1821:
1307:
1972:
1291:
47:
2102:
2165:
2553:
short by 150 pilots by 31 August 1940. Only 150 pilots could be replaced up to 21 September. Bomber pilots were converted to cope. Overall trend was up from July 1940. Murray focuses on German crew losses. Bf 109 units were running at 67 percent, Bf 110 units 46 percent, and bombers were at 59 percent establishment by 14 September. One week later it was 64, 52 and 52 percent respectively. It seemed that the
Germans were "running out of aircraft". Wood and Dempster assert that RAF operational strength hardly declined, from 64.8 percent on 24 August to 64.7 percent on 31 August, and finally 64.25 percent on 7 September 1940.
1205:
1807:
layout from the main headquarters at
Bentley Priory. The main map on the plotting table represented the group command area and its associated airfields. Extensive radio and telephone equipment transmitted and received a constant flow of information from the various sector airfields as well as the Observer Corps, AA Command and the navy. The "Duty fighter controller" was the Group GOC's personal representative and was tasked with controlling how and when each raid would be intercepted. If the telephone system failed engineers would be on site within minutes to repair the broken links.
118:
1731:
2510:. However, as with the campaign against the RAF, the types of targets differed radically and no sustained pressure was put under any one type of British target. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it had even begun. The end result of the air campaign against Britain in 1940 and 1941 was a decisive failure to end the war. As Hitler committed Germany to ever increasing military adventures, the
4352:
104:
2341:. Despite the group being a specialist night strike unit which had high expertise in night navigation, only four of the crews found their targets. The eleven 551 lb (250 kg) bombs dropped were not sufficient to disrupt fighter production. Around five of the 11 fell inside the compound. Casualties were small as workers had gone to shelter. Serious damage was done only to offices and a tool room, while a gas main was fractured. Another group, led by
1251:(the true figure was 496) and that figure would decrease, indicating that the RAF could not sustain a long battle of attrition. Schmid also claimed the command at all levels was rigid and inflexible, with fighters being tied to home bases. In his list of omissions, Schmid failed to mention the RAF maintenance and organisation operations, which put back damaged aircraft with rapid effect. He anticipated a short battle. Crucially, Schmid failed to mention
1803:. As the plots of the raiding aircraft moved, the counters were pushed across the map by magnetic "rakes". This system enabled the main "Fighter Controller" and Dowding to see where each formation was heading, at what height, and in what strength. This allowed an estimate to be made of possible targets. The age of the information was denoted from the colour of the counter. The simplicity of the system meant that decisions could be made quickly.
4364:
2423:
and
Eastchurch was a failure, as both were Coastal Command stations and bore no relation to Fighter Command. The Germans may have reasoned that if bases such as Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne were neutralised through the attacks on 12 August, then Fighter Command may have had to move onto these airfields. In fact, the bombing of 12 August had failed to knock out these strips, and
938:. The date of the assault was postponed several times because of bad weather. Eventually, it was carried out on 13 August 1940. The German attacks on 13 August inflicted significant damage and casualties on the ground, but, marred by poor intelligence and communication, they did not make a significant impression on Fighter Command's ability to defend British air space.
2449:), both sides claimed to have shot down and destroyed more enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air than they had in reality. RAF Fighter Command claimed 78 German aircraft shot down on 13 August 1940. Another source states that official RAF claims amounted to 64. Actual German losses amounted to 47–48 aircraft destroyed and 39 severely damaged. Conversely, the
1768:(ROC), combined with an organisation system to process the information was crucial to the RAF's ability to efficiently intercept incoming enemy aircraft. The technology was named RDF with misleading intent – the vague description would disguise the full nature of the system to the enemy if its existence ever became known.
2088:
to the target of
Portland. They ran into No. 601 Squadron RAF Hurricanes and lost six Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged. Only one Hurricane was shot down and another damaged. A second source states only four Bf 110s were destroyed, whilst a third gives the loss of five destroyed and five damaged. The
2474:
failed to develop any focused strategy for defeating RAF Fighter
Command. At first, it attempted to destroy RAF bases, then switched to strategic bombing by day and night. It tried to achieve the destruction of several British industries at the same time, switching from bombing aircraft factories, to
1250:
and underestimated the RAF. The most serious mistakes were made concerning radar, airfield identification, and production sites. Schmid asserted that the number of operational airfields in southern
England were severely limited; estimated that the British could produce only 180–330 fighters per month
1179:
The
Germans had not achieved a degree of success commensurate with their exertions. Nevertheless, in the belief they were having considerable effect on Fighter Command, they prepared to launch their all-out assault on the RAF the following day. By 12 August, German air strength had reached acceptable
1171:
was badly damaged and others targeted were also damaged, but not destroyed. All were in working order by the following morning. The attacks against the harbour and RAF stations had failed to destroy them. All were not in fully working order by the end of the day, but were back in action the following
1862:
had issued orders for bombers to abandon missions if their escorts did not show up, but Fink did not want to be accused of failing to obey orders and continued onward even though the Bf 110s turned back. The return leg would take KG 2 across No. 11 Group's territory, which could have been disastrous
2552:
Bungay notes that by between 27 August to 4 September 1940 that German bomber unit strength had shrunk to an average of 20 out of 35–40. Bf 109 units had declined to 18 out of 35–40 and Bf 110 units had shrunk even lower. Bungay also notes that the RAF pilot losses were 125 a week and the force was
2453:
claimed to have destroyed 70 Hawker
Hurricanes and Spitfires in the air and a further 18 Blenheim bombers in the air alone. This was an exaggeration of about 300 percent. Another 84 RAF fighters were claimed on the ground. Actual RAF losses in the air amounted to 13 fighters and 11 bombers, with 47
2146:
instead. No. 238 Squadron had been detailed to intercept, but the fighter escort was too strong and the bombers were not diverted from their course. Several warehouses were destroyed and a cold storage plant was also knocked out. All fires were under control by dusk. One III./LG 1 dropped its bombs
2121:
was to be bombed as well, with the support of 52 Ju 87s from StG 1 and StG 2 who were to strike at RAF Warmwell and Yeovil. I./JG 53 flew a fighter sweep ahead of the bombers from Poole to Lyme Regis in order to tempt the RAF into battle. I./JG 53 made landfall at 16:00. The sweep failed to attract
2087:
At 11:10, V./LG 1 Bf 110s took off in advance of a raid by KG 54, possibly to tempt RAF fighters into battle before the main assault, so the RAF would be out of position. The bombers' mission was cancelled. The order did not reach V./LG 1 who continued to their target area. The 23 Bf 110s continued
2422:
The
Germans had maintained the attacks on airfields in south-eastern England which they had started the previous day. On 12 August, most of the Kentish airfields had been attacked; and on 13 August, the Germans concentrated on the second line airfields south of London. The concentration on Detling
1871:
For an hour after dawn on 13 August, there were few German tracks upon the plot tables in operations rooms, and none at all in the central and eastern
Channel. The first signs of concentration, however, came earlier than usual, for between 05:30 and 05:40 two formations of 30 or more aircraft were
1806:
This information was simultaneously sent to the headquarters of each group, where it was cross-checked through a filter room before being sent through to another operations room, housed in an underground bunker. Because Group had tactical control of the battle, the operations room was different in
1113:
before the Battle of Britain. Over 1400 aircraft had been lost in the Battle of France on top of about 500 lost in conquering Poland and Norway in 1939. The service was forced to wait until it had reached acceptable levels before a main assault against the RAF could be made. Therefore, the first
2155:
intelligence had not identified the Southampton Spitfire factory—on the waterfront near the docks—as an important target. Poor intelligence suggested it was a bomber factory. Only later, in September, was it attacked and severely damaged. However, even then the Germans were unaware of the damage
1876:
area. For 30 minutes, they remained over land, but at 06:10 they began moving inland. The Observer Corps and radar tracked them and guided the RAF units to intercept. Unaware of the German intent, the controllers directed three full Squadrons and detachments of three others were alerted by
1936:
being missed approaching the eastern, instead of central Channel by radar, KG 2 hit the RAF airfield. KG 2 claimed 10 Spitfires destroyed on the ground. In fact, no Fighter Command fighters were lost. For some time afterward, this wrong claim convinced German intelligence that Eastchurch was a
1779:
aircraft as they organised over their own airfields in northern France and Belgium. Once the raiding aircraft moved inland behind the radar stations, the formations were plotted by the ROC. The information from RDF and the Observer Corps were sent through to the main operations room of Fighter
1128:) was sunk. Mine laying from aircraft had proved more profitable, sinking 38,000 tons . The impact on Fighter Command was minimal. It had lost 74 fighter pilots killed or missing and 48 wounded in July, and its strength rose to 1,429 by 3 August. By that date, it was only short of 124 pilots.
