfire factory—on the waterfront near the docks—as an important target. Poor intelligence suggested it was a bomber factory. Only later, in September, was it attacked and severely damaged. However, even then the Germans were unaware of the damage

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area. For 30 minutes, they remained over land, but at 06:10 they began moving inland. The Observer Corps and radar tracked them and guided the RAF units to intercept. Unaware of the German intent, the controllers directed three full Squadrons and detachments of three others were alerted by

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being missed approaching the eastern, instead of central Channel by radar, KG 2 hit the RAF airfield. KG 2 claimed 10 Spitfires destroyed on the ground. In fact, no Fighter Command fighters were lost. For some time afterward, this wrong claim convinced German intelligence that Eastchurch was a

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aircraft as they organised over their own airfields in northern France and Belgium. Once the raiding aircraft moved inland behind the radar stations, the formations were plotted by the ROC. The information from RDF and the Observer Corps were sent through to the main operations room of Fighter

1128:) was sunk. Mine laying from aircraft had proved more profitable, sinking 38,000 tons . The impact on Fighter Command was minimal. It had lost 74 fighter pilots killed or missing and 48 wounded in July, and its strength rose to 1,429 by 3 August. By that date, it was only short of 124 pilots. 1056:

With Western Europe neutralised, the OKL and OKW turned their attention to Britain, which was now home to the Allied base of operations in Europe. Hitler hoped Britain would negotiate for an armistice, for which he was prepared to offer generous terms. The tentative offers made by Hitler were

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intercepted. Four Ju 88s and one Bf 109 from JG 2 were shot down. The German fighters claimed six RAF fighters and the bombers another 14. In reality, the bombers only damaged five. The Bf 109s destroyed only one and damaged another. Of the five RAF fighters damaged by the bombers, two were

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optimistically claimed 30 RAF fighters destroyed (in reality RAF fighter losses in aerial combat amounted to 13 throughout the entire day), for a loss of 13 Bf 110s. The morning's effort had been a fiasco. The attacks showed a serious German technical failure in air-to-air communication.

1124:("Channel battle") rarely involved attacks against RAF airfields inland, but encouraged RAF units to engage in battle by attacking British Channel convoys. These operations would last from 10 July-8 August 1940. The attacks against shipping were not successful; only 24,000 tons ( 1950:

Eventually the bombers were intercepted. KG 2 lost five Do 17s in the attempt. Six Dorniers were also badly damaged. In return, accurate fire from the Dornier gunners shot down two Hurricanes from the attacking Squadrons: No. 111, No. 151 and No. 74 Squadron led by

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to decimate. The RAF aircraft industry supported the losses and its pilots were replaced sufficiently to limit the RAF's decline in strength and deny the Germans victory. Conversely, the RAF were able to ensure the serviceability rates and aircrew numbers of the

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underestimated British radar, and they had not realised its importance in the British operational system. To the contrary, OKL believed that the radar stations would benefit the German effort by sending RAF forces into large-scale air battles for the

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in the attack and one Coastal Command Spitfire. However, severe damage was done to the infrastructure. Much equipment and ammunition was destroyed and 16 of the Command's personnel were killed. RAF Eastchurch was back in operation by 16:00.

1850:—tried to warn the Dorniers of the cancellation. Unable to contact the bombers by radio, Huth tried to signal them by flying in front of them and performing aerobatics. Fink ignored him and flew on. KG 2 flew around the coast to his target, 1867:

misjudging the direction of the bombers, due to low-lying cloud, and the radar not picking up the direction of the German bombers, the WAAF plotted the course of the raid incorrectly and the RAF failed to prevent the target being attacked.

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would launch seven fruitless raids on it in the coming weeks. Added to this mistake was the failure to keep up pressure. Raids were spaced out, giving the field time to recover. The station was used by RAF Coastal Command, which lost five

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of KG 2 were not informed and took off at 04:50 for their target. They were to meet with their escorts from ZG 26 over the Channel. ZG 26 received the cancellation order, but II., and III./KG 2 did not. KG 2 had formed up by 05:10, led by

2084:. ZG 2 was supposed to provide escort during one these attacks, and in a breakdown of communications, arrived over the target without their Ju 88s, which had been ordered to stand down. One Bf 110 was shot down by No. 238 Squadron RAF. 2405:. Very little damage was done, though some rail tracks were cut temporarily and around 100 casualties were suffered. It is unknown if any German aircraft were lost. One German airman was found wandering around the countryside in 2003:. Losses and results are unknown. KG 27 also abandoned most of its operations. III./KG 27 did attempt to make it through to the Bristol docks, losing one He 111 to No. 87 Squadron RAF in the attempt. Little damage was done. 2122:

and divert RAF squadrons. Instead, all it succeeded in doing was to alert the RAF defences a critical five minutes earlier. When the main wave of LG 1 and StG 2 arrived over the coast, they were greeted by 77 RAF fighters.

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The lack of sustained and concentrated attacks on radar left it free to help direct the deployment of RAF units at opportune moments. Its continued warnings of incoming raids were a crucial benefit to Fighter Command. The

2520:, the invasion of Western Europe. The Battle of Britain ensured that the Western Allies had a base from which to launch the campaign and that there would be a Western Allied presence on the battlefield to meet the 2310:. One pilot turned back complaining of "fuel problems" and was court-martialled. That bomber was the only one to return. The rest fell to AAA fire and fighters. Some 24 airmen were killed and nine were captured. 934:. The service's destruction would deny the British their air superiority asset and feeling vulnerable to air attack might negotiate for peace. Throughout July and early August, the Germans made preparations for 2172:

StG 77 was also in action, escorted by JG 27 Bf 109s. StG 77s 52 Ju 87s were joined by 40 Ju 88s of KG 54. Both formations were heading for No. 10 Group RAF's airfields. StG 77 was targeting RAF Warmwell. The

2283:, No. 601 and No. 609 Squadrons intercepted. According to the account of JG 26, the British fighters made little impression on the bombers. Three JG 51 Bf 109s were shot down in skirmishes with RAF fighters. 2470:

from continuing its campaign. The assault against RAF airfields continued throughout August and into September 1940. The battles involved large numbers of aircraft and heavy losses on both sides. The

1799:, which gave the RAF intelligence on the German order of battle. Colour-coded counters representing each raid were placed on a large table, which had a map of Britain overlaid and squared off with a 2475:

attacking supporting industries, import or distribution networks such as coastal ports. An attempt was even made against unrelated targets, such as destroying the morale of the British population.

4394: 1784:. The plots were assessed to determine whether they were "hostile" or "friendly". If hostile, the information was sent to the main "operations room", which was in a large underground bunker. 2207:

from an unknown cause. The Ju 87s bombed the station and 40 Bf 109s strafed it, killing the commander. The operations block was hit, causing high casualties. The losses were disastrous for

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factory at Rochester. III./KG 3 broke away from the main formation and attacked Eastchurch while II./KG 3 headed for Rochester. Significant damage was done to the factory producing the

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StG 3 was to take part. For unknown reasons it was removed from the order of battle on 13 August. Another source asserts that the unit had its missions cancelled owing to poor weather.

2151:(Groups) had lost six destroyed and many damaged. They had escaped lightly. The bombing succeeded in destroying a bicycle factory, a furniture warehouse and a refrigerated meat depot. 1764:. The core of Dowding's system was implemented by Dowding himself: the use of Radio Direction Finding (RDF or radar) was at his behest, and its use, supplemented by information by the 246: 1991:

2 received the order to abandon morning operations, but some began their attacks aimed at airfields and ports in southern Britain. KG 76 abandoned its attack on Debden but struck at

4409: 2056:, which all flew ahead of the bomber stream to clear the airspace of enemy fighters. StG 77's target was obscured by cloud, but KG 54 continued to their target. RAF fighters from 2543:

According to de Zeng et al writes there is nothing published on KG 3; it was one of the most obscure bomber units, owing to the loss of most of its records at the end of the war.

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by RAF Middle Wallop Sector Station by mistake. Only Andover airfield was hit, and it was used for bomber operations, not fighters. III./LG 1 lost two Ju 88s. The 13 Ju 88

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In the afternoon, a force of 80 Do 17s of KG 3—escorted by JG 51, JG 52, JG 54 and 60 Bf 109s from JG 26 (some 270 aircraft in all)—headed for Eastchurch airfield and the

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also had poor intelligence on the type of RAF airfields. It made repeated errors, often misidentifying airfields as Fighter Command bases, which turned out to belong to

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While the gap between the British and Germans was not yet wide in this regard, the British were starting to gain a decisive lead in intelligence. The breaking of the

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to identify the radar chain and distinguish RAF fighter bases from those of other RAF commands undermined its ability to destroy the British fighter defences. The

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and the following operations failed to destroy the RAF, or gain the necessary local air superiority. As a result, Operation Sea Lion was postponed indefinitely.

