1578:
2644:, at least in deliberative settings. The argument is that cycling ensures that parties that lose to a majority have an interest to remain part of the group's process, because any decision can easily be overturned by another majority. Furthermore, suppose a minority wishes to overturn a decision. In that case, under majority rule it just needs to form a coalition that has more than half of the officials involved and that will give it power. Under supermajority rules, a minority needs its own supermajority to overturn a decision.
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polarization and policy lurch, or it may encourage compromise, depending on other aspects of political culture. McGann argued that such cycling encourages participants to compromise, rather than pass resolutions that have the bare minimum required to "win" because of the likelihood that they would soon be reversed.
2682:
Where large changes in seats held by a party may arise from only relatively slight change in votes cast (such as under FPTP), and a simple majority is all that is required to wield power (most legislatures in democratic countries), governments may repeatedly fall into and out of power. This may cause
2686:
Within this atmosphere of compromise, a minority faction may accept proposals that it dislikes in order to build a coalition for a proposal that it deems of greater moment. In that way, majority rule differentiates weak and strong preferences. McGann argued that such situations encourage minorities
2591:
A super-majority rule actually empowers the minority, making it stronger (at least through its veto) than the majority. McGann argued that when only one of multiple minorities is protected by the super-majority rule (same as seen in simple plurality elections systems), so the protection is for the
2572:
can form. It is possible that alternatives a, b, and c exist such that a majority prefers a to b, another majority prefers b to c, and yet another majority prefers c to a. Because majority rule requires an alternative to have majority support to pass, majority rule is vulnerable to rejecting the
2406:
for different voters, and as a result "two voters who are casually interested in doing something" can defeat one voter who has "dire opposition" to the proposal of the two, leading to poor deliberative practice or even to "an aggressive culture and conflict"; however, the
2365:. This is often used in elections with more than two candidates. In these elections, the winning candidate is the one with the most votes after applying some voting procedure, even if a majority of voters would prefer some other candidate.
2678:
flourishes under majority rule and that under majority rule, participants always have to convince more than half the group, while under supermajoritarian rules participants might only need to persuade a minority (to prevent a change).
2461:
decision rule, in that majority rule does not let some votes count more than others or privilege an alternative by requiring fewer votes to pass. Formally, majority rule is the only decision rule that has the following properties:
2559:
and any option can be chosen through a sequence of votes, regardless of the original option. This means that adding more options and changing the order of votes ("agenda manipulation") can be used to arbitrarily pick the winner.
2290:
have argued the two can be reconciled in practice, with majority rule being a valid approximation to the utilitarian rule whenever voters share similarly-strong preferences. This position has found strong support in many
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Under some circumstances, the legal rights of one person cannot be guaranteed without unjustly imposing on someone else. McGann wrote, "one man's right to property in the antebellum South was another man's slavery."
2906:
We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a
Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare
2651:
to racial minorities. Saunders, while agreeing that majority rule may offer better protection than supermajority rules, argued that majority rule may nonetheless be of little help to the least minorities.
2687:
to participate, because majority rule does not typically create permanent losers, encouraging systemic stability. He pointed to governments that use largely unchecked majority rule, such as is seen under
2647:
To support the view that majority rule protects minority rights better than supermajority rules, McGann pointed to the cloture rule in the US Senate, which was used to prevent the extension of
3387:
1536:
2435:. However such requirement means that 41 percent of the members or more could prevent debate from being closed, an example where the majority will would be blocked by a minority.
1220:
2555:
If voter's preferences are defined over a multidimensional option space, then choosing options using pairwise majority rule is unstable. In most cases, there will be no
1239:
3152:(2007). "Majority Cycling and Agenda Manipulation: Richard McKelvey's Contributions and Legacy". In Aldrich, John Herbert; Alt, James E.; Lupia, Arthur (eds.).
2511:: If a voter changes a preference, MR never switches the outcome against that voter. If the outcome the voter now prefers would have won, it still does so.
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guarantees that majority-rule will tend to elect "compromise" or "consensus" candidates in many situations, unlike plurality-rules (see
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in general, take into account not just the number of voters who support each choice but also the intensity of their
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May, Kenneth O. (1952). "A Set of
Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision".
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where the question is yes or no are also generally decided by majority rule. It is one of the basic rules of
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Philosophers critical of majority rule have often argued that majority rule does not take into account the
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3156:. Analytical perspectives on politics. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. pp. 20–23.
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2503:: if the vote is tied, adding a single voter (who expresses an opinion) will break the tie.
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2013:
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2800:, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
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Majority rule is the most common social choice rule worldwide, being heavily used in
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2475:). Who casts a vote makes no difference; the voter's identity need not be disclosed.
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The Logic of
Democracy: Reconciling Equality, Deliberation, and Minority Protection
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2968:"The Tyranny of the Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities"
2692:
2659:
2615:
Voting theorists claimed that cycling leads to debilitating instability.
2454:
2055:
2020:
1923:
1911:
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147:
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Another possible way to prevent tyranny is to elevate certain rights as
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3014:"Consensus and direct democracy:Conceptual and empirical linkages"
3661:
2696:
2068:
1726:
1059:
3949:
2700:
2627:
is the only decision rule that guarantees economic efficiency.
2118:
2060:
1958:
1564:
571:
3209:"Democracy-as-Fairness: Justice, Equal Chances, and Lotteries"
2599:. Thereafter, any decision that targets such a right might be
27:
Decision rule that selects alternatives which have a majority
2247:), the option preferred by more than half of the voters (a
2592:
status quo, rather than for the faction that supports it.
2457:
proved that the simple majority rule is the only "fair"
2703:, as empirical evidence of majority rule's stability.
3331:
Moral minorities and the making of
American democracy
3177:
Przeworski, Adam; Maravall, JosĂ© MarĂa (2003-07-21).
2809:
2239:
which says that, when comparing two options (such as
3350:"Democratic redistribution and rule of the majority"
2471:: the decision rule treats each voter identically (
2349:One alternative to the majority rule is the set of
3295:
3274:
3176:
2640:McGann argued that majority rule helps to protect
2965:
2282:. Although the two rules can disagree in theory,
4030:
2630:
2345:Pie charts plurality (left) and majority (right)
3348:Corneo, Giacomo; Neher, Frank (December 2015).