1056:
With Western Europe neutralised, the OKL and OKW turned their attention to Britain, which was now home to the Allied base of operations in Europe. Hitler hoped Britain would negotiate for an armistice, for which he was prepared to offer generous terms. The tentative offers made by Hitler were
2068:
intercepted. Four Ju 88s and one Bf 109 from JG 2 were shot down. The German fighters claimed six RAF fighters and the bombers another 14. In reality, the bombers only damaged five. The Bf 109s destroyed only one and damaged another. Of the five RAF fighters damaged by the bombers, two were
2092:
optimistically claimed 30 RAF fighters destroyed (in reality RAF fighter losses in aerial combat amounted to 13 throughout the entire day), for a loss of 13 Bf 110s. The morning's effort had been a fiasco. The attacks showed a serious German technical failure in air-to-air communication.
1124:("Channel battle") rarely involved attacks against RAF airfields inland, but encouraged RAF units to engage in battle by attacking British Channel convoys. These operations would last from 10 July-8 August 1940. The attacks against shipping were not successful; only 24,000 tons (
1950:
Eventually the bombers were intercepted. KG 2 lost five Do 17s in the attempt. Six Dorniers were also badly damaged. In return, accurate fire from the Dornier gunners shot down two Hurricanes from the attacking Squadrons: No. 111, No. 151 and No. 74 Squadron led by
2491:
to decimate. The RAF aircraft industry supported the losses and its pilots were replaced sufficiently to limit the RAF's decline in strength and deny the Germans victory. Conversely, the RAF were able to ensure the serviceability rates and aircrew numbers of the
2486:
underestimated British radar, and they had not realised its importance in the British operational system. To the contrary, OKL believed that the radar stations would benefit the German effort by sending RAF forces into large-scale air battles for the
1946:
in the attack and one Coastal Command Spitfire. However, severe damage was done to the infrastructure. Much equipment and ammunition was destroyed and 16 of the Command's personnel were killed. RAF Eastchurch was back in operation by 16:00.
1850:—tried to warn the Dorniers of the cancellation. Unable to contact the bombers by radio, Huth tried to signal them by flying in front of them and performing aerobatics. Fink ignored him and flew on. KG 2 flew around the coast to his target,
1867:
misjudging the direction of the bombers, due to low-lying cloud, and the radar not picking up the direction of the German bombers, the WAAF plotted the course of the raid incorrectly and the RAF failed to prevent the target being attacked.
1941:
would launch seven fruitless raids on it in the coming weeks. Added to this mistake was the failure to keep up pressure. Raids were spaced out, giving the field time to recover. The station was used by RAF Coastal Command, which lost five
1836:
of KG 2 were not informed and took off at 04:50 for their target. They were to meet with their escorts from ZG 26 over the Channel. ZG 26 received the cancellation order, but II., and III./KG 2 did not. KG 2 had formed up by 05:10, led by
2084:. ZG 2 was supposed to provide escort during one these attacks, and in a breakdown of communications, arrived over the target without their Ju 88s, which had been ordered to stand down. One Bf 110 was shot down by No. 238 Squadron RAF.
2405:. Very little damage was done, though some rail tracks were cut temporarily and around 100 casualties were suffered. It is unknown if any German aircraft were lost. One German airman was found wandering around the countryside in
2003:. Losses and results are unknown. KG 27 also abandoned most of its operations. III./KG 27 did attempt to make it through to the Bristol docks, losing one He 111 to No. 87 Squadron RAF in the attempt. Little damage was done.
2122:
and divert RAF squadrons. Instead, all it succeeded in doing was to alert the RAF defences a critical five minutes earlier. When the main wave of LG 1 and StG 2 arrived over the coast, they were greeted by 77 RAF fighters.
1258:
The lack of sustained and concentrated attacks on radar left it free to help direct the deployment of RAF units at opportune moments. Its continued warnings of incoming raids were a crucial benefit to Fighter Command. The
2520:, the invasion of Western Europe. The Battle of Britain ensured that the Western Allies had a base from which to launch the campaign and that there would be a Western Allied presence on the battlefield to meet the
2310:. One pilot turned back complaining of "fuel problems" and was court-martialled. That bomber was the only one to return. The rest fell to AAA fire and fighters. Some 24 airmen were killed and nine were captured.
934:. The service's destruction would deny the British their air superiority asset and feeling vulnerable to air attack might negotiate for peace. Throughout July and early August, the Germans made preparations for
2172:
StG 77 was also in action, escorted by JG 27 Bf 109s. StG 77s 52 Ju 87s were joined by 40 Ju 88s of KG 54. Both formations were heading for No. 10 Group RAF's airfields. StG 77 was targeting RAF Warmwell. The
2283:, No. 601 and No. 609 Squadrons intercepted. According to the account of JG 26, the British fighters made little impression on the bombers. Three JG 51 Bf 109s were shot down in skirmishes with RAF fighters.
2470:
from continuing its campaign. The assault against RAF airfields continued throughout August and into September 1940. The battles involved large numbers of aircraft and heavy losses on both sides. The
1799:, which gave the RAF intelligence on the German order of battle. Colour-coded counters representing each raid were placed on a large table, which had a map of Britain overlaid and squared off with a
2475:
attacking supporting industries, import or distribution networks such as coastal ports. An attempt was even made against unrelated targets, such as destroying the morale of the British population.
4394:
1784:. The plots were assessed to determine whether they were "hostile" or "friendly". If hostile, the information was sent to the main "operations room", which was in a large underground bunker.
2207:
from an unknown cause. The Ju 87s bombed the station and 40 Bf 109s strafed it, killing the commander. The operations block was hit, causing high casualties. The losses were disastrous for
2264:
factory at Rochester. III./KG 3 broke away from the main formation and attacked Eastchurch while II./KG 3 headed for Rochester. Significant damage was done to the factory producing the
1592:
StG 3 was to take part. For unknown reasons it was removed from the order of battle on 13 August. Another source asserts that the unit had its missions cancelled owing to poor weather.
2151:(Groups) had lost six destroyed and many damaged. They had escaped lightly. The bombing succeeded in destroying a bicycle factory, a furniture warehouse and a refrigerated meat depot.
1764:. The core of Dowding's system was implemented by Dowding himself: the use of Radio Direction Finding (RDF or radar) was at his behest, and its use, supplemented by information by the
246:
1991:
2 received the order to abandon morning operations, but some began their attacks aimed at airfields and ports in southern Britain. KG 76 abandoned its attack on Debden but struck at
4409:
2056:, which all flew ahead of the bomber stream to clear the airspace of enemy fighters. StG 77's target was obscured by cloud, but KG 54 continued to their target. RAF fighters from
2543:
According to de Zeng et al writes there is nothing published on KG 3; it was one of the most obscure bomber units, owing to the loss of most of its records at the end of the war.
4389:
2147:
by RAF Middle Wallop Sector Station by mistake. Only Andover airfield was hit, and it was used for bomber operations, not fighters. III./LG 1 lost two Ju 88s. The 13 Ju 88
2260:
In the afternoon, a force of 80 Do 17s of KG 3—escorted by JG 51, JG 52, JG 54 and 60 Bf 109s from JG 26 (some 270 aircraft in all)—headed for Eastchurch airfield and the
1263:
also had poor intelligence on the type of RAF airfields. It made repeated errors, often misidentifying airfields as Fighter Command bases, which turned out to belong to
1216:
While the gap between the British and Germans was not yet wide in this regard, the British were starting to gain a decisive lead in intelligence. The breaking of the
2482:
to identify the radar chain and distinguish RAF fighter bases from those of other RAF commands undermined its ability to destroy the British fighter defences. The
4404:
953:
and the following operations failed to destroy the RAF, or gain the necessary local air superiority. As a result, Operation Sea Lion was postponed indefinitely.
1093:
task came first. Once the RAF had been rendered impotent, Göring and Hitler hoped that an invasion would be unnecessary. If this proved not to be the case, the
239:
1097:
would then support the army and prevent the Royal Navy interdicting German sea traffic. Göring named the offensive against the RAF as Operation Eagle Attack (
1955:. Malan himself shot down one Do 17. Another source suggests the destruction of five Do 17s and another seven damaged. German manpower losses amounted to 11
1172:
morning. Unknown to German intelligence, Lympne itself was not even an operational station. This sort of intelligence blunder contributed to the failure of
2223:. The station's casualties amounted to 24 killed and 42 wounded. However, Detling was not an RAF Fighter Command station and the attack did not affect
2109:
The official go-ahead was given at 14:00. At 15:30, some 58–80 Ju 88s from I., II., and III./LG 1, escorted by 30 Bf 110s of V./LG 1, took off to bomb
2239:. Results are unknown and losses are unclear. KG 55 suffered heavy losses the previous day, so its operations seemed limited. On 12 August it lost 13
4399:
2436:
2131:
1775:
Radio Direction Finding (RDF) facilities, which were located along the coastlines of Britain. In most circumstances, RDF could pick up formations of
232:
1228:
on the Battle of Britain is a matter of dispute, with Official Histories claiming there was no direct impact. Whatever the truth, Ultra, and the
967:
1246:
5 as Chief IC). Throughout this time, Schmid's reports made a series of errors. In July 1940, Schmid grossly overestimated the strengths of the
1847:
1332:
949:
would achieve the results required within days, or at worst weeks. It was meant to be the beginning of the end of RAF Fighter Command, but
2177:
failed to find its target, dropping its bombs at random. The other Ju 87 units had attracted much attention and StG 77 escaped unnoticed.