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task came first. Once the RAF had been rendered impotent, Göring and Hitler hoped that an invasion would be unnecessary. If this proved not to be the case, the

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would then support the army and prevent the Royal Navy interdicting German sea traffic. Göring named the offensive against the RAF as Operation Eagle Attack (

1955:. Malan himself shot down one Do 17. Another source suggests the destruction of five Do 17s and another seven damaged. German manpower losses amounted to 11 1172:

morning. Unknown to German intelligence, Lympne itself was not even an operational station. This sort of intelligence blunder contributed to the failure of

2223:. The station's casualties amounted to 24 killed and 42 wounded. However, Detling was not an RAF Fighter Command station and the attack did not affect 2109:

The official go-ahead was given at 14:00. At 15:30, some 58–80 Ju 88s from I., II., and III./LG 1, escorted by 30 Bf 110s of V./LG 1, took off to bomb

2239:. Results are unknown and losses are unclear. KG 55 suffered heavy losses the previous day, so its operations seemed limited. On 12 August it lost 13 4399: 2436: 2131: 1775:

Radio Direction Finding (RDF) facilities, which were located along the coastlines of Britain. In most circumstances, RDF could pick up formations of

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on the Battle of Britain is a matter of dispute, with Official Histories claiming there was no direct impact. Whatever the truth, Ultra, and the

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5 as Chief IC). Throughout this time, Schmid's reports made a series of errors. In July 1940, Schmid grossly overestimated the strengths of the

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would achieve the results required within days, or at worst weeks. It was meant to be the beginning of the end of RAF Fighter Command, but

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failed to find its target, dropping its bombs at random. The other Ju 87 units had attracted much attention and StG 77 escaped unnoticed.

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were also airborne near London. By 06:25, the German formations were well over the Channel. No. 238 was moved to cover their own base at

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The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the

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In the second phase of attacks, shipping, coastal airfields, radar and stations south of London were attacked during 8–18 August. The

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Note excluding 4 casualties from Australia; the Commonwealth War Graves Commission lists only 25 Civilian casualties 13 August 1940

1336: 2139:; six out of nine Ju 87s were shot down. StG 1 and 2 gave up on their original targets owing to clouds. Both headed for Portland. 1820: 1800: 4333: 4318: 4303: 4284: 4270: 4253: 4239: 4225: 4186: 4172: 4154: 4135: 4101: 4087: 4069: 4055: 4041: 4026: 4012: 3997: 3982: 3968: 3954: 3939: 3924: 3910: 3881: 3873: 3856: 3839: 3824: 2795: 2125:

II., and III./JG 53 and III./ZG 76 flew escort for the Ju 87s. ZG 2 and JG 27 flew escort for LG 1. In response the whole of

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The head of the German Navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, did not believe an amphibious attack could be launched until 1941

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became increasingly overstretched and was unable to cope with a multi-front war. By 1944, the Allies were ready to launch

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E P Meggs-Davis. One Squadron Leader was killed—a J.H Lowe—and a further two were wounded. One of the wounded men was a

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with 71 percent of its bomber force, 85 percent of its Bf 109 units, and 83 percent of its Bf 110 units operational.

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was to destroy the RAF in order to prevent it from attacking the invasion fleet or providing protection for the

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write-offs. Of the 20 claimed, just three fighters were lost and three pilots were wounded. None were killed.

2101: 299: 2203:. JG 26 went out on a fighter sweep to clear the skies in advance of the attack. JG 26 lost one Bf 109 over 2019: 993: 874: 256: 34: 1832:

On the morning of 13 August, the weather was bad and Göring ordered a postponement of raids. However, the

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during the night although their specific target is unclear. Other bombers, commencing the night stage of

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Directive No. 17 ("or the conduct of air and sea warfare against England") to launch the air assault.

2164: 971: 646: 386: 369: 350: 275: 2022:'s airfield at 'RAF Farnborough' (RAE Farnborough). At 05:05, 18 Ju 88s from II./KG 54 took off for 2105:

Junkers Ju 88. In the mid-afternoon, this aircraft formed the backbone of German bomber formations.

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signals discipline allowed the British easy access to German communications traffic. The impact of

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inflicted to Spitfire production. The factory would later be broken up and production dispersed.

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gradually increased the frequency of attacks. German bombers also raided targets as far north as

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in the aftermath of the German invasion of Poland, nine months of stalemate took place along the

772: 605: 595: 420: 2369:. Five Short Stirling aircraft were destroyed. KG 27 also took part in the missions, and bombed 2290:—AOC (Air Officer Commanding)—had protested against the pointlessness of attacking airfields in 1795:

radio posts, which monitored enemy radio communications, and the Ultra decoding centre based at

1754: 1679: 1664: 1586: 1125: 1058: 819: 435: 425: 410: 877:) that ordered provisional preparations for invasion of Britain. This operation was codenamed 4356: 2250: 2220: 1139:

during night hours. The first major raid inland and against RAF airfields came on 12 August.

691: 629: 507: 459: 2280: 2276: 2187:. They took off at 15:15 and were escorted by ZG 76. They found unbroken cloud over Essex. 2136: 1918: 1914: 1906: 1898: 1882: 1878: 1791:(WAAF), who received information by telephone. Additional intelligence was provided by the 1765: 1725: 1225: 804: 699: 533: 415: 330: 320: 46: 8: 2299: 2245: 2208: 2188: 1926: 1922: 1913:. Not satisfied with the strength of the forces already airborne, controllers dispatched 1894: 1890: 1886: 1264: 931: 762: 724: 677: 670: 634: 569: 454: 335: 2517: 2272: 1781: 1643: 1619: 1597: 1538: 1525: 1511: 1498: 1434: 1375: 1268: 1070: 878: 787: 581: 574: 512: 445: 430: 291: 188: 3563: 4329: 4314: 4299: 4280: 4266: 4249: 4235: 4221: 4213: 4197: 4182: 4168: 4150: 4131: 4112: 4097: 4083: 4065: 4051: 4037: 4022: 4008: 3993: 3978: 3964: 3950: 3935: 3920: 3906: 3892: 3877: 3869: 3852: 3835: 3820: 2791: 2359: 2330: 2065: 2049: 2042: 1859: 1746: 1657: 1487: 1421: 1392: 1362: 1212:

Faulty intelligence was the component that was mostly responsible for the failure of

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was ordered to make all the necessary preparations for transporting the German army (

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docks were also targeted. The results of the raids were mixed. The Radar station at

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210 dropped their bombs over Canterbury. II./StG 1 was sent to bomb airfields near

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and subsequent operations failed to destroy the RAF or gain local air superiority.

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after Britain rejected all overtures for a negotiated peace with Germany. However,

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Squadrons to intercept between 06:30 and 06:35. The first combats began at 06:30.

4368: 3042: 3040: 2980: 2978: 2658: 2409:, West Sussex. No other traces of the aircraft or other crew members were found. 2334: 2323: 2216: 2114: 1855: 1633: 1566: 1493:

Unknown targets (lack of records)/some mine laying operations in English Channel

1440: 1368: 1233: 1115: 997: 914: 853: 757: 622: 550: 502: 464: 379: 173: 76: 4149:. Crowood Aviation Series. Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire, UK: Crowood Press. 3108: 3106: 2994: 2992: 2990: 4194:

Stuka Attack!: The Dive-Bombing Assault on England During the Battle of Britain

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on 14 June and overran half of France. The French surrendered on 25 June 1940.

1015: 905:, which might attempt to prevent a landing by sea. On 1 August Hitler gave the 540: 325: 280: 224: 144: 109: 3037: 2975: 1282:

s list—if destroyed—would not have impaired Fighter Command in the slightest.

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The Other Few: Bomber and Coastal Command Operations in the Battle of Britain

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is not uncommon. During the Battle of Britain (and, indeed, the rest of the

210: 2521: 2446: 2295: 2268: 2211:, which lost a number of Blenheims on the ground. The commander killed was 2061: 2057: 2011: 1952: 1902: 1750: 1734: 1670: 1469: 1312: 1232:

in particular, gave the British an increasingly accurate picture of German

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The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945

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Kampfgeschwader "Edelweiss": The history of a German bomber unit, 1935–45

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RAF Fighter Command. Dowding modernised a system created up from 1917 by

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First day of German military operations to destroy the British air force

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adopted a different and clearer strategy of strategic bombing known as

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Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–45, Volume 1

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had failed to destroy or render Detling or Eastchurch nonoperational.

2350:(Captain) Friedrich Achenbrenner, dispatched 15 He 111s from bases in 3932:

Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 2

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Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 1

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Johannes Fink. Part of the ZG 26 formation that had taken off—led by

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Battle of Britain: A Day-to-day Chronicle, 10 July – 31 October 1940

2524: 2406: 2402: 2377:, resolutely flew the length and breadth of Great Britain, bombing 2351: 2184: 2183:

210 were sent further east for an operation to attack targets near

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The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power

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The Most Dangerous Enemy : A History of the Battle of Britain

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RAF Bomber Command also took part in the day's fighting. Although

4082:. (Royal Air Force Official Histories) Frank Cass, London. 2000. 2394: 2386: 2382: 2378: 2370: 2363: 2307: 2303: 2081: 1771:

The first indications of incoming air raids were received by the

1653: 1626: 1611: 1545: 1168: 1014:(Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) turned their attentions to 72: 2243:

and their crews. The next day, 14 August, they would lose their

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The following targets were chosen for attack on 13 August 1940:

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Aerial operations and battles of World War II involving Germany

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I., II., and III./KG 55 were also in action. III./KG 55 bombed

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was commander of the Luftwaffe's Military Intelligence Branch (

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Princeton, New Jersey: University Press of the Pacific, 1983.

