109:, i.e., is the idea or method by which we find its referent. In other words, it's how we identify something in any possible world before knowing its actual nature. The primary intension of "water" might be a description, such as
113:
or "the clear, drinkable liquid that fills oceans and lakes". The thing picked out by the primary intension of "water" could have been otherwise. For example, on some other world where the inhabitants take "water" to mean
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because we can imagine another substance XYZ with watery properties, but it's not 2-possible. Hence, objections to conceivability implying possibility are unfounded when these words are used more carefully.
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The reason
Chalmers employs two-dimensional semantics is to avoid objections to conceivability implying possibility. For instance, it's claimed that we can conceive of water not having been
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world, whatever that world happens to be. It's determined after we discover water's actual composition in our world. So, if we assign "water" the primary intension
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Chalmers then advances the following "two-dimensional argument against materialism". Define P as all physical truths about the universe and Q as a truth about
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O" is true in every world. This explains how "water is XYZ" can be conceivable (using the primary intension) but not possible (using the secondary intension).
378:, such as that someone is conscious. Let "1-possible" refer to possibility relative to primary intension and "2-possible" relative to secondary intension.
237:, which entails that it is impossible for a proposition to fail to be a priori given that it is necessary. This can be proven as follows: If a proposition
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O, but given that it is true (which it is) it cannot be false. It would be absurd to claim that something that is water is not H
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and necessary is considered absurd by some philosophers (as is Kripke's paired claim that the same proposition can be both
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and others. Soames argues that two-dimensionalism stems from a misreading of passages in Kripke (1980) as well as
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Two-dimensional semantics has been used by David
Chalmers to counter objections to the various arguments against
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domains" in arguing from knowability or epistemic conceivability to what is necessary or possible (modalities).
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If two-dimensionalism is workable it solves some very important problems in the philosophy of language.
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Under two-dimensionalism, the problem disappears. The primary intension of "Water is H
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For example, Robert
Stalnaker's account of knowledge represents knowledge as a
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David J. Chalmers (2010). "The Two-Dimensional
Argument Against Materialism".
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proposition because this single sentence expresses two propositions, one
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Almog, Joseph; Perry, John; Wettstein, Howard K.; Kaplan, David (1989).
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However, this contention that one and the same proposition can be both
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and to overturn what he sees as a "revolution" in semantics begun by
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The Case of Hyper-intensionality in Two-Dimensional Modal
Semantics:
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O. When considered according to its secondary intension, "Water is H
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component, since it is contingent that the referent of "water" is H
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in this world. The secondary intension of "water" in our world is H
1932:
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An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language
2012:
638:
Two-Dimensional
Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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of "water" is whatever thing "water" happens to pick out in
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If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible or
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O (let's say it's XYZ), it is not the case that water is H
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118:, but where the chemical make-up of watery stuff is not H
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557:. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481–564.
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If P&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible
669:
Two-Dimensionalism and
Kripkean A Posteriori Necessity
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O. Neither intension gives us both a necessary and an
466:
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O" is an example of a necessary truth which is true
65:
602:
The
Character of Consciousness (Philosophy of Mind)
241:is necessary it is true in all possible worlds. If
677:Sentence-Relativity and the Necessary A Posteriori
399:Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true.
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493:
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1221:Segmented discourse representation theory (SDRT)
707:The Two Dimensional Argument against Materialism
396:If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false.
489:
487:
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459:for a fuller explanation see Chalmers, David.
261:is necessary then we know it necessarily, and
141:, then the secondary intension of "water" is H
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696:The Foundations of Two Dimensional Semantics
307:
70:Any given sentence, for example, the words,
16:Approach to semantics in analytic philosophy
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199:, since we had to discover that water was H
2167:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
1457:
1450:
1436:
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532:. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
340:, but it's not possible that water isn't
30:. It is a theory of how to determine the
463:. Oxford UP: 1996. Chapter 2, section 4.
280:O, while the secondary intension is the
2285:
604:. Oxford University Press, USA. 2010.
527:
1431:
1176:Discourse representation theory (DRT)
728:
653:Two dimensional semantics--the basics
314:materialism in the philosophy of mind
477:Issues in the Philosophy of Language
1089:Quantificational variability effect
756:Formal semantics (natural language)
631:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
475:Stalnaker, Robert. "Propositions."
13:
582:Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2006).