2423:Parliamentary rules may prescribe the use of a
2314:decisions, e.g. whether or not to pass a bill.
2266:. The most common alternative is given by the
3422:
2921:
2427:under certain circumstances, such as the 60%
2204:
1600:
665:
3879:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
3389:Majority Decisions: Principles and Practices
3386:Novak, Stéphanie; Elster, Jon, eds. (2014).
3206:
2581:
3385:
3347:
3293:
3202:
3200:
3183:. Cambridge University Press. p. 223.
3429:
3415:
3144:
2538:is to honestly disclose their preferences.
2211:
2197:
1607:
1593:
672:
658:
3392:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3281:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3129:May's Theorem with an Infinite Population
2961:
2959:
2957:
2955:
2953:
2951:
2949:
2928:American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
2803:
2262:is one of two major competing notions of
3238:
3236:
3197:
3135:, 2004, Vol. 23, issue 2, pages 275–293.
2340:
3874:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
3652:Sequential proportional approval voting
2924:"Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare"
14:
4031:
3277:The theory of committees and elections
3242:
3018:European Journal of Political Research
3011:
2946:
2872:
2544:
2418:
3436:
3410:
3358:European Journal of Political Economy
3272:
3233:
3154:Positive Changes in Political Science
2922:Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John (2015).
2523:of two outcomes a voter prefers, not
2274:rules), which identify the spirit of
3328:
3121:
3069:"What's wrong with majority voting?"
3044:"An Anarchist Critique of Democracy"
2917:
2915:
2813:And the loser is... Plurality Voting
2792:
2790:
2788:
2753:No independence before majority rule
2635:
40:. For the political philosophy, see
30:For the Canadian comedy series, see
3684:Indirect single transferable voting
3333:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3092:
3086:
2973:. Center for the Study of Democracy
2563:
2519:: the decision rule relies only on
24:
3266:
2796:Ball, Terence and Antis Loizides,
2669:
2586:
2336:
711:
25:
4055:
2912:
2882:Journal of Mathematical Economics
2785:
2368:
2322:, as described in handbooks like
2079:Biology and political orientation
3249:. University of Michigan Press.
2551:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
2483:: the decision rule treats each
2443:
2280:equal consideration of interests
2180:
1576:
1563:
1551:
1499:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
1145:Semi-proportional representation
777:First preference plurality (FPP)
641:
3170:
3138:
2662:has noted the existence of the
2331:
625:Latin America and the Caribbean
3795:Mixed ballot transferable vote
3371:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.08.003
3061:
3036:
3005:
2866:
2810:Jean-François Laslier (2011).
2610:
2576:
2074:Theories of political behavior
1700:Political history of the world
1537:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
1494:Moulin's impossibility theorem
1459:Conflicting majorities paradox
13:
1:
3180:Democracy and the Rule of Law
2894:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006
2873:Pivato, Marcus (2015-08-01).
2779:
2631:Arguments against limitations
2438:
2089:Critique of political economy
1363:Frustrated majorities paradox
437:Democracy and economic growth
3996:Comparison of voting systems
3838:Satisfaction approval voting
3823:Single non-transferable vote
3642:Proportional approval voting
2431:rule to close debate in the
2393:cardinal social choice rules
1670:Outline of political science
1532:Condorcet dominance theorems
1472:Social and collective choice
630:Middle East and North Africa
497:Peaceful transition of power
7:
4039:Monotonic electoral systems
3602:Graduated majority judgment
3294:Farquharson, Robin (1969).
3243:McGann, Anthony J. (2006).
2706:
2689:proportional representation
1198:By mechanism of combination
969:Proportional representation
527:Proportional representation
10:
4060:
3854:Condorcet winner criterion
3545:First-past-the-post voting
2966:Anthony J. McGann (2002).
2548:
2447:
2372:
2363:first-preference plurality
2355:ranked choice-runoff (RCV)
1675:Index of politics articles
1396:Multiple districts paradox
1127:Fractional approval voting
1115:Interactive representation
29:
4009:
4001:Voting systems by country
3988:
3942:
3904:Mutual majority criterion
3859:Condorcet loser criterion
3846:
3813:
3805:Vote linkage mixed system
3760:
3725:
3717:Largest remainders method
3692:
3619:
3610:
3461:
3444:
3133:Social Choice and Welfare
3073:Consensus Decision Making
2875:"Condorcet meets Bentham"
2738:Mutual majority criterion
2582:Arguments for limitations
2568:In group decision-making
2301:majority-preferred winner
1343:Paradoxes and pathologies
1192:Mixed-member proportional
1187:Mixed-member majoritarian
1182:By results of combination
1073:Approval-based committees
3894:Majority loser criterion
3780:Additional member system
3738:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
3657:Single transferable vote
3582:Positional voting system
3518:Minimax Condorcet method
3476:Combined approval voting
3075:. Seeds for Change. 2005
2733:Majority loser criterion
2723:Condorcet's jury theorem
2530:This can be replaced by
1522:Condorcet's jury theorem
1323:Double simultaneous vote
1298:Rural–urban proportional
1293:Dual-member proportional
1255:
1244:
1211:Parallel (superposition)
1103:Fractional social choice
1090:Expanding approvals rule
919:
904:
889:
820:
809:
785:
582:Wars between democracies
562:Territorial peace theory
407:Democratic confederalism
3919:Resolvability criterion
3909:Participation criterion
3884:Later-no-harm criterion
3700:Highest averages method
3030:10.1023/A:1007137026336
3012:Vatter, Adrian (2000).
2769:Voting system criterion
2404:intensity of preference
2325:Robert's Rules of Order
2320:parliamentary procedure
2308:deliberative assemblies
2297:socially-optimal winner
2084:Political organisations
1847:International relations
1685:Politics by subdivision
1449:Tyranny of the majority
1226:Fusion (majority bonus)
1043:Quota-remainder methods
567:Tyranny of the majority
502:Political demonstration
412:Democratic peace theory
387:Deliberative referendum
3960:First-preference votes
3899:Monotonicity criterion
3869:Independence of clones
3572:Simple majoritarianism
3273:Black, Duncan (1958).