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Eagle Day: The Battle of Britain, 6 August – 15 September 1940

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The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain

2672: 1029:—began in the West on 10 May 1940. The central campaign—the 2041:(Destroyer Wing 2; ZG 2), and V./LG 1 and 173 Bf 109s from 1996: 1976: 4328:. London: Tri-Service Press, third revised edition, 1990. 4094:

With Wings Like Eagles: A History of the Battle of Britain

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sent twelve Bristol Blenheims to bomb KG 30 airfields at

1787:

Here, the course information of each raid was plotted by

3817:

The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain

3407: 3398: 2939: 1033:—ended in Allied defeat and the destruction of the main 4410:

Attacks on military installations in the United Kingdom

3945:

de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.

3930:

de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.

3915:

de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.

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Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe

3344: 3224: 3222: 3220: 3218: 3216: 2727: 2725: 2723: 2721: 2719: 2717: 2715: 2713: 2711: 2709: 1114:

phase of the German air offensive took place over the

4390:

Military operations of World War II involving Germany

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Hitler's Stuka Squadrons: The Ju 87 at war, 1936–1945

4208:

Pictorial History Of The R.A.F.: Volume One 1918–1939

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in central Europe at the end of the war in May 1945.

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levels. After bringing its serviceable rates up, the

867:

On 16 July 1940 Hitler gave the German armed forces (

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Owing to the mistake by the Observer Corps, and the

3949:. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Publishing. 2009. 3934:. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Publishing. 2007. 3919:. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Publishing. 2007. 3213: 3170: 3168: 3166: 3073:

de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, pp. 49–54.