1901:
were also airborne near London. By 06:25, the German formations were well over the Channel. No. 238 was moved to cover their own base at
814:
545:
1741:
The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the
1038:
1131:
In the second phase of attacks, shipping, coastal airfields, radar and stations south of London were attacked during 8–18 August. The
2659:
Note excluding 4 casualties from Australia; the Commonwealth War Graves Commission lists only 25 Civilian casualties 13 August 1940
1336:
2139:; six out of nine Ju 87s were shot down. StG 1 and 2 gave up on their original targets owing to clouds. Both headed for Portland.
1820:
1800:
4333:
4318:
4303:
4284:
4270:
4253:
4239:
4225:
4186:
4172:
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4135:
4101:
4087:
4069:
4055:
4041:
4026:
4012:
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II., and III./JG 53 and III./ZG 76 flew escort for the Ju 87s. ZG 2 and JG 27 flew escort for LG 1. In response the whole of
1761:
1340:
809:
396:
285:
2568:
The head of the German Navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, did not believe an amphibious attack could be launched until 1941
2516:
became increasingly overstretched and was unable to cope with a multi-front war. By 1944, the Allies were ready to launch
4201:
2215:
E P Meggs-Davis. One Squadron Leader was killed—a J.H Lowe—and a further two were wounded. One of the wounded men was a
600:
663:
313:
4116:
3896:
1971:
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with 71 percent of its bomber force, 85 percent of its Bf 109 units, and 83 percent of its Bf 110 units operational.
362:
1447:
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was to destroy the RAF in order to prevent it from attacking the invasion fleet or providing protection for the
1788:
2069:
write-offs. Of the 20 claimed, just three fighters were lost and three pilots were wounded. None were killed.
2101:
299:
2203:. JG 26 went out on a fighter sweep to clear the skies in advance of the attack. JG 26 lost one Bf 109 over
2019:
993:
874:
256:
34:
1832:
On the morning of 13 August, the weather was bad and Göring ordered a postponement of raids. However, the
767:
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during the night although their specific target is unclear. Other bombers, commencing the night stage of
2196:
355:
612:
4384:
4342:
2199:. It failed to find the target and returned without incident. IV./LG 1—also with Ju 87s—was sent after
1010:
923:
782:
777:
747:
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471:
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Directive No. 17 ("or the conduct of air and sea warfare against England") to launch the air assault.
2164:
971:
646:
386:
369:
350:
275:
2022:'s airfield at 'RAF Farnborough' (RAE Farnborough). At 05:05, 18 Ju 88s from II./KG 54 took off for
2105:
Junkers Ju 88. In the mid-afternoon, this aircraft formed the backbone of German bomber formations.
1306:
1224:
signals discipline allowed the British easy access to German communications traffic. The impact of
710:
391:
345:
2035:
2156:
inflicted to Spitfire production. The factory would later be broken up and production dispersed.
1707:
1135:
gradually increased the frequency of attacks. German bombers also raided targets as far north as
992:
in the aftermath of the German invasion of Poland, nine months of stalemate took place along the
772:
605:
595:
420:
2369:. Five Short Stirling aircraft were destroyed. KG 27 also took part in the missions, and bombed
2290:—AOC (Air Officer Commanding)—had protested against the pointlessness of attacking airfields in
1795:
radio posts, which monitored enemy radio communications, and the Ultra decoding centre based at
1754:
1679:
1664:
1586:
1125:
1058:
819:
435:
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410:
877:) that ordered provisional preparations for invasion of Britain. This operation was codenamed
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2220:
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during night hours. The first major raid inland and against RAF airfields came on 12 August.
691:
629:
507:
459:
2280:
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2187:. They took off at 15:15 and were escorted by ZG 76. They found unbroken cloud over Essex.
2136:
1918:
1914:
1906:
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1791:(WAAF), who received information by telephone. Additional intelligence was provided by the
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533:
415:
330:
320:
46:
8:
2299:
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1913:. Not satisfied with the strength of the forces already airborne, controllers dispatched
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291:
188:
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Faulty intelligence was the component that was mostly responsible for the failure of
1085:
was ordered to make all the necessary preparations for transporting the German army (
1042:
975:
857:
738:
731:
705:
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588:
485:
440:
340:
153:
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docks were also targeted. The results of the raids were mixed. The Radar station at
918:
149:
2366:
2236:
2224:
2195:
210 dropped their bombs over Canterbury. II./StG 1 was sent to bomb airfields near
2126:
2053:
2031:
1960:
1956:
1943:
1688:
1560:
1456:
1156:
1030:
979:
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and subsequent operations failed to destroy the RAF or gain local air superiority.
860:
after Britain rejected all overtures for a negotiated peace with Germany. However,
717:
656:
617:
403:
374:
1929:
Squadrons to intercept between 06:30 and 06:35. The first combats began at 06:30.
4368:
3042:
3040:
2980:
2978:
2658:
2409:, West Sussex. No other traces of the aircraft or other crew members were found.
2334:
2323:
2216:
2114:
1855:
1633:
1566:
1493:
Unknown targets (lack of records)/some mine laying operations in English Channel
1440:
1368:
1233:
1115:
997:
914:
853:
757:
622:
550:
502:
464:
379:
173:
76:
4149:. Crowood Aviation Series. Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire, UK: Crowood Press.
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4194:
Stuka Attack!: The Dive-Bombing Assault on England During the Battle of Britain
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on 14 June and overran half of France. The French surrendered on 25 June 1940.
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905:, which might attempt to prevent a landing by sea. On 1 August Hitler gave the
540:
325:
280:
224:
144:
109:
3037:
2975:
1282:
s list—if destroyed—would not have impaired Fighter Command in the slightest.
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The Other Few: Bomber and Coastal Command Operations in the Battle of Britain
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2212:
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2015:
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1026:
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is not uncommon. During the Battle of Britain (and, indeed, the rest of the
210:
2521:
2446:
2295:
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2211:, which lost a number of Blenheims on the ground. The commander killed was
2061:
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2011:
1952:
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in particular, gave the British an increasingly accurate picture of German
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136:
123:
38:
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The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945
3903:
Kampfgeschwader "Edelweiss": The history of a German bomber unit, 1935–45
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RAF Fighter Command. Dowding modernised a system created up from 1917 by
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1411:
1148:
1034:
752:
555:
1204:
16:
First day of German military operations to destroy the British air force
3844:
2503:
adopted a different and clearer strategy of strategic bombing known as
2338:
2204:
2023:
1992:
1910:
1851:
1772:
1636:
1603:
1574:
1549:
1384:
1381:
1164:
1144:
1120:
902:
898:
492:
269:
140:
3947:
Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–45, Volume 1
2427:
had failed to destroy or render Detling or Eastchurch nonoperational.
2350:(Captain) Friedrich Achenbrenner, dispatched 15 He 111s from bases in
3932:
Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 2
3917:
Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 1
2512:
2504:
2398:
2390:
2355:
2346:
1841:
Johannes Fink. Part of the ZG 26 formation that had taken off—led by
1792:
1553:
1229:
1136:
869:
848:
799:
3832:
Battle of Britain: A Day-to-day Chronicle, 10 July – 31 October 1940
2524:
2406:
2402:
2377:, resolutely flew the length and breadth of Great Britain, bombing
2351:
2184:
2183:
210 were sent further east for an operation to attack targets near
1649:
1607:
1460:
1152:
1078:
4326:
The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power
2788:
The Most Dangerous Enemy : A History of the Battle of Britain
2286:
RAF Bomber Command also took part in the day's fighting. Although
4082:. (Royal Air Force Official Histories) Frank Cass, London. 2000.
2394:
2386:
2382:
2378:
2370:
2363:
2307:
2303:
2081:
1771:
The first indications of incoming air raids were received by the
1653:
1626:
1611:
1545:
1168:
1014:(Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) turned their attentions to
72:
2243:
and their crews. The next day, 14 August, they would lose their
1345:
The following targets were chosen for attack on 13 August 1940:
4395:
Aerial operations and battles of World War II involving Germany
2681:
2679:
2677:
2675:
2235:
I., II., and III./KG 55 were also in action. III./KG 55 bombed
1873:
1730:
1697:
1242:
was commander of the Luftwaffe's Military Intelligence Branch (
989:
4181:
Princeton, New Jersey: University Press of the Pacific, 1983.
