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201:, for use over Europe. This radar provided a significant advantage to the RAF over the older systems used by the Germans, and for the first time the RAF was able to seriously disrupt German night fighter operations by attacking them directly. Aircraft that did survive reported that there was no warning of the attack, and it was quickly surmised that the RAF had introduced a new microwave AI radar. This led to the rapid introduction of the Naxos ZR, tuned to the Mk. VIII's frequency and equipped with rearward facing antennas.
244:(fly) semi-parabolic system was introduced. This had the distinct disadvantage that it was not waterproof and had to be removed from its mounting and taken inside in order to dive. Even with this antenna, warning times were on the order of one minute. An even later version, Naxos ZM, spun the antenna at 1,300 RPM to display the angle directly on a
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aircraft carrying one were shot down and recovered, there was a very good chance the block would survive, at which point the secret would be revealed to anyone familiar with microwave techniques. This is precisely what occurred on the night of 2/3 February 1943, when the second mission to attempt to use H2S led to one of the
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system. Oboe broadcast pulses from the aircraft that needed to be powerful enough to be received by ground stations in the UK. This made them relatively easy to pick out at short ranges, as long as the receiver was tuned to a suitable frequency. When such a signal was detected, false pulses identical
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systems used traditional vacuum tube electronics and were limited to about 1.5 m wavelength in UK use, and as low as 50 cm in German systems. Both could receive the transmissions of their opposing radar systems and radar warning receivers were widely used by both sides in a number of roles.
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aircraft for anti-submarine duties, where the possibility of capture was remote. However, Bomber
Command fought this decision and by the time deliveries started late in the year they received all of the units. This was reconsidered once again when it was becoming clear the U-boats had been equipped
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on 2 September 1943. The unit, and others that were delivered during this time, proved extremely difficult to keep working. Even when they did work, their angle accuracy was limited, and it did not provide elevation or range information of any sort. Operators found it useful for finding the bomber
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Before the magnetron had been deployed operationally, there was a great debate in the UK over whether or not Bomber
Command should be allowed to use it. Unlike other types of tube electronics of the era, which are quite fragile, the main component of the magnetron is a large block of copper. If an
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News of the device made its way to
England, where some level of panic broke out when it was suggested that the H2S could be leading to the aircraft's demise. Arguments over the use of H2S by bomber command started anew. These were finally put to rest in July 1944 when a Naxos-equipped Ju 88 night
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offices in Berlin on 22 February. Although the possibility of developing radars using it was considered, the much more pressing need was the development of countermeasures to this now-undetectable radar. This effect was hampered by the industry's recent decision to give up on microwave research,
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system's rotating antenna for airborne use was driven by a DC motor, and comprised what appear to be a pair of vacuum tubes laid flat on a circular rotating carriage, which would be enclosed within a radome of either hemispherical shape for single-engine fighter use, or in a more aerodynamic
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for bomber guidance. None of the existing German receivers could operate at the magnetron's 10 cm wavelength, and the introduction of the ASV Mk. III, in particular, led to significant losses among the U-boat fleet during the summer of 1943.
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and German submarines were told to remain on the surface and fight it out in daylight rather than risk almost certain death at night. This led to a crash program to equip their fleet with a variation of Naxos that could detect the new radar.
221:, as they could be seen disappearing on the radar as the aircraft approached, and this was put to fearsome use in early 1943. A new agreement was reached where Coastal and Bomber Command would split the deliveries about 65/35.
162:, which was the only system able to reliably detect these high frequency signals. Enormous effort was expended to address these problems, and prototype units were available by the summer.
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to those received from the aircraft were re-broadcast from the ground. Stations in the UK thus received two or more signals for every signal they sent out, which confused the detectors.