2706: 2633: 2631: 2629: 2619: 2617: 2615: 2613: 2611: 2609: 2607: 2605: 2603: 2601: 1109:The losses of the spring campaign had weakened the 852:(German air force) intended to destroy the British 3631: 2586: 3133: 2437:Confirmation and overclaiming of aerial victories 2333:raid against the Supermarine Spitfire factory at 2168:Ju 87Bs. The Ju 87s severely damaged RAF Detling. 2034:. The raids were escorted by about 60 Bf 110s of 4376: 3264:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 193. 3255:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 198. 3246:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 195. 3210:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 184. 3201:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 179. 3192:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 146. 3183:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 155. 3163: 3151:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 354. 3130:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 370. 3121:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 266. 3112:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 360. 3100:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 104. 3091:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 118. 3055:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 171. 3016:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 236. 3007:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 225. 2998:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 228. 2930: 2626: 2598: 1909:was also ordered to take off at 06:20 to patrol 842:("Operation Eagle Attack"), an air operation by 254: 3082:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 75. 3046:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 48. 3034:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 33. 3025:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 24. 2984:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 14. 968:German occupation of Luxembourg in World War II 4405:Attacks on military installations in the 1940s 4298:. Botley, Oxford UK: Osprey Publishing. 1999. 1966: 1326: 4179:Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1935–1945. 1073:of Britain, codenamed Operation Sealion. The 240: 1828:like these throughout the Battle of Britain. 1104: 3564:RAF Station Commanders – South East England 2358:to strike at the Short Brothers factory at 2142:I./LG 1 abandoned Boscombe Down and bombed 4062:Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe 2014:ordered attacks to commence. At 05:00, 20 1719: 1025:(Operation Yellow), and also known as the 247: 233: 2454:aircraft of various kinds on the ground. 2329:(Bombing Group 100) He 111s to conduct a 2135:(Squadron) of II./StG 2 was badly hit by 1863:without fighter escort. But owing to the 1333:Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945) 1191: 114: 4400:Air-to-air combat operations and battles 4005:The Luftwaffe Bombers' Battle of Britain 2163: 2100: 1970: 1819: 1729: 1387:/RAF Biggin Hill/ Other unknown targets 1337:RAF Fighter Command Order of Battle 1940 1203: 3977:. London: Arms and Armour Press. 1993. 2076:were cancelled. I./KG 54 struck at the 2006:The cancellation order had not reached 1881:was protecting a convoy in the Thames, 1000:, in October 1939, the planners of the 4377: 4246:Battle of Britain, July – October 1940 4144: 4125: 4106: 3479: 3431: 2782: 2743: 1208:Radar covered the indicated air space. 4167:. McWhirter Twins Ltd, London. 1969. 3386:Hough and Richards 2007, pp. 155–157. 2764:Hooton 2007, pp. 47–48, p. 77, p. 86. 2499:Having failed to defeat the RAF, the 1341:Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940 961: 885:). Before this could be carried out, 856:(RAF). The operation came during the 228: 4265:. London: Sceptre Publishing, 1985. 3992:. Surrey, UK: Red Kite Books. 2005. 3834:. Quercus Publishing, London. 2009. 2790:. London: Aurum Press. p. 113. 2457: 1979:. The type suffered heavy losses on 4234:. Potomac Books, Washington. 1980. 4210:. Ian Allan. 1968. ASIN: B000QIV8AM 4032:Hough, Richard and Denis Richards. 2230: 2159: 1889:was covering RAF Manston. Parts of 838:("Eagle Day") was the first day of 13: 4218:Hitler's War Directives; 1939–1945 4017:Hall, Stephen and Lionel Quinlan. 2417: 2096: 1089:) across the English Channel. The 201:47 miscellaneous aircraft (ground) 14: 4421: 4206:Taylor, John and Moyes, Phillip. 4064:. Arms & Armour Press. 1997. 4050:. Arms & Armour Press. 1994. 3273:Bungay 2000, pp. 62, 447 Note 23. 2318:As darkness fell at the close of 2072:Further missions by II./KG 54 to 2018:of I./KG 54 took off to bomb the 1726:Dowding_system § Description 213:200 killed or captured including: 4362: 4350: 4324:Wood, Derek and Derek Dempster. 3815:Addison, Paul and Jeremy Crang. 3796: 3787: 3778: 3769: 3760: 3751: 3742: 3733: 3724: 3715: 3706: 3697: 3688: 3679: 3670: 3661: 3652: 3643: 3622: 3613: 3604: 3595: 3586: 3377:Hough and Richards 2007, p. 157. 2685:Hough and Richards 2007, p. 162. 2546: 1885:was protecting RAF Hawkinge and 1305: 1289: 1041:escaped encirclement during the 984:After the declaration of war on 941:Göring had promised Hitler that 116: 102: 45: 4279:. London: Eagles of War. 2004. 4111:. Wiltshire: he Crowood Press. 3891:. J.M Dent and Sons Ltd. 1980. 3808: 3793:Addison and Crang 2000, p. 270. 3757:Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 306. 3577: 3568: 3557: 3548: 3539: 3530: 3521: 3512: 3503: 3494: 3485: 3464: 3455: 3416: 3389: 3380: 3371: 3362: 3353: 3335: 3326: 3317: 3308: 3285: 3282:Hough and Richards 2007. p. 51. 3276: 3267: 3258: 3249: 3240: 3231: 3186: 3177: 3154: 3145: 3124: 3115: 3094: 3085: 3076: 3067: 3058: 3049: 3028: 3010: 3001: 2966: 2957: 2921: 2912: 2903: 2894: 2885: 2876: 2867: 2858: 2849: 2840: 2831: 2822: 2813: 2804: 2776: 2767: 2758: 2749: 2562: 2537: 2430: 1199: 4096:. Harper Books, London. 2009. 3851:. Davis-Poynter, London. 1990 3685:Addison and Crang 2000, p. 58. 2697: 2688: 2663: 2652: 2496:declined in August–September. 2313: 1694:RAF Middle Wallop/RAF Warmwell 1581:/Other unspecified operations 1059:Churchill coalition government 206:47–48 aircraft destroyed (air) 1: 3868:. London: Aurum Press. 2000. 3849:France and Belgium, 1939–1940 3610:Hall and Quinlan 2000, p. 18. 2703:Trevor-Roper 2004, pp. 74–79. 2669:Taylor and Moyes 1968, p. 23. 2575: 1745:, after its chief architect, 1275:, most of the targets on the 956: 4130:. London: Crowood Aviation. 2580: 2412: 2275:, No. 64, No. 111, No. 151, 2030:of StG 77 began heading for 2020:Royal Aircraft Establishment 2010:3 HQ at all. Its commander, 1975:Messerschmitt Bf 110s of 1./ 1815: 1296:Albert Kesselring commanded 7: 3470:de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 372. 3452:de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 179. 3443:de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 184. 3413:de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 228. 3404:de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 232. 1967:Coastal airfields and ports 1789:Women's Auxiliary Air Force 1327:Targets and order of battle 1039:British Expeditionary Force 1021:The German offensive—named 10: 4426: 4309:Weal, John. Junkers Ju 87 4248:. Headline, London, 2001. 4007:. Crecy Publishing. 2000. 2900:James 2000, pp. 63–64, 70. 