3046:. 2005. Archived from
2993:Cite journal requires
2748:Majoritarian democracy
2713:Appeal to the majority
2676:deliberative democracy
2534:, i.e. every person's
2493:free and fair election
2425:supermajoritarian rule
2346:
2284:political philosophers
1583:Mathematics portal
1489:Majority impossibility
1478:Impossibility theorems
1274:Negative vote transfer
1095:Method of equal shares
716:
392:Democratic backsliding
382:Criticism of democracy
3864:Consistency criterion
3785:Alternative vote plus
3550:Instant-runoff voting
3221:on September 10, 2008
3207:Ben Saunders (2008).
2674:Saunders argued that
2573:majority's decision.
2344:
2316:Mandatory referendums
2164:Political campaigning
1904:Public administration
1737:Collective leadership
1386:Best-is-worst paradox
1375:Pathological response
1110:Direct representation
763:Single-winner methods
715:
447:Electoral competition
427:Democratic transition
402:Democratic centralism
397:Democratic capitalism
3934:Seats-to-votes ratio
3705:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
2409:median voter theorem
2256:political philosophy
2225:social choice theory
2014:Separation of powers
1885:Political psychology
1860:Comparative politics
1838:political scientists
1825:Academic disciplines
1705:Political philosophy
1570:Economics portal
1517:Median voter theorem
736:Comparative politics
422:Democratic socialism
38:Majority Rule (band)
3914:Plurality criterion
3513:Kemeny–Young method
3329:Volk, Kyle (2014).
3150:Shepsle, Kenneth A.
2545:Agenda Manipulation
2473:one vote, one value
2419:Supermajority rules
2359:two-round plurality
2187:Politics portal
2036:Election commission
2007:Government branches
1890:Political sociology
1742:Confessional system
1680:Politics by country
1558:Politics portal
1269:Vote linkage system
1240:Seat linkage system
827:Ranked-choice (RCV)
648:Politics portal
442:Democracy promotion
417:Democratic republic
3955:Election threshold
3889:Majority criterion
3565:Supplementary vote
3302:(D.Phil. thesis).
2728:Majority criterion
2347:
2295:models, where the
2237:social choice rule
1870:Political analysis
1802:Semi-parliamentary
1454:Discursive dilemma
1413:Lesser evil voting
1288:Supermixed systems
991:Largest remainders
849:Round-robin voting
717:
587:Waves of democracy
547:Right to candidacy
517:Popular referendum
507:Political equality
377:Citizens' assembly
36:For the band, see
4026:
4025:
3924:Reversal symmetry
3833:Cumulative voting
3815:Semi-proportional
3790:Mixed single vote
3756:
3755:
3632:Mixed single vote
3540:Exhaustive ballot
3503:Copeland's method
3498:Condorcet methods
3438:Electoral systems
3304:Oxford University
3163:978-0-472-06986-6
2823:978-3-642-42955-2
2536:dominant strategy
2532:strategyproofness
2508:Positive response
2353:, which includes
2276:liberal democracy
2221:
2220:
2169:Political parties
2109:Electoral systems
1833:Political science
1807:Semi-presidential
1719:Political systems
1695:Political history
1690:Political economy
1617:
1616:
1504:Gibbard's theorem
1444:Dominance paradox
1381:Perverse response
1085:Phragmen's method
951:Majority judgment
879:Positional voting
837:Condorcet methods
705:electoral systems
682:
681:
537:Right to petition
16:(Redirected from
4051:
3965:Liquid democracy
3617:
3616:
3597:Two-round system
3508:Dodgson's method
3431:
3424:
3417:
3408:
3407:
3403:
3382:
3354:
3344:
3325:
3301:
3298:Theory of voting
3290:
3280:
3261:
3260:
3240:
3231:
3230:
3228:
3226:
3220:
3214:. Archived from
3213:
3204:
3195:
3194:
3174:
3168:
3167:
3142:
3136:
3125:
3119:
3118:
3090:
3084:
3083:
3081:
3080:
3065:
3059:
3058:
3056:
3055:
3040:
3034:
3033:
3009:
3003:
3002:
2996:
2991:
2989:
2981:
2979:
2978:
2972:
2963:
2944:
2943:
2919:
2910:
2909:
2879:
2870:
2864:
2863:
2857:
2853:
2851:
2843:
2807:
2801:
2794:
2764:Quadratic voting
2570:voting paradoxes
2564:Other properties
2557:Condorcet winner
2389:utilitarian rule
2379:Cardinal utility
2375:Utilitarian rule
2268:utilitarian rule
2213:
2206:
2199:
2185:
2184:
1975:
1920:
1875:Political theory
1865:Election science
1855:
1841:
1619:
1618:
1609:
1602:
1595:
1581:
1580:
1568:
1567:
1556:
1555:
1511:Positive results
1406:Strategic voting
1303:Majority jackpot
1260:
1249:
1120:Liquid democracy
996:National remnant
986:Highest averages
923:
908:
893:
825:
816:Alternative vote
814:
798:Partisan primary
790:
731:Mechanism design
684:
683:
674:
667:
660:
646:
645:
542:Right to protest
492:Nomination rules
47:
46:
21:
4059:
4058:
4054:
4053:
4052:
4050:
4049:
4048:
4029:
4028:
4027:
4022:
4005:
3984:
3938:
3929:Smith criterion
3842:
3809:
3770:Parallel voting
3752:
3748:Imperiali quota
3721:
3688:
3606:
3560:Contingent vote
3523:Nanson's method
3481:Unified primary
3471:Approval voting
3457:
3440:
3435:
3400:
3352:
3341:
3314:
3269:
3267:Further reading
3264:
3257:
3241:
3234:
3224:
3222:
3218:
3211:
3205:
3198:
3191:
3175:
3171:
3164:
3143:
3139:
3126:
3122:
3107:10.2307/1907651
3091:
3087:
3078:
3076:
3067:
3066:
3062:
3053:
3051:
3042:
3041:
3037:
3010:
3006:
2994:
2992:
2983:
2982:
2976:
2974:
2970:
2964:
2947:
2920:
2913:
2877:
2871:
2867:
2855:
2854:
2845:
2844:
2824:
2808:
2804:
2795:
2786:
2782:
2743:Majoritarianism
2718:Arrow's theorem
2709:
2672:
2670:Other arguments
2664:liberal paradox
2649:civil liberties
2642:minority rights
2638:
2636:Minority rights
2633:
2613:
2589:
2587:Minority rights
2584:
2579:
2566:
2553:
2547:
2452:
2446:
2441:
2421:
2385:
2373:Main articles:
2371:
2351:plurality rules
2339:
2337:Plurality rules
2334:
2303:often overlap.