3889:
Eagle Day: The Battle of Britain, 6 August – 15 September 1940
2000:
1464:
1252:
1160:
1050:
3866:
The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain
2672:
1029:—began in the West on 10 May 1940. The central campaign—the
2041:(Destroyer Wing 2; ZG 2), and V./LG 1 and 173 Bf 109s from
1996:
1976:
4328:. London: Tri-Service Press, third revised edition, 1990.
4094:
With Wings Like Eagles: A History of the Battle of Britain
3446:
3437:
2302:
sent twelve Bristol Blenheims to bomb KG 30 airfields at
1787:
Here, the course information of each raid was plotted by
3817:
The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain
3407:
3398:
2939:
1033:—ended in Allied defeat and the destruction of the main
4410:
Attacks on military installations in the United Kingdom
3945:
de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.
3930:
de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.
3915:
de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.
3301:
3299:
3297:
2739:
2737:
2645:
2643:
4048:
Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe
3344:
3224:
3222:
3220:
3218:
3216:
2727:
2725:
2723:
2721:
2719:
2717:
2715:
2713:
2711:
2709:
1114:
phase of the German air offensive took place over the
4390:
Military operations of World War II involving Germany
4340:
4277:
Hitler's Stuka Squadrons: The Ju 87 at war, 1936–1945
4208:
Pictorial History Of The R.A.F.: Volume One 1918–1939
3636:
3634:
2591:
2589:
2527:
in central Europe at the end of the war in May 1945.
1180:
levels. After bringing its serviceable rates up, the
867:
On 16 July 1940 Hitler gave the German armed forces (
3473:
3425:
3294:
3138:
3136:
2948:
2734:
2640:
1932:
Owing to the mistake by the Observer Corps, and the
3949:. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Publishing. 2009.
3934:. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Publishing. 2007.
3919:. Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Publishing. 2007.
3213:
3170:
3168:
3166:
3073:
de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, pp. 49–54.
2706:
2633:
2631:
2629:
2619:
2617:
2615:
2613:
2611:
2609:
2607:
2605:
2603:
2601:
1109:The losses of the spring campaign had weakened the
852:(German air force) intended to destroy the British
3631:
2586:
3133:
2437:Confirmation and overclaiming of aerial victories
2333:raid against the Supermarine Spitfire factory at
2168:Ju 87Bs. The Ju 87s severely damaged RAF Detling.
2034:. The raids were escorted by about 60 Bf 110s of
4376:
3264:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 193.
3255:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 198.
3246:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 195.
3210:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 184.
3201:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 179.
3192:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 146.
3183:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 155.
3163:
3151:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 354.
3130:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 370.
3121:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 266.
3112:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 360.
3100:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 104.
3091:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 118.
3055:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 171.
3016:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 236.
3007:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 225.
2998:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 2, p. 228.
2930:
2626:
2598:
1909:was also ordered to take off at 06:20 to patrol
842:("Operation Eagle Attack"), an air operation by
254:
3082:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 75.
3046:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 48.
3034:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 33.
3025:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 24.
2984:de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007 Vol 1, p. 14.
968:German occupation of Luxembourg in World War II
4405:Attacks on military installations in the 1940s
4298:. Botley, Oxford UK: Osprey Publishing. 1999.
1966:
1326:
4179:Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1935–1945.
1073:of Britain, codenamed Operation Sealion. The
240:
1828:like these throughout the Battle of Britain.
1104:
3564:RAF Station Commanders – South East England
2358:to strike at the Short Brothers factory at
2142:I./LG 1 abandoned Boscombe Down and bombed
4062:Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe
2014:ordered attacks to commence. At 05:00, 20
1719:
1025:(Operation Yellow), and also known as the
247:
233:
2454:aircraft of various kinds on the ground.
2329:(Bombing Group 100) He 111s to conduct a
2135:(Squadron) of II./StG 2 was badly hit by
1863:without fighter escort. But owing to the
1333:Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)
1191:
114:
4400:Air-to-air combat operations and battles
4005:The Luftwaffe Bombers' Battle of Britain
2163:
2100:
1970:
1819:
1729:
1387:/RAF Biggin Hill/ Other unknown targets
1337:RAF Fighter Command Order of Battle 1940
1203:
3977:. London: Arms and Armour Press. 1993.
2076:were cancelled. I./KG 54 struck at the
2006:The cancellation order had not reached
1881:was protecting a convoy in the Thames,
1000:, in October 1939, the planners of the
4377:
4246:Battle of Britain, July – October 1940
4144:
4125:
4106:
3479:
3431:
2782:
2743:
1208:Radar covered the indicated air space.
4167:. McWhirter Twins Ltd, London. 1969.
3386:Hough and Richards 2007, pp. 155–157.
2764:Hooton 2007, pp. 47–48, p. 77, p. 86.
2499:Having failed to defeat the RAF, the
1341:Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940
961:
885:). Before this could be carried out,
856:(RAF). The operation came during the
228:
4265:. London: Sceptre Publishing, 1985.
3992:. Surrey, UK: Red Kite Books. 2005.
3834:. Quercus Publishing, London. 2009.
2790:. London: Aurum Press. p. 113.
2457:
1979:. The type suffered heavy losses on
4234:. Potomac Books, Washington. 1980.
4210:. Ian Allan. 1968. ASIN: B000QIV8AM
4032:Hough, Richard and Denis Richards.
2230:
2159:
1889:was covering RAF Manston. Parts of
838:("Eagle Day") was the first day of
13:
4218:Hitler's War Directives; 1939–1945
4017:Hall, Stephen and Lionel Quinlan.
2417:
2096:
1089:) across the English Channel. The
201:47 miscellaneous aircraft (ground)
14:
4421:
4206:Taylor, John and Moyes, Phillip.
4064:. Arms & Armour Press. 1997.
4050:. Arms & Armour Press. 1994.
3273:Bungay 2000, pp. 62, 447 Note 23.
2318:As darkness fell at the close of
2072:Further missions by II./KG 54 to
2018:of I./KG 54 took off to bomb the
1726:Dowding_system § Description
213:200 killed or captured including:
4362:
4350:
4324:Wood, Derek and Derek Dempster.
3815:Addison, Paul and Jeremy Crang.
3796:
3787:
3778:
3769:
3760:
3751:
3742:
3733:
3724:
3715:
3706:
3697:
3688:
3679:
3670:
3661:
3652:
3643:
3622:
3613:
3604:
3595:
3586:
3377:Hough and Richards 2007, p. 157.
2685:Hough and Richards 2007, p. 162.
2546:
1885:was protecting RAF Hawkinge and
1305:
1289:
1041:escaped encirclement during the
984:After the declaration of war on
941:Göring had promised Hitler that
116:
102:
45:
4279:. London: Eagles of War. 2004.
4111:. Wiltshire: he Crowood Press.
3891:. J.M Dent and Sons Ltd. 1980.
3808:
3793:Addison and Crang 2000, p. 270.
3757:Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 306.
3577:
3568:
3557:
3548:
3539:
3530:
3521:
3512:
3503:
3494:
3485:
3464:
3455:
3416:
3389:
3380:
3371:
3362:
3353:
3335:
3326:
3317:
3308:
3285:
3282:Hough and Richards 2007. p. 51.
3276:
3267:
3258:
3249:
3240:
3231:
3186:
3177:
3154:
3145:
3124:
3115:
3094:
3085:
3076:
3067:
3058:
3049:
3028:
3010:
3001:
2966:
2957:
2921:
2912:
2903:
2894:
2885:
2876:
2867:
2858:
2849:
2840:
2831:
2822:
2813:
2804:
2776:
2767:
2758:
2749:
2562:
2537:
2430:
1199:
4096:. Harper Books, London. 2009.
3851:. Davis-Poynter, London. 1990
3685:Addison and Crang 2000, p. 58.
2697:
2688:
2663:
2652:
2496:declined in August–September.
2313:
1694:RAF Middle Wallop/RAF Warmwell
1581:/Other unspecified operations
1059:Churchill coalition government
206:47–48 aircraft destroyed (air)
1:
3868:. London: Aurum Press. 2000.
3849:France and Belgium, 1939–1940
3610:Hall and Quinlan 2000, p. 18.
2703:Trevor-Roper 2004, pp. 74–79.
2669:Taylor and Moyes 1968, p. 23.
2575:
1745:, after its chief architect,
1275:, most of the targets on the
956:
4130:. London: Crowood Aviation.
2580:
2412:
2275:, No. 64, No. 111, No. 151,
2030:of StG 77 began heading for
2020:Royal Aircraft Establishment
2010:3 HQ at all. Its commander,
1975:Messerschmitt Bf 110s of 1./
1815:
1296:Albert Kesselring commanded
7:
3470:de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 372.