2434: 1723: 1577:and surrounding airfields/ 1330: 1011:Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1002:Oberkommando der Luftwaffe 965: 924:Oberkommando der Luftwaffe 815:Raids on the Atlantic Wall 810:Strategic Bombing Campaign 4036:: Pen & Sword. 2007. 3819:. London: Pimlico. 2000. 3802:Bungay 2000, pp. 393–394. 3350:Bungay 2000, pp. 207–208. 3064:Bungay 2000, pp. 203–212. 2945:Bungay 2000, pp. 187–188. 2649:Donnelly 2004, pp. 88–89. 1810: 1737:, C-in-C Fighter Command. 1349:Attack on 13 August 1940 1105:Background: early battles 1061:. Hitler now ordered the 972:Battle of the Netherlands 930:The essential target was 266: 167: 130: 95: 55: 44: 32: 25: 4313:. Oxford: Osprey. 1997. 3545:Mason 1969, pp. 239–240. 3461:Mason 1969, pp. 238–239. 2972:Mason 1969, pp. 236–237. 2694:Mason 1969, pp. 240–243. 2530: 2298:insisted on such raids. 1937:fighter station and the 1780:Command Headquarters at 840:Unternehmen Adlerangriff 4311:Stukageschwader 1937–41 4196:. Grub Street, London. 3905:. Allan; London. 1975. 3766:Overy 1980, pp. 34, 36. 3721:Bungay 2000, pp. 68–69. 3305:Bungay 2000, pp. 61–69. 2954:Hooton 1994, pp. 19–20. 2773:Parker 2000, pp. 98–99. 1995:and other airfields in 1720:RAF operational command 1708:Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 1077:was to eliminate enemy 4232:The Air War, 1939–1945 3694:Terraine 1985, p. 186. 3583:Saunders 2013, p. 212. 3574:Saunders 2013, p. 211. 3341:James 2000, pp. 71–73. 2891:James 2000, pp. 49–62. 2819:Hooton 1997, p. 17–18. 2169: 2106: 1984: 1829: 1755:air officer commanding 1738: 1713:RAF Warmwell/Portland 1680:Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 1665:Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 1587:Sturzkampfgeschwader 3 1209: 1163:were to be destroyed. 1151:and radar stations at 1008:High Command) and the 912:s commander-in-chief, 203:c. 25 civilians killed 131:Commanders and leaders 4292:Messerschmitt Bf 110 4220:. Birlinn Ltd. 2004. 4080:The Battle of Britain 4034:The Battle of Britain 3160:de Zeng 2010, p. 100. 2221:Robert J. O. Compston 2167: 2104: 1974: 1823: 1801:British Modified Grid 1733: 1240:Joseph "Beppo" Schmid 1207: 508:Battle of Britain Day 168:Casualties and losses 4145:Mackay, Ron (2003). 4126:Mackay, Ron (2001). 4109:Messerschmitt Bf 110 4107:Mackay, Ron (2000). 3990:Dornier 17: In Focus 3784:Bungay 2000, p. 379. 3748:Parker 2000, p. 309. 3730:Bungay 2000, p. 298. 3712:Parker 2000, p. 311. 3676:Bishop 2010, p. 179. 3601:Dierich 1975, p. 39. 3554:Warner 2005, p. 258. 3332:Collier 1980, p. 51. 3323:Bungay 2000, p. 192. 3314:Parker 2000, p. 123. 3291:Parker 2000, p. 117. 3228:Bungay 2000, p. 208. 2963:Ray 2009, pp. 46–47. 2755:Healy 2007, pp. 3–5. 2731:Bungay 2000, p. 210. 2637:Bungay 2000, p. 371. 2623:Bungay 2000, p. 211. 2595:Bungay 2000, p. 207. 2322:, Sperrle sent nine 2137:No. 609 Squadron RAF 1907:No. 257 Squadron RAF 1899:No. 238 Squadron RAF 1766:Royal Observer Corps 1448:Erprobungsgruppe 210 805:Defence of the Reich 286:The Heligoland Bight 4296:Aces of World War 2 4177:Murray, Willamson. 4165:Battle Over Britain 3975:The Fighting Me 109 3901:Dierich, Wolfgang. 3876:(hardcover), 2002, 3775:Hooton 1997, p. 38. 3703:Murray 1983, p. 54. 3649:Mason 1969, p. 243. 3628:Mason 1969, p. 242. 3619:Baker 1996, p. 113. 3592:Mason 1969, p. 240. 3536:Mason 1969, p. 237. 3527:Korda 2009, p. 167. 3500:Mason 1969, p. 239. 3422:Mason 1969, p. 241. 3359:Mason 1969, p. 238. 2936:Murray 1983, p. 47. 2927:Murray 1983, p. 51. 2855:Murray 1983, p. 44. 2837:Hooton 2010, p. 75. 2828:Parker 2000, p. 93. 2810:Murray 1983, p. 45. 2478:The failure of the 2300:No. 82 Squadron RAF 2246:Geschwaderkommodore 2209:No. 53 Squadron RAF 2189:No. 56 Squadron RAF 2090:Zerstörergeschwader 2037:Zerstörergeschwader 1887:No. 74 Squadron RAF 1839:Geschwaderkommodore 1625:Fleet Air Arm base 1354:German bomber unit 1350: 1265:RAF Coastal Command 932:RAF Fighter Command 883:Unternehmen Seelöwe 794:Strategic campaigns 397:Ypres–Comines Canal 219:at least 45 missing 208:39 severely damaged 51:An air battle, 1940 4214:Trevor-Roper, Hugh 4021:. Red Kite. 2000. 3963:. Red Kite. 2004. 3887:Collier, Richard. 3739:Murray 1983, p. 52 3667:James 2000, p. 79. 3640:James 2000, p. 80. 3509:James 2000, p. 77. 3368:James 2000, p. 73. 3237:James 2000, p. 74. 3142:Ward 2004, p. 105. 2918:James 2000, p. 71. 2909:James 2000, p. 70. 2882:James 2000, p. 45. 2873:James 2000, p. 43. 2864:James 2000, p. 17. 2518:Operation Overlord 2466:did not deter the 2170: 2107: 1985: 1830: 1782:RAF Bentley Priory 1739: 1691:area and airfields 1644:Kampfgeschwader 55 1620:Kampfgeschwader 54 1598:Kampfgeschwader 51 1539:Kampfgeschwader 27 1526:Kampfgeschwader 30 1512:Kampfgeschwader 26 1499:Kampfgeschwader 40 1435:Kampfgeschwader 53 1376:Kampfgeschwader 76 1348: 1269:RAF Bomber Command 1210: 1071:amphibious assault 1069:to prepare for an 962:Strategic overview 893:was required. The 879:Operation Sea Lion 820:Battle of Atlantic 189:RAF Bomber Command 180:1 fighter (ground) 4385:Battle of Britain 4334:978-1-85488-027-7 4319:978-1-85532-636-1 4304:978-1-85532-753-5 4285:978-1-86227-246-0 4271:978-0-340-41919-9 4254:978-0-7472-3452-4 4240:978-1-57488-716-7 4226:978-1-84341-014-0 4187:978-0-89875-797-2 4173:978-0-901928-00-9 4156:978-1-86126-576-0 4137:978-1-86126-431-2 4102:978-0-06-112535-5 4088:978-0-7146-8149-8 4074:James, T.C.G and 4070:978-1-86019-995-0 4056:978-1-86019-964-6 4042:978-1-84415-657-3 4027:978-0-9538061-0-2 4013:978-0-947554-82-8 3998:978-0-9546201-4-1 3983:978-1-85409-209-0 3969:978-0-9546201-2-7 3959:Donnelly, Larry. 3955:978-1-906537-08-1 3940:978-1-903223-87-1 3925:978-1-85780-279-5 3911:978-0-7110-0601-0 3882:978-1-85410-801-2 3874:978-1-85410-721-3 3857:978-0-7067-0168-5 3840:978-1-84916-989-9 3825:978-0-7126-6475-2 3658:Goss 2000, p. 80. 3518:Weal 2000. p. 54. 3491:Weal 1999, p. 47. 3395:Goss 2005, p. 60. 3174:Goss 2000, p. 79. 2797:978-1-85410-721-3 2458:Battle of Britain 2343:Gruppenkommandeur 2331:strategic bombing 2191:intercepted, but 2129:intercepted. One 2066:RAF Middle Wallop 1944:Bristol Blenheims 1860:Albert Kesselring 1747:Air Chief Marshal 1717: 1716: 1658:RAF Middle Wallop 1488:Kampfgeschwader 4 1422:Kampfgeschwader 3 1393:Kampfgeschwader 2 1363:Kampfgeschwader 1 1043:Battle of Dunkirk 976:Battle of Belgium 858:Battle of Britain 828: 827: 223: 222: 195:24 aircrew killed 178:13 fighters (air) 154:Albert Kesselring 91: 90: 4417: 4367: 4366: 4365: 4355: 4354: 4353: 4346: 4244:Parker, Mathew. 4230:Overy, Richard. 4192:Saunders, Andy. 4163:Mason, Francis. 4160: 4141: 4122: 4092:Korda, Michael. 