2286:beginning with
2217:
2179:
2174:
2173:
2104:
2103:
2094:
2093:
2051:
2050:
2041:
2040:
2009:
2008:
1999:
1998:
1994:Public interest
1979:Domestic policy
1969:
1962:
1961:
1950:
1949:
1914:
1907:
1906:
1895:
1894:
1856:
1849:
1842:
1835:
1827:
1826:
1817:
1816:
1722:
1721:
1710:
1709:
1665:
1664:
1655:
1624:Politics series
1613:
1575:
1574:
1562:
1550:
1542:
1541:
1508:
1484:Arrow's theorem
1474:
1464:
1463:
1432:
1402:
1391:No-show paradox
1372:
1358:Cloning paradox
1348:Spoiler effects
1345:
1335:
1334:
1309:
1196:
1179:
1169:
1168:
1141:
1132:Maximal lottery
1099:
1080:Thiele's method
1069:
1039:
971:
961:
960:
946:Approval voting
934:Cardinal voting
930:
875:
869:Maximal lottery
833:
765:
755:
678:
640:
635:
634:
600:
592:
591:
472:Majoritarianism
432:Democratization
367:
359:
358:
93:
83:
52:Politics series
45:
42:majoritarianism
33:Majority Rules!
28:
23:
22:
18:Majority voting
15:
12:
11:
5:
4057:
4047:
4046:
4041:
4024:
4023:
4010:
4007:
4006:
4004:
4003:
3998:
3992:
3990:
3986:
3985:
3983:
3982:
3977:
3972:
3967:
3962:
3957:
3952:
3946:
3944:
3940:
3939:
3937:
3936:
3931:
3926:
3921:
3916:
3911:
3906:
3901:
3896:
3891:
3886:
3881:
3876:
3871:
3866:
3861:
3856:
3850:
3848:
3844:
3843:
3841:
3840:
3835:
3830:
3828:Limited voting
3825:
3819:
3817:
3811:
3810:
3808:
3807:
3802:
3797:
3792:
3787:
3782:
3777:
3772:
3766:
3764:
3758:
3757:
3754:
3753:
3751:
3750:
3745:
3740:
3735:
3729:
3727:
3723:
3722:
3720:
3719:
3714:
3713:
3712:
3707:
3696:
3694:
3690:
3689:
3687:
3686:
3681:
3676:
3675:
3674:
3669:
3664:
3654:
3649:
3644:
3639:
3634:
3629:
3623:
3621:
3614:
3608:
3607:
3605:
3604:
3599:
3594:
3589:
3584:
3579:
3574:
3569:
3568:
3567:
3562:
3557:
3555:Coombs' method
3547:
3542:
3537:
3536:
3535:
3533:Schulze method
3530:
3525:
3520:
3515:
3510:
3505:
3495:
3493:Bucklin voting
3490:
3485:
3484:
3483:
3478:
3467:
3465:
3459:
3458:
3445:
3442:
3441:
3434:
3433:
3426:
3419:
3411:
3405:
3404:
3398:
3383:
3345:
3339:
3326:
3312:
3291:
3268:
3265:
3263:
3262:
3255:
3232:
3196:
3189:
3169:
3162:
3137:
3120:
3101:(4): 680–684.
3085:
3060:
3035:
3024:(2): 171–192.
3004:
2995:|journal=
2945:
2934:(4): 339–375.
2911:
2865:
2856:|journal=
2822:
2802:
2783:
2781:
2778:
2777:
2776:
2771:
2766:
2761:
2756:
2750:
2745:
2740:
2735:
2730:
2725:
2720:
2715:
2708:
2705:
2671:
2668:
2637:
2634:
2632:
2629:
2612:
2609:
2588:
2585:
2583:
2580:
2578:
2575:
2565:
2562:
2549:Main article:
2546:
2543:
2542:
2541:
2540:
2539:
2512:
2504:
2496:
2476:
2448:Main article:
2445:
2442:
2440:
2437:
2420:
2417:
2413:center squeeze
2370:
2369:Cardinal rules
2367:
2338:
2335:
2333:
2330:
2251:) should win.