3452:de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 179.
3443:de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 184.
3413:de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 228.
3404:de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 232.
1967:Coastal airfields and ports
1789:Women's Auxiliary Air Force
1327:Targets and order of battle
1039:British Expeditionary Force
1021:The German offensive—named
10:
4426:
4309:Weal, John. Junkers Ju 87
4248:. Headline, London, 2001.
4007:. Crecy Publishing. 2000.
2900:James 2000, pp. 63–64, 70.
2434:
1723:
1577:and surrounding airfields/
1330:
1011:Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
1002:Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
965:
924:Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
815:Raids on the Atlantic Wall
810:Strategic Bombing Campaign
4036:: Pen & Sword. 2007.
3819:. London: Pimlico. 2000.
3802:Bungay 2000, pp. 393–394.
3350:Bungay 2000, pp. 207–208.
3064:Bungay 2000, pp. 203–212.
2945:Bungay 2000, pp. 187–188.
2649:Donnelly 2004, pp. 88–89.
1810:
1737:, C-in-C Fighter Command.
1349:Attack on 13 August 1940
1105:Background: early battles
1061:. Hitler now ordered the
972:Battle of the Netherlands
930:The essential target was
266:
167:
130:
95:
55:
44:
32:
25:
4313:. Oxford: Osprey. 1997.
3545:Mason 1969, pp. 239–240.
3461:Mason 1969, pp. 238–239.
2972:Mason 1969, pp. 236–237.
2694:Mason 1969, pp. 240–243.
2530:
2298:insisted on such raids.
1937:fighter station and the
1780:Command Headquarters at
840:Unternehmen Adlerangriff
4311:Stukageschwader 1937–41
4196:. Grub Street, London.
3905:. Allan; London. 1975.
3766:Overy 1980, pp. 34, 36.
3721:Bungay 2000, pp. 68–69.
3305:Bungay 2000, pp. 61–69.
2954:Hooton 1994, pp. 19–20.
2773:Parker 2000, pp. 98–99.
1995:and other airfields in
1720:RAF operational command
1708:Sturzkampfgeschwader 77
1077:was to eliminate enemy
4232:The Air War, 1939–1945
3694:Terraine 1985, p. 186.
3583:Saunders 2013, p. 212.
3574:Saunders 2013, p. 211.
3341:James 2000, pp. 71–73.
2891:James 2000, pp. 49–62.
2819:Hooton 1997, p. 17–18.
2169:
2106:
1984:
1829:
1755:air officer commanding
1738:
1713:RAF Warmwell/Portland
1680:Sturzkampfgeschwader 2
1665:Sturzkampfgeschwader 1
1587:Sturzkampfgeschwader 3
1209:
1163:were to be destroyed.
1151:and radar stations at
1008:High Command) and the
912:s commander-in-chief,
203:c. 25 civilians killed
131:Commanders and leaders
4292:Messerschmitt Bf 110
4220:. Birlinn Ltd. 2004.
4080:The Battle of Britain
4034:The Battle of Britain
3160:de Zeng 2010, p. 100.
2221:Robert J. O. Compston
2167:
2104:
1974:
1823:
1801:British Modified Grid
1733:
1240:Joseph "Beppo" Schmid
1207:
508:Battle of Britain Day
168:Casualties and losses
4145:Mackay, Ron (2003).
4126:Mackay, Ron (2001).
4109:Messerschmitt Bf 110
4107:Mackay, Ron (2000).
3990:Dornier 17: In Focus
3784:Bungay 2000, p. 379.
3748:Parker 2000, p. 309.
3730:Bungay 2000, p. 298.
3712:Parker 2000, p. 311.
3676:Bishop 2010, p. 179.
3601:Dierich 1975, p. 39.
3554:Warner 2005, p. 258.
3332:Collier 1980, p. 51.
3323:Bungay 2000, p. 192.
3314:Parker 2000, p. 123.
3291:Parker 2000, p. 117.
3228:Bungay 2000, p. 208.
2963:Ray 2009, pp. 46–47.
2755:Healy 2007, pp. 3–5.
2731:Bungay 2000, p. 210.
2637:Bungay 2000, p. 371.
2623:Bungay 2000, p. 211.
2595:Bungay 2000, p. 207.
2322:, Sperrle sent nine
2137:No. 609 Squadron RAF
1907:No. 257 Squadron RAF
1899:No. 238 Squadron RAF
1766:Royal Observer Corps
1448:Erprobungsgruppe 210
805:Defence of the Reich
286:The Heligoland Bight
4296:Aces of World War 2
4177:Murray, Willamson.
4165:Battle Over Britain
3975:The Fighting Me 109
3901:Dierich, Wolfgang.
3876:(hardcover), 2002,
3775:Hooton 1997, p. 38.
3703:Murray 1983, p. 54.
3649:Mason 1969, p. 243.
3628:Mason 1969, p. 242.
3619:Baker 1996, p. 113.
3592:Mason 1969, p. 240.
3536:Mason 1969, p. 237.
3527:Korda 2009, p. 167.
3500:Mason 1969, p. 239.
3422:Mason 1969, p. 241.
3359:Mason 1969, p. 238.
2936:Murray 1983, p. 47.
2927:Murray 1983, p. 51.
2855:Murray 1983, p. 44.
2837:Hooton 2010, p. 75.
2828:Parker 2000, p. 93.
2810:Murray 1983, p. 45.
2478:The failure of the
2300:No. 82 Squadron RAF
2246:Geschwaderkommodore
2209:No. 53 Squadron RAF
2189:No. 56 Squadron RAF
2090:Zerstörergeschwader
2037:Zerstörergeschwader
1887:No. 74 Squadron RAF
1839:Geschwaderkommodore
1625:Fleet Air Arm base
1354:German bomber unit
1350:
1265:RAF Coastal Command
932:RAF Fighter Command
883:Unternehmen Seelöwe
794:Strategic campaigns
397:Ypres–Comines Canal
219:at least 45 missing
208:39 severely damaged
51:An air battle, 1940
4214:Trevor-Roper, Hugh
4021:. Red Kite. 2000.
3963:. Red Kite. 2004.
3887:Collier, Richard.
3739:Murray 1983, p. 52
3667:James 2000, p. 79.
3640:James 2000, p. 80.
3509:James 2000, p. 77.
3368:James 2000, p. 73.
3237:James 2000, p. 74.
3142:Ward 2004, p. 105.
2918:James 2000, p. 71.
2909:James 2000, p. 70.
2882:James 2000, p. 45.
2873:James 2000, p. 43.
2864:James 2000, p. 17.
2518:Operation Overlord
2466:did not deter the
2170:
2107:
1985:
1830:
1782:RAF Bentley Priory
1739:
1691:area and airfields
1644:Kampfgeschwader 55
1620:Kampfgeschwader 54
1598:Kampfgeschwader 51
1539:Kampfgeschwader 27
1526:Kampfgeschwader 30
1512:Kampfgeschwader 26
1499:Kampfgeschwader 40
1435:Kampfgeschwader 53
1376:Kampfgeschwader 76
1348:
1269:RAF Bomber Command
1210:
1071:amphibious assault
1069:to prepare for an
962:Strategic overview
893:was required. The
879:Operation Sea Lion
820:Battle of Atlantic
189:RAF Bomber Command
180:1 fighter (ground)
4385:Battle of Britain
4334:978-1-85488-027-7
4319:978-1-85532-636-1
4304:978-1-85532-753-5
4285:978-1-86227-246-0
4271:978-0-340-41919-9
4254:978-0-7472-3452-4
4240:978-1-57488-716-7
4226:978-1-84341-014-0
4187:978-0-89875-797-2
4173:978-0-901928-00-9
4156:978-1-86126-576-0
4137:978-1-86126-431-2
4102:978-0-06-112535-5
4088:978-0-7146-8149-8
4074:James, T.C.G and
4070:978-1-86019-995-0
4056:978-1-86019-964-6
4042:978-1-84415-657-3
4027:978-0-9538061-0-2
4013:978-0-947554-82-8
3998:978-0-9546201-4-1
3983:978-1-85409-209-0
3969:978-0-9546201-2-7
3959:Donnelly, Larry.
3955:978-1-906537-08-1
3940:978-1-903223-87-1
3925:978-1-85780-279-5
3911:978-0-7110-0601-0
3882:978-1-85410-801-2
3874:978-1-85410-721-3
3857:978-0-7067-0168-5
3840:978-1-84916-989-9
3825:978-0-7126-6475-2
3658:Goss 2000, p. 80.
3518:Weal 2000. p. 54.
3491:Weal 1999, p. 47.
3395:Goss 2005, p. 60.
3174:Goss 2000, p. 79.