3803: 3800: 3794: 3791: 3785: 3782: 3776: 3773: 3767: 3764: 3758: 3755: 3749: 3746: 3740: 3737: 3731: 3728: 3722: 3719: 3713: 3710: 3704: 3701: 3695: 3692: 3686: 3683: 3677: 3674: 3668: 3665: 3659: 3656: 3650: 3647: 3641: 3638: 3629: 3626: 3620: 3617: 3611: 3608: 3602: 3599: 3593: 3590: 3584: 3581: 3575: 3572: 3566: 3561: 3555: 3552: 3546: 3543: 3537: 3534: 3528: 3525: 3519: 3516: 3510: 3507: 3501: 3498: 3492: 3489: 3483: 3477: 3471: 3468: 3462: 3459: 3453: 3450: 3444: 3441: 3435: 3429: 3423: 3420: 3414: 3411: 3405: 3402: 3396: 3393: 3387: 3384: 3378: 3375: 3369: 3366: 3360: 3357: 3351: 3348: 3342: 3339: 3333: 3330: 3324: 3321: 3315: 3312: 3306: 3303: 3292: 3289: 3283: 3280: 3274: 3271: 3265: 3262: 3256: 3253: 3247: 3244: 3238: 3235: 3229: 3226: 3211: 3208: 3202: 3199: 3193: 3190: 3184: 3181: 3175: 3172: 3161: 3158: 3152: 3149: 3143: 3140: 3131: 3128: 3122: 3119: 3113: 3110: 3101: 3098: 3092: 3089: 3083: 3080: 3074: 3071: 3065: 3062: 3056: 3053: 3047: 3044: 3035: 3032: 3026: 3023: 3017: 3014: 3008: 3005: 2999: 2996: 2985: 2982: 2973: 2970: 2964: 2961: 2955: 2952: 2946: 2943: 2937: 2934: 2928: 2925: 2919: 2916: 2910: 2907: 2901: 2898: 2892: 2889: 2883: 2880: 2874: 2871: 2865: 2862: 2856: 2853: 2847: 2846:Bungay 2000 p124 2844: 2838: 2835: 2829: 2826: 2820: 2817: 2811: 2808: 2802: 2801: 2780: 2774: 2771: 2765: 2762: 2756: 2753: 2747: 2741: 2732: 2729: 2704: 2701: 2695: 2692: 2686: 2683: 2670: 2667: 2661: 2656: 2650: 2647: 2638: 2635: 2624: 2621: 2596: 2593: 2569: 2566: 2554: 2550: 2544: 2541: 2447:Second World War 2441:Overclaiming in 2367:Northern Ireland 2237:Heathrow Airport 2231:South East raids 2225:No. 11 Group RAF 2193:Erprobungsgruppe 2181:Erprobungsgruppe 2160:Ju 87 operations 2127:No. 10 Group RAF 2032:Portland Harbour 1961:prisoners of war 1957:killed in action 1854:airfield on the 1561:Lehrgeschwader 1 1455:Radar Stations; 1351: 1347: 1309: 1293: 1292: 1281: 1057:rejected by the 1031:Battle of France 1023:Unternehmen Gelb 980:Battle of France 911: 875:Directive No. 16 657:Atlantic Pockets 261: 257:Western Front of 249: 242: 235: 226: 225: 193:11 bombers (air) 126: 122: 120: 119: 108: 106: 105: 57: 56: 49: 23: 22: 4425: 4424: 4420: 4419: 4418: 4416: 4415: 4414: 4375: 4374: 4373: 4363: 4361: 4351: 4349: 4341: 4339: 4202:978-1908-117359 4157: 4138: 4119: 3862:Bungay, Stephen 3811: 3806: 3801: 3797: 3792: 3788: 3783: 3779: 3774: 3770: 3765: 3761: 3756: 3752: 3747: 3743: 3738: 3734: 3729: 3725: 3720: 3716: 3711: 3707: 3702: 3698: 3693: 3689: 3684: 3680: 3675: 3671: 3666: 3662: 3657: 3653: 3648: 3644: 3639: 3632: 3627: 3623: 3618: 3614: 3609: 3605: 3600: 3596: 3591: 3587: 3582: 3578: 3573: 3569: 3562: 3558: 3553: 3549: 3544: 3540: 3535: 3531: 3526: 3522: 3517: 3513: 3508: 3504: 3499: 3495: 3490: 3486: 3478: 3474: 3469: 3465: 3460: 3456: 3451: 3447: 3442: 3438: 3430: 3426: 3421: 3417: 3412: 3408: 3403: 3399: 3394: 3390: 3385: 3381: 3376: 3372: 3367: 3363: 3358: 3354: 3349: 3345: 3340: 3336: 3331: 3327: 3322: 3318: 3313: 3309: 3304: 3295: 3290: 3286: 3281: 3277: 3272: 3268: 3263: 3259: 3254: 3250: 3245: 3241: 3236: 3232: 3227: 3214: 3209: 3205: 3200: 3196: 3191: 3187: 3182: 3178: 3173: 3164: 3159: 3155: 3150: 3146: 3141: 3134: 3129: 3125: 3120: 3116: 3111: 3104: 3099: 3095: 3090: 3086: 3081: 3077: 3072: 3068: 3063: 3059: 3054: 3050: 3045: 3038: 3033: 3029: 3024: 3020: 3015: 3011: 3006: 3002: 2997: 2988: 2983: 2976: 2971: 2967: 2962: 2958: 2953: 2949: 2944: 2940: 2935: 2931: 2926: 2922: 2917: 2913: 2908: 2904: 2899: 2895: 2890: 2886: 2881: 2877: 2872: 2868: 2863: 2859: 2854: 2850: 2845: 2841: 2836: 2832: 2827: 2823: 2818: 2814: 2809: 2805: 2798: 2784:Bungay, Stephen 2781: 2777: 2772: 2768: 2763: 2759: 2754: 2750: 2742: 2735: 2730: 2707: 2702: 2698: 2693: 2689: 2684: 2673: 2668: 2664: 2657: 2653: 2648: 2641: 2636: 2627: 2622: 2599: 2594: 2587: 2583: 2578: 2573: 2572: 2567: 2563: 2558: 2557: 2551: 2547: 2542: 2538: 2533: 2462:The failure of 2460: 2439: 2433: 2420: 2418:Effect of raids 2415: 2335:Castle Bromwich 2316: 2241:Heinkel He 111s 2233: 2217:First World War 2162: 2099: 2097:Renewed attacks 2026:. At 05:50, 88 1969: 1872:located in the 1856:Isle of Sheppey 1818: 1813: 1728: 1722: 1702: 1634:RAF Farnborough 1567:RAF Worthy Down 1482: 1441:RAF North Weald 1416: 1369:RAF Biggin Hill 1343: 1331:Main articles: 1329: 1324: 1323: 1322: 1321: 1320: 1310: 1302: 1301: 1294: 1290: 1279: 1234:order of battle 1202: 1197: 1116:English Channel 1107: 998:Polish Campaign 988:by Britain and 982: 966:Main articles: 964: 959: 915:Reichsmarschall 909: 887:air superiority 873:) a directive ( 854:Royal Air Force 831: 830: 829: 824: 551:St Nazaire Raid 503:The Hardest Day 370:Fort Eben-Emael 356:Rotterdam Blitz 314:The Netherlands 262: 258: 255: 253: 218: 216: 214: 209: 207: 202: 200: 198: 196: 194: 192: 187: 181: 179: 177: 174:Fighter Command 160: 156: 152: 143: 139: 117: 115: 103: 101: 87:British victory 79: 77:English Channel 50: 17: 12: 11: 5: 4423: 4413: 4412: 4407: 4402: 4397: 4392: 4387: 4372: 4371: 4359: 4357:United Kingdom 4338: 4337: 4322: 4307: 4288: 4273: 4259:Terraine, John 4256: 4242: 4228: 4211: 4204: 4190: 4175: 4161: 4155: 4147:Heinkel He 111 4142: 4136: 4123: 4117: 4104: 4090: 4076:Cox, Sebastian 4072: 4058: 4044: 4030: 4015: 4001: 3986: 3971: 3957: 3943: 3928: 3913: 3899: 3885: 3859: 3842: 3828: 3812: 3810: 3807: 3805: 3804: 3795: 3786: 3777: 3768: 3759: 3750: 3741: 3732: 3723: 3714: 3705: 3696: 3687: 3678: 3669: 3660: 3651: 3642: 3630: 3621: 3612: 3603: 3594: 3585: 3576: 3567: 3556: 3547: 3538: 3529: 3520: 3511: 3502: 3493: 3484: 3472: 3463: 3454: 3445: 3436: 3424: 3415: 3406: 3397: 3388: 3379: 3370: 3361: 3352: 3343: 3334: 3325: 3316: 3307: 3293: 3284: 3275: 3266: 3257: 3248: 3239: 3230: 3212: 3203: 3194: 3185: 3176: 3162: 3153: 3144: 3132: 3123: 3114: 3102: 3093: 3084: 3075: 3066: 3057: 3048: 3036: 3027: 3018: 3009: 3000: 2986: 2974: 2965: 2956: 2947: 2938: 2929: 2920: 2911: 2902: 2893: 2884: 2875: 2866: 2857: 2848: 2839: 2830: 2821: 2812: 2803: 2796: 2775: 2766: 2757: 2748: 2733: 2705: 2696: 2687: 2671: 2662: 2651: 2639: 2625: 2597: 2584: 2582: 2579: 2577: 2574: 2571: 2570: 2560: 2559: 2556: 2555: 2545: 2535: 2534: 2532: 2529: 2459: 2456: 2443:aerial warfare 2435:Main article: 2432: 2429: 2419: 2416: 2414: 2411: 2360:Queen's Island 2315: 2312: 2288:Charles Portal 2266:Short Stirling 2262:Short Brothers 2251:Wing Commander 2232: 2229: 2161: 2158: 2098: 2095: 2080:(FAA) base at 2044:Jagdgeschwader 2028:Junkers Ju 87s 2016:Junkers Ju 88s 1987:Most units of 1968: 1965: 1865:Observer Corps 1844:Oberstleutnant 1834:Dornier Do 17s 1826:Dornier Do 17s 1817: 1814: 1812: 1809: 1797:Bletchley Park 1743:Dowding System 1724:Main article: 1721: 1718: 1715: 1714: 1711: 1704: 1703: 1701: 1700: 1695: 1692: 1685: 1683: 1675: 1674: 1668: 1661: 1660: 1647: 1640: 1639: 1623: 1616: 1615: 1614:radar station 1601: 1594: 1593: 1590: 1583: 1582: 1564: 1557: 1556: 1542: 1535: 1534: 1529: 1522: 1521: 1519:Linton-on-Ouse 1517:RAF Dishforth/ 1515: 1508: 1507: 1502: 1495: 1494: 1491: 1484: 1483: 1481: 1480: 1477: 1472: 1467: 1452: 1450: 1444: 1443: 1438: 1431: 1430: 1428:RAF Eastchurch 1425: 1418: 1417: 1415: 1414: 1409: 1407:RAF Eastchurch 1404: 1402:RAF Hornchurch 1398: 1396: 1389: 1388: 1379: 1372: 1371: 1366: 1359: 1358: 1355: 1328: 1325: 1311: 1304: 1303: 1295: 1288: 1287: 1286: 1285: 1284: 1218:Enigma machine 1201: 1198: 1196: 1190: 1126:Gross register 1106: 1103: 1016:Western Europe 963: 960: 958: 955: 919:Hermann Göring 826: 825: 823: 822: 817: 812: 807: 802: 791: 790: 785: 780: 775: 770: 765: 760: 755: 750: 745: 744: 743: 729: 722: 715: 714: 713: 708: 696: 689: 682: 675: 660: 659: 654: 649: 644: 637: 632: 627: 620: 615: 613:Hürtgen Forest 610: 603: 598: 596:Siegfried Line 593: 586: 579: 572: 561: 560: 559: 558: 553: 546:Commando Raids 543: 541:Baedeker Blitz 538: 531: 518: 517: 510: 505: 500: 495: 482: 481: 480: 479: 469: 462: 457: 452: 451: 450: 438: 433: 428: 423: 418: 413: 400: 399: 394: 389: 384: 377: 372: 359: 358: 353: 348: 346:The Grebbeberg 343: 338: 333: 328: 323: 310: 309: 296: 295: 288: 283: 278: 267: 264: 263: 252: 251: 244: 237: 229: 221: 220: 204: 184:fighter pilots 170: 169: 165: 164: 150:Hermann Göring 147: 145:Charles Portal 133: 132: 128: 127: 112: 110:United Kingdom 98: 97: 93: 92: 89: 88: 85: 81: 80: 71: 69: 65: 64: 63:13 August 1940 61: 53: 52: 42: 41: 30: 29: 21: 20: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4422: 4411: 4408: 4406: 4403: 4401: 4398: 4396: 4393: 4391: 4388: 4386: 4383: 4382: 4380: 4370: 4360: 4358: 4348: 4347: 4344: 4335: 4331: 4327: 4323: 4320: 4316: 4312: 4308: 4305: 4301: 4297: 4293: 4289: 4286: 4282: 4278: 4274: 4272: 4268: 4264: 4260: 4257: 4255: 4251: 4247: 4243: 4241: 4237: 4233: 4229: 4227: 4223: 4219: 4215: 4212: 4209: 4205: 4203: 4199: 4195: 4191: 4188: 4184: 4180: 4176: 4174: 4170: 4166: 4162: 4158: 4152: 4148: 4143: 4139: 4133: 4129: 4128:Junkers Ju 88 4124: 4120: 4118:1-86126-313-9 4114: 4110: 4105: 4103: 4099: 4095: 4091: 4089: 4085: 4081: 4077: 4073: 4071: 4067: 4063: 4060:Hooton, E.R. 4059: 4057: 4053: 4049: 4046:Hooton, E.R. 4045: 4043: 4039: 4035: 4031: 4028: 4024: 4020: 4016: 4014: 4010: 4006: 4003:Goss, Chris. 