2219:
2218:
2216:
2215:
2208:
2201:
2193:
2190:
2189:
2176:
2175:
2172:
2171:
2166:
2161:
2156:
2151:
2150:
2149:
2133:
2128:
2123:
2122:
2121:
2111:
2105:
2101:
2100:
2099:
2096:
2095:
2092:
2091:
2086:
2081:
2076:
2071:
2058:
2052:
2049:Related topics
2048:
2047:
2046:
2043:
2042:
2039:
2038:
2033:
2028:
2023:
2017:
2016:
2010:
2006:
2005:
2004:
2001:
2000:
1997:
1996:
1991:
1986:
1984:Foreign policy
1981:
1976:
1963:
1957:
1956:
1955:
1952:
1951:
1948:
1947:
1946:
1945:
1931:
1926:
1921:
1908:
1902:
1901:
1900:
1897:
1896:
1893:
1892:
1887:
1882:
1880:Policy studies
1877:
1872:
1867:
1862:
1857:
1845:
1843:
1831:
1828:
1824:
1823:
1822:
1819:
1818:
1815:
1814:
1809:
1804:
1799:
1794:
1789:
1784:
1779:
1774:
1769:
1764:
1759:
1754:
1749:
1744:
1739:
1734:
1729:
1723:
1717:
1716:
1715:
1712:
1711:
1708:
1707:
1702:
1697:
1692:
1687:
1682:
1677:
1672:
1666:
1663:Primary topics
1662:
1661:
1660:
1657:
1656:
1654:
1653:
1648:
1643:
1637:
1634:
1633:
1627:
1626:
1615:
1614:
1612:
1611:
1604:
1597:
1589:
1586:
1585:
1573:
1572:
1560:
1547:
1544:
1543:
1540:
1539:
1534:
1529:
1524:
1519:
1507:
1506:
1501:
1496:
1491:
1486:
1475:
1470:
1469:
1466:
1465:
1462:
1461:
1456:
1451:
1446:
1431:
1430:
1428:Turkey-raising
1425:
1420:
1415:
1401:
1400:
1399:
1398:
1388:
1383:
1371:
1370:
1368:Center squeeze
1365:
1360:
1355:
1353:Spoiler effect
1346:
1341:
1340:
1337:
1336:
1333:
1332:
1327:
1326:
1325:
1312:By ballot type
1308:
1307:
1306:
1305:
1300:
1295:
1285:
1284:
1283:
1282:
1281:
1276:
1266:
1265:
1264:
1253:
1230:
1229:
1228:
1223:
1218:
1213:
1195:
1194:
1189:
1180:
1175:
1174:
1171:
1170:
1167:
1166:
1164:Limited voting
1161:
1160:
1159:
1140:
1139:
1134:
1129:
1124:
1123:
1122:
1117:
1098:
1097:
1092:
1087:
1082:
1068:
1067:
1062:
1057:
1052:
1038:
1037:
1036:
1035:
1033:Localized list
1030:
1025:
1020:
1015:
1005:
1004:
1003:
1001:Biproportional
998:
993:
988:
972:
967:
966:
963:
962:
959:
958:
953:
948:
943:
929:
928:
913:
898:
874:
873:
872:
871:
866:
861:
856:
846:
832:
831:
830:
829:
818:
805:Instant-runoff
802:
801:
800:
792:Jungle primary
779:
768:Single vote -
766:
761:
760:
757:
756:
754:
753:
743:
738:
733:
728:
722:
719:
718:
708:
707:
697:
696:
680:
679:
677:
676:
669:
662:
654:
651:
650:
637:
636:
633:
632:
627:
622:
617:
612:
607:
601:
598:
597:
594:
593:
590:
589:
584:
579:
577:War referendum
574:
569:
564:
559:
554:
549:
544:
539:
534:
529:
524:
519:
514:
509:
504:
499:
494:
489:
484:
479:
474:
469:
467:Libertarianism
464:
459:
454:
449:
444:
439:
434:
429:
424:
419:
414:
409:
404:
399:
394:
389:
384:
379:
374:
368:
366:Related topics
365:
364:
361:
360:
357:
356:
351:
346:
341:
336:
331:
326:
321:
316:
311:
306:
301:
300:
299:
294:
289:
284:
279:
269:
267:Representative
264:
259:
254:
249:
244:
239:
234:
229:
224:
219:
214:
209:
204:
195:
190:
185:
180:
175:
170:
165:
160:
155:
150:
145:
140:
135:
130:
125:
120:
115:
110:
105:
100:
94:
89:
88:
85:
84:
82:
81:
76:
71:
65:
62:
61:
55:
54:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4056:
4045:
4044:Voting theory
4042:
4040:
4037:
4036:
4034:
4021:
4020:
4015:
4014:
4008:
4002:
3999:
3997:
3994:
3993:
3991:
3987:
3981:
3978:
3976:
3973:
3971:
3968:
3966:
3963:
3961:
3958:
3956:
3953:
3951:
3948:
3947:
3945:
3941:
3935:
3932:
3930:
3927:
3925:
3922:
3920:
3917:
3915:
3912:
3910:
3907:
3905:
3902:
3900:
3897:
3895:
3892:
3890:
3887:
3885:
3882:
3880:
3877:
3875:
3872:
3870:
3867:
3865:
3862:
3860:
3857:
3855:
3852:
3851:
3849:
3845:
3839:
3836:
3834:
3831:
3829:
3826:
3824:
3821:
3820:
3818:
3816:
3812:
3806:
3803:
3801:
3798:
3796:
3793:
3791:
3788:
3786:
3783:
3781:
3778:
3776:
3773:
3771:
3768:
3767:
3765:
3763:
3759:
3749:
3746:
3744:
3741:
3739:
3736:
3734:
3731:
3730:
3728:
3724:
3718:
3715:
3711:
3708:
3706:
3703:
3702:
3701:
3698:
3697:
3695:
3691:
3685:
3682:
3680:
3677:
3673:
3670:
3668:
3665:
3663:
3660:
3659:
3658:
3655:
3653:
3650:
3648:
3645:
3643:
3640:
3638:
3635:
3633:
3630:
3628:
3625:
3624:
3622:
3618:
3615:
3613:
3609:
3603:
3600:
3598:
3595:
3593:
3590:
3588:
3585:
3583:
3580:
3578:
3575:
3573:
3570:
3566:
3563:
3561:
3558:
3556:
3553:
3552:
3551:
3548:
3546:
3543:
3541:
3538:
3534:
3531:
3529:
3526:
3524:
3521:
3519:
3516:
3514:
3511:
3509:
3506:
3504:
3501:
3500:
3499:
3496:
3494:
3491:
3489:
3486:
3482:
3479:
3477:
3474:
3473:
3472:
3469:
3468:
3466:
3464:
3463:Single-winner
3460:
3456:
3454:
3450:
3443:
3439:
3432:
3427:
3425:
3420:
3418:
3413:
3412:
3409:
3401:
3399:9781107054097
3395:
3391:
3390:
3384:
3380:
3376:
3372:
3368:
3365:(A): 96–109.