14:
2319:
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82:is taken to express two distinct
66:Two-dimensional semantic analysis
161:O in every world because unlike
2107:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
1171:Combinatory categorial grammar
546:
521:
497:The Character of Consciousness
453:
1:
1988:Principle of compositionality
949:Antecedent-contained deletion
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357:1-possible that water wasn't
207:O, for these are known to be
105:of a word or sentence is its
94:, which together compose its
2137:Philosophical Investigations
404:
7:
1978:Modality (natural language)
718:Two Dimensional Modal Logic
586:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
500:. Oxford University Press.
434:
353:. Chalmers replies that it
189:has argued that "Water is H
10:
2324:
2117:Language, Truth, and Logic
1857:Theological noncognitivism
1742:Contrast theory of meaning
1737:Causal theory of reference
1468:Index of language articles
830:Syntax–semantics interface
575:
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2202:Philosophy of information
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1802:Mediated reference theory
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1272:Conversational scoreboard
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1049:Intersective modification
1034:Homogeneity (linguistics)
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685:Two Dimensional Semantics
626:Two-Dimensional Semantics
584:Two-Dimensional Semantics
530:Reference and Description
308:In the philosophy of mind
180:
86:, often referred to as a
2127:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
1382:Distributional semantics
383:P&~Q is conceivable
1928:Use–mention distinction
1772:Direct reference theory
1377:Computational semantics
1114:Subsective modification
918:Propositional attitudes
1862:Theory of descriptions
1797:Linguistic determinism
1459:Philosophy of language
1407:Philosophy of language
1044:Inalienable possession
1024:Free choice inferences
1019:Faultless disagreement
790:Generalized quantifier
528:Soames, Scott (2007).
402:
294:necessary a posteriori
165:it is impossible for H
1973:Mental representation
1908:Linguistic relativity
1792:Inquisitive semantics
1302:Plural quantification
1196:Inquisitive semantics
1161:Alternative semantics
380:
376:phenomenal experience
265:we know it a priori.
2303:Theories of language
2157:Naming and Necessity
2067:De Arte Combinatoria
1866:Definite description
1827:Semantic externalism
1287:Function application
1094:Responsive predicate
1084:Privative adjectives
169:O to be other than H
2207:Philosophical logic
2197:Analytic philosophy
2003:Sense and reference
1882:Verification theory
1837:Situation semantics
1372:Cognitive semantics
1337:Strawson entailment
1282:Existential closure
1226:Situation semantics
1129:Temperature paradox
1099:Rising declaratives
1064:Modal subordination
1039:Hurford disjunction
999:Discourse relations
131:secondary intension
92:secondary intension
32:sense and reference
28:analytic philosophy
2057:Port-Royal Grammar
1953:Family resemblance
1872:Theory of language
1847:Supposition theory
1417:Semantics of logic
1342:Strict conditional
1312:Quantifier raising
1277:Downward entailing
1257:Autonomy of syntax
1186:Generative grammar
1166:Categorial grammar
1104:Scalar implicature
1009:Epistemic modality
984:De dicto and de re
663:Alexandra Arapinis
555:Themes from Kaplan
461:The Conscious Mind
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2308:Modal metaphysics
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1782:Dynamic semantics
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1332:Squiggle operator
1292:Meaning postulate
1231:Supervaluationism
1201:Intensional logic
1181:Dynamic semantics
1142:
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974:Crossover effects
923:Tense–aspect–mood
903:Lexical semantics
721:by Gary Hardegree
611:978-0-19-531110-5
539:978-0-691-13099-6
391:Russellian monism
88:primary intension
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1968:Metalanguage
1963:Logical form