4002: 3999: 3995: 3991: 3987: 3984: 3980: 3976: 3972: 3970: 3966: 3962: 3958: 3956: 3952: 3948: 3944: 3941: 3937: 3933: 3929: 3926: 3922: 3918: 3914: 3912: 3908: 3904: 3900: 3898: 3897:0-460-04370-6 3894: 3890: 3886: 3883: 3879: 3875: 3871: 3867: 3863: 3860: 3858: 3854: 3850: 3846: 3843: 3841: 3837: 3833: 3830:Bishop, Ian. 3829: 3826: 3822: 3818: 3814: 3813: 3799: 3790: 3781: 3772: 3763: 3754: 3745: 3736: 3727: 3718: 3709: 3700: 3691: 3682: 3673: 3664: 3655: 3646: 3637: 3635: 3625: 3616: 3607: 3598: 3589: 3580: 3571: 3565: 3560: 3551: 3542: 3533: 3524: 3515: 3506: 3497: 3488: 3482:, p. 51. 3481: 3476: 3467: 3458: 3449: 3440: 3434:, p. 31. 3433: 3428: 3419: 3410: 3401: 3392: 3383: 3374: 3365: 3356: 3347: 3338: 3329: 3320: 3311: 3302: 3300: 3298: 3288: 3279: 3270: 3261: 3252: 3243: 3234: 3225: 3223: 3221: 3219: 3217: 3207: 3198: 3189: 3180: 3171: 3169: 3167: 3157: 3148: 3139: 3137: 3127: 3118: 3109: 3107: 3097: 3088: 3079: 3070: 3061: 3052: 3043: 3041: 3031: 3022: 3013: 3004: 2995: 2993: 2991: 2981: 2979: 2969: 2960: 2951: 2942: 2933: 2924: 2915: 2906: 2897: 2888: 2879: 2870: 2861: 2852: 2843: 2834: 2825: 2816: 2807: 2799: 2793: 2789: 2785: 2779: 2770: 2761: 2752: 2746:, p. 71. 2745: 2740: 2738: 2728: 2726: 2724: 2722: 2720: 2718: 2716: 2714: 2712: 2710: 2700: 2691: 2682: 2680: 2678: 2676: 2666: 2660: 2655: 2646: 2644: 2634: 2632: 2630: 2620: 2618: 2616: 2614: 2612: 2610: 2608: 2606: 2604: 2602: 2592: 2590: 2585: 2565: 2561: 2549: 2540: 2536: 2528: 2526: 2523: 2519: 2515: 2514: 2509: 2508: 2502: 2497: 2495: 2490: 2485: 2481: 2476: 2473: 2469: 2465: 2455: 2452: 2448: 2444: 2438: 2428: 2426: 2410: 2408: 2404: 2400: 2396: 2392: 2389:, Liverpool, 2388: 2384: 2380: 2376: 2372: 2368: 2365: 2361: 2357: 2353: 2349: 2348: 2344: 2340: 2336: 2332: 2328: 2326: 2321: 2311: 2309: 2305: 2301: 2297: 2293: 2289: 2284: 2282: 2278: 2274: 2270: 2267: 2263: 2258: 2256: 2255:Alois Stoeckl 2252: 2248: 2247: 2242: 2238: 2228: 2226: 2222: 2218: 2214: 2213:Group Captain 2210: 2206: 2202: 2198: 2194: 2190: 2186: 2182: 2178: 2176: 2166: 2157: 2154: 2150: 2145: 2140: 2138: 2134: 2133: 2128: 2123: 2120: 2116: 2112: 2111:Boscombe Down 2103: 2094: 2091: 2085: 2083: 2079: 2078:Fleet Air Arm 2075: 2070: 2067: 2063: 2059: 2055: 2051: 2047: 2045: 2040: 2038: 2033: 2029: 2025: 2021: 2017: 2013: 2009: 2004: 2002: 1998: 1994: 1990: 1982: 1978: 1973: 1964: 1962: 1958: 1954: 1948: 1945: 1940: 1935: 1930: 1928: 1924: 1920: 1916: 1912: 1908: 1904: 1900: 1896: 1892: 1888: 1884: 1880: 1875: 1869: 1866: 1861: 1857: 1853: 1849: 1846: 1845: 1840: 1835: 1827: 1822: 1808: 1804: 1802: 1798: 1794: 1790: 1785: 1783: 1778: 1774: 1769: 1767: 1763: 1760: 1759:Major General 1756: 1752: 1748: 1744: 1736: 1732: 1727: 1712: 1709: 1706: 1705: 1699: 1696: 1693: 1690: 1687: 1686: 1684: 1681: 1677: 1676: 1673:/RAF Detling 1672: 1669: 1666: 1663: 1662: 1659: 1655: 1651: 1648: 1645: 1642: 1641: 1638: 1635: 1632: 1628: 1624: 1621: 1618: 1617: 1613: 1609: 1605: 1602: 1599: 1596: 1595: 1591: 1588: 1585: 1584: 1580: 1576: 1572: 1568: 1565: 1562: 1559: 1558: 1555: 1551: 1547: 1543: 1540: 1537: 1536: 1533: 1532:RAF Driffield 1530: 1527: 1524: 1523: 1520: 1516: 1513: 1510: 1509: 1506: 1505:RAF Dishforth 1503: 1500: 1497: 1496: 1492: 1489: 1486: 1485: 1478: 1476: 1473: 1471: 1468: 1466: 1462: 1458: 1454: 1453: 1451: 1449: 1446: 1445: 1442: 1439: 1436: 1433: 1432: 1429: 1426: 1423: 1420: 1419: 1413: 1410: 1408: 1405: 1403: 1400: 1399: 1397: 1394: 1391: 1390: 1386: 1383: 1380: 1377: 1374: 1373: 1370: 1367: 1364: 1361: 1360: 1356: 1353: 1352: 1346: 1342: 1338: 1334: 1318: 1314: 1308: 1299: 1283: 1278: 1274: 1270: 1266: 1262: 1256: 1254: 1249: 1245: 1241: 1237: 1236:deployments. 1235: 1231: 1227: 1223: 1219: 1215: 1206: 1194: 1189: 1187: 1183: 1177: 1175: 1170: 1166: 1162: 1158: 1154: 1150: 1146: 1142: 1138: 1134: 1129: 1127: 1123: 1122: 1117: 1112: 1102: 1100: 1096: 1092: 1088: 1084: 1080: 1076: 1072: 1068: 1064: 1060: 1054: 1052: 1048: 1044: 1040: 1036: 1032: 1028: 1027:Manstein Plan 1024: 1019: 1017: 1013: 1012: 1007: 1003: 999: 995: 994:Western Front 991: 987: 981: 977: 973: 969: 954: 952: 948: 944: 939: 937: 933: 928: 926: 925: 920: 917: 916: 908: 904: 900: 896: 892: 891:air supremacy 888: 884: 880: 876: 872: 871: 865: 863: 859: 855: 851: 850: 845: 841: 837: 836: 821: 818: 816: 813: 811: 808: 806: 803: 801: 798: 797: 796: 795: 789: 786: 784: 781: 779: 776: 774: 771: 769: 766: 764: 761: 759: 756: 754: 751: 749: 746: 742: 741: 737: 736: 735: 734: 730: 728: 727: 723: 721: 720: 716: 712: 709: 707: 704: 703: 702: 701: 697: 695: 694: 690: 688: 687: 683: 681: 680: 676: 674: 673: 669: 668: 667: 666: 665: 658: 655: 653: 652:Colmar Pocket 650: 648: 645: 643: 642: 638: 636: 633: 631: 628: 626: 625: 621: 619: 616: 614: 611: 609: 608: 607:Market Garden 604: 602: 599: 597: 594: 592: 591: 587: 585: 584: 580: 578: 577: 573: 571: 568: 567: 566: 565: 557: 554: 552: 549: 548: 547: 544: 542: 539: 537: 536: 532: 530: 529: 525: 524: 523: 522: 516: 515: 511: 509: 506: 504: 501: 499: 496: 494: 491: 490: 489: 488: 487: 478: 477:Haddock Force 475: 474: 473: 470: 468: 467: 463: 461: 458: 456: 453: 449: 448: 444: 443: 442: 439: 437: 434: 432: 429: 427: 424: 422: 419: 417: 414: 412: 409: 408: 407: 406: 405: 398: 395: 393: 390: 388: 385: 383: 382: 378: 376: 373: 371: 368: 367: 366: 365: 364: 357: 354: 352: 349: 347: 344: 342: 339: 337: 334: 332: 329: 327: 324: 322: 319: 318: 317: 316: 315: 308: 307:Schuster Line 305: 304: 303: 302: 301: 294: 293: 289: 287: 284: 282: 279: 277: 274: 273: 272: 271: 265: 260: 250: 245: 243: 238: 236: 231: 230: 227: 212: 205: 190: 185: 175: 172: 171: 166: 163: 162:Joseph Schmid 159: 155: 151: 148: 146: 142: 138: 135: 134: 129: 125: 113: 111: 100: 99: 94: 86: 83: 82: 78: 74: 70: 67: 66: 62: 59: 58: 54: 48: 43: 40: 36: 35:Western Front 31: 28: 24: 19: 4325: 4310: 4295: 4291: 4290:Weal, John. 4276: 4275:Ward, John. 4262: 4245: 4231: 4217: 4207: 4193: 4178: 4164: 4146: 4127: 4108: 4093: 4079: 4061: 4047: 4033: 4018: 4004: 3989: 3988:Goss, Chris. 