3364:
3360:
3359:
3351:
3346:
3342:
3340:9780199371914
3336:
3332:
3327:
3323:
3319:
3315:
3313:9780300011210
3309:
3305:
3300:
3299:
3292:
3288:
3284:
3279:
3278:
3271:
3270:
3258:
3252:
3248:
3247:
3239:
3237:
3217:
3210:
3203:
3201:
3192:
3190:9780521532662
3186:
3182:
3181:
3173:
3165:
3159:
3155:
3151:
3147:
3141:
3134:
3130:
3124:
3116:
3112:
3108:
3104:
3100:
3096:
3089:
3074:
3070:
3064:
3050:on 2008-04-29
3049:
3045:
3039:
3031:
3027:
3023:
3019:
3015:
3008:
3000:
2987:
2969:
2962:
2960:
2958:
2956:
2954:
2952:
2950:
2941:
2937:
2933:
2929:
2925:
2918:
2916:
2908:
2903:
2899:
2895:
2891:
2887:
2883:
2876:
2869:
2861:
2849:
2841:
2837:
2833:
2829:
2825:
2819:
2815:
2814:
2806:
2799:
2793:
2791:
2789:
2784:
2775:
2774:Voting system
2772:
2770:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2760:
2757:
2754:
2751:
2749:
2746:
2744:
2741:
2739:
2736:
2734:
2731:
2729:
2726:
2724:
2721:
2719:
2716:
2714:
2711:
2710:
2704:
2702:
2698:
2694:
2690:
2684:
2680:
2677:
2667:
2665:
2661:
2657:
2653:
2650:
2645:
2643:
2628:
2626:
2622:
2618:
2608:
2606:
2602:
2598:
2593:
2574:
2571:
2561:
2558:
2552:
2537:
2533:
2529:
2528:
2526:
2522:
2518:
2517:
2513:
2510:
2509:
2505:
2502:
2501:
2497:
2494:
2490:
2486:
2482:
2481:
2477:
2474:
2470:
2469:
2465:
2464:
2463:
2460:
2456:
2451:
2450:May's Theorem
2444:May's Theorem
2436:
2434:
2430:
2426:
2416:
2414:
2410:
2405:
2400:
2398:
2394:
2390:
2384:
2380:
2376:
2366:
2364:
2360:
2356:
2352:
2343:
2329:
2328:
2326:
2321:
2317:
2313:
2309:
2304:
2302:
2298:
2294:
2293:social choice
2289:
2285:
2281:
2277:
2273:
2269:
2265:
2261:
2260:majority rule
2257:
2252:
2250:
2246:
2242:
2238:
2234:
2230:
2229:majority rule
2226:
2214:
2209:
2207:
2202:
2200:
2195:
2194:
2192:
2191:
2188:
2183:
2178:
2177:
2170:
2167:
2165:
2162:
2160:
2157:
2155:
2152:
2147:
2143:
2139:
2138:
2137:
2134:
2132:
2129:
2127:
2124:
2120:
2117:
2116:
2115:
2112:
2110:
2107:
2106:
2098:
2097:
2090:
2087:
2085:
2082:
2080:
2077:
2075:
2072:
2070:
2066:
2062:
2059:
2057:
2054:
2053:
2045:
2044:
2037:
2034:
2032:
2029:
2027:
2024:
2022:
2019:
2018:
2015:
2012:
2011:
2003:
2002:
1995:
1992:
1990:
1989:Civil society
1987:
1985:
1982:
1980:
1977:
1973:
1968:
1967:Public policy
1965:
1964:
1960:
1954:
1953:
1943:
1939:
1935:
1934:
1932:
1930:
1927:
1925:
1922:
1918:
1913:
1910:
1909:
1905:
1899:
1898:
1891:
1888:
1886:
1883:
1881:
1878:
1876:
1873:
1871:
1868:
1866:
1863:
1861:
1858:
1853:
1848:
1844:
1839:
1834:
1830:
1829:
1821:
1820:
1813:
1810:
1808:
1805:
1803:
1800:
1798:
1795:
1793:
1790:
1788:
1787:Parliamentary
1785:
1783:
1780:
1778:
1775:
1773:
1772:Hybrid regime
1770:
1768:
1765:
1763:
1760:
1758:
1755:
1753:
1750:
1748:
1745:
1743:
1740:
1738:
1735:
1733:
1730:
1728:
1725:
1724:
1720:
1714:
1713:
1706:
1703:
1701:
1698:
1696:
1693:
1691:
1688:
1686:
1683:
1681:
1678:
1676:
1673:
1671:
1668:
1667:
1659:
1658:
1652:
1649:
1647:
1644:
1642:
1639:
1638:
1636:
1635:
1632:
1629:
1628:
1625:
1621:
1620:
1610:
1605:
1603:
1598:
1596:
1591:
1590:
1588:
1587:
1584:
1579:
1571:
1566:
1561:
1559:
1554:
1549:
1548:
1546:
1545:
1538:
1535:
1533:
1530:
1528:
1527:May's theorem
1525:
1523:
1520:
1518:
1515:
1514:
1513:
1512:
1505:
1502:
1500:
1497:
1495:
1492:
1490:
1487:
1485:
1482:
1481:
1480:
1479:
1473:
1468:
1467:
1460:
1457:
1455:
1452:
1450:
1447:
1445:
1442:
1441:
1440:
1439:
1438:
1437:majority rule
1435:Paradoxes of
1429:
1426:
1424:
1421:
1419:
1416:
1414:
1411:
1410:
1409:
1408:
1407:
1397:
1394:
1393:
1392:
1389:
1387:
1384:
1382:
1379:
1378:
1377:
1376:
1369:
1366:
1364:
1361:
1359:
1356:
1354:
1351:
1350:
1349:
1344:
1339:
1338:
1331:
1328:
1324:
1321:
1320:
1319:
1316:
1315:
1314:
1313:
1304:
1301:
1299:
1296:
1294:
1291:
1290:
1289:
1286:
1280:
1277:
1275:
1272:
1271:
1270:
1267:
1263:
1258:
1254:
1252:
1247:
1243:
1242:
1241:
1238:
1237:
1236:
1235:
1231:
1227:
1224:
1222:
1219:
1217:
1214:
1212:
1209:
1208:
1207:
1206:
1201:
1200:
1199:
1193:
1190:
1188:
1185:
1184:
1183:
1178:
1177:Mixed systems
1173:
1172:
1165:
1162:
1158:
1155:
1154:
1153:
1150:
1149:
1148:
1147:
1146:
1138:
1137:Random ballot
1135:
1133:
1130:
1128:
1125:
1121:
1118:
1116:
1113:
1112:
1111:
1108:
1107:
1106:
1105:
1104:
1096:
1093:
1091:
1088:
1086:
1083:
1081:
1078:
1077:
1076:
1075:
1074:
1066:
1063:
1061:
1058:
1056:
1053:
1051:
1048:
1047:
1046:
1045:
1044:
1034:
1031:
1029:
1026:
1024:
1021:
1019:
1016:
1014:
1011:
1010:
1009:
1006:
1002:
999:
997:
994:
992:
989:
987:
984:
983:
982:
981:Apportionment
979:
978:
977:
976:
970:
965:
964:
957:
954:
952:
949:
947:
944:
942:
939:
938:
937:
936:
935:
926:
922:
917:
916:Antiplurality
914:
911:
907:
902:
899:
896:
892:
887:
884:
883:
882:
881:
880:
870:
867:
865:
862:
860:
857:
855:
852:
851:
850:
847:
845:
844:Condorcet-IRV
842:
841:
840:
839:
838:
828:
823:
819:
817:
812:
808:
807:
806:
803:
799:
796:
795:
793:
788:
783:
780:
778:
775:
774:
773:
771:
764:
759:
758:
751:
747:
744:
742:
739:
737:
734:
732:
729:
727:
726:Social choice
724:
723:
721:
720:
714:
710:
709:
706:
702:
701:Social choice
699:
698:
694:
690:
686:
685:
675:
670:
668:
663:
661:
656:
655:
653:
652:
649:
644:
639:
638:
631:
628:
626:
623:
621:
618:
616:
613:
611:
608:
606:
603:
602:
596:
595:
588:
585:
583:
580:
578:
575:
573:
570:
568:
565:
563:
560:
558:
555:
553:
552:Right to vote
550:
548:
545:
543:
540:
538:
535:
533:
530:
528:
525:
523:
520:
518:
515:
513:
510:
508:
505:
503:
500:
498:
495:
493:
490:
488:
485:
483:
480:
478:
477:Majority rule
475:
473:
470:
468:
465:
463:
460:
458:
455:
453:
450:
448:
445:
443:
440:
438:
435:
433:
430:
428:
425:
423:
420:
418:
415:
413:
410:
408:
405:
403:
400:
398:
395:
393:
390:
388:
385:
383:
380:
378:
375:
373:
370:
369:
363:
362:
355:
352:
350:
347:
345:
344:Supermajority
342:
340:
337:
335:
332:
330:
327:
325:
322:
320:
317:
315:
312:
310:
307:
305:
302:
298:
295:
293:
290:
288:
285:
283:
280:
278:
275:
274:
273:
270:
268:
265:
263:
260:
258:
255:
253:
250:
248:
245:
243:
242:Participatory
240:
238:
235:
233:
230:
228:
225:
223:
220:
218:
215:
213:
210:
208:
205:
203:
199:
196:
194:
191:
189:
186:
184:
181:
179:
176:
174:
173:Hybrid regime
171:
169:
166:
164:
161:
159:
156:
154:
151:
149:
146:
144:
141:
139:
136:
134:
131:
129:
126:
124:
121:
119:
116:
114:
111:
109:
106:
104:
101:
99:
96:
95:
92:
87:
86:
80:
77:
75:
72:
70:
67:
66:
64:
63:
60:
57:
56:
53:
49:
48:
43:
39:
35:
34:
19:
4017:
4011:
3627:Mixed-member
3612:Proportional
3587:Score voting
3571:
3528:Ranked pairs
3447:Part of the
3446:
3388:
3362:
3356:
3330:
3297:
3276:
3245:
3225:September 8,
3223:. Retrieved
3216:the original
3179:
3172:
3153:
3146:Cox, Gary W.
3140:
3132:
3123:
3098:
3095:Econometrica
3094:
3088:
3077:. Retrieved
3072:
3063:
3052:. Retrieved
3048:the original
3038:
3021:
3017:
3007:
2986:cite journal
2975:. Retrieved
2931:
2927:
2905:
2885:
2881:
2868:
2812:
2805:
2798:"James Mill"
2685:
2681:
2673:
2658:
2654:
2646:
2639:
2614:
2605:equal rights
2601:majoritarian
2594:
2590:
2567:
2554:
2524:
2520:
2515:
2507:
2500:Decisiveness
2499:
2488:
2484:
2479:
2467:
2453:
2422:
2401:
2386:
2383:Rated voting
2348:
2332:Alternatives
2323:
2305:
2259:
2253:
2248:
2232:
2228:
2222:
1917:street-level
1792:Presidential
1752:Dictatorship
1622:Part of the
1510:
1509:
1476:
1436:
1434:
1433:
1418:Exaggeration
1404:
1403:
1374:
1373:
1347:
1311:
1310:
1279:Mixed ballot
1234:Compensatory
1232:
1205:compensatory
1202:
1197:
1181:
1143:
1142:
1101:
1100:
1071:
1070:
1041:
1040:
1028:List-free PR
973:
941:Score voting
932:
931:
877:
876:
864:Ranked pairs
835:
834:
767:
476:
349:Totalitarian
232:Non-partisan
212:Majoritarian
193:Jeffersonian
133:Deliberative
123:Cosmopolitan
118:Conservative
98:Anticipatory
50:Part of the
32:
3970:Spoilt vote
3733:Droop quota
3672:Schulze STV
3647:Rural–urban
3592:STAR voting
3488:Borda count
3127:Mark Fey, "
2693:Netherlands
2660:Amartya Sen
2611:Instability
2597:inalienable
2577:Limitations
2491:equally (a
2485:alternative
2455:Kenneth May
2397:preferences
2312:dichotomous
2056:Sovereignty
2021:Legislature
1924:Technocracy
1912:Bureaucracy
1777:Meritocracy
1757:Directorial
1318:Single vote
1221:Conditional
1216:Coexistence
1065:Quota Borda
1055:Schulze STV
1013:Closed list
956:STAR voting
901:Borda count
457:Kleroterion
339:Substantive
314:Semi-direct
4033:Categories
3989:Comparison
3743:Hare quota
3693:Allocation
3679:Spare vote
3667:Hare-Clark
3637:Party-list
3256:0472069497
3079:2006-01-17
3054:2008-06-09
2977:2008-06-09
2840:Q108664719
2780:References
2759:Ochlocracy
2623:note that
2516:Ordinality
2480:Neutrality
2439:Properties
2429:filibuster
2288:James Mill
2270:(or other
2245:candidates
2146:Governance
2136:Government
2131:Federalism
1732:City-state
1423:Truncation
1152:Cumulative
975:Party-list
750:By country
741:Comparison
620:Historical
532:Referendum
487:Ochlocracy
462:Liberalism
452:Initiative
329:Sociocracy
257:Procedural
227:Multiparty
188:Jacksonian
183:Industrial
163:Grassroots
148:Electronic
3980:Unseating
3975:Sortition
3577:Plurality
3453:Economics
2940:1945-7669
2907:function.