2797:978-1-85410-721-3
2458:Battle of Britain
2343:Gruppenkommandeur
2331:strategic bombing
2191:intercepted, but
2129:intercepted. One
2066:RAF Middle Wallop
1944:Bristol Blenheims
1860:Albert Kesselring
1747:Air Chief Marshal
1717:
1716:
1658:RAF Middle Wallop
1488:Kampfgeschwader 4
1422:Kampfgeschwader 3
1393:Kampfgeschwader 2
1363:Kampfgeschwader 1
1043:Battle of Dunkirk
976:Battle of Belgium
858:Battle of Britain
828:
827:
223:
222:
195:24 aircrew killed
178:13 fighters (air)
154:Albert Kesselring
91:
90:
4417:
4367:
4366:
4365:
4355:
4354:
4353:
4346:
4244:Parker, Mathew.
4230:Overy, Richard.
4192:Saunders, Andy.
4163:Mason, Francis.
4160:
4141:
4122:
4092:Korda, Michael.
3803:
3800:
3794:
3791:
3785:
3782:
3776:
3773:
3767:
3764:
3758:
3755:
3749:
3746:
3740:
3737:
3731:
3728:
3722:
3719:
3713:
3710:
3704:
3701:
3695:
3692:
3686:
3683:
3677:
3674:
3668:
3665:
3659:
3656:
3650:
3647:
3641:
3638:
3629:
3626:
3620:
3617:
3611:
3608:
3602:
3599:
3593:
3590:
3584:
3581:
3575:
3572:
3566:
3561:
3555:
3552:
3546:
3543:
3537:
3534:
3528:
3525:
3519:
3516:
3510:
3507:
3501:
3498:
3492:
3489:
3483:
3477:
3471:
3468:
3462:
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2853:
2847:
2846:Bungay 2000 p124
2844:
2838:
2835:
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2826:
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2817:
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2808:
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2801:
2780:
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2661:
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2647:
2638:
2635:
2624:
2621:
2596:
2593:
2569:
2566:
2554:
2550:
2544:
2541:
2447:Second World War
2441:Overclaiming in
2367:Northern Ireland
2237:Heathrow Airport
2231:South East raids
2225:No. 11 Group RAF
2193:Erprobungsgruppe
2181:Erprobungsgruppe
2160:Ju 87 operations
2127:No. 10 Group RAF
2032:Portland Harbour
1961:prisoners of war
1957:killed in action
1854:airfield on the
1561:Lehrgeschwader 1
1455:Radar Stations;
1351:
1347:
1309:
1293:
1292:
1281:
1057:rejected by the
1031:Battle of France
1023:Unternehmen Gelb
980:Battle of France
911:
875:Directive No. 16
657:Atlantic Pockets
261:
257:Western Front of
249:
242:
235:
226:
225:
193:11 bombers (air)
126:
122:
120:
119:
108:
106:
105:
57:
56:
49:
23:
22:
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4374:
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4363:
4361:
4351:
4349:
4341:
4339:
4202:978-1908-117359
4157:
4138:
4119:
3862:Bungay, Stephen
3811:
3806:
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3788:
3783:
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2850:
2845:
2841:
2836:
2832:
2827:
2823:
2818:
2814:
2809:
2805:
2798:
2784:Bungay, Stephen
2781:
2777:
2772:
2768:
2763:
2759:
2754:
2750:
2742:
2735:
2730:
2707:
2702:
2698:
2693:
2689:
2684:
2673:
2668:
2664:
2657:
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2648:
2641:
2636:
2627:
2622:
2599:
2594:
2587:
2583:
2578:
2573:
2572:
2567:
2563:
2558:
2557:
2551:
2547:
2542:
2538:
2533:
2462:The failure of
2460:
2439:
2433:
2420:
2418:Effect of raids
2415:
2335:Castle Bromwich
2316:
2241:Heinkel He 111s
2233:
2217:First World War
2162:
2099:
2097:Renewed attacks
2026:. At 05:50, 88
1969:
1872:located in the
1856:Isle of Sheppey
1818:
1813:
1728:
1722:
1702:
1634:RAF Farnborough
1567:RAF Worthy Down
1482:
1441:RAF North Weald
1416:
1369:RAF Biggin Hill
1343:
1331:Main articles:
1329:
1324:
1323:
1322:
1321:
1320:
1310:
1302:
1301:
1294:
1290:
1279:
1234:order of battle
1202:
1197:
1116:English Channel
1107:
998:Polish Campaign
988:by Britain and
982:
966:Main articles:
964:
959:
915:Reichsmarschall
909:
887:air superiority
873:) a directive (
854:Royal Air Force
831:
830:
829:
824:
551:St Nazaire Raid
503:The Hardest Day
370:Fort Eben-Emael
356:Rotterdam Blitz
314:The Netherlands
262:
258:
255:
253:
218:
216:
214:
209:
207:
202:
200:
198:
196:
194:
192:
187:
181:
179:
177:
174:Fighter Command
160:
156:
152:
143:
139:
117:
115:
103:
101:
87:British victory
79:
77:English Channel
50:
17:
12:
11:
5:
4423:
4413:
4412:
4407:
4402:
4397:
4392:
4387:
4372:
4371:
4359:
4357:United Kingdom
4338:
4337:
4322:
4307:
4288:
4273:
4259:Terraine, John
4256:
4242:
4228:
4211:
4204:
4190:
4175:
4161:
4155:
4147:Heinkel He 111
4142:
4136:
4123:
4117:
4104:
4090:
4076:Cox, Sebastian
4072:
4058:
4044:
4030:
4015:
4001:
3986:
3971:
3957:
3943:
3928:
3913:
3899:
3885:
3859:
3842:
3828:
3812:
3810:
3807:
3805:
3804:
3795:
3786:
3777:
3768:
3759:
3750:
3741:
3732:
3723:
3714:
3705:
3696:
3687:
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3669:
3660:
3651:
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3630:
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3612:
3603:
3594:
3585:
3576:
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3547:
3538:
3529:
3520:
3511:
3502:
3493:
3484:
3472:
3463:
3454:
3445:
3436:
3424:
3415:
3406:
3397:
3388:
3379:
3370:
3361:
3352:
3343:
3334:
3325:
3316:
3307:
3293:
3284:
3275:
3266:
3257:
3248:
3239:
3230:
3212:
3203:
3194:
3185:
3176:
3162:
3153:
3144:
3132:
3123:
3114:
3102:
3093:
3084:
3075:
3066:
3057:
3048:
3036:
3027:
3018:
3009:
3000:
2986:
2974:
2965:
2956:
2947:
2938:
2929:
2920:
2911:
2902:
2893:
2884:
2875:
2866:
2857:
2848:
2839:
2830:
2821:
2812:
2803:
2796:
2775:
2766:
2757:
2748:
2733:
2705:
2696:
2687:
2671:
2662:
2651:
2639:
2625:
2597:
2584:
2582:
2579:
2577:
2574:
2571:
2570:
2560:
2559:
2556:
2555:
2545:
2535:
2534:
2532:
2529:
2459:
2456:
2443:aerial warfare
2435:Main article:
2432:
2429:
2419:
2416:
2414:
2411:
2360:Queen's Island
2315:
2312:
2288:Charles Portal
2266:Short Stirling
2262:Short Brothers
2251:Wing Commander
2232:
2229:
2161:
2158:
2098:
2095:
2080:(FAA) base at
2044:Jagdgeschwader
2028:Junkers Ju 87s
2016:Junkers Ju 88s
1987:Most units of
1968:
1965:
1865:Observer Corps
1844:Oberstleutnant
1834:Dornier Do 17s
1826:Dornier Do 17s
1817:
1814:
1812:
1809:
1797:Bletchley Park
1743:Dowding System
1724:Main article:
1721:
1718:
1715:
1714:
1711:
1704:
1703:
1701:
1700:
1695:
1692:
1685:
1683:
1675:
1674:
1668:
1661:
1660:
1647:
1640:
1639:
1623:
1616:
1615:
1614:radar station
1601:
1594:
1593:
1590:
1583:
1582:
1564:
1557:
1556:
1542:
1535:
1534:
1529:
1522:
1521:
1519:Linton-on-Ouse
1517:RAF Dishforth/
1515:
1508:
1507:
1502:
1495:
1494:
1491:
1484:
1483:
1481:
1480:
1477:
1472:
1467:
1452:
1450:
1444:
1443:
1438:
1431:
1430:
1428:RAF Eastchurch
1425:
1418:
1417:
1415:
1414:
1409:
1407:RAF Eastchurch
1404:
1402:RAF Hornchurch
1398:
1396:
1389:
1388:
1379:
1372:
1371:
1366:
1359:
1358:
1355:
1328:
1325:
1311:
1304:
1303:
1295:
1288:
1287:
1286:
1285:
1284:
1218:Enigma machine
1201:
1198:
1196:
1190:
1126:Gross register
1106:
1103:
1016:Western Europe
963:
960:
958:
955:
919:Hermann Göring
826:
825:
823:
822:
817:
812:
807:
802:
791:
790:
785:
780:
775:
770:
765:
760:
755:
750:
745:
744:
743:
729:
722:
715:
714:
713:
708:
696:
689:
682:
675:
660:
659:
654:
649:
644:
637:
632:
627:
620:
615:
613:HĂĽrtgen Forest
610:
603:
598:
596:Siegfried Line
593:
586:
579:
572:
561:
560:
559:
558:
553:
546:Commando Raids
543:
541:Baedeker Blitz
538:
531:
518:
517:
510:
505:
500:
495:
482:
481:
480:
479:
469:
462:
457:
452:
451:
450:
438:
433:
428:
423:
418:
413:
400:
399:
394:
389:
384:
377:
372:
359:
358:
353:
348:
346:The Grebbeberg
343:
338:
333:
328:
323:
310:
309:
296:
295:
288:
283:
278:
267:
264:
263:
252:
251:
244:
237:
229:
221:
220:
204:
184:fighter pilots
170:
169:
165:
164:
150:Hermann Göring
147:
145:Charles Portal
133:
132:
128:
127:
112:
110:United Kingdom
98:
97:
93:
92:
89:
88:
85:
81:
80:
71:
69:
65:
64:
63:13 August 1940
61:
53:
52:
42:
41:
30:
29:
21:
20:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4422:
4411:
4408:
4406:
4403:
4401:
4398:
4396:
4393:
4391:
4388:
4386:
4383:
4382:
4380:
4370:
4360:
4358:
4348:
4347:
4344:
4335:
4331:
4327:
4323:
4320:
4316:
4312:
4308:
4305:
4301:
4297:
4293:
4289:
4286:
4282:
4278:
4274:
4272:
4268:
4264:
4260:
4257:
4255:
4251:
4247:
4243:
4241:
4237:
4233:
4229:
4227:
4223:
4219:
4215:
4212:
4209:
4205:
4203:
4199:
4195:
4191:
4188:
4184:
4180:
4176:
4174:
4170:
4166:
4162:
4158:
4152:
4148:
4143:
4139:
4133:
4129:
4128:Junkers Ju 88
4124:
4120:
4118:1-86126-313-9
4114:
4110:
4105:
4103:
4099:
4095:
4091:
4089:
4085:
4081:
4077:
4073:
4071:
4067:
4063:
4060:Hooton, E.R.