3974: 3973:Feist, Uwe. 3960: 3946: 3931: 3916: 3902: 3888: 3865: 3848: 3831: 3816: 3809:Bibliography 3798: 3789: 3780: 3771: 3762: 3753: 3744: 3735: 3726: 3717: 3708: 3699: 3690: 3681: 3672: 3663: 3654: 3645: 3624: 3615: 3606: 3597: 3588: 3579: 3570: 3559: 3550: 3541: 3532: 3523: 3514: 3505: 3496: 3487: 3475: 3466: 3457: 3448: 3439: 3427: 3418: 3409: 3400: 3391: 3382: 3373: 3364: 3355: 3346: 3337: 3328: 3319: 3310: 3287: 3278: 3269: 3260: 3251: 3242: 3233: 3206: 3197: 3188: 3179: 3156: 3147: 3126: 3117: 3096: 3087: 3078: 3069: 3060: 3051: 3030: 3021: 3012: 3003: 2968: 2959: 2950: 2941: 2932: 2923: 2914: 2905: 2896: 2887: 2878: 2869: 2860: 2851: 2842: 2833: 2824: 2815: 2806: 2787: 2778: 2769: 2760: 2751: 2699: 2690: 2665: 2654: 2564: 2548: 2539: 2511: 2506: 2500: 2498: 2493: 2488: 2483: 2479: 2477: 2471: 2467: 2463: 2461: 2450: 2440: 2431:Overclaiming 2424: 2421: 2374: 2345: 2342: 2324: 2319: 2317: 2296:Air Ministry 2285: 2271:. The RAF's 2269:heavy bomber 2259: 2244: 2234: 2227:in any way. 2192: 2180: 2179: 2174: 2171: 2152: 2148: 2141: 2130: 2124: 2108: 2089: 2086: 2071: 2062:RAF Tangmere 2058:RAF Northolt 2043: 2036: 2012:Hugo Sperrle 2007: 2005: 1988: 1986: 1980: 1953:Adolph Malan 1949: 1938: 1933: 1931: 1903:RAF Warmwell 1870: 1848:Joachim Huth 1842: 1838: 1831: 1805: 1786: 1776: 1770: 1751:Hugh Dowding 1740: 1735:Hugh Dowding 1678:I., and II./ 1671:RAF Warmwell 1470:RAF Hawkinge 1344: 1316: 1315:, commanded 1313:Hugo Sperrle 1297: 1276: 1272: 1260: 1257: 1247: 1243: 1238: 1221: 1213: 1211: 1200:Intelligence 1195:preparations 1192: 1185: 1181: 1178: 1173: 1141:RAF Hawkinge 1132: 1130: 1119: 1110: 1108: 1099:Adlerangriff 1098: 1094: 1090: 1086: 1083:Kriegsmarine 1082: 1074: 1067:Kriegsmarine 1066: 1062: 1055: 1046: 1037:forces. The 1022: 1020: 1009: 1005: 1001: 996:. After the 986:Nazi Germany 983: 950: 947:Adlerangriff 946: 942: 940: 935: 929: 922: 913: 906: 894: 882: 868: 866: 861: 847: 844:Nazi Germany 839: 834: 833: 832: 793: 792: 739: 732: 725: 718: 698: 692: 685: 678: 671: 662: 661: 640: 623: 606: 589: 582: 575: 563: 562: 534: 527: 520: 519: 513: 497: 484: 483: 465: 446: 402: 401: 380: 361: 360: 312: 311: 298: 297: 290: 268: 259:World War II 158:Hugo Sperrle 137:Hugh Dowding 96:Belligerents 39:World War II 33:Part of the 26: 18: 3884:(paperback) 3845:Bond, Brian 3480:Mackay 2000 3432:Mackay 2001 2744:Mackay 2003 2354:across the 2325:Kampfgruppe 2314:Night raids 2292:Scandinavia 2201:RAF Detling 2144:Southampton 2119:RAF Andover 2115:Worthy Down 2074:RAF Croydon 1762:E B Ashmore 1631:RAF Croydon 1579:RAF Detling 1571:Southampton 1569:/ Ports of 1475:RAF Manston 1412:RAF Manston 1091:Luftwaffe's 1035:French Army 693:Blockbuster 601:Netherlands 556:Dieppe Raid 351:Afsluitdijk 276:River Forth 4379:Categories 4078:(editor). 2576:References 2339:Birmingham 2205:Folkestone 2175:Geschwader 2024:RAF Odiham 2008:Luftflotte 1993:RAF Kenley 1989:Luftflotte 1934:Geschwader 1911:Canterbury 1852:Eastchurch 1824:KG 2 flew 1773:Chain Home 1637:RAF Odiham 1604:RAF Bibury 1575:Portsmouth 1550:Birkenhead 1479:RAF Kenley 1385:RAF Debden 1382:RAF Kenley 1317:Luftflotte 1298:Luftflotte 1165:Portsmouth 1121:Kanalkampf 1045:, but the 957:Background 903:Home Fleet 899:Royal Navy 700:Lumberjack 570:Baby Blitz 535:Donnerkeil 493:Kanalkampf 416:Montcornet 321:Maastricht 300:Luxembourg 270:Phoney War 217:23 wounded 197:9 captured 141:Keith Park 4294:Zerstōrer 2581:Citations 2513:Wehrmacht 2501:Luftwaffe 2494:Luftwaffe 2489:Luftwaffe 2484:Luftwaffe 2480:Luftwaffe 2472:Luftwaffe 2468:Luftwaffe 2451:Luftwaffe 2413:Aftermath 2399:Edinburgh 2391:Sheffield 2356:Irish Sea 2347:Hauptmann 2197:Rochester 2153:Luftwaffe 2048:(JG 27), 1959:and nine 1939:Luftwaffe 1816:KG 2 raid 1793:Y Service 1777:Luftwaffe 1710:(StG 77) 1554:Liverpool 1544:Ports of 1277:Luftwaffe 1261:Luftwaffe 1248:Luftwaffe 1244:Abteilung 1230:Y service 1222:Luftwaffe 1220:and poor 1214:Adlertag. 1193:Luftwaffe 1182:Luftwaffe 1137:Liverpool 1133:Luftwaffe 1111:Luftwaffe 1095:Luftwaffe 1079:air power 1075:Luftwaffe 1063:Luftwaffe 1049:captured 1047:Wehrmacht 1006:Luftwaffe 907:Luftwaffe 895:Luftwaffe 870:Wehrmacht 849:Luftwaffe 800:The Blitz 783:Nuremberg 778:Heilbronn 763:Frankfurt 748:Paderborn 726:Undertone 679:Veritable 672:Blackcock 564:1944–1945 521:1941–1943 455:Abbeville 336:Rotterdam 331:The Hague 215:44 killed 4369:Aviation 2786:(2000). 2525:Red Army 2464:Adlertag 2425:Adlertag 2407:Balcombe 2403:Aberdeen 2375:Adlertag 2352:Brittany 2320:Adlertag 2185:Southend 1981:Adlertag 1689:Portland 1682:(StG 2) 1667:(StG 1) 1650:Plymouth 1646:(KG 55) 1622:(KG 54) 1610:harbour/ 1608:Spithead 1600:(KG 51) 1589:(StG 3) 1541:(KG 27) 1528:(KG 30) 1514:(KG 26) 1501:(KG 40) 1461:Pevensey 1437:(KG 53) 1378:(KG 76) 1273:Adlertag 1255:at all. 1186:Adlertag 1174:Adlertag 1153:Pevensey 1081:and the 951:Adlertag 943:Adlertag 936:Adlertag 921:and the 862:Adlertag 835:Adlertag 768:Würzburg 647:2nd Alps 641:Nordwind 583:Chastity 576:Overlord 528:Cerberus 514:Sea Lion 498:Adlertag 472:1st Alps 431:Boulogne 387:Gembloux 292:Wikinger 68:Location 27:Adlertag 4343:Portals 2395:Norwich 2387:Swansea 2383:Cardiff 2379:Bristol 2371:Glasgow 2364:Belfast 2308:Denmark 2304:Aalborg 2281:No. 249 2277:No. 234 2149:Gruppen 2132:Staffel 2082:Gosport 1915:No. 601 1883:No. 111 1879:No. 151 1877:06:15. 1654:Feltham 1627:Gosport 1612:Ventnor 1563:(LG 1) 1546:Bristol 1490:(KG 4) 1424:(KG 3) 1395:(KG 2) 1365:(KG 1) 1357:Target 1169:Ventnor 1149:Manston 788:Hamburg 758:TF Baum 740:Varsity 733:Plunder 711:Cologne 706:Remagen 686:Grenade 664:Germany 630:Scheldt 590:Dragoon 486:Britain 441:Dunkirk 363:Belgium 341:Zeeland 124:Germany 73:England 4332: 4317: 4302: 4283: 4269: 4252: 4238: 4224: 4200: 4185: 4171: 4153: 4134: 4115: 4100: 4086: 4068: 4054: 4040: 4025: 4011: 3996: 3981: 3967: 3953: 3938: 3923: 3909: 3895: 3880: 3872: 3855: 3838: 3823: 2794: 2522:Soviet 2294:, the 1895:No. 43 1891:No. 85 1874:Amiens 1811:Battle 1753:, the 1698:Yeovil 1339:, and 1184:began 1145:Lympne 1118:. The 990:France 978:, and 773:Kassel 719:Gisela 618:Aachen 447:Dynamo 436:Calais 421:Saumur 404:France 392:La Lys 375:Hannut 199:Other: 186:killed 121: 107: 84:Result 2531:Notes 2507:Blitz 2273:No. 3 2050:JG 53 2001:Essex 1465:Dover 1280:' 1271:. On 1253:radar 1226:Ultra 1161:Dover 1051:Paris 910:' 635:Bulge 624:Queen 466:Paula 460:Lille 426:Arras 411:Sedan 381:David 211:circa 4330:ISBN 4315:ISBN 4300:ISBN 4281:ISBN 4267:ISBN 4250:ISBN 4236:ISBN 4222:ISBN 4198:ISBN 4183:ISBN 4169:ISBN 4151:ISBN 4132:ISBN 4113:ISBN 4098:ISBN 4084:ISBN 4066:ISBN 4052:ISBN 4038:ISBN 4023:ISBN 4019:KG55 4009:ISBN 3994:ISBN 3979:ISBN 3965:ISBN 3951:ISBN 3936:ISBN 3921:ISBN 3907:ISBN 3893:ISBN 3878:ISBN 3870:ISBN 3853:ISBN 3836:ISBN 3821:ISBN 2792:ISBN 2505:The 2401:and 2219:ace 2113:and 2064:and 2054:JG 3 2052:and 1999:and 1997:Kent 1977:LG 1 1925:and 1897:and 1749:Sir 1267:and 1159:and 1087:Heer 1065:and 945:and 753:Ruhr 326:Mill 281:Saar 75:and 60:Date 2327:100 1919:213 1457:Rye 1157:Rye 1101:). 901:'s 889:or 846:'s 37:of 4381:: 4261:. 4216:. 3864:. 3847:. 3633:^ 3296:^ 3215:^ 3165:^ 3135:^ 3105:^ 3039:^ 2989:^ 2977:^ 2736:^ 2708:^ 2674:^ 2642:^ 2628:^ 2600:^ 2588:^ 2397:, 2393:, 2385:, 2381:, 2362:, 2337:, 2306:, 2279:, 2257:. 2253:) 2117:. 2060:, 2046:27 1963:. 1927:87 1923:64 1921:, 1917:, 1905:. 1893:, 1858:. 1573:, 1463:, 1459:, 1335:, 1319:3. 1300:2. 1176:. 1155:, 1147:, 1143:, 1018:. 974:, 970:, 182:3 4345:: 4336:. 4321:. 4306:. 4287:. 4189:. 4159:. 4140:. 4121:. 4029:. 4000:. 3985:. 3942:. 3927:. 3827:. 2800:. 2249:( 2039:2 1983:. 1656:/ 1652:/ 1629:/ 1606:/ 1552:/ 1548:/ 1004:( 881:( 248:e 241:t 234:v 191:: 176::

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