2902:0304-4068
2888:: 58–65.
2858:ignored (
2848:cite book
2832:2267-828X
2625:unanimity
2489:candidate
2468:Anonymity
2433:US Senate
2278:with the
2272:welfarist
2264:democracy
2126:Unitarism
2114:Elections
2102:Subseries
2031:Judiciary
2026:Executive
1929:Adhocracy
1812:Theocracy
1767:Feudalism
1747:Democracy
1330:Dual-vote
1023:Panachage
1018:Open list
1008:List type
886:Plurality
782:Two-round
770:plurality
693:Economics
557:Sortition
512:Polyarchy
372:Anarchism
354:Workplace
334:Sovereign
324:Socialist
304:Sectarian
282:Christian
272:Religious
247:Pluralist
202:Illiberal
178:Inclusive
153:Empowered
128:Defensive
113:Consensus
59:Democracy
3847:Criteria
3800:Scorporo
3449:politics
3379:55606246
3322:51803346
2836:Wikidata
2755:(NIBMAR)
2707:See also
2617:Buchanan
2525:how much
2299:and the
2249:majority
2154:Ideology
1972:doctrine
1933:Service
1797:Republic
1782:Monarchy
1762:Federacy
1651:Category
1631:Politics
1050:Hare STV
689:Politics
687:A joint
522:Populism
277:Buddhist
222:Monitory
143:Economic
108:Cellular
103:Athenian
4019:Project
3710:D'Hondt
3662:CPO-STV
3620:Systems
3115:1907651
2697:Austria
2691:in the
2621:Tullock
2459:ordinal
2235:) is a
2159:Culture
2069:Country
1727:Anarchy
1641:Outline
1060:CPO-STV
910:Baldwin
859:Schulze
854:Minimax
772:methods
287:Islamic
262:Radical
252:Popular
198:Liberal
79:Indices
69:History
4013:Portal
3950:Ballot
3726:Quotas
3455:series
3396:
3377:
3337:
3320:
3310:
3287:387017
3285:
3253:
3187:
3160:
3113:
2938:
2900:
2838:
2830:
2820:
2701:Sweden
2699:, and
2391:, and
2381:, and
2258:, the
2227:, the
2119:voting
2061:Polity
1959:Policy
1938:Public
1852:theory
925:Coombs
695:series
615:Europe
605:Africa
599:Region
572:Voting
482:Motion
319:Social
297:Mormon
292:Jewish
207:Liquid
168:Guided
158:Ethnic
138:Direct
74:Theory
3943:Other
3762:Mixed
3375:S2CID
3353:(PDF)
3219:(PDF)
3212:(PDF)
3111:JSTOR
2971:(PDF)
2878:(PDF)
2521:which
2361:, or
2241:bills
2142:forms
2065:State
1942:Civil
1646:Index
1262:'MMP'
1251:'AMS'
217:Media
91:Types
3451:and
3394:ISBN
3335:ISBN
3318:OCLC
3308:ISBN
3283:OCLC
3251:ISBN
3227:2013
3185:ISBN
3158:ISBN
2999:help
2936:ISSN
2898:ISSN
2860:help
2828:ISSN
2818:ISBN
2619:and
2387:The
2310:for
1203:Non-
1157:SNTV
746:List
703:and
691:and
610:Asia
309:Semi
237:Oral
3775:MMP
3367:doi
3131:",
3103:doi
3026:doi
2890:doi
2607:.
2487:or
2415:).
2254:In
2243:or
2223:In
921:el.
906:el.
895:IRV
891:el.
4035::
4016:—
3373:.
3363:40
3361:.
3355:.
3316:.
3306:.
3235:^
3199:^
3148:;
3109:.
3099:20
3097:.
3071:.
3022:38
3020:.
3016:.
2990::
2988:}}
2984:{{
2948:^
2930:.
2926:.
2914:^
2904:.
2896:.
2886:59
2884:.
2880:.
2852::
2850:}}
2846:{{
2834:.
2826:.
2816:.
2787:^
2695:,
2527:.
2495:).
2399:.
2377:,
2357:,
2233:MR
2144:/
2067:/
2063:/
1940:/
1257:NZ
1246:UK
822:US
811:UK
794:)
787:US
200:/
3430:e
3423:t
3416:v
3402:.
3381:.
3369::
3343:.
3324:.
3289:.
3259:.
3229:.
3193:.
3166:.
3117:.
3105::
3082:.
3057:.
3032:.
3028::
3001:)
2997:(
2980:.
2942:.
2932:7
2892::
2862:)
2842:.
2327:.
2231:(
2212:e
2205:t
2198:v
2148:)
2140:(
1974:)
1970:(
1944:)
1936:(
1919:)
1915:(
1854:)
1850:(
1840:)
1836:(
1608:e
1601:t
1594:v
1259::
1248::
927:)
918:(
912:)
903:(
897:)
888:(
824::
813::
789::
784:(
752:)
748:(
673:e
666:t
659:v
44:.
20:)
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