4059:
4057:
4053:
4049:
4046:Hooton, E.R.
4045:
4043:
4039:
4035:
4031:
4028:
4024:
4020:
4016:
4014:
4010:
4006:
4003:Goss, Chris.
4002:
3999:
3995:
3991:
3987:
3984:
3980:
3976:
3972:
3970:
3966:
3962:
3958:
3956:
3952:
3948:
3944:
3941:
3937:
3933:
3929:
3926:
3922:
3918:
3914:
3912:
3908:
3904:
3900:
3898:
3897:0-460-04370-6
3894:
3890:
3886:
3883:
3879:
3875:
3871:
3867:
3863:
3860:
3858:
3854:
3850:
3846:
3843:
3841:
3837:
3833:
3830:Bishop, Ian.
3829:
3826:
3822:
3818:
3814:
3813:
3799:
3790:
3781:
3772:
3763:
3754:
3745:
3736:
3727:
3718:
3709:
3700:
3691:
3682:
3673:
3664:
3655:
3646:
3637:
3635:
3625:
3616:
3607:
3598:
3589:
3580:
3571:
3565:
3560:
3551:
3542:
3533:
3524:
3515:
3506:
3497:
3488:
3482:, p. 51.
3481:
3476:
3467:
3458:
3449:
3440:
3434:, p. 31.
3433:
3428:
3419:
3410:
3401:
3392:
3383:
3374:
3365:
3356:
3347:
3338:
3329:
3320:
3311:
3302:
3300:
3298:
3288:
3279:
3270:
3261:
3252:
3243:
3234:
3225:
3223:
3221:
3219:
3217:
3207:
3198:
3189:
3180:
3171:
3169:
3167:
3157:
3148:
3139:
3137:
3127:
3118:
3109:
3107:
3097:
3088:
3079:
3070:
3061:
3052:
3043:
3041:
3031:
3022:
3013:
3004:
2995:
2993:
2991:
2981:
2979:
2969:
2960:
2951:
2942:
2933:
2924:
2915:
2906:
2897:
2888:
2879:
2870:
2861:
2852:
2843:
2834:
2825:
2816:
2807:
2799:
2793:
2789:
2785:
2779:
2770:
2761:
2752:
2746:, p. 71.
2745:
2740:
2738:
2728:
2726:
2724:
2722:
2720:
2718:
2716:
2714:
2712:
2710:
2700:
2691:
2682:
2680:
2678:
2676:
2666:
2660:
2655:
2646:
2644:
2634:
2632:
2630:
2620:
2618:
2616:
2614:
2612:
2610:
2608:
2606:
2604:
2602:
2592:
2590:
2585:
2565:
2561:
2549:
2540:
2536:
2528:
2526:
2523:
2519:
2515:
2514:
2509:
2508:
2502:
2497:
2495:
2490:
2485:
2481:
2476:
2473:
2469:
2465:
2455:
2452:
2448:
2444:
2438:
2428:
2426:
2410:
2408:
2404:
2400:
2396:
2392:
2389:, Liverpool,
2388:
2384:
2380:
2376:
2372:
2368:
2365:
2361:
2357:
2353:
2349:
2348:
2344:
2340:
2336:
2332:
2328:
2326:
2321:
2311:
2309:
2305:
2301:
2297:
2293:
2289:
2284:
2282:
2278:
2274:
2270:
2267:
2263:
2258:
2256:
2255:Alois Stoeckl
2252:
2248:
2247:
2242:
2238:
2228:
2226:
2222:
2218:
2214:
2213:Group Captain
2210:
2206:
2202:
2198:
2194:
2190:
2186:
2182:
2178:
2176:
2166:
2157:
2154:
2150:
2145:
2140:
2138:
2134:
2133:
2128:
2123:
2120:
2116:
2112:
2111:Boscombe Down
2103:
2094:
2091:
2085:
2083:
2079:
2078:Fleet Air Arm
2075:
2070:
2067:
2063:
2059:
2055:
2051:
2047:
2045:
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1759:Major General
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1236:deployments.
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1027:Manstein Plan
1024:
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1007:
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994:Western Front
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891:air supremacy
888:
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652:Colmar Pocket
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607:Market Garden
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307:Schuster Line
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162:Joseph Schmid
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35:Western Front
31:
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4295:
4291:
4290:Weal, John.
4276:
4275:Ward, John.
4262:
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4146:
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4004:
3989:
3988:Goss, Chris.
3974:
3973:Feist, Uwe.
3960:
3946:
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3916:
3902:
3888:
3865:
3848:
3831:
3816:
3809:Bibliography
3798:
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2493:
2488:
2483:
2479:
2477:
2471:
2467:
2463:
2461:
2450:
2440:
2431:Overclaiming
2424:
2421:
2374:
2345:
2342:
2324:
2319:
2317:
2296:Air Ministry
2285:
2271:. The RAF's
2269:heavy bomber
2259:
2244:
2234:
2227:in any way.
2192:
2180:
2179:
2174:
2171:
2152:
2148:
2141:
2130:
2124:
2108:
2089:
2086:
2071:
2062:RAF Tangmere
2058:RAF Northolt
2043:
2036:
2012:Hugo Sperrle
2007:
2005:
1988:
1986:
1980:
1953:Adolph Malan
1949:
1938:
1933:
1931:
1903:RAF Warmwell
1870:
1848:Joachim Huth
1842:
1838:
1831:
1805:
1786:
1776:
1770:
1751:Hugh Dowding
1740:
1735:Hugh Dowding
1678:I., and II./
1671:RAF Warmwell
1470:RAF Hawkinge
1344:
1316:
1315:, commanded
1313:Hugo Sperrle
1297:
1276:
1272:
1260:
1257:
1247:
1243:
1238:
1221:
1213:
1211:
1200:Intelligence
1195:preparations
1192:
1185:
1181:
1178:
1173:
1141:RAF Hawkinge
1132:
1130:
1119:
1110:
1108:
1099:Adlerangriff
1098:
1094:
1090:
1086:
1083:Kriegsmarine
1082:
1074:
1067:Kriegsmarine
1066:
1062:
1055:
1046:
1037:forces. The
1022:
1020:
1009:
1005:
1001:
996:. After the
986:Nazi Germany
983:
950:
947:Adlerangriff
946:
942:
940:
935:
929:
922:
913:
906:
894:
882:
868:
866:
861:
847:
844:Nazi Germany
839:
834:
833:
832:
793:
792:
739:
732:
725:
718:
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692:
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678:
671:
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483:
465:
446:
402:
401:
380:
361:
360:
312:
311:
298:
297:
290:
268:
259:World War II
158:Hugo Sperrle
137:Hugh Dowding
96:Belligerents
39:World War II
33:Part of the
26:
18:
3884:(paperback)
3845:Bond, Brian
3480:Mackay 2000
3432:Mackay 2001
2744:Mackay 2003
2354:across the
2325:Kampfgruppe
2314:Night raids
2292:Scandinavia
2201:RAF Detling
2144:Southampton
2119:RAF Andover
2115:Worthy Down
2074:RAF Croydon
1762:E B Ashmore
1631:RAF Croydon
1579:RAF Detling
1571:Southampton
1569:/ Ports of
1475:RAF Manston
1412:RAF Manston
1091:Luftwaffe's
1035:French Army
693:Blockbuster
601:Netherlands
556:Dieppe Raid
351:Afsluitdijk
276:River Forth
4379:Categories
4078:(editor).