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The naval version of Naxos was used by U-boats to detect aircraft carrying ASV Mk. III radars, which had been developed from the H2S equipment. This U-boat is equipped with the
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Although Naxos was useful against ASV Mk. III, by 1944 the
British and US were already well on their way to introducing newer magnetron-based radar systems, like the American
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systems began reaching service in early 1943, the effects were profound. Once again
British aircraft could attack submarines with no warning until the last seconds when the
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The resulting Naxos U initially proved to have very short detection range, too short to be really useful. This led to a series of new antenna designs before the final
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considering it to be a dead-end, as had
British engineers before the introduction of the magnetron. Adding to their problems was the lack of a suitable rugged
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Given the concerns over the possibility of losing a magnetron to the
Germans, for some time through the summer of 1942 the RAF limited future deliveries to
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An attempt to address the limited resolution of Naxos was undertaken in the Korfu, which had a better antenna system and more sensitive receiver.
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fighter became lost and landed in the UK. The crew described the operation of Naxos as being of little overall use, while another device,
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was illuminated, far too late for the submarine to take defensive action. A new phase started where
British aircraft pressed into the
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LuftArchiv.de's Naxos description in German, under "Passive Nacht-Zielsuchgeräte - Telefunken FuG 350 Z »Naxos Z«" description
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were being introduced to service just as Naxos was being fitted. As a result, Naxos never had as great a success as the
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stream, at ranges as great as 35 kilometres (22 mi), but could not use it to home in on individual aircraft. The
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281:. Some effort was made to develop this into an airborne version, FuG 351 Corfu Z, but this never entered service.
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By 1942, the UK had made enough progress on the magnetron to begin introducing new radars using it, including the
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Experiments with a ground-based version of Naxos using directional antennas had been carried out under the name
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When it was clear that the magnetron was known to the
Germans, the RAF released its night fighter version,
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radar. Monica was removed from service and H2S was allowed to continue throughout the war.
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display in the submarine. This was still under development when the war ended.
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150:(gadget, or device) led to the rapid formation of a study group to exploit it.
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180:"teardrop" shape for placement atop a twin-engined night fighter's canopy.
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Naxos receivers were also combined with the parabolic antennas from
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A Radar
History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives
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system. The system later used a Domeyer receiver and became the
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systems to produce a long-range receiver tuned to the British
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Altogether, about 700 Naxos Z and ZR's were produced.
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129:for sea-surface search (anti-submarine) and the
398:Military equipment introduced from 1940 to 1944
255:, operating at even higher frequencies in the
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190:was able to home in on individual aircraft's
217:with some sort of detector for the existing
82:, offering early warning of the approach of
54:. Introduced in September 1943, it replaced
319:bombing radar immune to detection from the
142:bombers carrying it being shot down near
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146:. The magnetron was recovered and this
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16:Radar warning receiver in World War II
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170:The first operational use was in a
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109:Prior to the introduction of the
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388:World War II German electronics
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360:Publishing. pp. 315–316.
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50:microwave radar produced by a
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153:The group first met at the
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46:German countermeasure to
224:When the first of these
393:Radar warning receivers
40:radar warning receiver
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352:Brown, Louis (1999).
259:. The first of these
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358:Institute of Physics
125:for night fighters,
84:RAF Coastal Command
273:Other developments
91:ASV Mark III radar
74:aircraft, and the
72:RAF Bomber Command
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323:detecting device.
261:ASV Mk. VI radars
226:ASV Mk. III radar
199:AI Mk. VIII radar
127:ASV Mk. III radar
123:AI Mk. VIII radar
99:AI Mk. VIII radar
93:. A later model,
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296:radio navigation
246:cathode ray tube
219:ASV Mk. II radar
160:crystal detector
111:cavity magnetron
52:cavity magnetron
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87:patrol aircraft
60:FuG 350 Naxos Z
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257:3 cm band
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89:equipped with
76:FuMB 7 Naxos U
66:to home in on
64:night fighters
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44:World War II
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230:Leigh light
70:carried by
382:Categories
356:. London:
328:References
155:Telefunken
105:Background
68:H2S radars
187:Flensburg
144:Rotterdam
131:H2S radar
31:antennas.
307:See also
95:Naxos ZR
300:Naxburg
177:Naxos Z
80:U-boats
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317:X-band
242:Fliege
192:Monica
48:S band
42:was a
25:Fliege
321:Naxos
279:Corfu
266:Metox
115:radar
56:Metox
37:Naxos
29:Tunis
362:ISBN
293:Oboe
78:for
35:The
27:and
313:H2X
253:H2X
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113:,
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