1918:Truth-bearer
1877:Unilalianism
1787:Expressivism
1614:Wittgenstein
1559:von Humboldt
1476:Philosophers
1347:Type shifter
1317:Quantization
1267:Continuation
1134:Veridicality
1014:Exhaustivity
979:Cumulativity
898:Indexicality
878:Definiteness
873:Conditionals
800:Logical form
717:
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679:Kai-Yee Wong
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671:Kai-Yee Wong
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511:. Retrieved
496:
476:
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441:David Kaplan
410:Scott Soames
408:
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326:
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298:a posteriori
297:
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290:a posteriori
289:
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274:a posteriori
273:
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216:a posteriori
213:
208:
196:a posteriori
194:
184:
163:watery stuff
162:
151:watery stuff
150:
139:watery stuff
138:
134:
130:
128:
116:watery stuff
115:
111:watery stuff
110:
101:The primary
100:
91:
87:
84:propositions
81:
69:
19:
18:
2293:Modal logic
2212:Linguistics
2177:Limited Inc
2097:On Denoting
1923:Proposition
1574:de Saussure
1539:Ibn Khaldun
1262:Context set
1236:Type theory
1119:Subtrigging
883:Disjunction
810:Proposition
513:4 September
187:Saul Kripke
74:"Water is H
40:truth-value
2287:Categories
2272:Discussion
2267:Task Force
2217:Pragmatics
2008:Speech act
1938:Categories
1852:Symbiosism
1807:Nominalism
1719:Watzlawick
1599:Bloomfield
1519:Chrysippus
1412:Pragmatics
1059:Mirativity
825:Speech act
780:Entailment
775:Denotation
447:References
272:O" is the
263:ipso facto
224:contingent
145:O, since H
2298:Semantics
2249:Semiotics
2237:Semantics
2087:Alciphron
2023:Statement
1958:Intension
1898:Ambiguity
1777:Dramatism
1757:Cratylism
1509:Eubulides
1504:Aristotle
1484:Confucius
1211:Mereology
1147:Formalism
1029:Givenness
954:Cataphora
942:Phenomena
933:Vagueness
863:Ambiguity
815:Reference
795:Intension
785:Extension
643:Assertion
414:Russelian
405:Criticism
318:epistemic
302:necessary
282:necessary
209:identical
103:intension
24:semantics
2262:Category
2222:Rhetoric
2047:Cratylus
2018:Sentence
1993:Property
1913:Language
1891:Concepts
1729:Theories
1694:Strawson
1679:Davidson
1669:Hintikka
1664:Anscombe
1609:Vygotsky
1564:Mauthner
1534:Averroes
1524:Zhuangzi
1514:Diodorus
1494:Cratylus
1365:See also
1250:Concepts
1124:Telicity
959:Coercion
913:Negation
908:Modality
858:Anaphora
435:See also
431:(1989).
393:is true.
300:and one
231:relation
220:a priori
44:sentence
38:and the
2029:more...
1933:Concept
1674:Dummett
1649:Gadamer
1644:Chomsky
1629:Derrida
1619:Russell
1604:Bergson
1589:Tillich
1549:Leibniz
1489:Gorgias
868:Binding
576:Sources
418:Fregean
96:meaning
2181:(1988)
2171:(1982)
2161:(1980)
2151:(1967)
2141:(1953)
2131:(1951)
2121:(1936)
2111:(1921)
2101:(1905)
2091:(1732)
2081:(1668)
2071:(1666)
2061:(1660)
2051:(n.d.)
2013:Symbol
1714:Searle
1704:Putnam
1654:Kripke
1639:Austin
1624:Carnap
1569:Ricœur
1554:Herder
1544:Hobbes
1297:Monads
844:Topics
608:
590:
561:
536:
504:
429:Kaplan
425:Kripke
253:, for
181:Impact
90:and a
2039:Works
1948:Class
1709:Lewis
1699:Quine
1684:Grice
1634:Whorf
1594:Sapir
1579:Frege
1529:Xunzi
1499:Plato
989:De se
893:Focus
851:Areas
820:Scope
322:modal
149:O is
107:sense
42:of a
34:of a
1998:Sign
1903:Cant
1689:Ryle
1659:Ayer
1584:Boas
606:ISBN
588:ISBN
559:ISBN
534:ISBN
515:2014
502:ISBN
320:and
222:and
135:this
129:The
52:true
36:word
1943:Set
1241:TTR
710:by
699:by
688:by
645:by
247:not
233:on
226:).
50:is
26:in
2289::
2099:"
484:^
468:^
355:is
304:.
211:.
98:.
78:O"
62:.
2095:"
1868:)
1864:(
1451:e
1444:t
1437:v
748:e
741:t
734:v
634:)
628:(
614:.
596:.
567:.
542:.
517:.
416:–
368:O
364:2
359:H
351:O
347:2
342:H
338:O
334:2
329:H
286:2
278:2
270:2
259:P
255:P
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243:P
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205:2
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120:2
76:2
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