2576:References
2339:Birmingham
2205:Folkestone
2175:Geschwader
2024:RAF Odiham
2008:Luftflotte
1993:RAF Kenley
1989:Luftflotte
1934:Geschwader
1911:Canterbury
1852:Eastchurch
1824:KG 2 flew
1773:Chain Home
1637:RAF Odiham
1604:RAF Bibury
1575:Portsmouth
1550:Birkenhead
1479:RAF Kenley
1385:RAF Debden
1382:RAF Kenley
1317:Luftflotte
1298:Luftflotte
1165:Portsmouth
1121:Kanalkampf
1045:, but the
957:Background
903:Home Fleet
899:Royal Navy
700:Lumberjack
570:Baby Blitz
535:Donnerkeil
493:Kanalkampf
416:Montcornet
321:Maastricht
300:Luxembourg
270:Phoney War
217:23 wounded
197:9 captured
141:Keith Park
4294:ZerstĹŤrer
2581:Citations
2513:Wehrmacht
2501:Luftwaffe
2494:Luftwaffe
2489:Luftwaffe
2484:Luftwaffe
2480:Luftwaffe
2472:Luftwaffe
2468:Luftwaffe
2451:Luftwaffe
2413:Aftermath
2399:Edinburgh
2391:Sheffield
2356:Irish Sea
2347:Hauptmann
2197:Rochester
2153:Luftwaffe
2048:(JG 27),
1959:and nine
1939:Luftwaffe
1816:KG 2 raid
1793:Y Service
1777:Luftwaffe
1710:(StG 77)
1554:Liverpool
1544:Ports of
1277:Luftwaffe
1261:Luftwaffe
1248:Luftwaffe
1244:Abteilung
1230:Y service
1222:Luftwaffe
1220:and poor
1214:Adlertag.
1193:Luftwaffe
1182:Luftwaffe
1137:Liverpool
1133:Luftwaffe
1111:Luftwaffe
1095:Luftwaffe
1079:air power
1075:Luftwaffe
1063:Luftwaffe
1049:captured
1047:Wehrmacht
1006:Luftwaffe
907:Luftwaffe
895:Luftwaffe
870:Wehrmacht
849:Luftwaffe
800:The Blitz
783:Nuremberg
778:Heilbronn
763:Frankfurt
748:Paderborn
726:Undertone
679:Veritable
672:Blackcock
564:1944–1945
521:1941–1943
455:Abbeville
336:Rotterdam
331:The Hague
215:44 killed
4369:Aviation
2786:(2000).
2525:Red Army
2464:Adlertag
2425:Adlertag
2407:Balcombe
2403:Aberdeen
2375:Adlertag
2352:Brittany
2320:Adlertag
2185:Southend
1981:Adlertag
1689:Portland
1682:(StG 2)
1667:(StG 1)
1650:Plymouth
1646:(KG 55)
1622:(KG 54)
1610:harbour/
1608:Spithead
1600:(KG 51)
1589:(StG 3)
1541:(KG 27)
1528:(KG 30)
1514:(KG 26)
1501:(KG 40)
1461:Pevensey
1437:(KG 53)
1378:(KG 76)
1273:Adlertag
1255:at all.
1186:Adlertag
1174:Adlertag
1153:Pevensey
1081:and the
951:Adlertag
943:Adlertag
936:Adlertag
921:and the
862:Adlertag
835:Adlertag
768:WĂĽrzburg
647:2nd Alps
641:Nordwind
583:Chastity
576:Overlord
528:Cerberus
514:Sea Lion
498:Adlertag
472:1st Alps
431:Boulogne
387:Gembloux
292:Wikinger
68:Location
27:Adlertag
4343:Portals
2395:Norwich
2387:Swansea
2383:Cardiff
2379:Bristol
2371:Glasgow
2364:Belfast
2308:Denmark
2304:Aalborg
2281:No. 249
2277:No. 234
2149:Gruppen
2132:Staffel
2082:Gosport
1915:No. 601
1883:No. 111
1879:No. 151
1877:06:15.
1654:Feltham
1627:Gosport
1612:Ventnor
1563:(LG 1)
1546:Bristol
1490:(KG 4)
1424:(KG 3)
1395:(KG 2)
1365:(KG 1)
1357:Target
1169:Ventnor
1149:Manston
788:Hamburg
758:TF Baum
740:Varsity
733:Plunder
711:Cologne
706:Remagen
686:Grenade
664:Germany
630:Scheldt
590:Dragoon
486:Britain
441:Dunkirk
363:Belgium
341:Zeeland
124:Germany
73:England
4332:
4317:
4302:
4283:
4269:
4252:
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3981:
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3938:
3923:
3909:
3895:
3880:
3872:
3855:
3838:
3823:
2794:
2522:Soviet
2294:, the
1895:No. 43
1891:No. 85
1874:Amiens
1811:Battle
1753:, the
1698:Yeovil
1339:, and
1184:began
1145:Lympne
1118:. The
990:France
978:, and
773:Kassel
719:Gisela
618:Aachen
447:Dynamo
436:Calais
421:Saumur
404:France
392:La Lys
375:Hannut
199:Other:
186:killed
121:
107:
84:Result
2531:Notes
2507:Blitz
2273:No. 3
2050:JG 53
2001:Essex
1465:Dover
1280:'
1271:. On
1253:radar
1226:Ultra
1161:Dover
1051:Paris
910:'
635:Bulge
624:Queen
466:Paula
460:Lille
426:Arras
411:Sedan
381:David
211:circa
4330:ISBN
4315:ISBN
4300:ISBN
4281:ISBN
4267:ISBN
4250:ISBN
4236:ISBN
4222:ISBN
4198:ISBN
4183:ISBN
4169:ISBN
4151:ISBN
4132:ISBN
4113:ISBN
4098:ISBN
4084:ISBN
4066:ISBN
4052:ISBN
4038:ISBN
4023:ISBN
4019:KG55
4009:ISBN
3994:ISBN
3979:ISBN
3965:ISBN
3951:ISBN
3936:ISBN
3921:ISBN
3907:ISBN
3893:ISBN
3878:ISBN
3870:ISBN
3853:ISBN
3836:ISBN
3821:ISBN
2792:ISBN
2505:The
2401:and
2219:ace
2113:and
2064:and
2054:JG 3
2052:and
1999:and
1997:Kent
1977:LG 1
1925:and
1897:and
1749:Sir
1267:and
1159:and
1087:Heer
1065:and
945:and
753:Ruhr
326:Mill
281:Saar
75:and
60:Date
2327:100
1919:213
1457:Rye
1157:Rye
1101:).
901:'s
889:or
846:'s
37:of
4381::
4261:.
4216:.
3864:.
3847:.
3633:^
3296:^
3215:^
3165:^
3135:^
3105:^
3039:^
2989:^
2977:^
2736:^
2708:^
2674:^
2642:^
2628:^
2600:^
2588:^
2397:,
2393:,
2385:,
2381:,
2362:,
2337:,
2306:,
2279:,
2257:.
2253:)
2117:.
2060:,
2046:27
1963:.
1927:87
1923:64
1921:,
1917:,
1905:.
1893:,
1858:.
1573:,
1463:,
1459:,
1335:,
1319:3.
1300:2.
1176:.
1155:,
1147:,
1143:,
1018:.
974:,
970:,
182:3
4345::
4336:.
4321:.
4306:.
4287:.
4189:.
4159:.
4140:.
4121:.
4029:.
4000:.
3985:.
3942:.
3927:.
3827:.
2800:.
2249:(
2039:2
1983:.
1656:/
1652:/
1629:/
1606:/
1552:/
1548:/
1004:(
881:(
248:e
241:t
234:v
191::
176::
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